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Background. Prejudice and bias motivated behaviors remain salient in our modern world. In 
every society, all over the world prejudice and bias motivated aggression occur, to differing 
degrees. Contemporary scholarship on prejudice centers around integrated threat theory (e.g. 
Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and the dual process model (e.g. Duckitt, 2001). In integrated threat 
theory, both realistic and symbolic threats are considered potent predictors of prejudice, 
whereas in the dual process model, two ideological attitudes, right wing authoritarianism and 
social dominance orientation, are considered to be the main predictors of prejudice. Whilst the 
former theory focuses on the context, the latter theory focuses on the individual level, i.e 
attitudes. However, as right wing authoritarianism focuses on threats, and social dominance 
orientation on competition, both approaches can be considered to be complementary. In 
literature, it has been suggested that right wing authoritarianism is in fact the result of the 
evolution of human sociality (Kessler & Cohrs, 2008). In a similar vein, it has been argued that 
social dominance orientation has its roots in the evolution of human psychology. However, both 
of these links with evolutionary theory have not been the subject of thorough empirical research.  
Goals. In the current study, the evolutionary roots of contemporary prejudice and bias 
motivated aggression are investigated. The overall goal of the study is to investigate in what 
sense prejudice and bias motivated behaviors could have been functionally adaptive in our 
ancestral past. More precisely, it is argued that contemporary prejudice and bias motivated 
aggression are the result of the evolution of human sociality, which relies heavily on the 
detection of allied groups and hostile groups, a cognitive module referred to as coalitional 
exploitation (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). Subsequently, social dominance orientation and right 
wing authoritarianism are integrated in this evolutionary framework, as they (i) constitute the 
most salient predictors of prejudice and (ii) because theoretical links with evolutionary theory 
have been pointed out for both of these ideological attitudes.  
Main hypotheses. In order to empirically test this conjecture, two measurement scales have 
been developed. One scale probes genuine signaling of commitment to the in-group and the 
other probes deceptive signaling of commitment to the in-group. It is hypothesized that genuine 
signaling of commitment of the in-group has (i) a positive direct effect on right wing 
authoritarianism, consistent with the conjecture of Kessler & Cohrs (2008), and (ii) an indirect 
effect on bias motivated aggression, mediated by right wing authoritarianism and prejudice. 
Second, it is hypothesized that deceptive signaling of pro-sociality has (i) a positive and direct 
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effect on social dominance orientation and (ii) an indirect effect on prejudice, mediated by 
social dominance orientation and prejudice. 
Methods. Data have been gathered with two large student samples in Belgium (n = 1300) and 
Spain (n = 1360). Data were gathered using an online questionnaire, implemented through 
Limesurvey. Structural equation models have been constructed for both samples using Amos, 
in order to test the direct paths and total indirect effects of the exogenous variables on the 
endogenous variables. In order to test specific mediation paths, a regression based approach as 
proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2008) has been used.  
Results. The results of the study corroborate the hypotheses set out in this study. Genuine 
signaling of sociality had a positive and direct effect on RWA, and a significant specific 
mediated effect on bias motivated behaviors, mediated by RWA and prejudice. Deceptive 
signaling of sociality had a positive and direct effect on SDO, and a significant specific indirect 
effect on bias motivated behaviors, mediated by SDO and prejudice. Furthermore, no 
differences in the direction of the results could be found between sexes and countries, a finding 
that bolsters the evolutionary nature of mechanism under investigation.  
Conclusion. This is the first study to empirically investigate the evolutionary roots of RWA, 
SDO, prejudice and bias motivated behaviors, and one of the few studies connecting the 
ideological attitudes right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation to bias 
motivated behaviors. The finding that prejudice and bias motivated behaviors may have pro-
social roots can change the way we look at these modes of behaviors, and the ways in which 
we deal with them in society. It is proposed that punitive responses may not always be warranted 
and even result in an adversary effect. Rather, it is proposed that restoratively inspired 
approaches and holistic prevention strategies are to be preferred over punitive responses to 






Achtergrond. Vooroordeel en de gedragingen die er uit volgen blijven hardnekkig bestaan in 
de huidige wereld. In elke samenleving, waar ook ter wereld kunnen vooroordeel en de 
gedragingen die er uit voorvloeien, vastgesteld worden. Hedendaags onderzoek naar 
vooroordeel focust zich vooral op integrated threat theory (e.g. Stephan & Stephan, 2000) en 
het dual process model (e.g. Duckitt, 2001). In integrated threat theory worden zowel 
realistische als symbolische dreigingen beschouwd als sterke predictoren voor vooroordeel. In 
het dual process model worden twee ideologische attitudes, rechts extremisme en sociale 
dominantie, gezien as de sterkste voorspellers van vooroordeel. Daar waar de eerste theorie zich 
focust op de context waarbinnen gedrag tot stand komt, focust de tweede theorie zich op he 
individuele niveau, i.e. attitudes. Aangezien beide theorieën als kernelementen dreiging en 
competitie naar voor schuiven, kunnen ze echter als complementair worden beschouwd. In de 
literatuur wordt verder gesuggereerd dat rechts autoritarisme een gevolg is van de evolutie van 
menselijk sociaal gedrag (Kessler & Cohrs, 2008), en, op gelijkaardige manier, wordt het 
evenzeer gesuggereerd dat sociale dominantie zijn wortels heeft in evolutionaire psychologie. 
Deze connecties met evolutieleer zijn echter in hoofdzaak theoretisch; ze zijn nog niet 
onderworpen aan systematisch empirisch onderzoek.  
Doel. Het doel van voorliggende studie is de evolutionaire grondslag van hedendaags 
vooroordeel en de gedragingen die daar uit volgen, empirisch te onderzoeken. In dit opzicht 
wordt onderzocht welke functioneel adaptieve rol voor dergelijke gedragingen kon weggelegd 
zijn in ons evolutionaire verleden. In voorliggende studie wordt beargumenteerd dat 
vooroordeel en de daaruit volgende gedragingen een gevolg zijn van de evolutie naar socialiteit, 
waar het detecteren van vijandige en/of geallieerde groepen van uitermate groot belang is. Dit 
laatste wordt verzorgd door een specifieke cognitieve module, coalitionele uitbuiting (Kurzban 
& Leary, 2001). Verder worden rechts autoritarisme en sociale dominantie in dit theoretisch 
kader geïntegreerd, aangezien ze (i) de meest saliente predictoren voor vooroordeel zijn en (ii) 
er in de literatuur reeds theoretische verbanden tussen deze ideologische attitudes en 
evolutieleer werden gesuggereerd.  
Kernhypothesen. Om dit doel te bereiken, werden twee meetschalen ontwikkeld, waarvan een 
peilt naar de geneigdheid van mensen om op een oprechte manier hun betrokkenheid op de in-
groep te uiten, en de andere naar de geneigdheid van mensen om op bedrieglijke wijze hun 
betrokkenheid op de in-groep te uiten. De eerste hypothese stelt dat het oprecht uiten van 
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betrokkenheid op de in-groep (i) een positief en direct effect heeft op rechts autoritarisme en 
(ii) een significant en positief indirect effect heeft op bevooroordeelde gedragingen, gemedieerd 
door rechts autoritarisme en vooroordeel. De tweede hoofdhypothese stelt dat het bedrieglijk 
uiten van betrokkenheid op de in-groep (i) een direct en positief effect heeft op sociale 
dominantie en (ii) een significant positief indirect effect heeft op bevooroordeelde gedragingen, 
gemedieerd door sociale dominantie en vooroordeel.  
Methoden. Data werden verzameld bij twee grote steekproeven bestaande uit studenten, 
waarvan een steekproef in België werd genomen (n= 1300) en een in Spanje (n = 1360). Data 
werden verzameld door middel van een online survey die werd geïmplementeerd via 
Limesurvey. Structurele equatie modellen werden opgesteld om de directe effecten en de totale 
indirecte effecten van de exogene variabelen op de afhankelijke variabele in te schatten. Om de 
significantie van specifieke gemedieerde paden te onderzoeken, werd gebruik gemaakt van de 
op regressie gebaseerde procedure voorgesteld door Preacher en Hayes (2008).  
Resultaten. De resultaten bevestigen de theoretische verwachtingen. Oprecht uiten van 
betrokkenheid op de in-groep had een positief en rechtstreeks effect op rechts autoritarisme, en 
een significant specifiek indirect effect op bevooroordeelde gedragingen, gemedieerd door 
rechts autoritarisme en vooroordeel. Bedrieglijk uiten van betrokkenheid op de in-groep had 
een positief en direct effect op sociale dominantie, en een significant specifiek indirect effect 
op bevooroordeeld gedrag, gemedieerd door sociale dominantie en vooroordeel. Daarenboven 
kon er geen verschil in de richting van de resultaten vastgesteld worden voor mannen en 
vrouwen, of tussen de twee betrokken landen, wat de evolutionaire oorsprong van het 
mechanisme dat werd onderzocht, ondersteunt.  
Conclusie. Dit is de eerste studie die de evolutionaire grondslag van RWA, SDO, vooroordeel 
en bevooroordeelde gedragingen empirisch onderzocht, en een van de weinige studies waar de 
attitudes sociale dominantie en rechts autoritarisme worden verbonden met bevooroordeelde 
gedragingen. De bevindingen hebben interessante gevolgen voor de praktijk en de manier 
waarop we met vooroordeel omgaan. Zo wordt voorgesteld dat een punitief antwoord niet altijd 
de beste optie is, en vaak zelfs in een tegengesteld effect kan resulteren. Een herstelrechtelijke 
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Among the many evils that have always been present in the evolution of mankind, prejudice 
and intergroup hostility are two of the most visible and notable ones. Not only have they fueled 
the great variety of wars waged throughout our turbulent history, have they given shape to what 
our society has looked like architecturally (e.g. the grand walls and gates that surround historical 
cities), fueled veritable genocides and massacres, served as the foundation of many ferocious 
ideologies of various natures (humanitarian and genocidal alike), they still persist in our 
contemporary societies, from east to west, north to south, and on all levels of society, from 
politics to soccer. And this in spite of the vast body of laws and socio-legal initiatives that have 
been brought into existence to combat this very phenomenon. This all the more striking, as we 
all remember the atrocities committed on the basis of prejudiced doctrines, such as the atrocities 
committed by the Nazi’s, the horrible massacre of Hutu’s on Tutsi’s, the Armenian Genocide, 
to mention but a few. Even worse, we are witnessing a veritable resurgence of prejudice and 
bias motivated behaviors in the 21st century, accompanied by an increasing tolerance for 
xenophobic speech and ideology on a political level. Even though this very brief survey can 
only be regarded as the very small tip of the iceberg, it does immediately raise the question: 
how can this be? How can it be that we witness and denounce such atrocities, whilst they 
reoccur periodically in one place or the other? How can it be that mainstream ideology is more 
tolerant, yet right-wing political movements gain support and xenophobic everyday speech is 
becoming more and more commonplace? How can it be that the problem of prejudice persists, 
despite the massive campaigns that have been designed to combat it, both legally and extra-
legally, that have been brought to life in the last century? How can it be, that someone who is 
generally considered to be altruistic and caring, ostensibly goes rogue and aggresses someone 
from a different group, without any apparent reason? This is the type of questions that inspired 
me to initiate the current study, in the course of which I will lift a humble tip of the veil to the 
answer these questions.   
So is it a lack of research that might account for this problem? This is dubious, for a wide 
plethora of research exists with regard to prejudice, especially since World War II. In fact, up 
until the early 20th century, mainly psychological research conducted with regard to race did 
not investigate prejudice as such, but was conducted to justify prejudice as a normal response 
to inferior races (see Rooster, 1930 for an overview). From about the 1950’s onwards, this 
approach clearly began to fade, in part inspired by the atrocities committed by the Nazi’s. 
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Theodor Adorno and his colleagues published their seminal work, The Authoritarian 
Personality (Adorno et. al., 1950), in which they attributed prejudice to a specific personality 
type, focused on strict rules and their enforcement. This idea is still present in contemporary 
thinking, be it in a more nuanced form, i.e. Right Wing Authoritarianism. This will be a central 
element in the current research, and elaborated in depth at a later stage.  
Another notable historical approach is the seminal work of Gordon Allport, who saw prejudice 
as an instance of categorical thinking, the latter being one of the basic ways in which people 
process the magnitude of information they are confronted with on a daily basis (Allport, 1979). 
At about the same time, Sherif and Sherif conducted their infamous Robber’s Cave Experiment, 
showing the arbitrary nature of prejudice, which showed clearly that the mechanism underlying 
prejudice is triggered even when people are arbitrarily divided into two (or more) groups that 
were brought in competition or conflict with one another in one way or the other (e.g. Sherif, 
1988). This approach differs fundamentally from the Adorno approach, insofar as prejudice is 
seen as part of our basic psychological wiring, and not some distortion therein or a specific 
personality. The current research is to be situated in this approach, too.  
Current research approaches to prejudice in social psychology are based on these “historical” 
approaches – which are therefore not “wrong”; they merely got elaborated. One prominent 
research tradition is research on right wing authoritarianism (e.g. Altemeyer, 1981, 1988), 
based on the authoritarian personality, with the one difference that the former is regarded as an 
ideological orientation rather than a personality (trait). Of a more recent date is social 
dominance orientation (e.g. Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), which centers around an individual’s  
preference for a hierarchically organized social world. Both modeled together in a single model 
are referred to as the dual process model (Duckitt, 2001). Next to this approach, integrated 
threat theory (e.g. Stephan & Stephan, 2000) is another main player in the explanation of 
prejudice. In this theory, realistic threats, symbolic threats as well as some more specific types 
of threat such as status threat, identity threat, and negative stereotypes, are deemed to influence 
prejudice.  
It is surprising to see that within Criminology, not a lot of attention has been awarded to the 
study of prejudice until recently – especially compared to the domain of social psychology – 
but advances are being made. Whilst the focus of criminology used to be on race as a 
predisposing factor to crime as a result of, primarily, structural inequalities (e.g. Gabbidon & 
Greene, 2005), attention of researchers is shifting to the general phenomenon of prejudice (e.g. 
16 
 
Perry, 2001) and more precise domains, such as political violence and extremist violence (e.g. 
Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Horgan, 2009). There, often the "usual suspects” of general 
criminological theories are found (for example, self-control, social bonds, and exposure), but 
from time to time, albeit not enough in my opinion, also elements from other domains, such as 
authoritarianism.1  
This way-to-brief overview clearly indicates that there certainly is no lack of research dealing 
with prejudice and bias motivated aggression. Then why, in spite of all existing programs and 
initiatives designed to deal with prejudice, does the problem persist? One possible reason is a 
lack of communication between science and policy. For, prejudice has received a lot of 
scientific attention in the last decades, especially in social psychology. Even though the output 
of these studies is utterly relevant and has clear implications for practice, it may be that they 
are not picked up sufficiently by policy makers, or, conversely, that researchers do not 
sufficiently report on the policy and practice implications of their studies. A second possible 
reason can be the fact that prejudice is not yet understood sufficiently in order to successfully 
deal with it. Notwithstanding great advances in the study of prejudice, it may be possible that 
some important elements are missing, or that additional sources of prejudice may be present 
that shed another light on the ways it is best dealt with. That is, one cannot possibly say if the 
mechanisms leading to prejudice are understood sufficiently well in order to successfully 
combat it.  
In very general terms, this study tries to contribute to the existing body of literature on prejudice 
by addressing the issues above. The main aim of the study is to contribute to our understanding 
of prejudice by expanding current theorization on the topic, as this is the basis of any suggestion 
as to policy changes or suggestions for dealing with prejudice, which will be presented in a 
discussion chapter of the study. This way, the study is not so much occupied with an empirical 
problem (it is clear enough prejudice exists), but rather with a conceptual or theoretical 
problem2. For this reason, the initial problem formulation will be phrased in terms of theory 
rather than in terms of facts. However, in order to do so properly, it needs, of course, to be clear 
what is to be understood as a theory in this context, how theories operate, what they do, and 
how they change. If this is not clear, it will prove to be impossible to give clear description of 
                                                 
1 That is to say, authoritarianism is used in criminological research, but not to explain prejudice or hate crime. 
Rather, it is invoked to explain violent extremism (e.g. De Waele & Pauwels, 2014) and vigilantism (e.g. 
Van Damme & Pauwels, 2012). 
2 See Laudan (1977) for more information on the difference between both.  
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the problem or the goals of the study. For this reason, the first chapter will introduce the reader 
to the philosophy of science that underlies the study at hand, thus elucidating the problem 
formulation, goals of the study, and their relevance in a clear and transparent way. By doing so, 
I hope to provide the reader with a clear insight in the assumptions of the study at hand, which 
should equally facilitate debate and the critical evaluation of the claims made in the study.  
This part of the study is important in my opinion, as the meta-theoretical assumptions on which 
research is founded are not often made explicit in the realm of the social sciences, with the 
exception of constructivist scientists who usually open up their scientific discourse with a 
positioning in the field of constructivism, and a discussion on how this approach differs meta-
theoretically from those approaches founded on the natural scientific approach. The reasons 
why the philosophical rooting of research is largely absent in the social sciences, are probably 
manifold (inter alia a lack of education thereon in regular social scientific curricula), but I 
sincerely think this is problematic. For, a clear comprehension of the meta-theoretical 
assumptions, probably even more than theory, can provide a very clear idea of how to pursue 
the goals set out by a researcher, not in the least by providing clear indications of the nature of 
the object one wishes to investigate, which can be, inter alia, a social regularity, a social 
construction, a singular instance, or a combination thereof. Every such object is of a different 
kind, and requires a different logical approach. Lack thereof, can result in an unclear set of 
inferences made by the researcher, some of which inductive, some of which deductive, some 
of which unidentifiable. Obscurity in this matter, however, makes it difficult to give a proper 
interpretation to research findings.  
For this reason, I have always borne in mind a secondary goal when conducting this study: the 
application of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science on a social scientific research. I have chosen 
Popper’s work, because I am convinced that he has been one of the most enlightened 
philosophers of science that have ever walked the face of the planet, yet is oftentimes poorly 
understood or even blatantly not understood at all. Even though his work applied foremost to 
the natural sciences, I myself was amazed at the (logical) simplicity of the argument presented 
in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper, 2002 [1959], and really saw no reason why this 
way of reasoning about science could or should not be applied to the social sciences. Therefore, 
I will try to explicitly make reference to his “way of doing science” throughout the text, 
wherever appropriate. This does not mean that I have found a watertight, failsafe system of 
falsification in the social sciences – Popper himself would and often has also reject(ed) such a 
naïve notion of falsification, yet this is the notion usually ascribed to him in social scientific 
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circles – but rather an attitude; the attitude to challenge, to formulate unexpected, bold 
hypotheses, as opposed to the attitude to confirm, over and over again, ad infinitum.3 To bolster 
the utility of Popper’s work in the social sciences, I have stuck to the oeuvre of Karl Popper 
only, and will only consider more contemporary interpretations, discussions, or elaborations 
thereof such as analytical sociology, in the sideline. What Popper said, suffices to be useful in 
the social sciences in my opinion. As said, this is a secondary goal that stems from my own 
appreciation of Popper’s work, but I hope you can appreciate the import of his philosophy of 
science on this study.  
In the second chapter, the theoretical backbone of the study will be discussed at length. The 
general theoretical framework chosen to conduct this study is evolutionary theory. This 
approach is foremost inspired by the fact that (i) prejudice and bias motivated aggression are of 
all times, (ii) of all places, and (iii) do not respond easily to judicial interventions or other 
initiatives designed to combat them. From the vantage point of evolution, this gives rather 
strong indications that, at least at some point in human evolution, this kind of behavior was 
adaptive, i.e. functional to our survival as a species. Otherwise it would neither have existed on 
such a large scale, nor would it be so predominantly present. Especially if it were to be 
dysfunctional, it ought to have been selected out a long time ago.  
Apart from these theoretical reasons, it seems to me that criminology has difficulties embracing 
evolutionary theory or sociobiological approaches altogether in explanatory models of crime. 
It seems the dominant sociological model is still omnipresent in criminology, and 
sociobiological approaches are looked at skeptically as they tend to challenge this dominant 
model (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Walsh & Beaver, 2009a)4. Therefore, I hope this 
introduction to evolutionary theory as a heuristic tool in the social sciences grasps the attention 
of the reader in terms of applicability in their own research domains. In this chapter, a brief 
introduction to the principles of evolutionary theory will be given, followed by an overview of 
theorizing on the evolution of human sociality. At the end of this chapter, the general aim of 
this research will be concretized into a general research question: “can contemporary prejudice 
and bias motivated aggression be regarded as a specific instance of human sociality?”. Given 
the contra-intuitive nature of this question, it can be regarded as exactly the kind of “bold” 
research question social scientists should try to come up with in the Popperian approach, at least 
                                                 
3 Even though such attitude would be more practical, and probably more fruitful career-wise, in these 
publication-obsessed times.  
4 Even though not nearly as fundamentally as many allege it to. 
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in my opinion. It also indicates that evolutionary theory can indeed be a good source of 
inspiration to deduce unexpected, contra-intuitive research questions (and let’s be fair, these are 
the fun ones to investigate), which makes it the perfect accomplice of a Popperian approach to 
social science. 
In the third chapter, an overview of current social psychological theorizing on prejudice and 
bias motivated aggression will be presented. The focus there is on social psychological theories, 
as they have the most longstanding research tradition in the study of prejudice. However, in the 
sideline I will make reference to some classical criminological theories as well, to indicate 
briefly the extent to which they are compatible with the evolutionary framework that is 
developed in this study.  
The fourth chapter is the place where the transition is made to a testable model. In this chapter, 
the selection of the variables to be used in the study will be motivated. By making reference to 
philosophy of science, the main hypotheses of the study will be deduced, and their rationale 
explicated, in order to ensure that no steps in the reasoning in this study are left unclear to the 
reader. This way, a critical and profound debate can be held with regards to the study and its 
results.  
The methodology will be presented in chapter five. There, the choice for the respondent groups 
and possible weaknesses thereof will be discussed. All methodological choices will be 
motivated from a philosophical point of view, and the way in which falsification will be put to 
practice outlined. In short, the design is quantitative, using structural equation modeling.  
The results are presented in chapter six. Two studies have been conducted, one in Spain and 
one in Belgium. The theoretical model as well as additional hypotheses that serve as additional 
critical tests for the theoretical model as such, will be tested there. In order to challenge the 
theory even further, a group comparison based on sex is conducted in both countries, as well as 
a group comparison based on country. In all tests, the theoretical model developed holds, i.e. 
the main hypotheses could not be falsified.  
In the general discussion, presented in chapter 7, the potential threats or weaknesses of the 
study are discussed. Second, the theory is logically evaluated using the criteria degree of 
universality, degree of precision, and simplicity, as envisioned in Popper’s Logic of Scientific 
Discovery (2002 [1959]). These prove to be useful tools, and the theory is able to achieve a 
higher degree of universality as well as a higher degree of precision. In that respect, it can be 
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considered to be a fruitful theory, notwithstanding its relatively low degree of corroboration. 
Third, the theory is linked to other research areas in which it may apply. In this context, it is 
linked to the study of violent extremism, victimology, restorative justice, the enforcement of 
legislation designed to combat discrimination and crime prevention. The theory can make 
fruitful contributions to any of those fields. This discussion is followed by a general conclusion, 




Chapter I. Scientific philosophical background and problem 
formulation 
In this chapter, some considerations from the point of view of philosophy of science will be 
presented. They constitute the general background of the study, and have specific implications 
for some of the choices made in the remainder of the study. Furthermore, the problem 
formulation of this study is of a conceptual/theoretical nature, and the meta-theoretic 
assumptions that underlie the study have an important bearing on the concrete specification of 
the problem. Therefore, it seems but a good practice making these assumptions crisp clear to 
the reader. In two words, the philosophical view underlying the study is  critical rationalism as 
initially developed by Karl Popper.  
1. Ontology and epistemology: the nature of reality and our knowledge 
The main ontological view or assumptions regarding the nature of reality underlying this study 
is realism. In line with Popper’s own three world ontology, this realism extends to three 
different kinds of entities, or “worlds” in Popper’s own terminology (Popper, 1978b). First, 
there is the world of all physical objects, processes and events. Second, there is the world of all 
mental events, processes and dispositions. Third, there is the world of the products of the human 
mind, such as ideals, scientific studies, and various types of art. This is not the place for an in 
depth discussion on this specific ontology of Popper’s, but it is important to note that it 
explicitly acknowledges the presence of a physical world without denying the existence of 
emergent properties such as mental representations, culture, logic and art, which are considered 
to be no less real than the objects of the physical world. They are considered to be emergent 
because they cannot simply emerge out of physical objects or be selected for by natural 
selection.5 
As Agnew (2011) discusses in his Toward A Unified Criminology, one of the main breaking 
points between mainstream criminology and critical criminology is their respective view on 
reality. Whereas mainstream criminology assumes an objective reality that can be accurately 
measured, critical criminologists tend to reject this view, and replace it with one existing out of 
multiple realities. The ontology adopted in this study in principle takes up a mid-position in this 
debate: there is an objective reality but it is difficult to accurately measure it, if possible at all. 
                                                 
5 What can be selected for by natural selection, is the potential to create culture. How this is given concrete 
shape is, however not a matter of natural selection. Furthermore, they are not “inheritable” in the sense of 
natural selection, and need to be learned by each newly born individual.  
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The reason is simple: people are themselves part of that reality, and so are their predispositions 
that have evolved over time. These predispositions inevitably obscure observations of reality, 
and they do not allow for an accurate – in the sense of objective – measurement thereof. This, 
however, brings me to the subject of epistemology.  
1.1. Epistemology – the nature of truth 
Popper’s epistemology is a fundamental breach with the up to then popular view of the Vienna 
Circle, generally referred to as empiricism. Popper referred to this as the “bucket theory of 
mind”(for the most clear discussion on the subject, see Popper, 1979, pp. 341-361), referring to 
the mind as an empty bucket, which is filled with ideas and knowledge by neutral observation. 
This is, according to Popper, a false belief. According to him, all observation is driven by 
expectations; neutral observation does not exist. This implies it is quite impossible to uncover 
an objective, fundamental truth; the question is not if such a truth exists, but rather if we are 
capable of uncovering it with our flawed and selective perceptual apparatus. If our observations 
are flawed – by expectations, predispositions, physical limitations of our senses, etcetera – then 
our truth can never be absolute, and it follows that no theory as such can be regarded as being 
the one ultimately “true” theory6 (Popper, 1979, pp. 32-106; Popper & Bartley, 1993, esp. sect. 
9-13).  
Opposed to this idea, Popper proposed that truth can only be approximated, and that one theory 
may be a better approximation to the truth than another one. The classic example given by 
Popper is the succession in time of the theories of Galileo, Kepler, Newton, and Einstein. None 
of these theories are considered to be “the true” one, but neither is either one of them “false”: 
in their own time and place, they did perform the function they were intended to perform – that 
is, they could resolve the problems they were designed to resolve. Thus, truth is never absolute 
(Popper, 1979, pp. 32-103). One inevitably flawed theory can only be replaced by a theory that 
is flawed to a lesser degree. But how does one evaluate the degree to which a theory is flawed 
if our senses are flawed themselves? The answer given by Popper, and various other 
philosophers of science, is that the extent to which a theory is flawed can only be evaluated in 
light of the problems one theory can resolve in comparison to its competitors. As Popper would 
say, “all life is problem solving” (Popper, 1999), but so is all science. It is simply a more 
organized or methodologically founded mode of problem solving, taking into account the flaws 
                                                 
6 A good exercise, explained by Popper, is to ask someone the following simple question: “observe”. Usually, 
the answer you will get is “observe what?”.  
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of human perception and reasoning (Popper, 1979, esp. sect. 3 and 4). This way, it can be argued 
that the view on science this study adopts is a pragmatic view, insofar as it is occupied with 
solving problems, be it intellectual ones or practical ones.7  
Thus, compared to the classical two “camps” in criminology, I will take up a mid-position in 
the current study. Whilst I do  not accept the empiricism of many classical schools of 
criminology, neither do I accept the (hyper)relativism and subjectivism present in other, mainly 
constructivist and critical, traditions. Thus, whilst I do recognize some kind of social reality 
(and regularities – see infra), I also recognize the existence of emergent subjective thought 
contents that are rooted in more general dispositions8, similar to the three world ontology of 
Popper’s.  
1.2. Deduction and the problem of induction  
The study at hands aims at being explicitly deductive or theory driven. The reason for this is an 
old problem that has been identified a very long time ago, especially with respect to the natural 
sciences, i.e. the problem of induction.9  
The starting point of Popper’s critique on the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle was the 
problem of induction, or, as he often called it, “Hume’s problem”. In this context, Hume 
discerned two different types of problem, viz. the psychological and the logical problem of 
induction (Popper, 1979, pp. 1-32; 2002, pp. 78-87). The psychological problem of induction 
identified by Hume and discarded as a myth by Popper, refers to the fact that we tend to see 
regularities in events that periodically repeat themselves, whilst the logical problem of 
induction refers to the practice of inferring universal statements from a set of singular 
statements or, to put it differently, to posit regularities or laws (it really does not matter how 
you call it) on the basis of individual observations, how numerous they may be. This problem 
clearly is of more relevance to science, as it was the basis of the empiricist philosophy of science 
which Popper opposed. The emblematic example of Popper’s critique is the regularity “all 
                                                 
7 Which should in no sense be confused with the “pragmatism” associated with logical positivism, where 
science merely is an instrument to predict future events on the basis of present observations, i.e. induction. 
The sense in which I use “pragmatic” refers to what is to be regarded in the sense of a demarcation of what 
makes truths significant, or worth pursuing.   
8 More on this particular point will follow in the chapter on evolutionary theory.  
9 Even though Popper was foremost concerned with the physical sciences and not so much with the social 
sciences (Popper, 2002 [1959]), there are some instances in which Poppers makes reference to the logic of 
the social sciences – be it that this remains an unfinished project. In the current author’s opinion, however, 
these few ideas can be tied to the original formulation of the problem of induction. 
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swans are white”, which is formulated on the basis of numerous observations of white swans. 
In order to maintain this claim, one would in principle need to look for all white swans in the 
entire world, otherwise one can never be sure of this universal statement. This is the infinite 
regress that accompanies induction: there really is no end to the process of verification, it can 
go on forever. In sharp contrast to this, however, the identification of one single black swan 
suffices to reject the universal statement.  
Let us rephrase this problem in formal logical terms, in a slightly different format. What 
empiricist science does, relates to the mode of inference referred to as modus ponens: 
P1   Everyone who passes their PhD-defense, is 
happy 
P2  I am happy 
C  I passed my PhD defense 
Table 1: modus ponens fallacy 
In the table, P refers to premise, C to conclusion, with P1 being a universal statement and P2 
and C being singular statements. Basically what happens is a logical fallacy called the 
affirmation of the consequent. As a general rule, any inference is only valid when the conclusion 
can never be false, if both premises are true. In the example above, the conclusion can be false 
when the premises are true. What it basically says is that because I am happy, it must be so that 
I past my PhD defense. That is, passing my PhD defense is a necessary condition for me to be 
happy. Now while it is undoubtedly true that I will be happy if I pass my PhD defense (and let 
us hope I do), there are several other reasons why I can be happy as well. So passing my PhD 
defense is a sufficient, but non-necessary condition for me to be happy. For example, I haven’t 
finished my PhD yet, but I won the lottery. This also would make me happy, whilst it does not 
deny the truth of the premises in the example. It does, however, render the conclusion false. 
The only valid inference that can be produced from the inference above is the following: 
In falsification, this logical fallacy is acknowledged, and remedied by turning to the modus 
tollens, or the inferential scheme denying the consequent: 
P1  Everyone who passes their PhD-defense, is 
happy 
P2  I am not happy 
C  I did not pass my PhD defense 
Table 2: modus tollens or denial of the consequent 
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Here, the conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true. If we, again, regard passing the 
PhD-defense as a sufficient cause for me to be happy, the fact that I did not pass it must also 
imply the fact that I am not happy. For, my passing my PhD defense is part of the class of events 
that would make me happy sine qua non. This also sheds more light on the fact that a singular 
statement can in fact reject a universal one, whilst it can never fully confirm a universal 
statement. For this reason, Popper defended falsification: it is a far better practice to look for a 
black swan, rather than looking for all of the white swans in the world.10 However, I think that, 
next to these two problems, the social sciences are confronted with a third problem of induction: 
a substantive problem of induction. This problem intensifies the difficulties of doing inductive 
research in the social sciences compared to the natural sciences. 
The root of this problem can be traced back to the distinction Popper made with regard to 
objective and subjective knowledge, and more importantly objective problem situations and 
subjective perceptions thereof (Popper, 1979, pp. 112-119). Rather than a physical entity, the 
objects of the social sciences can be regarded as subjective thought contents, which give rise to 
behavior in a certain situation, more precisely when someone is confronted with a certain 
problem situation (if there is no perceived problem11 of some kind, how small it may be, it is 
questionable that either something will be observed or that behavior will be elicited). In line 
with Popper’s situational analysis12 (e.g. Gorton, 2006), the person acts according to the logic 
of the situation, in a process of trial and error elimination:  
P1 → TS → EE →P2 
When an individual is confronted with a certain problem situation (P1), a tentative solution will 
be put forth to overcome the problem (TS). This is, however, subject to error elimination (EE). 
As no one ever disposes of complete knowledge of the situation nor the possible alternative 
solutions to it, inevitably this will give rise to new problem situations (P2) (Popper 1979, 241-
248). However, an important distinction must be made here. The problem to which an 
individual acts, is a subjective perception of an objective problem situation, and, as Popper 
indicates (1979, 206-56) “objective problems in this sense need not have their conscious 
                                                 
10 This really is a simplified version of the principle of falsification in a nutshell. Popper acknowledged that 
it ought not to be applied naïvely, and that in reality the falsification of entire theories is more difficult as it 
is difficult to say where the theory fails when not standing up to a test (sophisticated falsification). 
11 A “problem” needs to be interpreted in the very broad sense here, it may also refer to a simple desire to 
satisfy a need, for example. So if I am thirsty, I will go to my fridge and get a glass of water.  
12 Situational analysis is the only philosophical account of the social sciences to be found with Popper. He 
was foremost concerned with the natural sciences, not the social sciences.  
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counterpart; and where they have their conscious counterpart, the conscious problem need not 
coincide with the objective problem”. 
From the above discussion, it follows that additional problems with regard to, let’s say “pure” 
induction follow. If one is interested in explaining behavior, and one simply asks respondents 
why they did something, it is very likely that the outcome will be flawed given the discrepancies 
that exist between objective problems and the subjective perception thereof. It furthermore does 
not make any difference at all if one works quantitatively or qualitatively, the problem is not of 
a purely methodological nature. In “pure” induction, the only thing that one can do is explain 
singular actions by singular agents from the singular point of view of those agents (“singular” 
is mentioned three times intentionally to stress that these explanations need not relate to 
regularities if one proceeds on the basis of pure induction).  
This is not to say that both methods are “wrong” or are “bad”.13 They aren’t. They just are in 
need of a searchlight, which can be provided by knowledge in the objective sense; by theory. 
Only then can the social sciences aspire to a goal similar to that of the natural sciences: the 
growth of knowledge. I agree with Popper that the aim of the social sciences is to discover “new 
worlds behind the world of ordinary experience .” (Popper & Notturno, 1994, p. 105), with a 
view to “explain how the unintended consequences of our intentions and actions arise, and 
what kind of consequences arise if people do this that or the other in a certain social situation” 
(Popper 1974, 125). Alternatively put, this comes down to a search for social regularities 
(Popper, 2007, p. 61 ff.). Even if the goal of a scientist would be to understand the actions of 
an individual, then still objective knowledge is of the utmost importance, inter alia to discover 
where certain subjective perceptions stem from, and why people are susceptible to them.  
This, however, does not seem to be the case in most social scientific practice. For the body of 
knowledge in the social sciences is increasingly diverse, whilst in a mature science it tends to 
converge into simpler and more universal laws (e.g. string theory in physics). To use the 
imagery of Popper (1979, 262 ff.), science is like a tree growing in the opposite direction: it 
starts from a vast variety of roots, and grows up to one trunk.14 That is to say, as science 
progresses, we find increasingly universal laws. As opposed to this, the tree of knowledge 
seems to be growing as a regular tree in the social sciences: with ever more branches. Because 
of the inductive fallacy, a situation of (theoretical) overspecialization presents itself in the social 
                                                 
13 More on qualitative versus quantitative methods will follow.  
14 In contrast, to this, applications of science grow as a “regular” tree: towards ever more diverse applications.  
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sciences. I concede with Popper that the only way for the social sciences is to embrace 
objectivity, because “an objectivist epistemology which studies the third world [to be 
understood as theories] can help to throw an immense amount of light upon the second world 
of subjective consciousness…; but the converse is not true” (1979, 112). 
The above exposition immediately begs the – very sensitive – question as to what a social law 
or, put more softly, social regularity may look like. This question in itself has been subject to 
quite a lot of debate, and has caused a lot of controversy among social scientists, and thus merits 
attention in thre present study as well. In my opinion, these universal statements do not 
necessarily stem from what is generally labeled as “the social” as such, but rather from biology. 
What I refer to in this context is the “wiring” of our brain according to long standing survival 
strategies that have come into existence through evolution (more on what these dispositions are 
and how they come into existence will be discussed in the next chapter). I will dub these 
evolutionary predispositions to act (for short: EPA) for the purpose of the present study.  
It is not my intention to dwell on the precise content of such EPA’s, but the literature in the 
field is expanding (e.g. Buckman, 2000; Darwin & Zimmer, 2007; Dawkins, 2006; Dawkins, 
2006 [1975]; Hauser, 2006; Hinde, 2002; Shermer, 2004). That is to say, there is an established 
evolutionary benefit in certain forms of behavior (good and bad, from whatever point of view), 
which have, through evolution, become a predisposition to act which we are not always 
consciously aware of. Popper was also aware of this, and formulated it in the sense that abstract 
selection pressures can have a downward causal effect on a concrete organism, by natural 
selection. These effects may subsequently be amplified by genetic inheritance (Popper, 1978a). 
A very good example of this which relates to a core debate in both the social sciences and 
contemporary philosophy is the research of Hauser (2006), who showed that a sense of morality 
is invariant to culture and to the fact whether or not one is religious. However interesting this 
may be from a substantive point of view, my aim is to elucidate the meta-theoretical importance 
such evolutionary predispositions to act may have in light of the social sciences: The 
evolutionary predispositions may be good candidates to qualify as universal statements, given 
their relative independence of a particular location in time and space.  
Should such dispositions be regarded as universal laws of nature, as in physics? I do not think 
this is necessary. As argued by Sober (Sober, 1997; Sober & Wilson, 1998) and Brandon 
(Brandon, 1997), in the wake of Beatty’s notion of Evolutionary Contingency Thesis (Beatty, 
1995), evolutionary processes are to be regarded as contingent outcomes rather than laws as 
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such. However, Mitchell (1997) responds to this by indicating that this line of reasoning implies 
a normative notion of law, which is not the only possible notion of laws that may be useful to 
science. I contend with Mitchell that these predispositions in the social sciences can best be 
regarded as pragmatic laws. The main difference with laws is that pragmatic laws are to be 
defined in terms of degrees of contingency rather than necessary consequences. As indicated 
above, evolutionary theory does provide pragmatic laws with very high degrees of contingency, 
i.e. applying to all people over a vast span of time and space (however defined). Especially in 
the social sciences this notion may prove to be useful as it may enable a treatment of theories 
by the same or very similar criteria as those applied in the natural sciences. In agreement with 
Leuridan (2010), I would argue for the usage of pragmatic laws, rather than mechanistic 
explanations of the social, given that the latter need the be grounded on the former, but not 
necessarily the other way around. Through this lens, I consider it possible to loosen the 
deterministic character of situational analysis while not giving up the covering-law model 
explanation, as does Neves (2004). 
Of course, the argument as it stands now fails to provide a satisfactory account of social 
scientific explanation. Similar to the natural sciences, pragmatic laws only yield an advantage 
in combination with certain initial conditions, and certain auxiliary hypotheses. For any social 
situation is not solely dependent on the physical environment, but equally on the social 
environment which includes, inter alia, social institutions. Now, these institutions are equally 
independent of individual people, and can be regarded as objective (Popper 1979, 158-159). In 
this sense, entities such as economy and law can be regarded as man-made products (social 
constructions), yet existing independently of any particular person. We can look at them as open 
systems of propositions, more or less axiomatized; in short, as theoretical systems. 
This way, the link between the individual, social institutions and universal (as having a high 
degree of contingency) statements in the form of pragmatic laws may be elucidated. For, it is 
not likely that people will engage in behavior that may harm themselves or that does not result 
in any adaptive advantage given a certain situation. Systems such as the economical one appeal 
(or can appeal) to people as they do because they are engrafted more or less directly on certain 
evolutionary predispositions to act (more on this will follow in the next chapter, but specifically 
geared towards prejudice). One need not look too far to see this link, for example the appeal to 
physical attraction in many commercials, the fact that (group or individual) identity is often 
accompanied by certain commodities, and so on. So, this system does not operate in complete 
independence of the pragmatic laws of evolutionary biology, but is based on them. In terms of 
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the previously set out conception of a theory, one might say that the auxiliary hypotheses which 
constitute the social environment of an individual in turn “select” the initial conditions in which 
a pragmatic universal evolutionary law may instantiate in a certain form. And it most likely 
instantiates in quite a similar form given the same or very similar initial conditions.  
This may also clarify why mechanisms require pragmatic laws, but not necessarily the other 
way around. If we take a mechanism to be “entities and activities organized such that they are 
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination of conditions” 
(Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000, p. 2), the particular object of study of the social sciences 
seems to suggest a necessity for pragmatic evolutionary laws. For, I can think of a vast amount 
of such mechanisms, which would not in the least appeal to anyone. Any mechanistic 
explanation in the social sciences which uses elements from such systems as economy, seems 
to be bound to refer to an underlying pragmatic law (not necessarily explicitly). For example, 
stating that someone commits a crime because he cannot attain middle class values falls short 
of being a full explanation: the next question which should be asked is why someone is 
susceptible to these values, why they are so tantamount in society, and why this is the case here 
but not necessarily somewhere else. Undoubtedly, many interesting questions can be raised – 
and hopefully answered – by using pragmatic laws which are situated on a higher level of 
universality (or, more precisely, contingency) than any mechanism can be, due to its basic 
dependency on these pragmatic laws.  
Thus, on the one hand, we can be confronted with a pragmatic law which is valid for all human 
beings on, yet people in reality seem to be responsive to very different sets of stimuli (e.g. 
economy in the west, tribal values in central Africa), and act accordingly. The end result, 
however, is contingent. To me, this suggests that, in the subjective perception of people, 
different forms of “rationality”15 exist which are spread out through a given society by social 
learning and mere exposure to different kinds of “problem situations”. In this sense, behavior 
is shaped by pragmatic laws, in combination with a rather specific local context, in which 
behaviors occur. Whilst the pragmatic laws have high degrees of contingency, the context may 
vary significantly across time and space. This way, societies may seem completely different, 
yet based on the same underlying principles. In my opinion, then, I agree with critical 
rationalism that the primary target of social sciences is neither the individual nor the 
context/situation, but the constant interplay between them. So, in theoretical terms, pragmatic 
                                                 
15 In the sense of locally endorsed modes of behavior or reactions to given problem situations.  
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law as well as the concrete situation may help elucidate how subjective perceptions of objective 
problem situations arise. Rather than explaining behavior by making reference to certain norms, 
customs, beliefs, values, and so on (which essentially are part of the context), this approach 
may encompass possibilities to answer the more fundamental question, i.e. where those norms 
and beliefs stem from, and how and why they are maintained.  
From a practical point of view this implicates that in order to test a theory, a mechanism 
animated by pragmatic laws may well be used. For, a universal statement as such is not 
observable. Using auxiliary hypotheses, the particular initial conditions that may shape the 
universal statement need to be deduced. From this theoretical system, then, a concrete instance 
(or class thereof) can be predicted, to enable corroboration or falsification of the universal 
statement (see infra: 1.4. Causation and explanation).  
1.3. Structural components of a theory 
By means of summary, now the structural components a theory should consist of can be 
elucidated. These can, considering the above discussion, be regarded as the very same as the 
components of a theory described in the natural sciences by Popper. In The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, Popper presents the basic structure of a theory (Popper, 2002 [1959], 37-57). Even 
though this structure is quite common in the natural sciences, it often is absent from the social 
sciences. According to Popper, a theory consists of: 
- One or more universal statements (conjectures); 
- One or more auxiliary hypothesis (if needed); 
- One or more initial conditions. 
The general idea behind Popper’s conception of a theory is that one predicts a certain event on 
the basis of one or more universal statements in combination with initial conditions, and then 
subjects this to empirical tests. In the critical rationalist tradition, the idea is to subject the theory 
to the most severe tests or to try to refute it. On a meta-theoretical level, the aim of the natural 
sciences is to formulate theories that are more universal, in the sense that they entail more, and 
thus have a higher degree of testability. It must be borne in mind that a universal statement in 
itself is not observable and therefore not testable. What is observable, however, is its 
instantiation. This instantiation is only possible within certain initial conditions, which are 
bound to a specific place and time. The conjunction of a universal statement with certain initial 
conditions allows it to instantiate, which in turn allows for prediction and the formulation of 
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observation statements that can be used to critically test the theory and either corroborate or 
falsify it.  
This view on theory allows for a more precise specification of the situation the social sciences 
are confronted with. As universal laws are a part of world three and can therefore be regarded 
as objective, the problem of induction in the social sciences can be rephrased in terms of a lack 
of universal statements in the social sciences. Let us take a look at the interpretative sciences, 
in terms of the structural components of a theory. Theories formulated on the basis of 
interpretative methods only make use of individual concepts (Popper 2002, 41-7). This is due 
to the fact that they limit themselves to what people perceive to be the problem situation to 
which they react (in terms of situational analysis); the concepts derived from such practice are 
limited to a particular person, in a concrete place and time. The statements that may be 
constructed by means of such concepts, are existential (Ibid., 47-50). This means that they can 
only say something about this concrete time and place (i.e. particular statements), or even only 
this specific person (i.e. singular statements). 
Pretty much the same, however, holds for the positivist social sciences. Apart from the well-
known criticisms on induction, it may be added that the concept of universality (and therewith 
objectivity) the positivist social sciences pursue is only numerical universality (Popper, 2002 
[1959], p. 40 f.). This means that, by relying on observation statements without specifying the 
relevant universal law, the positivist universalizes his propositions by means of a conjunction 
of singular statements. That is, it is still bound by a specific place and time. In this sense, it 
would be, in principle, possible to enumerate all the individual singular statements the 
numerically universal statement refers to. This stands in contradistinction to strict universality, 
which is invariant to particular locations in time and space (or, by comparison to its predecessor 
theories, less variant to time and space). It follows that the concepts used in the propositions in 
principle are singular in nature as well. This logic is prone to the logic of frequentist probability, 
which is still unable to dispel the classical problems associated with inductive logic (Popper 
2002 [1959], 263), viz. an infinite regress. 
1.4. Causation and explanation  
In current philosophy of science, subjects such as “cause”, “causality” and “causation” take up 
a central place. The question that poses itself, then, is how do these concepts tie in with the 
structural components of a theory set out above, and – equally important – how are they 
translated to practice? Let us first consider the principle of causation defined as the rule that 
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everything must have a cause. This principle in itself would be untestable, in the sense that it is 
either a logical tautology, as one can always find a cause for any given event, or an untestable 
statement about reality, as no potential falsifiers can be identified to challenge such a principle. 
For this reason, Popper did not accept (nor reject) a principle of causation. It simply does not 
fall within the scope of science as such – demarcated by the criterion of testability – but rather 
it is to be placed in the field of metaphysics (Popper, 2002 [1959], esp. sect. 12). Other notable 
thinkers on the subject are usually in agreement with this. In this sense, for example, Bunge  – 
which can be regarded as an authority when it comes to causality – clearly indicated that not 
every event is caused, and that certain events exist per se (see Bunge, 1959, esp. sect. IV). Thus, 
I will neither adopt a principle of causality in this study, first of all because it is untestable and 
therefore metaphysical, but, secondly, because it is not a necessary yet ontologically very 
important assumption to make.  
The fact that I do not assume an ontological principle of causality, does not preclude a 
discussion on what can logically be seen as “cause” and “effect”. In this sense, the above 
exposition on the structural components of a theory offers the answer. What is usually called 
“cause” are the initial conditions, and what is usually referred to as the “effect” is the prediction 
that is derived from the conjunction of a universal statement with these initial conditions 
(Popper, 2002 [1959], 39-40). Also note that reference is often made to “proximate” and 
“distal” causes in contemporary social science, in line with the vocabulary used by certain 
philosophers in other spheres, analogous to Dretske’s distinction between “structuring” and 
“triggering” causes (Dretske, 1988; Sandis, 2008). Even though one could argue that, in the 
sense of cause adopted here, the universal statement is the structuring or distal cause, and the 
initial conditions the triggering or proximate cause, I will not adopt this language here. For both 
are needed in order to constitute a causal explanation, and both are present at the same time, 
constituting the instance in a parallel way (making them equally “proximate” or “distal”).  
In contemporary criminology, another, similar, terminology has emerged recently, i.c. causes 
of the causes (e.g. Wikström & Sampson, 2006). This terminology might be better suited to 
describe causation as adopted in this study, in the sense that the universal law in principle 
constitutes the underlying cause which is given shape by the initial conditions, resulting in a 
particular instance thereof. However, recall that a universal statement in itself is unobservable 
– therefore unmeasurable and untestable. From this it follows that the only way social scientists 
can proceed to testing a universal statement is through initial conditions, for example by relating 
two distinct instances of the same universal statement with each other, as will be done in this 
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study. Given that the one instance is not the cause of the other, causes being defined as initial 
conditions, the terminology causes of the causes may be misleading, for which reason I will not 
adopt it in this study. This cannot, however, be regarded as a critique on scholars using this 
particular terminology. They usually adopt it in more general theories of crime. In such theories 
it does make sense to utilize this terminology, as both general and domain specific variables are 
used in explanation. In the current study, however, the focus only is on domain-specific 
variables, viz. variables that are specifically relevant to the cognitive module deemed 
responsible for prejudice, whilst general domain variables, that relate to a wide array of 
behaviors, such as self-control, are not included.  
What it means, then, to explain something also relates to a core aspect of the structural 
components of a theory. For, an event or class of events can be regarded to be explained, if it is 
derived as a prediction from a universal statement and one or more initial condition(s). Thus, 
an event can be regarded as explained if it is unified under a more general, universal statement. 
This account of explanation is inherently present in the critical rationalism as elaborated by 
Popper, but can also be found as one of the main approaches to explanation in contemporary 
philosophy of science, as elaborated by, for example, Kitcher (Kitcher, 1981, 1989). To 
evaluate the “level” of unification, two aspects are of great importance: level of universality (as 
per Popper) or alternatively generality (as per Kitcher), and simplicity. Both of these terms will 
be elaborated on infra (chapter 7, section 1). Thus, for the purpose of this study, a causal 
explanation will be an explanation that (i) unifies a phenomenon with other phenomena under 
a more universal statement/law and (ii) utilizes one or more initial conditions as “causes” of the 
phenomenon to be explained, which is the prediction deduced from the universal statement in 
conjunction with one or more initial conditions.  
Given that the focus of the current study is on the phenomenon prejudice on a population level 
(see infra, sect. 1.5.: The object of study and prediction), and not on any particular incident of 
prejudice, the notion of causal chain is less of importance. Rather, the notion of difference 
making is applied here. Difference making refers to the case where a certain presumed cause 
(initial condition) contributes to the production of a certain effect in a meaningful way (see 
Strevens (2004) for a more detailed discussion on the role of difference making in a 
unificationist account of explanation). Given the complexity of social phenomena, where 
causation is usually not simple, viz. one cause and one effect, but multiple, viz. multiple causes 
and one effect or a single cause and multiple effects (see Bunge, 1959, esp. sect. III for a more 
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detailed account), is the main concern. A strict counterfactual model would therefore not be 
suited.  
A better approach to the value of a cause in this sense would be Mackie’s operationalization 
thereof in terms of INUS conditions, or to regard a cause as insufficient but non-redundant part 
of an unnecessary but sufficient condition for the explanandum to occur (Mackie, 1965). This 
renders the question of causation a question of degree rather than a “yes or no” question often 
assumed in counterfactual models (especially in simple causation). This makes the question one 
of causal relevance or the question whether or not a certain cause contributes to the effect or 
not (see Strevens, 2004). In research, often (and implicitly),a probabilistic criterion is 
maintained in order to indicate causal relevance. I will adopt such a criterion, too.  
Thus, in summary, a causal explanation is an explanation that unifies a certain phenomenon 
under a more universal law, and that predicts the phenomenon by deducing it form that universal 
law by restricting it by specific initial conditions. In practice, the causal relevance of a presumed 
cause is estimated in a probabilistic way. If the presumed cause increases the probability of the 
phenomenon to occur (or is influenced by the cause in a statistically significant way), it will be 
presumed to be a nonredundant cause in terms of Makie’s INUS conditions. The object of study 
and prediction 
1.5. The object of study and prediction 
As argued, inter alia, by Heylen and Nachtegael (Heylen & Nachtegael, 2013), a distinction 
can be made between the study of social phenomena and the study of individual cases. This 
idea is congruent with the above analysis of both theory and causality. For the probabilistic 
criterion of causal relevance focuses on social phenomena, ultimately to be found at the highest 
levels of universality (population level). Such an explanation only provides an account of the 
“usual suspects” that make a causally relevant contribution to a given phenomenon, amongst 
other possible causes. It follows, then, that such a cause is not applicable to individual cases, 
which are of a singular nature, and thus located on a much lower level of universality. The 
distinction is not trivial; for one individual case, for example an individual person, may be part 
of many social phenomena (or regularities) at the very same time, which foreground and 
background according to the situation the person finds him- or herself in (ibid.).  
For example, John may display empathy, a general phenomenon, but this empathy does not 
necessarily always manifest itself in the same way. This is bound to the situation in which john 
finds himself, or the initial conditions to put it in terms of the structural components of a theory. 
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That is, in interaction with other elements, such as specific persons, his empathy may be 
triggered or not. For example, it is more likely that John will show empathy towards his children 
(which is a very well-studied and cross culturally prevalent regularity, both in man and animal), 
whilst he may not show this empathy to the man who just robbed him. Thus, in this example 
the manifestation of empathy is dependent on the situation John is confronted with, or the initial 
condition of who is at the receiving end of the empathy. Next to these conditions, John also has 
varying degrees of membership in other “regularities”. Next to empathy, he may also dispose 
of vengeful tendencies. These are the ones more likely to emerge in the case of the robber, 
instead of the empathic tendency he disposes of. Thus, this regularity is also dependent on the 
specific situation, viz. initial conditions, John finds himself in.  
This way, one can study phenomena at the population level, but that is all they are: phenomena, 
animated by regularities with a relatively high degree of contingency over time and space. 
These phenomena are, however, to varying degrees present in individual people, and a great 
many of those, often contradictory ones, are operating at the same time. Further, they are 
foregrounded and backgrounded depending on the situation the person is facing. This implies 
that prediction in the social sciences is a matter of population level phenomena, and not of 
individual people. Due to the complexity and adaptability of people, it would be unrealistic to 
predict individual behavior, only abstract phenomena are susceptible to this. Explanation of 
individual behaviors (retrospectively, so not prediction), is a matter of in-depth, qualitative 
research, in which the entire causal chain leading up to a certain behaviors is unveiled.16 
1.6. Substantive assumptions with regard to crime and criminology 
As may already have appeared from the above, a lot in this study is based on the views on 
human behavior adopted in the field of evolutionary biology. In order to finish this section on 
the assumptions underlying the study, the assumptions underlying various theoretical strands 
as discussed by Agnew in his Unified Criminology (Agnew, 2011) will be presented, but filled 
in from the point of view of evolutionary theory (more on this theoretical strand from a 
substantive point of view will follow in the next chapter).  
                                                 
16 It is, however, advisable to utilize universal laws to guide such an explanation; to see how these laws have 
instantiated and influence each other. On the one hand this may provide a safeguard against the  notorious 




The nature of crime. In evolutionary theory, behavior is behavior, if this is labeled as deviant 
or criminalized or not. The only thing that is taken into account is whether or not the behavior 
is or has been adaptive at a certain point in time in the evolution of humanity.  
Determinism versus agency. In evolutionary theory, with regard to human behavior, mankind 
is endowed with certain “modules” or psychological information-processing mechanisms that 
were formed by selection pressures, and thus are functional to the survival of various sets of 
genes (Kurzban, 2010). An example which will be of central importance to this study is 
“coalitional computation”. These modules provide a kind of blueprint of behavior, and thus the 
human mind is not regarded as a blank slate. However, these modules do not dictate concrete 
behaviors, they only represent propensities in my view, and nothing more than that. How these 
are given substance is a spatiotemporally contingent matter. Thus, whilst people do have of a 
great amount of agency, they are also prone to certain predispositions (e.g. the aforementioned 
EPA’s). Constant interaction between both, and between different modules, makes human 
behavior a ultimately complex matter, which cannot be labeled as “deterministic” in the strict 
sense of the word. The modularity of the human mind does, however, allow for prediction and 
testing on an aggregate level (see also supra – the object of study and prediction).  
The nature of human nature. This question is often treated as if the nature of human nature is 
an all-or-nothing question in social sciences: i.e. either people are fully selfish or fully 
altruistic.17 Evolutionary research, however, clearly points out that people have both selfish and 
other regarding interests, and thus once again the current study finds itself in between of both 
existing alternatives (e.g. Pinker, 2002; Walsh & Beaver, 2009b). These notions will 
furthermore be of central importance in the remainder of the text, where selfish and other-
regarding tendencies – to be understood in the biological sense –  will be modeled in interaction 
with each other.  
The nature of society. This is probably the most tricky assumption following from evolutionary 
theory, and is a topic on which entire libraries have been written. To keep it short – as this is a 
very complex and intricate discussion that will in part be reproduced throughout the text in this 
study – culture (and all its institutions) is viewed as a product of (evolved) psychology. Building 
further on the previous assumptions, and on evidence derived from different disciplines, 
                                                 
17 Both the terms are to be understood in the biological sense: altruism, in this sense, means conferring a 
benefit on someone else without benefitting therefrom directly, whilst selfish means reaping the benefits of 
others without reciprocation. Both terms will be further explained in the next chapter.  
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including evolutionary biology, cognitive science, behavioral ecology, psychology, hunter-
gatherer studies, social anthropology, biological anthropology, primatology, and neurobiology, 
Barkow, Tooby and Cosmides posit the following overview in The Psychological Foundations 
of Culture, the first chapter of their groundbreaking book The Adapted Mind (Barkow et al., 
1992, pp. 23-24): 
- The human mind consists of set of evolved information-processing mechanisms 
instantiated in the human nervous system; 
- These mechanisms, and the developmental programs that produce them, are adaptations, 
produced by natural selection over evolutionary time in ancestral environments; 
- Many of these mechanisms are functionally specialized to produce behavior that solves 
particular adaptive problems, such as mate selection, language acquisition, family 
relations and cooperation; 
- To be functionally specialized, many of these mechanisms must be richly structured in 
a content-specific way; 
- Content-specific information-processing mechanisms generate some of the particular 
content of human culture, including certain behaviors, artifacts, and linguistically 
transmitted representations; 
- The cultural content generated by these and other mechanisms is then present to be 
adopted or modified by psychological mechanisms situated in other members of the 
population; 
- This sets up epidemiological and historical population-level processes; and 
- These processes are located in particular ecological, economic, demographic, and 
intergroup social context or environments.  
This way, what society ultimately looks like is a result of the evolution of the human mind, 
in combination with interactions with the environment. From this, the integrative approach 
that biosocial criminology represents is apprehended: it seeks to explain why similar 
environments produce different outcomes for different people (hence the focus is on the 
person), and how different environments may produce similar outcomes for different people 
(where the focus is on the environment) (e.g. Walsh & Beaver, 2009a). Hence, even though 
the ultimate foundation of culture and society is the human mind, a synergy exists between 
individual people and the environment.  
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2.  Problem formulation 
As indicated earlier, the problem formulation underlying this study is of a conceptual nature, 
insofar as it is concerned with the theoretical dimensions of prejudice and bias motivated 
aggression. More precisely, it is about “when theory fails to utilize concepts from other, more 
general theories to which it should be logically subordinate” (Laudan, 1977). Even though this 
formulation is quite strong, the implications of such a failure, in principle a failure of 
integration18, are discussed below. This will be followed by a brief exposition of the main goal 
and questions of the study.  
Various disciplines have been involved in explaining prejudice and its most obvious 
manifestations such as bias motivated behaviors.19 Contrary to sociology, in psychology, an 
interest in prejudice (and it’s like manifestations), more precisely the origins of prejudice, has 
existed presumably since the early 1930s. This is probably due to the fact that the sociologically 
dominated field of criminology mostly gains an interest in a topic starting from its 
criminalization or its being labeled as deviant, which was not necessarily the case in the 1930 
when overt expressions of prejudice were quite common. Further, whilst psychology has mostly 
been occupied with the explanation of prejudice itself, criminology has been mostly occupied 
with explaining offending by minorities, less so with explaining prejudice and the commission 
of hate crimes themselves (e.g. Gabbidon & Greene, 2005; Higgins, 2010). Another notable 
difference between both strands of research is that criminology has equally been occupied with 
the criminalization of hate crimes and the criminalization of minorities in penal law (thus 
referring to a form of institutional discrimination), the latter of which is foremost done in critical 
criminology.20 Insofar as these different strands seem to exist side by side, with no or little 
cross-fertilization, it might be an interesting endeavor to integrate both in order to connect micro 
and macro processes, as well as bridging the gap between different etiological approaches and 
different types of responses to reduce prejudice and bias motivated aggression, of which 
criminalization is but one. This connection in itself might provide vital information on how to 
                                                 
18 It can, at least in my opinion, be equated with a failure of integration looking at social scientific practice. 
For, both by utilizing a more general theory to incorporate the “subordinate” (in terms of generality) theory, 
and by integrating two theories, thus constructing a more general theory, the aim Laudan seems to refer to is 
addressed.  
19 Throughout the text, I will use the term bias motivated aggression in order to avoid confusion with those 
instances of bias motivated aggression that are criminalized, as an aetiology thereof in terms of evolutionary 
theory is not concerned with the legal status of a category of behaviors.  
20 Which is not within the scope of this study, as it is only occupied with the etiology of prejudice and bias 
motivated aggression.  
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overcome the persistence of prejudice and bias motivated behaviors notwithstanding the various 
legal and social initiatives that have been developed in order to combat it. Thus, one problem 
with regard to the explanation of hate crime and prejudice more in general can be labeled 
overspecialization.  
A second problem in the explanation of prejudice and hate crime that follows from 
overspecialization, is the conceptual obscurity surrounding the theme. An overview of the 
literature at hand learns that a wide variety of terms, which are all related and often used 
interchangeably, can be found to label the object of study. For the purpose of illustration, a grab 
out of the offer: blatant prejudice (e.g. Pettigrew), overt racism, old-fashioned racism or 
prejudice, subtle prejudice / racism  (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), modern prejudice (Pedersen 
& Walker, 1997), modern racism (Akrami, Ekehammar, & Araya, 2000), implicit prejudice 
(Sears, 2004), unconscious racism (Duster, 2008; Quillian, 2008), internalized racism (Pyke, 
2010), scientific racism (Carter, 2007), systemic racism (Feagin, 2004), new racism (Vala, 
2009), xeno-racism (Sivanandan, 2001), two-faced racism (Watkins-Hayes, 2009), implicit 
racism (Yoo, Steger, & Lee, 2010), horizontal racism (NGO websites), institutional racism 
(Pilkington, 2008), state racism (Rasmussen, 2011), historical racism (Birnir, 2007), 
contemporary racism (Dirlik, 2008), color-blind racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2002), latent racism 
(Staurowsky, 2007), and of course not to forget the related general terms such as xenophobia, 
colorism, white supremacy, redlining, racial purity, black/white supremacy, racial 
discrimination, ethnic nationalism, fascism, radicalization, ethnocentrism, and so on. By 
writing down all of these different terms in one paragraph, I certainly do not want to critique 
the authors that employ them as they undoubtedly have good reasons to use a specific term for 
the purpose of their own research and for the purpose of clarity. What I do want to stress, 
however, is that none of these names is “better” or “worse” than any other.  
One threat to scientific progress (and, by extension, in the applications thereof – see section on 
the philosophy of science) that is indicated by this is that in many cases the focus is on very 
specific cases of prejudice, or on a specific context in which it emerges. In other words, this 
indicates that one finds a lot of literature dealing with specific instances of prejudice. This 
problem may be referred to as superprecision (own terminology). In itself this is not a problem, 
but it can become a problem if the more universal statements are omitted from the explanation. 
The problem this may lead to is the fragmentation of a field of study; a loss of coherence in 
theoretical explanations. This lowers the explanatory power of a field of science and its 
predictive power and puts limits on its practical utility.  
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What was just labeled as superprecision in principle is a variant of overspecialization discussed 
in the previous section. Even though the names are arbitrary, with overspecialization I refer to 
the fact that no or little communication exists between different fields of study that share a 
research object, and with superprecision I refer to the situation in which the research focus 
within one domain is heavily skewed towards either a specific context or specific instance of 
an otherwise more universal mechanism, without taking into account this more universal 
mechanism.  
3. Goals of the study and their relevance 
The problem formulation from the previous section may be briefly summarized as (i) the 
persisting problem of prejudice notwithstanding various legal and social initiatives that have 
been developed to combat it and a strengthened international interest in the topic, (ii) theoretical 
overspecialization or a lack of interdisciplinary efforts in studying the problem in all of its 
facets, and (iii) superprecision within disciplines which may entail a barrier to the unification 
of science and thus the growth thereof. On this basis, the following general goals of the study 
can be formulated.  
3.1. Theoretical goals: integration and unification 
The first goal of the study is to integrate the insights of different disciplines into one coherent 
framework. This goal can be done in two distinct ways. First, one can integrate the findings 
with regard to the etiology of prejudice and its various manifestations across disciplines. This 
is an obvious goal of the current study, in which the literature of primarily social psychology 
and evolutionary theory will be brought together in one coherent theoretical framework. The 
overall goal of theoretical integration, then is “the act of combining two or more sets of logically 
interrelated propositions into one larger set of interrelated propositions, in order to provide a 
more comprehensive explanation of a particular phenomenon” (Thornberry, 1989, p. 75). 
Integration can be done in various ways. A distinction can be made between conceptual 
integration on the one hand, and the integration of propositions on the other hand. Given the 
fact that the current study is of an interdisciplinary nature, first conceptual integration will be 
attempted. The reason for this is to see if a common ground, or common vocabulary, can be 
found in order to connect the various disciplines occupied with the study of prejudice and bias 
motivated aggression. Once this common ground is found, integration of propositions will be 
done, in the form of a model in which various propositions of the different disciplines are 
connected “end-to-end” style (Pauwels, Ponsaers, & Svensson, 2009).  
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The second theoretical goal of the study is unification of the theories on prejudice and bias 
motivated aggression, and this goals is strongly related to the former goals of integration. 
Unification implies to bring the theory to a higher level of universality, i.e. to give a common 
theoretical basis to existing theories that are located on a lower level of universality. If at least 
the same degree of precision, defined as the number of predictions that can be derived from it, 
is retained by the theory, it can be evaluated as “superior” to the other theory, at least from a 
logical point of view. From a pragmatic point of view, a theory can be considered “better” if it 
is able to resolve issues that former theories did not resolve, or did not acknowledge. In the 
current study, both the practical and the logical criteria to evaluate theories will be adopted 
(Popper, 2002 [1959], esp. sect. 36). In the discussion section of this study, the theory will be 
thoroughly logically evaluated. There, both universality and precision will be examined in detail 
and applied to the theory developed in this study.  
To concretize this goal, the theory that will be used in order to achieve both forms of integration 
is evolutionary theory. The reason for this is, as Beaver and Walsh (2009) state, that this theory 
allows to ask for “ultimate” causes of behavior, thus causes that are basically at the highest 
possible level of universality, as they have helped to shape mankind into what it is today. For 
this reason, it is presumably at the limits of universality as well, which implies that it is a very 
good candidate to achieve the goal of unification. 
Content-wise, the study will focus on the evolution of human sociality, which  - as will appear 
in the next chapter – relates strongly to intergroup conflict, exclusion, informal punishment, 
and like concepts. The main hypothesis that will be put forth there, is that prejudice and bias 
motivated behaviors can be viewed as the flipside of human sociality. That is as much as saying 
that they are very specific, conditional instances of human sociality. This may sound strange at 
first sight, but will be explained more in depth in the next chapter. In any case, this gives rise 
to the first main question that lies at the basis of this study: 
Can prejudice and bias motivated behaviors be viewed as instances of human sociality? 
This general question will subsequently be reformulated and refined into specific sub-questions, 
to finally result in a theoretical model on prejudice. Given the distance between the distant 
evolutionary past and our current society, the evolutionary cause will be conceived of as a 
macro-level framework for the contemporary explanations social dominance orientation, right 
wing authoritarianism, and intergroup threat. Throughout the chapters that will follow, this 
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general main question will be refined into subquestions and concrete hypotheses to be tested 
empirically.  
3.2. Practical goal: implications for practice 
Next to this theoretical goal, however, the study tries to be pragmatic as well (all life is problem 
solving, right?). Given the persistence of the problem, in a discussion part of the study, the 
focus will shift to the implications for practice of the empirical study. The focus will be on the 
utility or desirability of dealing with prejudice and bias motivated aggression in a punitive way, 
and possible alternatives will be explored. This part will serve as a source for inspiration for 
further research and policy recommendations. The general question underlying this part of the 
study is: 
What are the implications of the theory for policy and practice? 
This question is of great importance in dealing with prejudice and bias motivated aggression, 
as the currently adopted evolutionary approach seems to suggest that a punitive response may 
result in undesired effects that stand in stark opposition to the goal of remedying prejudice and 
bias motivated aggression, insofar as there is a rather important signaling function attributed to 
prejudice, which, in evolutionary terms, may be seen as moralistic aggression. Insofar as the 
success of signaling is fully dependent on the cost of that signal, and given that a punitive 
response significantly increases the cost of the signal, any deterrent effect is not to be expected. 
Quite on the contrary, it might even be so that this may even incite the behaviors it seeks to 
erase from society. More on signaling will follow in the third chapter, whilst an in-depth 
discussion on the possible unintended consequences of enforcement of anti-discriminatory 
legislation follows in chapter 7, section 3.3.  
3.3.  Criminological relevance 
Even though the above mentioned goals may be relevant from a variety of points of view (such 
as theoretical relevance and policy relevance), it may be useful to indicate how the study is 
relevant to the field of criminology. In the end, this is a PhD in criminology, so it is not a 
redundancy to indicate where it ties in to the main body of criminological research, or at least 
to clarify the potential the current study has for the field of criminology. In this sense, 
criminology can be regarded as a very wide field of study, incorporating a wide variety of 
approaches, which often complement each other but equally so often stand in stark contrast to 
each other, and in which a wide variety of topics are covered. Indeed, quite recently an entire 
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book entitled What Is Criminology (Bosworth & Hoyle, 2011) was published, which gives a 
clear indication of the fact that criminology is at least a diverse discipline, still trying to define 
itself (if this is needed anyway; in my opinion such diversity can prevent a discipline from 
stranding in its own practices through constant dialogue, discussion, critical reflection and 
innovation). 
This question may be especially relevant to the current study, as the focus will be on 
evolutionary theory and social psychology, rather than the theories that are usually applied in 
what may be called mainstream criminology. This choice, however, is inspired by a variety of 
reasons. First, psychology is an integral part of criminology’s interdisciplinary mix of 
approaches, and evolutionary psychology can be regarded as the meta-theoretical framework 
of social psychology (Barkow et al., 1992; Buss, 1995), or even the social sciences as a whole 
(Ploeger, 2010). Therefore, the integration of current social psychology and evolutionary 
psychology seems but a logical starting point. Second, the social psychological study of 
prejudice is usually limited to the ideology of prejudice, and not so much related to behaviors. 
In the current study, the dependent variable will be bias motivated behaviors, which 
automatically extends the scope of current psychological approaches. Third, the current study 
can be placed in the broader field of biosocial criminology. Even though this field is booming, 
studies explicitly grounded in evolution and especially evolutionary psychology remain rather 
rare (some examples include (some examples include Armit, 2011; Blokland, 2005; Boehm, 
2011; Eisner, 2011; Ellis & Walsh, 1997; Roth, 2011; Wood, 2011). And, last but not least, the 
usually used criminological theories will not be discussed as they are not used in the empirical 
study conducted for the purpose of this study. This is done in order to maintain a strict and very 
clear scope of research, in line with the critical rationalist view on science. There, a test ought 
to be as clear and strict as possible, otherwise it may be (i) more difficult to point out exactly 
where the test went wrong if it does go wrong and (ii) it is way easier to come up with ad hoc 
protective hypotheses in complex models incorporating a great many variables.  
This does not mean, however, that this study is not relevant to the most widely used approaches 
in contemporary criminology. Quite on the contrary, it may be an ideal candidate to unify these 
theories into one coherent, complementary framework, whilst it may be at stakes with other 
theories – or at least provide insights to further refine specific ideas. For example, social 
disorganization theory (Shaw & McKay, 1942) would be compatible with the evolutionary view 
that will be discussed in the next chapter, where horizontal transmission may be translated to 
the presence of subcultures approving of crime. This also holds for social learning theory 
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(Akers, 1998), as horizontal transmission basically means that people pick up the habits of the 
majority of people in their environment, and especially the habits of those they deem to be 
successful. Furthermore, a lot of attention will go to a perception of conflict or competition, 
which makes the theory at least compatible with strain theory (Agnew, 1992), another big 
theory which is very salient in contemporary criminology. The theory to be developed in this 
study is at stakes, however, with social control theory (Hirschi, 1969). Whereas social control 
theory posits that social bonds, of any kind, are protective of crime, the evolutionary approach 
to prejudice and bias motivated aggression will posit exactly the opposite: social bonds or 
sociality will contribute to the instantiation of prejudice and bias motivated aggression rather 
than prevent it, if the conditions are right. Even though this study is not the place for an in-
depth discussion on integration of criminological theories (which would require another PhD 
in my opinion if it is to be done properly), I will make brief reference to points of overlap and 
points of contradiction with the evolutionary framework, in order to show the unification 
potential of the latter.  
4. Design and Methodology in a nutshell 
The focus of the study is on a specific social phenomenon and tries to uncover a regularity on 
a higher degree of universality which may be considered to be a structural cause of it. Given 
this focus, a quantitative research based on the causal relevance interpretation of causality 
seems to be the most appropriate, taking into account the discussion on theory and causality 
above. That is, the aim consists of uncovering a regularity, which cannot be done by means of 
the process theory of causality (or its usually accompanying qualitative methods).  
The general design opted for is a quantitative survey research. Given the fact that the aim of 
the study is to uncover a rather new approach to the study of prejudice and bias motivated 
behaviors, a survey design seems to be very well suited. The primary aim is to uncover a robust 
regularity, and therefore it is warranted to reach a rather large group of people. Surveys are an 
excellent way to do so in a timely and comprehensive manner.  
As the research is inspired by evolutionary theory, the results should go into the same direction 
in different countries, as functional adaptations are presumed to have evolved for all of mankind 
in our ancestral past. For this reason, a comparative research has been executed in two countries, 
i.e. Belgium and Spain. The aim of this is to provide for an additional test of the robustness of 
the results across countries. Apart from differences in effect sizes due to cultural variation, no 
substantial differences are expected between both samples.  
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The target population of the survey are university and college students. This is foremost 
inspired by practical considerations. This way, it is possible to generate an international 
comparison with the means and time available. Further, it has been noted in meta-analytic 
reviews that there is no difference in the direction of the results using a student sample 
compared to a general population sample, there are only differences in the strength of these 
relations with regard to the well-validated measures used (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008, pp. 254-
268). Student samples usually yield stronger results than adult populations.21 All of this will be 
clarified and elaborated in chapter 5, where the methodology of the study will be thoroughly 
dealt with 
The measurement scales used in the survey are mainly existing and validated scales used in 
social psychological and criminological research on the topic. This has been done in order to 
make the study comparable to existing scholarly work on prejudice and bias motivated 
behaviors. It is important that the theoretical import of the study is not an “island” in the 
extensive body of research that exists with regard to the topic, as it can only be evaluated in 
light of  existing research on the topic. Further, it is a study into the evolutionary underpinnings 
of current explanations, and therefore some contemporary salient approaches in the explanation 
of prejudice are also incorporated in the survey. From a practical point of view, one does not 
have to invent the wheel again either. However, given that the aim is to study a rather specific 
process, two scales have been developed for the purpose of this study: genuine signaling of 
sociality and deceptive signaling of sociality. These concepts are directly derived from the 
evolutionary theory, and the operationalization thereof based on existing research into 
popularity, peer pressure, and conformity. The scale construction process is discussed 
elaborately in the methodology section.  
5. Concepts and quarrels over words: practical agreement on terms used in 
the study 
Before moving on to the structure of the dissertation, a short note on the use of concepts seems 
to be warranted, as this seems to cause a lot of confusion and seems to lead to many discussions 
on “which concept should be used”. And, as indicated earlier, a lot of different terms exist in 
                                                 
21 Which does NOT automatically imply that they are more “prejudiced”, it may equally refer to higher social 
desirability among adults.  
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the study of prejudice, both within and between the various disciplines it is concerned with. In 
short, I agree with Popper on this matter: 
…problems of definition, or of ‘analysis’, or ‘explication’ are, by themselves, 
without any significance; they can be significant only relative to other and more 
serious problems. It can never be a rational enterprise to replace a term by a more 
‘exact’ one – this really is not a serious problem; but it may become a serious task 
in connection with some serious problem whose solution might be made easier if 
we had a definition, or if we cleared up some terminological ambiguities first […] 
Incidentally, there is a whole category of problems that looks as if their solution 
might be furthered by a definition while in fact definitions would merely rob them 
of their empirical character, by turning a factual problem into a verbal one. 
(Popper, 1979, pp. 275-276)  
To avoid confusion over terms and quarrels over words, I will use the terms “prejudice” and 
“bias motivated behaviors/aggression” in order to refer to the subject matter at hand, whenever 
I am speaking of the theory developed in this study. In this context prejudice refers to the 
attitude in which negative traits and qualities are ascribed to entire groups of people, so defined 
on the basis of a – in principle arbitrary – specific marker. Bias motivated behaviors, then, refer 
to the plethora of actions one can take inspired by such an attitude, ranging from being 
uncomfortable being around people of certain out-groups, to outright racist violence. Given the 
evolutionary nature of this research, it is not concerned with criminalization processes nor the 
fact whether or not certain behaviors are criminalized or not.22 Wherever appropriate, I will use 
the original terms used by researchers when discussing their work. Let us agree on this as a 
practical matter, a lot of which will become more clear throughout the text. In order to give the 
legal/punitive aspect a place in this study – I am a criminologist after all – an entire section of 
the discussion is devoted to the socio-legal implications of the study, how it relates to 
punishment and its alternatives, and how it relates to current policy regarding prejudice and 
bias motivated behaviors.   
The reason why so many quarrels over words exist over these terms especially in criminology 
can probably be traced back to the fact that criminology usually is carried out either in faculties 
                                                 
22 Even though this institutional context can – and does – impact on the manifestations of certain behaviors. 
Those include criminalized but also non-criminalized behaviors, so there is no need to be concerned with 
criminalization of acts; I will only look into the etiological aspects of such behaviors.  
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of law, and that many criminologists in fact are sociologists of law or lawyers as such. This is 
not a problem as such, but may generate a Babylonian confusion of tongues, for the following 
reason. As Brigandt (2010) elucidates, a concept consists of (i) an empirical referent, (ii) 
inferential role, and (iii) epistemic goal. In short, the empirical referent is the object the concept 
refers to in reality. The inferential role of a concept is the place it takes up in a body of 
propositions, and the connections between this body of propositions and the concept. It is 
basically where the concept fits into the wider theoretical approaches that exist with regard to 
the area of study the concept is part of. The inferential role of a concept is the purpose of the 
concept, the reason why it is invoked. Let us briefly consider the differences between the 
concept “racism” for example, as viewed by a social scientist and a lawyer (and again, there is 
no “better” or “worse” approach, there are only two different approaches with different goals. 
Admittedly, the comparison is a rather basic and short one, but I hope it displays the vast 
differences that exist between a legal approach and a behavioral approach to the subject matter 
at hand. Even though the two are commensurable at some point, often discussions are held with 
very different background assumptions, necessarily leading to nowhere.  
 
 Social science Law 
Empirical referent The entire range of prejudiced behaviors, 
ranging from negative emotions over micro-
aggressions to severe “hate crimes” 
Only criminalized forms of bias motivated 
behaviors 
Inferential role Placed in a web of behavioral propositions Placed in a web of normative propositions 
Epistemic goal Explaining a particular form of behavior in all 
its manifestations 
Symbolic signaling of values and constraining 
a particular (criminalized) range of behaviors, 
given certain conditions (e.g. when intent can 
be shown) / explaining evolutions in 
normativity and/or criminalization  
Table 3: Brigandt's analysis of concepts briefly applied to prejudice and bias motivated behaviors. 
 
Thus, for all clarity, this study is a social scientific study into the etiology of prejudice and bias 
motivated behaviors, comprising those behaviors given a different name for either (i) normative 
reasons, which are of no concern to the study at hand at this point or (ii) because a niche 
manifestation of the wider phenomenon is studied (as indicated supra). Furthermore, as 
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discussed in the assumptions with regard to the nature of culture, of which institutions such as 
the law are part, are in themselves considered to be a product of the human mind in evolutionary 
psychology, the starting point of explanation should logically be that mind, and not the 
institutions themselves. To put it colloquially, institutions are made by people, and if institutions 
or structures “are prejudiced”, it is because they are either made by prejudiced people or that 
prejudiced people manage them.23 
6.  To conclude 
In summary, the aim of this study is to give an ultimate explanation to prejudice and bias 
motivated behaviors, and to explore the implications thereof for policy and practice. The focus 
of the empirical study will be on the first goal, i.e. the etiology of prejudice and bias motivated 
behaviors. There, the evolutionary roots of prejudice and bias motivated behaviors will be 
explored.  
A large stress will be on the evolution of human sociality, rather than selfishness, and it will be 
argued that prejudice and its manifestations can be considered to be the result of human 
sociality. That is, they result from processes that have evolved in order to maintain social groups 
in society. Central elements there are parochial altruism, coalitional exploitation, moralistic 
aggression and costly signaling. In short, parochial altruism refers to the context in which group 
living would have proved to be adaptive, i.c. a hostile environment with low availability of 
resources, and the presence of other mobile groups competing over these resources. The second 
central element, coalitional psychology, refers to the psychological module that evolved due to 
intergroup conflict and competition. The key there is that humans are equipped with a cognitive 
module that allows to discern group membership on the basis of – otherwise arbitrary – markers. 
The third element, costly signaling, comes in two varieties. The one refers to signaling quality 
– or a genuine concern with norm compliance, whilst the other refers to compliance with norms 
in the form of subtle cheating, in which people tend to behave socially to secure self-interested 
goals such as not being exposed as a cheater. This is important, given the fact that group living 
cannot be maintained without the emergence of norms, as will be discussed. The fourth element, 
moralistic aggression, is equally important, as it is the prime mechanism through which these 
norms are maintained. The overall conclusion of this chapter is that prejudice, or at least some 
                                                 
23 As will appear in the next chapter, prejudice in this sense need not always be consciously present.  
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forms thereof, can be regarded as very specific manifestations of specific forms of pro-social 
behavior (pro-social in the evolutionary sense, with no moral connotation).  
Of course, what happened in the evolutionary past can constitute an “ultimate explanation” as 
Walsh and Beaver (2009) put it, but it can hardly be directly transposed to contemporary 
society. Even though the mechanisms find their origin there, they need to be translated to the 
present. For, a lot of time and history are between then and now, and it needs to be clarified 
how these mechanisms can relate to contemporary society. For this reason, in the third chapter, 
an overview of the currently most widely accepted explanations of prejudice will be presented, 
in order to see how they relate (or not) to the evolutionary framework presented. The theories 
will be drawn from social psychology. More precisely, social dominance orientation, right wing 
authoritarianism, and integrated threat theory will take center stage, as these represent the most 
widely established traditions in explaining prejudice. Thus, the first goal of the study comes 
down to embedding the current social psychological explanations of prejudice in the 
evolutionary framework as a meta-theoretical framework. Even though reference is sometimes 
made to evolution in social dominance and right wing authoritarianism, this is only done to a 
limited extent. In this study, I intend to make the evolutionary underpinnings not only more 
explicit, but also to test them empirically by introducing two new measurement scales, and 
connecting both the concepts of right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation 




Chapter II. The dark side of human sociality: towards an evolutionary 
theory on prejudice 
 
As societies evolved from bands through tribes into chiefdoms and states, some of the 
modes of bonding were extended beyond kinship networks to include other kinds of 
alliances and economic agreements. Because the networks were then larger, the lines of 
communication longer, and the interactions more diverse, the total systems became vastly 
more complex. But the moralistic rules underlying these arrangements appear not to have 
been altered a great deal. The average individual still operates under a formalized code 
no more elaborate than that governing the members of hunter-gatherer societies.  
E. O. Wilson (1975: 554) 
 
In this chapter, the evolutionary roots of contemporary prejudice and bias motivated behaviors 
will be explored. As the quote suggests, the evolutionary approach assumes that the 
mechanisms that have evolved thousands of years ago still have a bearing on the behavior of 
people in contemporary societies, be it that these societies have become immensely more 
complex than those in which the cognitive mechanisms under discussion have evolved initially. 
The goal of this chapter is to uncover the evolution of cognitive mechanisms that may, at least 
in part, give rise to – inter alia –  contemporary prejudice and bias motivated behaviors. In the 
next chapters, these mechanisms will be brought into connection with current theorizing on 
prejudice and bias motivated behaviors.24 Thus, the task ahead is a search for the evolutionary 
roots of prejudice, or, as biosocial criminologists would call it, the ultimate causes of 
contemporary prejudice (Jensen, 2010; Walsh & Beaver, 2009a). This way, the goal is to 
indicate “where violence comes from, how it is embedded in human history, how social 
institutions shape levels and manifestations of violence” (Eisner, 2011, p. 473) in the specific 
case of prejudice and bias motivated behaviors. 
With regard to what is currently called prejudice, one specific narrowing of the scope of the 
study is in order. For, as Kurzban and Leary explain, there are three sources of stigmatization 
and subsequent social exclusion to be found in evolutionary theory. The first one is called 
                                                 
24 That is to say, in this section the “naked” module or mechanism is discussed, whilst in the next chapter it will be 
explored more in depth how these mechanisms are given substance in our contemporary and vastly more complex 
Western world.  
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dyadic cooperation, and is described as “a suite of adaptations designed to cause one to avoid 
interactions with individuals who are poor partners for social exchange, pose a social cost 
greater than their potential social benefit, or, perhaps, simply fail to meet any of the criteria 
for being a potentially valuable social interaction partner”. The second is labeled “parasite 
aversion” and refers to “a suite of adaptations designed to prevent prolonged contact with those 
who are differentially likely to carry communicable pathogen”. Thus, this specific module only 
relates to the exclusion of the ill. The third is called “coalitional computation” and refers to “a 
suite of adaptations designed to cause one to exclude individuals from reaping the benefits of 
membership in one's group, particularly if it is a locally dominant one, and to exploit excluded 
individuals” (Kurzban & Leary, 2001, p. 192). This particular module or mechanism is 
explicitly inter-group oriented, and is the most salient in order to explain most forms of 
contemporary prejudice, as will be explained below. For this reason, the focus of the current 
chapter will be on this specific mechanism, as it provides the core of most instances of prejudice 
(next to other things). Next to this, dyadic cooperation will also be explained, as this module 
presumably produces prejudice and bias motivated behaviors in conjunction with coalitional 
computation. The chapter will not elaborate on parasite aversion, as this is an entirely different 
mechanism.25 
As the title suggests, prejudice can be regarded as the “dark side” of human sociality. By this, 
it is meant that at the time when the psychological modules that may still shape prejudice today 
evolved, group living (or sociality) were adaptive, but could not have been maintained without 
the exclusion of others, be it individuals of the in-group, or entire out-groups for that matter. In 
a way, sociality and a-sociality co-evolved in this way. As it is impossible to clearly isolate the 
evolutionary process that eventually leads to prejudice alone, as evolved psychological modules 
are not that specific, the broader evolutionary history of sociality and a-sociality will be 
presented in this chapter, of course, with due stress on the elements that are of importance to 
the explanation of prejudice.  
However, before doing so, a concise introduction to evolutionary theory will be presented for 
the interested reader. The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with the nuts and bolts 
of evolutionary theory. In the second section, the evolution of human sociality will be discussed. 
In the third section, its counterpart, human a-sociality, will be discussed. In each of these 
                                                 
25 This particular mechanism can, however, be used in order to do a quasi-experimental study. For, if it is true that the 
modules are distinct, any theory that is able to explain prejudice on the basis of coalitional computation in conjunction 
with dyadic cooperation, should not be able to explain the social exclusion of the ill.  
52 
 
sections, the elements that pertain to prejudice and bias motivated behaviors will be explicitly 
highlighted. In a fourth section, two other general-purpose mechanisms or psychological 
modules that have a bearing on the etiology of prejudice and bias motivated behaviors will be 
discussed in order to make the transition to the next chapter, where contemporary theories of 
prejudice will be discussed. In the concluding section, after summarizing the main findings with 
regard to prejudice, the general problem formulation of the study will be reformulated in terms 
of evolutionary theory.  
1. Nuts and bolts of evolutionary theory 
Given the fact that the social sciences have been quite reluctant to accept evolutionary theory 
in their theoretical models (e.g. Wright & Miller, 1998)26, a few basic principles that underlie 
the evolutionary approach but may be “landmines” if not properly explained, will be discussed. 
In addition, some of the main misconceptions about evolutionary theory will be reviewed and 
evaluated in light of these core principles. 
The key logic in evolutionary theory is the principle that the evolution of species occurs through 
random variation and functional selection. Mutations occur over generations through the 
recombination of genes, thus resulting in random mutations with regard to an organism’s 
genotype.27 However, not all random mutations will eventually “survive”, or prove adaptive to 
the environment. This is due to the limited availability of resources, in combination with the 
fact that a population expands until the carrying capacity thereof is exceeded in its natural 
environment. This means that at least not all members of that particular species will survive, 
but that only those who are “best” adapted will do so. The term “best” in this context is to be 
understood without any normative connotation. That is, what we morally define as “good” or 
“bad” has no bearing on the theory of evolution: an adaptation or mutation is only evaluated in 
                                                 
26 The reason for this disproportionate absence of evolutionary thought in criminology most likely is of a moral nature; 
as aberrant misconceptions of evolutionary theory, such as the widespread racism based on beliefs of inferiority of races, 
Lombroso’s atavism, social Darwinism, and eugenics have waded through our recent history with the memory of, among 
others, the Nazi and apartheid regimes still quite vividly present, this should not come as a surprise, just as the Hobbesian 
conception of human nature has been generally rejected in favor of that of Rousseau in a specific historic context of 
humanitarianism. However, even though the moral goal pursued by this is to be applauded by all means, the atrocities 
thus rightfully rejected rest on false premises with regard to evolutionary theory. Hence, any rejection of evolutionary 
theory as such on this basis would amount to a false dismissal thereof. In this chapter, the often violent nature of man 
will not be ignored, but attention will equally be paid to the behavioral aspects of man, equally adaptive as the more 
violent dispositions, that in current times are considered the highest moral good. There often is a thin line between “good” 
and “bad” in this sense, and often the context will play a crucial role in this sense. For, in evolution there is only adaptive 
or maladaptive, not “good” or “bad”, and behavior is adaptive to a context or environment, which may elicit a variety of 
behavioral responses.  
27 This is the genetic makeup of an organism. This makeup, in combination with developmental and environmental factors 
will eventually determine the organism’s phenotype, or how the genetic makeup of the organism is displayed in 
characteristics, behavior, and various “artifacts” such as a bird’s nest or human cultural traditions.  
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light of the environmental pressures an organism faces. That is, the organisms equipped with 
the (random) mutations that happen to be best suited to deal with the specific, spatiotemporally 
restricted environmental conditions it is confronted with will be the ones that eventually survive 
in the “struggle for life”. In this sense, selection is functional in relation to the environment.  
Further, the main goal of natural selection is passing on genes, not individuals, an approach 
exemplified in Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (Dawkins, 2006 [1975]). In this widely accepted 
view, the unit of selection at the most basic level in evolutionary theory is not an individual 
organism, but the gene and the information it contains. Strategies ensuring the survival of genes 
over many generations are, in this context, to be seen as successful from an evolutionary point 
of view. The term selfish in this context does not refer to the way we apply this term to humans 
– as genes do not consciously think and act – but indicates that “the units that survive in the 
world will be the ones that succeed at surviving at the expense of their rivals at their own level 
in the hierarchy” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 246).28 However, the “selfishness” of genes does not 
imply – nor does it preclude – the selfishness of the organism in which they reside. Of all 
thinkable random mutations, then, only a 
few (relatively speaking) succeed in 
transmitting genetic material to other 
generations. Among these few, still wide 
variety exists. Some of them will be 
undoubtedly selfish, but, as will appear, the 
role of biological altruism and cooperation 
have traditionally been severely 
underestimated in this process. 
The notion that the environmental pressures 
facing an organism are spatiotemporally 
restricted is of great importance in evolution, 
indicating that this environment itself is 
subject to change as well. In this sense, a 
random mutation that is functional now, may 
                                                 
28 The term “hierarchy” here does not refer to the idea of a qualified hierarchy as in the well-known Scala Naturalis idea 
(the idea of a hierarchy between forms of life, with a deity at the top, mankind right under that deity, and all other fauna 
and flora hierarchically ordered below humans). It does refer to the level of selection, i.e. here it is about competition 
between genes and genes alone. Multi-level selection theories incorporate multiple levels (e.g. the organism and the 
group) in them.  
Ernst Mayr’s summary of Darwinian evolution (Mayr, 
2001, p. 186) 
Fact 1. Every population has such high fertility that its size 
would increase exponentially if not constrained. 
Fact 2. The size of populations, except for temporally annual 
fluctuations, remains stable over time (observed steady-state 
stability). 
Fact 3. The resources available to every species are limited. 
Inference 1. There is intense competition (struggle for 
existence) among the members of a species. 
Fact 4. No two individuals of a population are exactly the same 
(population thinking). 
Inference 2. Individuals of a population differ from each other 
in the probability of survival (i.e. natural selection). 
Fact 5. Many of the differences among the individuals of a 
population are, at least in part, heritable. 
Inference 3. Natural selection, continued over many 
generations, results in evolution. 
 
Table 4: summary of evolutionary theory by Mayr. 
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well be nonfunctional or maladaptive in the future, and, vice versa, a random mutation that is 
not functional now, may well be functional in the future. This finding stands in sharp contrast 
with teleological reasoning where everything evolves directionally towards some form of 
“ultimate goal”, which is entirely absent in evolutionary thinking. Through repetitions of this 
process over generations, certain genes will be copied whilst others perish, and evolution of 
species occurs. The logic in Darwinian evolution has been summarized in a clear and concise 
way by Ernst Mayr, one of the most notable evolutionary biologists, in five steps (Mayr, 2001, 
p. 186) (see box).  
An important remark with regard to the environment is in order here: selection pressures are 
not limited to the natural environment, but may also relate to the cultural environment. This is 
exemplified in the “gene-culture” co-evolution thesis, and related viewpoints such as multilevel 
selection theory (e.g. Richerson & Boyd, 2005) and “the extended phenotype” (Dawkins & 
Dennett, 1999)29. In this sense, culture is an evolutionary force in itself, and co-evolves with 
genes in an interactive manner. It is, however, important to note that culture is not reducible to 
genetics; rather, it is generally considered to be an evolutionary force in its own right. Moreover, 
culture and genes co-evolve, meaning that genetic changes may result in cultural changes, but 
also the other way around: cultural changes may entail genetic changes as well, given that they 
may be induced through functional selection in the cultural environment of organisms.30 T 
his latter phenomenon is often referred to as “niche construction” or the ability of humans to 
alter the niche they live in. To the extent that genetic change is largely selected for functionally 
on the basis of niches, this may exert important influences on the genetic development of the 
organism inhabiting it. Given the fact that humans are by far the most potent niche constructors 
around, the importance of culture ought not to be underestimated. (see Dawkins, 2004, pp. 28-
34 for a more detailed exposition on this complex process and similar examples). 
                                                 
29 Multilevel selection theory states that it is not only genes and their replication that steers evolutionary processes, but that cultural 
entities are subject to similar variation and selection processes. A related but more contested idea is “meme theory” (Blackmore, 1999). 
The idea of the extended phenotype goes against this point of view by maintaining that the gene does remain the central driving force 
in evolution, and that culture can be seen as a phenotypical extensions of the genetic makeup of a specific gene pool. Both, however, 
ascribe culture a powerful evolutionary role in human development. This debate will not be further considered in the current study, 
however, as the main idea to withhold is that culture does play an important part in human evolution. The point of view taken up in the 
current study, however, is the gene-centered view (inter alia because of technical and theoretical problems associated with multilevel 
and group selection theories – apart from cultural group selection theories). Also, some theorists to be cited in the current chapter do 
adhere to the group selection paradigm. This is, however, no problem. The elements discussed from these theorists are phenomena that 
are also endorsed by gene-centered theorists. The specific group-selection mechanisms of the theorists will not be considered. In the 
gene-centered view, population level dynamics equally are possible.  
30 I use the term “organism” to stress the existence of artifacts impacting genetic evolution in other life forms as well, the typical example 
being beaver dams. Of course, the extent to which humans are cultural is unparalleled in other species around the world.  
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Thus, assuming selection occurs functionally in relation to the environment,  an adaptation can 
also lose its adaptive value when the environmental pressure changes. By asking the question 
whether behavior is (a) an adaptation and (b) whether or not this behavior is adaptive here and 
now, four types of results of evolution can be discerned. In case of a current adaptation, 
behavior still is adaptive in light of the environment. In case of a past adaptation, the behavior 
once was adaptive, but the environment has changed to such an extent that he adaptation has 
lost its adaptiveness. In case of an exaptation31, behavior is currently adaptive, but was not 
selected for as such. Finally, a dysfunctional side-product is behavior that just is what it is, 
without increasing fitness, and without being selected for (Blokland, 2005; Blokland, 
Thienpont, & Donker, 2005). In general, in this chapter I will argue that the evolutionarily 
inherited psychology underlying contemporary negative prejudice and the behaviors resulting 
therefrom are past adaptations even though one can claim current adaptiveness for the general 
mechanism in other contexts than prejudice. However, an investigation into the evolutionary 
roots of this behavior might elucidate the cognitive mechanisms that evolved to resolve issues 
essential to our species’ survival, and may hence increase our understanding of that particular 
mode of behavior a lot.  
This indicates the main role of evolutionary theory in the study: it has a heuristic value. As 
Eisner puts it, “the issues raised by evolutionary theory strike at the very heart of the 
criminology of violence: they are aspects of the question of where violence comes from, how it 
is embedded in human history, how social institutions shape levels and manifestations of 
violence, and how state order relates to violence” (Eisner, 2011a, p. 473). The main value 
thereof lies in the fact that evolutionary theory may provide for a rich source of inspiration to 
“channel” the vast diversity and accompanying yet sometimes dangerous fragmentation and 
overspecialization of the field; that is, it may prove to be fertile ground for unification and, 
consequently, theoretical interdisciplinary integration (see also the introductory chapter on 
scientific philosophical considerations underlying the present study). In a second, yet in no way 
less important sense, it may also provide criminologists and social scientists alike with hints as 
to the underlying structuring causes of behavior which are not always straightforward or 
intuitively expected. As indicated in the introductory part describing the philosophical 
framework of this study, this may have certain benefits as the problem of induction is amplified 
in the social sciences, and, as a result, inductive reasoning may well lead to spurious concepts 
                                                 
31 For example, our sense of balance allows us to ride a bicycle, but it certainly is not selected for in order to ride bicycles.  
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constructed around various sets of initial conditions. This can be avoided by taking research to 
a higher level of universality – a deeper level of robustness if you wish.32  
Finally, I would like to address a very common misconception about evolutionary theory 
applied to human behavior. It is not about a reinvention of Lombroso as is often claimed, usually 
by those criminologists that brand themselves as “critical” (Carrier & Walby, 2014). Put 
differently, the myth of born criminals is not in any way a necessary consequence of an 
evolutionary analysis of crime and deviance, nor is this notion of any interest to the present 
study. It has to be noted from the onset that an evolutionary analysis of crime does not classify 
people in a binary fashion as either “criminal” or “normal”. Rather, it has an eye for the 
adaptability of people  – and other organisms for that matter – to the situation or niche an 
individual is in. In this vein, no person can be regarded as “criminal” or “normal”, rather the 
question of criminals and crime becomes a question which is essentially concerned with 
context. The Lombrosian concept of “atavism” is equally rejected in this logic, given that – in 
Darwin’s words – natura non facit saltum. Not forward, not backward. Even though no 
individual is the same, the idea of a “setback” in evolution is not in line with evolutionary 
thinking, as the mere idea presupposes a direction in which evolution would be moving.  
This brings me to the question of determination. In the wake of the fear of revival of Lombroso, 
it is often assumed that evolutionary theory will result in deterministic explanations. This is 
false, and contradicts the core principle of evolution: random mutation and functional selection. 
Mutations are as random as this term can possibly refer to; there are no limits to the type of 
mutation that may occur. In itself, this would make determination quite difficult. But selection 
itself neither can provide for grounds of determination, as it is functional in light of the 
environment. Given that the environment is constantly changing, in non-predictable ways, this 
is no fertile ground for determination either, especially taking into account the complex socio-
cultural environment mankind has been able to create. Both arguments in combination with 
each other, then, make determination quite unlikely or practically impossible when applying 
evolutionary theory.  
2. Human sociality 
In this section, a potential evolutionary source of contemporary prejudice and bias motivated 
aggression will be explored that meets the criteria of a higher degree of universality and an at 
                                                 
32 Again, I do not imply by this statement that all current research is “wrong” or “bad”, I only mean that it may be a valuable exercise to 
add this type of analysis to it.  
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least similar degree of precision. In other words, a search into a possible structural cause of 
prejudice and bias motivated aggression will be undertaken in the current section. More 
concretely, I will try to show that prejudice and bias motivated behaviors are at least in part 
instances of pro-social behavior. The study of mankind’s cooperative or social nature is in large 
part to be accredited to the field of economics, where theoreticians have been puzzled by the 
fact that people did not act selfishly in a variety of laboratory and natural settings, even though 
it was a common assumption that all of mankind is selfish in the sense that they will tend to 
maximize their own profit, if need be at the expense of the greater good. Especially considering 
that natural selection would favor “defectors” (the name usually given to individuals who do 
not cooperate but act selfishly) over cooperators, as the former maximize their gains whilst the 
latter are basically leeched upon in order to do so. Given the fact that people have been 
cooperating for a long time, mainly economists undertook a search into the possible 
evolutionary roots of cooperation, for if there is no mechanism and purpose sustaining it, it 
should not have existed – at the very least not on the scale it currently exists in humans; the trait 
is too predominantly present in all cultures for it to be a random dysfunctional mutation / 
byproduct of evolution. 
In what follows, the term “pro-social”, refers to behaviors that benefit others, while not 
necessarily being beneficial to the person or organism performing the act of helping. 
Sometimes this also called (biological) altruism, a term which has no moral connotation in 
evolutionary theory (it simply means that the cost33 to the one performing the act is greater than 
that of the one receiving the act, which might be zero). In the remainder of the text the concepts 
altruism, cooperation and pro-sociality can be used interchangeably in the sense of pro-social 
behaviors.  
2.1. “Classical” explanations of human sociality 
Traditionally, four forms of social behaviors (biologically altruistic behaviors) can be 
discerned. One of the most well-known is called kin selection, and was already referred to by 
Charles Darwin himself in his studies on domestication of animals. However, even though the 
term was probably coined by J.M. Smith (1964), the logic behind it was first formally 
(mathematically) treated by J.B.S. Haldane (1932) and R.A. Fischer (1930) before. Explicit 
links with social behavior and altruism more precisely have been formulated at an early stage 
                                                 
33 In evolutionary terms, “cost” is to be understood in terms of success of transmission of genes. This may imply risks to 
the own well-being, death being the most obvious one involved. 
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by Hamilton (1963). The principle behind kin selection is that organisms that dispose of 
characteristics that lead them to protect and help genetically related organisms, will have higher 
chances in passing on their genetic material. From the “selfish gene” point of view this is 
logical: if an organism would be purely selfish and only concentrate on generating more 
offspring, but not care for this offspring, its chances of survival are reduced considerably. If, 
on the other hand, it does care about their offspring and make sure they survive into adulthood 
to procreate themselves, the chances of passing on genetic material to future generations is 
greatly enhanced. Especially in an environment where both types of organism are in 
competition to maximize their share in the gene-pool, those that are pro-social toward their kin 
can be expected to see their “profits”, in terms of the relative share in the gene-pool, grow 
disproportionately compared to the latter. Further, as exemplified in “Hamilton’s rule”, this 
type of inclusive fitness is not limited to offspring, but may also include more distant relatives. 
In this respect, Hamilton’s rule states that the altruistic tendencies towards another is directly 
related to the degree of kinship the altruist shares therewith (Hamilton, 1963). 
Even though the process of kin selection is widely observed in nature (including humans), it 
does have the main limitation of being restricted to kinas it is not capable of explaining the 
existence of altruism between non-related people (for example). This type of pro-social 
behavior has been explained mainly by Trivers’ reciprocal altruism. As he explains, “certain 
classes of behavior conveniently denoted as ‘altruistic’ can be selected for even when the 
recipient is so distantly related to the organism performing the altruistic act that kin selection 
can be ruled out” (Trivers, 1971, p. 35) This type of behavior may take place between members 
of different species, and only benefit the organism performing them in the long run. It is 
“referred to as symbiosis and forms the basis of all forms of barter and trade” (Dawkins, 2006, 
p. 248). The main principle is that altruistic acts may be reciprocated in the future, thus 
enhancing the fitness (in terms of the propagation of genetic material) of those involved over 
those that are not altruistic, should they ever be in need of such behavior themselves – which 
occurs often in natural settings. It is based on the following limiting assumptions, without which 
it cannot emerge: 
- the cost to the giver is smaller than the benefit to the receiver 
- long lifespan of the organisms involved; 
- low dispersal rate (that is, quite small groups); 
- life in small, mutually dependent social groups; 




Even though this model of altruism goes further than kin selection models, its main limitations 
are the above listed assumptions. For, if we look at modern society, people do not live in small, 
mutually dependent groups (anymore), and are consequently not likely to meet each other again 
in the future. The type of “direct” reciprocity described above thus may fall short of providing 
an explanation why people do cooperate with people they are not likely to encounter again in 
the future, a very real scenario in the contemporary world. In order to explain this, the term 
indirect reciprocity has emerged. Instead of the principle “I’ll scratch your back if you’ll scratch 
mine”, the principle in indirect reciprocity is “I’ll scratch your back and someone else will 
scratch mine” or “I’ll scratch someone else’s back and you’ll scratch mine”. Even though this 
seems a plausible expansion of the original concept “reciprocal altruism”, some problems may 
easily emerge with regard to the stability of the cooperative strategies involved. The reason for 
this is that reputation plays an important role in indirect reciprocity. By helping someone who 
cannot directly help us in a future encounter (as is the case in direct reciprocity), one builds a 
reputation of being a good reciprocator. In turn, this reputation of being a “helper” will elicit 
help from others when needed. The reason is that a good reputation signals the individual’s 
willingness to help others, thus also potentially the helper (Nowak, 2006).  
Nowak and Sigmund (2005, p. 1292 in particular) convincingly show that problems may arise 
if no “rules of engagement” are spelled out in order to assess other individuals. If no such rules 
are available, a stable cooperative strategy cannot emerge. If people would act purely on the 
basis of self-interest by giving help to anyone, including defectors, in order to gain a positive 
reputation (unconditional strategy), defection would soon become the dominant strategy. The 
reason for this simply is that people are not inclined to help others if there is not a clear 
indication that they will receive any help in the future. That way, they will soon decide to defect 
themselves as well, given that their pro-social efforts remain unrewarded. In this process, 
cooperation is destabilized over time for which reason discrimination of defectors (in the sense 
of exclusion, non-interaction with them) is required. That is, a conditional strategy is warranted 
in order to reach a stable solution. In this sense, indirect reciprocity requires advanced cognitive 
abilities, allowing people to assess the norm-conformity of the people involved in the 
interaction. This, as Nowak and Sigmund argue (ibid.), is most likely the basis for the 
exceptional cognitive abilities found among humans.  
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2.2. Parochial altruism and coalitional computation 
Even though the “classic” explanations of human cooperation or altruism are well tested and 
very acceptable from an evolutionary point of view, they are still pestered by difficulties in 
explaining two theoretically relevant phenomena (Bowles & Gintis, 2011, p. 3). First, they 
cannot account for situations in which people do not interact repeatedly. This is a problem 
foremost applicable to reciprocal altruism (or “enlightened self-interest”). If reciprocity is the 
basis of our cooperative nature, it seems difficult to theoretically expand this model to one shot 
interactions – even though the above mentioned game theoretic designs did report cooperation 
in single shot studies (game theoretic designs in which partners change continuously, or when 
there is no chance at even meeting them in person). One simple example would be one shot 
trade exchanges with people across the ocean, made easy these days by means of internet. It 
would seem difficult to sustain cooperation in “groups” of global proportions, in which one shot 
interactions are tantamount, on the mere basis of reciprocity, direct or indirect.  
A second, related reason is that it is not always possible to build reputations, for basically the 
very same reason of group size. Gossip and other common channels used to spread reputational 
information are not as effective in this context as they are in small (e.g. tribal) groups. Why 
then, do we maintain cooperation, even in a scenario where selfishness would result in better 
overall payoffs, often even without a chance of being excluded or penalized for it? In light of 
the tantamount number of chances to defect or cheat, it is remarkable how people, people all 
across the world alike, do not engage in a kind of large scale selfish defection, which remains 
– in light of the classic accounts – an evolutionary puzzle.  
This is especially puzzling, taking into account the violent group interactions of mankind, 
commonly observed both in large scale warfare and everyday conflicts both past and present. 
In dealing with this ostensible evolutionary conundrum, Bowles and colleagues propose the 
rather counterintuitive yet evolutionary acceptable and well tested hypothesis that altruism and 
parochialism could have evolved in synergy with one another (Bowles, 2008, p. 326). He bases 
this hypothesis on the finding that neither altruism, defined as an act conferring a benefit on 
another at a personal cost, nor parochialism, defined as favoring insiders over outsiders, alone 
would be favored by selection. In this context, altruism alone would include bearing costs at 
the expense of others, possibly non-altruistic, which would thus gain an evolutionary advantage 
in terms of fitness (be it reproductive or material). Hence, “pure” altruists would not be favored 
by natural selection. For parochialism, it is argued that explicit hostility toward outsiders may 
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equally prove to be a setback from an evolutionary point of view, given that others might benefit 
from cooperative strategies or alliances with others. However, one need not look very far to see 
that both behavioral dispositions seem to coexist in humanity (its history is ridden with 
bloodshed but equally so with alliances and morally inspiring acts of courage and generosity). 
How parochialism and altruism co-evolved or act in synergy, has a lot to do with the 
environments in which our ancestors lived. In this context, Late Pleistocene environments were 
quite hostile environments, due to – inter alia – climatological instability, the presence of 
multiple predators, and often scarcity of resources. As a result, often long-ranging migrations 
would take place, in the course of which encounters with other migrating groups, in search of 
the same scarce resources, were likely events. This likelihood is also reflected in the abundant 
archeological and statistical evidence testifying to a history of conflict. In principle, two 
elements emerge here: (i) hostile environments and (ii) the presence of other groups competing 
over scarce resources. The term “hostile” is to be understood in the sense that environmental 
shifts may have induced scarcity of resources and fueled mobility of a wide variety of organisms 
(e.g. hostile animals) competing over these resources. “Hostile” in this sense may also refer to 
the fact that hunting large game, rather the rule than the exception at the time, might be 
impossible for one single individual. However, in the explanation of parochial altruism, 
especially intergroup competition over scarce resources is focused on. As Choi and Bowles 
indicate (2007, p. 636), parochial altruists, defined as those who are willing to bear costs in the 
form of taking part in conflict (possibly perishing in the conflict), in order to confer benefits on 
the other group members, were favored by selection over individuals who are either solely 
altruistic or solely parochial34 in the Late Pleistocene environment.  
In their experimental design, Choi and Bowles indicate four possible combinations between the 
altruist and parochial dispositions; tolerant or non-parochial altruists, parochial altruists, 
parochial non-altruists, and tolerant non-altruists (Choi & Bowles, 2007, p. 637). Neither 
altruism nor parochialism emerge alone as the main strategy in their computer simulations, and 
the (however fictive) societies that do emerge after thousands of (however fictive) generations 
are either tolerant or selfish, with little warfare or conflict between groups, or they are parochial 
and altruistic, with frequent hostile interactions with other groups (Bowles, 2008, p. 326). 
However, in real life scenarios as opposed to necessarily simplified computer simulations, it 
                                                 
34 It must be remembered at this instance that in the gene-centered approach, expressions such as the one presented may 
be confusing. For, it is not so much a conscious effort of the person doing the act; he is usually motivated to do so by the 
proximal mechanisms such as emotions. What counts, is the relative proportion of a certain gene in the overall gene pool 
of a certain population. In this sense, “conferring a benefit” simply means increasing this relative proportion.  
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plausible that all of the four types of people described above are present. How interactions with 
other groups occur, then, depends on the fractions of either of the types mentioned in the overall 
population. If a group with a large fraction of parochial altruists fights over scarce resources 
with a group consisting of a large fraction of non-altruistic parochialists, for example, the 
former would be favored by selection over the latter, thus contributing to the spread of parochial 
altruists over the world.  
It remains, however, more complex than an all-or-nothing game; for, if both groups consist of 
high fractions of parochial altruists (groups are thus evenly matched), conflict will be avoided, 
as is the case, for example, with primates (Choi & Bowles, 2007, p. 637; Wilson, Hauser, & 
Wrangham, 2001).35 Also, shifts occur in the balance of the population, due to these dynamics 
(over generations that is). Hypothetically, when the vast majority of individuals in a population 
is non-parochial, intergroup conflict is not likely. However, when the vast majority of the 
population consists of parochial altruists, neither is violent intergroup conflict likely, as most 
groups in the population would be evenly matched. The incidence of violent conflict is most 
likely highest when a large part, but not a vast majority, of the population consists of parochial 
altruists (theoretically 40%-70% based on computer simulations), given that under these 
circumstances groups are most unevenly matched. Finally, in the absence of violent intergroup 
conflict, parochial altruism is not favored, but rather non-parochial altruism is. Again, it needs 
to be stressed that this is not an all-or-nothing logic, all types are probably present in any 
population. However, due to micro-changes in populations over generations shifts from “peace” 
to “war” may occur, due to gradual shifts in the composition of the population.36 
From the above it already appears that human sociality is not always an unconditional 
phenomenon, but it is often limited to a specific group of people whilst the same courtesy is not 
extended to other groups of people, especially so in situations of conflict and competition. The 
important element to remember for the purpose of the present study, is that the above 
environmental pressures may have selected for a specific type of cognitive module, that still 
persists today. An obvious mechanism that would be needed in order to confer benefits to the 
in-group in competition with other groups is a psychological module allowing to differentiate 
                                                 
35 An interesting finding by Wilson et al in this context is that the willingness to engage in conflict also depends on the 
density of the population. The lesser the density of the population, the less, in this case, individual chimpanzees are 
inclined to engage in intergroup conflict (Wilson et al., 2001, p. 1213). Various other contextual factors are noted by 
them.  
36 Even though Gintis et al. apply the reasoning to a genetic group-selection model (which are very contested), this 
presumption is not necessary. Other scholars, such as Kurzban et al. (personal communication) who do not embrace 
genetic group-selection models do accept the role of the environment and intergroup conflict in the evolution of sociality.  
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between the various groups involved in the conflict. A module that may perform this function 
is discussed by Kurzban and Leary (2001) as one of three mechanisms responsible for social 
exclusion: coalitional computation or exploitation. Kurzban and Leary describe it as: “A suite 
of adaptations designed to cause one to exclude individuals from reaping the benefits of 
membership in one's group, particularly if it is a locally dominant37 one, and to exploit excluded 
individuals” (p. 192). This mechanism can be considered to be explicitly group-oriented and 
finds its basis in the very same Late Pleistocene living conditions as discussed by Bowles and 
Gintis in their “parochial altruism”. 
Thus, what the evolutionary history of parochial altruism (or at least the conditions leading 
thereto) resulted in from a psychological point of view, is a coalitional computation module or 
the ability to pick up signals that represent coalitional group membership, be it of competing or 
collaborating groups. Even though the environmental pressures today are very distinct from 
those faced by people in the late Pleistocene (or in current ancestral societies), this does not 
mean that this cognitive module therefore does not exist anymore. In this sense it can be seen 
as mainly a past adaptation. 
It is important to stress that there hardly is any “automatic” coding of cues that may be 
associated with coalitional group membership. In this sense, the cognitive module is rather 
neutral: it allows for the registration of coalitional belonging as such, but is indifferent to the 
concrete content of the cues used (such as, for example, skin color). Only two such cues are 
cross-culturally automatically coded: gender and age, as encoding thereof results in a variety 
of evolutionarily beneficial inferences about an individual. As Kurzban, Toobey and Cosmides 
(2003) argue however, automatic coding is very unlikely in the case of skin color. The reason 
is simple: ancestral societies most likely did not travel far enough to actually encounter 
individuals of another skin color, which makes the automatic encoding of race doubtful. The 
reason why skin color often is encoded then (at least in the contemporary world), is the same 
as any other cue may possibly be encoded: it has gained coalitional meaning. That is, it serves 
as a proxy to determine the coalitional membership of someone. Importantly, these cues can 
basically be anything, as long as they are proxies of coalitional belonging. Thus, any cue can 
be encoded through the machinery of coalitional computation, but they will only do so if the 
cue in question has meaning in terms of coalitional belonging, the latter often being 
locally/culturally defined.  
                                                 
37 Or, put differently, not evenly matched to the competing group in the positive sense.  
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This reasoning was also put to the test in an experimental design by Kurzban et. al. (Kurzban, 
Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001) and the findings are quite astonishing. In two experiments using a 
memory confusion protocol, the registration of coalitional alliances was tested for. In a nutshell, 
the first experiment tested for the encoding of coalitional alliance on the basis of verbal cues 
rather than visual clues, whereas the second experiment used shirts of different color to visually 
indicate coalition. In both experiments, both Euro-American and Afro-American subjects were 
presented to the participants. Importantly, skin color did not match the verbal cues of coalition 
in either experiment, whereas the color of the t-shirt in the second experiment did match the 
verbal cues. In experiment two, it is important to note that the verbal and visual markers of 
coalition did not match skin color (both groups consisted of both Afro- and Euro-Americans). 
In the first experiment, coalitional alliance on the basis of both verbal cues and skin color 
occurred, with the effect of skin color being twice as strong as the verbal cues. In experiment 
two, coalition was coded substantially stronger on the basis of both verbal and visual clues. 
Even though subjects did continue to encode for skin color, the effect of skin color was 
substantially lower compared to experiment one. Furthermore, in experiment two, encoding of 
coalitional alliance was far stronger than encoding for race. As the title of their article suggests, 
these results imply that “race can be erased” by replacing it with different visual markers of 
shared belonging.  
2.3. Intermediary conclusion 
Thus, whilst there are many mechanisms that explain human sociality, the concept of “parochial 
altruism” is one which enables to explain sociality under far less stringent conditions compared 
to the mechanisms of kin selection, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity. It appears that a 
very plausible reason why large scale cooperation and sociality evolved among humans, is the 
hostile environment in which people lived in the late Pleistocene. It was hostile in two senses. 
First, the presence of both large predators and an instable environment would be a selection 
pressure for group living. Second, it was an instable environment with scarce resources. Whilst 
groups travel around, competition arises over those resources when groups meet, which also 
provides a selection pressure for group living and cooperation. This history of humanity may 
have led to the evolution of a cognitive mechanism that allows for the identification of different 
groups, both for the purpose of identifying those with which one can cooperate, and those who 
are competitors.  
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These processes cannot be seen entirely distinctly from each other. For, “parochial altruism” or 
in-group cooperation as proposed by Bowles et al. may easily extensions or adaptations of 
strong reciprocity In any case, nature is “economical” and often different processes co-evolve. 
As has already been suggested in the margin of the discussion on reciprocity models, sociality 
does often co-evolve with bias and even outright hostility towards certain people or groups of 
people. It is at the heart of the “parochial altruism” hypothesis, where sociality evolved out of 
violent conflict as such. In fact, violence and social exclusion both on an intra- and inter-group 
level are often needed in order to maintain sociality. This will be the subject matter of the next 
section.  
3. Co-evolution of social exclusion and hostility 
In this section, the darker side of human sociality will be subject of discussion. I will argue that 
morally denounced behaviors, ranging from gossiping over exclusion to extermination, have 
been a necessary condition for human sociality to evolve in our ancestral history. More 
precisely, punishment of bad reciprocators, the intensification of punishment of out-group 
members, and costly signaling will be discussed. Whilst these are all important features in the 
maintenance of human sociality, they are also presumed to have a direct import on prejudice 
and bias motivated behaviors, if they are combined with coalitional thinking. Whilst 
punishment of bad reciprocators has been indicated as an intra-group process, the cognitive 
mechanism of coalitional computation may, conditional upon the circumstances, take it to the 
inter-group level. That very same mechanism may, conditionally upon the circumstances, 
provide for opportunities to send costly signals of one’s overall quality as a group member. Let 
us now turn to the beginning of this story: moralistic aggression. 
3.1. Punishment of bad reciprocators 
Without regulating mechanisms, natural selection – essentially based on competition – favors 
defectors. As was shown by (Fischbacher & Gachter, 2010), in a game theoretic design, people 
can either be inclined to free riding (selfish motive), or to cooperate (social motive), or can find 
themselves in between. Voluntary contributions to the public good, however, are not 
unconditional but modeled on the contributions of others. Therefore, they state that cooperation 
is conditional on the contributions of others (Fischbacher & Gachter, 2010, p. 541). Also, 
perfect conditional cooperators – whose contributions match those given by others – are very 
rare, most people being classified as imperfect conditional cooperators. As a result, 
contributions to the public good decline over time: “after some time, all types behave like 
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income-maximizing free riders, even though only a minority is motivated by pure income-
maximization alone” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002, p. C17; Fischbacher & Gachter, 2010, p. 554). 
In the same vein, people prefer (see infra: the role of emotions) to interact with likeminded 
people (Page, Putterman, & Unel, 2005, p. 1033)38: if someone is a conditional cooperator, he 
or she will tend to cooperate if he or she knows that other people will do the same.  
In this sense, one way of dealing with cheating is to not interact when they are present, 
discriminating against them, or to even banish them from the group (e.g. Cinyabuguma, Page, 
& Putterman, 2005). This type of discrimination is a powerful tool to maintain in-group 
cooperation when interactions with outsiders are regular, especially if those outsider groups are 
non-altruistic (e.g. García & van den Bergh, 2011, pp. 286-287). This finding is in line with the 
above discussion on parochial altruism, in which cooperative tendencies are forged in the midst 
of conflict and competition. However, no group consists of cooperators exclusively, so 
discrimination against in-group members who refuse to cooperate, either in the form of refusals 
to cooperate with them or in the form of banishment, occur as well. Further, the threat of 
expulsion may provide strong incentives for free-riders to cooperate notwithstanding their non-
cooperative tendencies. The reason is simple: if one looks at the situation form the point of view 
of a selfish individual, his or her payoff (in terms of fitness or personal incentives) will by no 
means be served if they are excluded from the group (Cinyabuguma et al., 2005).  
Further, it has been widely established in game theoretic research designs that punishment of 
defectors leads to increases in the contributions of people to the common good or their 
willingness to cooperate with others. As Jensen (2010) describes, the ability to punish in direct 
reciprocal relationships has quite clear advantages, insofar as it is capable of deterring potential 
cheaters into reciprocating on their own. The incentive here can be labeled “self-serving”, “self-
interested” or “selfish”, insofar as the only incentive to cooperate (i.e. reciprocate) on behalf of 
the reciprocating party, is the avoidance of punishment. Basically the same holds for second 
party punishment, where the punishment is executed by a party not involved in the reciprocal 
relationship. There too, deterrence may be the factor that explains the wide occurrence of 
behavior. Apart from that, however, it can also be viewed as a “self-serving behavior at the 
disposal of dominant individuals who can coerce others into behaving cooperatively” (Jensen, 
                                                 
38 In this sense it has been repeatedly investigated and corroborated that people have social preferences, and that these 
play an important role in the modeling of interactions between various types of people. Social preferences include 
reciprocity, inequity aversion, pure altruism, and envious preferences.  
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2010, p. 2635). As we will see further, indeed other motives can be invoked for this type of 
behavior, i.e. costly signaling of reputation and strength.  
However, this explanation of the sustainment of cooperation in principle has the same problems 
as did reciprocity when used as an explanation for altruism. For, the mechanism described 
above presumably is most efficient in groups that fit the same criteria as the groups in which 
reciprocity is most likely to emerge. Even in the case of indirect reciprocity, the explanation 
fails to address the issue why altruism and cooperation is sustained in mankind to such high 
degrees. In order to explain this, the concept of strong reciprocity has been invoked.  
A wide variety of game theoretic experimental designs have supported the claim that people 
punish those who cheat, also apart from the particular case of indirect reciprocity (e.g. Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2002; Fischbacher & Gachter, 2010; Page et al., 2005). The key finding in this 
type of study is that the punishment of norm transgressors occurs apart from any kind of 
reciprocity; that is, strong reciprocity is common among humanity. Just as the “classical” 
explanations of cooperation fail to explain why people have developed a sense of strong 
reciprocity and the accompanying pro-social norms next to more selfish tendencies, the 
explanations of punishment in the reciprocity model do not allow to explain the existence of 
“purely” altruistic punishment – punishment in which the punisher only incurs a cost to the 
benefit of the larger group, without this ever being  reciprocated. This is a scenario quite 
common in the ever more globalized world we live in. Again, the large fractions of strong 
reciprocators among mankind have been a puzzle for economists and evolutionary biologists 
alike for a long time.  
The authors ascribe the way this strong reciprocity – the combination of unconditional 
reciprocation with altruistic punishment – came about relates to the exceptional cognitive skills 
mankind is equipped with. As elaborated earlier, it is likely that one of the earliest forms of 
altruism found in humans is kin altruism. An adaptation thereof, resulting in reciprocity, may 
have proven to be favored by selection given its obvious fitness advantage. Reciprocity already 
requires more mental gymnastics to occur. Especially another adaptation thereof, indirect 
reciprocity, would require even more intellect. But the phenomenon of strong reciprocity 
requires even more, as it is strongly related to the ability for abstract reasoning, language, and 
the ability to define social norms and to reach some kind of consensus on them (Bowles & 
Gintis, 2004). This is the only plausible sense in which it can escape the trap of earlier theories 
on reciprocity in the explanation of a wide variety of pro-social behaviors. In principle, or so I 
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argue, the evolution of strong reciprocity is dependent on the evolution of a sense of morality.39 
What does remain clear, however, is that social norms are of great importance in the evolution 
of humanity, and they do serve evolutionary purposes as well, i.e; they do enhance fitness over 
norm-less groups. Otherwise, quite frankly, they would not have made it this far in human 
evolution. 
3.2. Dynamics in punishment 
Even though the goals of punishment of controlling cheating and thus modifying behavior is 
rather straightforward Bowles and Gintis describe some interesting dynamics regarding 
punishment that cannot be explained on the basis of the self-interest hypothesis (Bowles & 
Gintis, 2011, pp. 19-42). One rather puzzling finding in this respect is that punishment need not 
entail any “real” disadvantage for the defector, that is, it need not result in any monetary or 
material repercussions. Put differently, often punishment is purely symbolic, and, symbolic 
punishment is effective. In game theoretic research designs, this has been tested in various 
ways, such as the usage of disapproval points (Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, & Villeval, 2003), 
where the base rate of contributions in the punishment condition was higher than in the baseline 
condition. Furthermore, it seems that the mere opinion of people matters a lot even to defectors, 
and this alone can be reason enough not to defect in most cases. As Bochet et al have shown in 
a study where the effects of communication preceding the voluntary contributor game were 
compared to the effects of punishment, the effect of communication was stronger than that of 
punishment. They compared the effect of face-to-face communication and communication via 
chatboxes on voluntary contributions to that of punishment, and concluded that people are 
susceptible to what others think of them in terms of being reliable allies (Bochet, Page, & 
Putterman, 2006). Given that there were opportunities to defect, as promises did not need to be 
kept during the game, this finding once again stands in stark contrast to the self-interest 
hypothesis. Thus, in addition to the fact that symbolic punishment is effective, it seems that the 
mere threat of symbolic punishment, for example in the form of “name calling”, is equally so 
effective. As we will see further, signaling of reputation may be one important explanation of 
this phenomenon. 
Anthropological research also points into the direction of the wide usage of symbolic 
punishment. In this context, Wiessner analyzed 308 conversations among members of an 
                                                 
39 Morality as such, however, is not the subject matter of this study; therefore, this otherwise very interesting 
and intricate debate will not be reproduced here. An interesting book-length exposition on the matter can, 
however, be found with Greene (2013) 
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African forager society (Ju’/hoansi Bushmen), and found that four types of punishment were 
present in their society: (1) put-downs through pantomime and joking, (2) mild criticism and 
complaint, (3) harsh criticism and complaint, and (4) harsh criticism and violent acts. Of these 
four, the most common was outright mild criticism (41%), followed by harsh criticism (35%) 
and put-downs through pantomime or joking (22%), whilst criticism combining violent acts 
only accounted for a minor amount of punishments (2%) (Wiessner, 2005, pp. 129-131). With 
regard to the effectiveness, it must be noted that only in 13% of cases corrective action was 
taken, in 26% of cases opinions against the target were rallied, and in 39% of cases the “message 
was heard” by the target with no direct visible response to the punishment (Ibid., p. 131-134). 
In this latter case, it should be taken into account that responses to punishment can be 
postponed, and that in many cases long term effects cannot be observed (e.g. more food sharing 
in the later future). Notwithstanding these qualifications, it does seem that punishment need not 
result in the modification of behavior per se, which brings me to the next dynamic of 
punishment. 
As a second dynamic, Bowles and Gintis (ibid.) mention that punishment is not always 
strategic, as one might expect, for example, in the case of reciprocity. Especially the case of 
altruistic punishment (strong reciprocity) points into this direction. In game theoretic research 
designs, next to the above mentioned research by Weissner, this conclusion has been repeatedly 
been confirmed: in the last rounds of voluntary contributor games, punishment was 
considerable (even higher than the average in the immediately preceding rounds). In this case, 
punishment simply cannot alter people’s behavior anymore, and consequently cannot be 
considered to be strategic (that is, with a view to change behavior) (e.g. Bochet et al., 2006). 
Thus, punishment can be considered to be a goal in itself.  
However, there is one reason why punishment may be effective even if it does not result in 
behavioral change of the target. As Barr shows by means of a game theoretic design carried out 
in Zimbabwe, the mere observation of someone being punished may result in behavioral change 
of bystanders – people not involved in the punishment interaction but observing it. So, 
notwithstanding the plausible absence of behavioral change on the part of the direct target, 
punishment can be considered to have a group level effect as well insofar as those who observe 
punishment will tend to compensate their behavior in the socially desired way to avoid similar 
punishment. This finding is congruent with the earlier reported findings regarding deterrence. 
In this sense, the conjecture that punishment has a social function in itself finds support in these 
empirical findings. It is interesting to note that the effect of punishment may be different for the 
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punished party compared to bystanders: whilst it may have a negative effect on the contributions 
of direct targets, as they retaliate against those who are giving them a bad status, it may have a 
positive effect on bystanders who make low contributions, as this enables them to build a 
reputation (Barr, 2001).  
A final interesting dynamic with regard to informal punishment is the finding that the cost of 
punishment is reduced by forming coalitions when punishing. Thus, punishment occurs in 
groups (when possible) rather than by individuals. As Weismann found while studying a tribal 
African society (Ju’/hoansi bushmen), this is most likely to be the case when norm violaters 
posed threats to group harmony (Wiessner, 2005). In such a scenario, the relative cost of 
punishment decreases as the number of altruistic punishers increases in the population under 
consideration. As indicated earlier, punishment can sustain cooperation through the evolution 
of strong reciprocity, which in turn might be the basis for “coalitional punishment” (see also 
Bowles, Boyd, Mathew, & Richerson, 2012; Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010).  
3.3. The import of coalitional psychology on punishment 
However, even though the link between the maintenance of cooperation and punishment today, 
with written agreements, by human beings endowed with spectacular cognitive capacities 
which allow them to agree on coalitions and the like, may be clear in general, it does not explain 
one peculiar fact found by Bernard and colleagues (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006): 
punishment is heavier towards out-group members compared to in-group members. Bernhard 
et al. conducted a third party punishment game in Papua New Guinea, in which it was clearly 
shown that people contributing less to the public good than normatively expected were all 
punished in general by a third party. However, the experiment also clearly shows that the 
punishment of defectors that did not belong to the in-group of the punished party and punisher, 
was more severe compared to a defector belonging to the same in-group. This phenomenon will 
further be referred to as parochial altruistic punishment.  
In my opinion, this finding can also be regarded as additional support for the parochial altruism 
conjecture. For, if altruism is forged in conflict with out-groups, it is very plausible that 
subsequent modifications thereof, including altruistic punishment to sustain social norms such 
as reciprocity, equally bears this parochial characteristic. In addition to this, it must also be 
remembered that strong reciprocity is a fitness enhancing adaptation from the point of view of 
the group as such, not so much the individual actor within a specific group. For in the latter 
case, selfishness would be selected for over strong reciprocity. An important qualification, 
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however, is that the parochial character of altruistic punishment need not necessarily lead to 
group conflict. This will only be so if certain social norms (e.g. fairness norms) are violated or 
when  the out–group poses certain threats (e.g. threats to the in-group’s safety) to the in-group, 
the two main driving forces behind cooperation in the first place, as discussed in both the 
parochial altruism conjecture and the coalitional computation conjecture. As is shown 
throughout history, different groups do engage in mutually beneficial activities, they do form 
coalitions, and among many modern and ancestral groups collaborative relations exist. These 
mutually beneficial activities can be regarded as another fruit of the exceptional human capacity 
for reasoning.  
4. Reputation and costly signaling 
Thus far, a few intertwined processes that have a bearing on contemporary prejudice and bias 
motivated behaviors have been discussed. All of these center around human sociality, where 
the notion of “parochial altruism” and the subsequent coalitional psychology take up a central 
place. However, in order to maintain group living (or sociality), punishment is an essential 
element, as neither unconditional cooperation nor unconditional defection would be favored by 
natural selection. As has already been suggested in the sideline of the foregoing discussion, 
another such mechanism is reputation. In this section, two distinct types of reputation building 
that are closely intertwined with the previous exposition will be elaborated on. 
When one thinks of reputation, signaling theory immediately comes to mind. Signaling theory 
is a well-established theory in evolution, and has been studied abundantly in both plants and 
animals (for an overview, consult Searcy & Nowicki, 2005). The core principle of the theory is 
basically very simple: sometimes organisms display features that only serve to signal a specific 
quality to fellow members of that species. The qualities signaled may range from strength, for 
example dominance, to sexual health (as is the case in sexual selection theory). This way, it can 
be regarded as a mode of communication between different animals. If the signal is maladaptive 
to the organism in question, then it is called a costly signal – and most signals do imply a certain 
cost.  
The schoolbook example of signaling is the peacock’s tail. The very large, colored and complex 
tales of the peacock are a signal of reproductive fitness of the peacock. The bigger and brighter 
the tail, the stronger the signal is, but also the more costly the signal is to the organism carrying 
it. For sure, you can imagine what it would be like to drag around a tail of that size respective 
to the size of the peacock itself. This can be called a costly signal, given that apart from 
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signaling reproductive fitness, it does benefit the peacock’s ability to cope with environmental 
pressures, quite on the contrary indeed. However, if a peahen has the choice between two 
peacocks to mate with, she can infer from the size and quality of the tails which peacock has 
the best reproductive quality: the peacock that is able to bear a larger “cost”, is the fittest 
peacock.40 Even though this principle is of a very general nature, it can be applied directly to 
the above discussion on punishment and parochial altruism. As will be discussed in the next 
section, it will prove to be of direct importance to the explanation of prejudice and bias 
motivated behaviors, too.  
Of course, mankind is equally inclined towards signaling certain qualities notwithstanding the 
fact that the story there is a bit more complicated as signaling in mankind is to a greater extent 
niche-bound. A great example would be the difference between males investing a lot of time 
and energy in the gym to “bulk up”, compared to those males spending efforts to “be the 
brightest”. Whilst both are valid signals in their own right and cultural niche, the appearance of 
both males will be entirely different. Apart from this type of signaling more or less bound to 
sexual selection, human cooperation also fosters signaling, in a very important sense. Recall 
that people are imperfect conditional cooperators. On top of that, they often interact in “one 
shot” situations, which does not enable them to create an image of the reciprocation partner. 
Exactly in this type of situation, signaling and reputation building are of the utmost 
importance(e.g. Barclay, 2006a; Barclay, 2006b; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). In short, by giving 
certain costly signals, people are able to build a reputation of a good group member, which 
abides by the norms of reciprocity or cooperation. In the exposition above, both genuine pro-
social tendencies and cheating have been mentioned. Both are accompanied by a specific form 
of signaling, as will be discussed below.41  
4.1. Genuine signaling of pro-sociality 
One pressing issue in wider networks with recurrent one-shot interactions would be the 
assessment of a previously unknown interaction partner with regards to his merits as a good or 
bad reciprocator. In order to resolve this issue, people will often help others altruistically or 
                                                 
40 It must also be noted that this kind of signaling of reproductive fitness is not limited to signals of beauty 
and splendor. In the case of chimpanzees, for example, the females that look most “ravaged” so to speak, 
bear the preference of the males. The signal there is interpreted to exemplify the female’s experience in 
bearing children, leaving visible markers in her bodily appearance.  
41 In those sections, the reader will notice far less references than in the preceding sections. This is due to the 
fact that the two types of signaling are my own conjectures in case of prejudice, and will subsequently also 
be empirically tested. That is, the following sections are the basis of what I hope to be my humble contribution 
to our understanding of prejudice and bias motivated behaviors. 
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perform acts that signal their willingness to invest energy and means in the welfare of the group, 
such as altruistic punishment. The main advantage of this, is that it may endow the party 
performing the act with a reputation as a good member, a “team player”. This may facilitate 
future interactions insofar as it allows possible interaction partners to easily evaluate the person 
in question, and consequently facilitate interactions with them. This way, a good reputation may 
enable them to attract more like-minded reciprocators, which would benefit them all in the long 
term (supra).  
This particular in-group dynamic can be translated to the intra-group level through the module 
of coalitional computation. That is, in the face of out-group threat, signaling opportunities 
present themselves as well in the shape of the proverbial “taking one for the group”. When the 
conditions in which parochial altruism thrived are present, my conjecture is that defending the 
group against threatening or competitive out-group members is an equally valid mode of 
signaling. As is the case with punishment, this can often occur by the formation of coalitions: 
the entire group takes part in the defense of the in-group against possible threats or in the 
competitive conflict over resources. Those who do not take part, can easily be regarded as bad 
group members insofar as they are not willing to invest (for example by taking a risk in conflict) 
in the wellbeing of the in-group. Those that actually do take part in the conflict, however, are 
regarded as good group members. This way, from an evolutionary point of view out-group 
aggression can in principle be regarded as a specific instance genuine commitment to the in-
group in the face of conflict or competition.  
Of course, this dynamic is further shaped by specific initial conditions. For example, is the out-
group a previously unknown group or a known group? In the former case, out-group hostility 
will depend on conditions such as the match between groups, and the symbolic interchanges 
between the groups, such as food sharing. If the group is a known group, the likelihood of 
intergroup conflict will depend on their former status. If the group was previously known as an 
allied group which now turned on the in-group, conflict is very likely as this can be regarded as 
a form of large scale defection. Again, however, this will depend on the match between both 
groups, as does the outcome of the conflict (see Heylen & Pauwels, 2015, p. for more 
information on this mode of signaling).  
4.2. Deceptive signaling of pro-sociality 
Once sociality has emerged, defectors will also tend to signal their commitment to the group 
and its norms by mimicking cooperation. This is, in my opinion, the second form of signaling 
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the evolution of sociality entails. This type of signaling differs significantly from the former, in 
that the reason for signaling is very different, i.c. not being exposed as a defector. These 
individuals not really care about the group, but does care a lot about him- or herself. They are 
not in the game for the sake of the group, but to really gain something from being in the group. 
They act pro-socially to safeguard their own interests. As signaling is all about reputation, the 
most prominent gain to be made in this context is that of higher status within the group. This 
way, even though the final result on a group-level may be beneficial, the intrinsic motivation 
of the performing party need not be. That is, a more selfish orientation on an individual level, 
may still result in a group-wide beneficial effect. For this reason, I have dubbed this type of 
signaling “deceptive signaling of pro-sociality” given that one deceptively (individual 
motivation) signals pro-sociality (as it does, in the end, benefit the wider in-group) (Heylen & 
Pauwels, 2015).  
As the signal’s impact is a function of the cost of the signal, I conjecture that these individuals 
are the prime candidates for third party punishment and (seemingly) altruistic helping. An 
interesting fact in this case is that third party punishment is only feasible if it is executed by 
dominant individuals. The reason is that they usually have easier access resources, there is a 
lesser risk of retaliation if punishment is executed by a high-status individual (Barclay, 2006b; 
Eckel, Fatas, & Wilson, 2010; Kim, Smith, & Brigham, 1998) and/or, they tend to be part of 
large coalitions (Mathew & Boyd, 2011). This latter finding can be explained by the fact that 
people will tend to team up with those who are powerful, lesser so with those who are not able 
to display signs of strength and overall good quality. As indicated earlier, punishment within a 
group tends to be performed in coalitions, and it is presumably the dominant individual that 
takes the lead therein.  
Again, this dynamic can be easily transposed to the inter-group level through coalitional 
computation. in the face of inter-group conflict, taking the lead in the struggle, and consequently 
running the most risk on injury or even death, is a very strong signal to fellow group members, 
resulting in a heightened status within the group. In the previous paragraph, it was suggested 
that these dominant individuals often are part of large coalitions, which hints at an interesting 
dynamic at play in a social group, between dominant and more subordinate individuals, which 
will be discussed in the next section.  
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4.3. Intermediary conclusion: leaders and followers 
Both types of signaling do not merely exist next to each other. In first instance, both types may 
be present in one individual at the same time. The reason for this is the level of selection: genes 
coding for either one type of signaling may be passed on to future generations, and it is very 
likely that both are present, to differing degrees, in any given individual. Traits so important to 
the survival of our species are likely to be found in every specimen thereof, that is. Second, 
from a group-level perspective, an interesting dynamic may take place. If both types of 
“signalers” are present, it is very likely that group cohesion rises as well. For, if a dominant 
individual signals his power and status by, for example, punishing a defector, the bystander 
effect may evoke similar reactions of those who genuinely signal their commitment to the in-
group, thus strengthening the overall signal. The more coherent or coordinated this type of 
action is, the better it will function for the group. The same holds for the conditions of threat 
and competition. When a dominant individual takes the lead in an attack on the threatening out-
group, or in the defense of the in-group, the bystander effect may result in a coordinated, group-
wide action to preserve the interests of the in-group.  
Apart from any moral connotation one might intuitively connect to words such as “dominance”, 
the overall result for the group, and eventually the genes residing in that group, is positive.42 As 
Pinker put it, “according to evolutionary biology, all societies-animal and human-seethe with 
conflicts of interest and are held together by shifting mixtures of dominance and cooperation” 
(Pinker, 2002, p. 286)  In the next chapter, the two types of signaling will be brought into 
relationship with two very well-known ideological attitudes that are considered to be the two 
most salient predictors of prejudice: right wing authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation. Before doing so, however, some auxiliary hypothesis will be discussed to complete 
the picture. More precisely, the mechanisms discussed can account for the creation of multiple 
groups in societies, and shed more light on how the processes described above are put to 
practice.  
5. Auxiliary mechanisms 
In this section two auxiliary mechanisms that may contribute to the persistence of sociality will 
be discussed. The first is the transmission of norms. A lot of the foregoing has (implicitly) dealt 
                                                 
42 On the long term. Of course, the violence that often accompanies dominance struggles has negative aspects 
for the in-group as well.  
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with norms and their transgression; punishment occurs when one fails to reciprocate, for 
example. Thus, an important element is how people actually pick up such norms, and how such 
norms may be transmitted through time. As will be explained, these mechanisms enable the 
formation of a variety of groups and sub-groups in society as well (with all the coalitional 
psychology in its wake). The second element that will be addressed is the role of emotions. 
Emotions play a very important role in any evolutionary process, as they are the proximal 
stimuli to do something or to refrain from doing something. That is, all of the above processes 
do not necessarily occur consciously (most of them do not), but are mediated by emotions. 
5.1. Transmission mechanisms 
In this section, I will consider a few basic mechanisms through which people pick up norms 
from an evolutionary point of view. The goal is not to discuss the vast array of theories that 
exist with regard to social learning and socialization.43 Again, the goal of this is to answer the 
“ultimate” question: notwithstanding the fact that a lot of social scientific research exists that 
describes how social learning processes come about and what the differential effects of various 
social learning practices may be, it remains an open question why people are susceptible to 
socialization in the first place.44 Especially with regard to the persistence of in principle non-
fitness improving norms from the point of view of the individual, a discussion on cultural 
transmission is important. For, even though the direct pay-offs of cooperation and biological 
altruism might have been superior to those of a more selfish nature in the conditions described 
above as experienced by our distant ancestors, in many cases these conditions have altered a 
great deal since then, which makes the pay-off or fitness maximization of norms a troubling 
question. The discussion will be limited to the discussion of two specific evolutionary 
mechanisms that may underlie socialization, as they present an interesting additional dimension 
to sociological socialization theories: conformist transmission and unbiased transmission.  
Unbiased transmission refers to the transmission of (behavioral) traits from parents (vertical 
transmission) or other elderly in the social environment of an individual (oblique transmission) 
                                                 
43 The terms “socialization”, “social learning” and “cultural transmission” are interchangeable in this context. 
Socialization can be considered to be a more specific corm of social learning in general, which, in turn, can be considered 
to be a subtype of cultural transmission (which, for example, equally occurs through books and other artifacts). 
44 This is probably due to the fact that social scientist usually seek an answer to other questions. For example, a 
criminologist applying socialization theory usually is interested in the outcome of a differential socialization process, that 
is, how differential socialization may lead to (certain forms of) antisocial behavior. As happens often, the explanation of 
a locally restricted phenomenon (the particular crime under consideration), is sought on a higher level of universality 
(socialization, which accounts for much more than only that crime). However, in my personal opinion, such an 
explanation may clarify why someone committed a certain crime, but in order to fully understand the mechanism (and 
maybe try to affect it), a more profound explanation is needed, i.e. one that also takes into account the reasons why people 
are susceptible to this mechanism, and why it equally leads to a variety of different outcomes.  
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to a given individual (Bowles & Gintis, 2011, pp. 168-185). These types of cultural transmission 
can be regarded as being unbiased when they entail individual learning where an individual 
adopts the behavior of parents and/or random other individuals in the population (e.g. Henrich 
& Boyd, 1998, p. 219).  
In a similar vein, Bowles and Gintis speak of payoff-based social learning, when individuals 
adopt the behaviors of others who they consider to be really successful in life (2011, p. 169-
170). The reason why such mechanisms of mimicking may have evolved through the course of 
the evolution of humanity (but also other organisms) is rather clear: the mimicking of apparently 
successful behavior is a non-costly way to acquire specific successful strategies.45 With regard 
to humanity, one really need not look very far to see this mechanism in action, examples of 
which including children’s imitating of super heroes, and the many sports idols that are being 
adorned and imitated (“I want to be just like …”) all over the world. Parents, in this respect, 
usually take up a prominent role. These views are consistent with the great many developmental 
theories that exist in psychology today.  
However, what these mechanisms cannot explain is why human culture, as opposed to 
transmission in animals, has a tendency to be cumulative, meaning that humans are capable of 
quickly learning certain behaviors or skills by means of observation or instruction, which they 
would otherwise never have learned on their own. This can be explained by the unique human 
capacities for conformist transmission, as opposed to unbiased transmission. In this type of 
transmission, the behaviors or traits that are exhibited by most of the members of a population 
are adopted by the social learner. Thus, the most commonly observed traits tend to 
(cumulatively) replicate through time. As Henrich and Boyd indicate, conformist transmission 
does not operate alone, that is, other forces of learning norms and constraining conditions are 
present – if not, the most prevalent cultural traits or norms would become the only ones. It does, 
however, provide a “directional force” in the maintenance and establishment of moral norms – 
the “mainstream” if you wish – for which unbiased transmission is insufficient (Henrich & 
Boyd, 1998, pp. 219-220). They furthermore indicated that conformist transmission is salient 
in a wide variety of contexts, through various computer simulations (Henrich & Boyd, 1998, 
2001). As appears from these studies, conformist transmission is favored by selection as long 
as environments are relatively stable, greater rates of environmental change decrease reliance 
on social learning whilst the adaptiveness of conformist transmission is not touched, conformist 
                                                 
45 One specific such mechanism is prestige-biased transmission, where prestigious people are disproportionately more 
imitated compared to others. This allows to link transmission back to the concept of costly signaling.  
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transmission increases the reliance on social learning, and changes in the number of 
subpopulations do not alter the adaptiveness of social learning.  
The emergence of conformist transmission in periodically changing environments was further 
investigated by Nakahashi, who very interestingly found that the rate of environmental change 
bears a negative relationship to the strength of conformity bias (using computer simulation 
models), contrary to the findings of Henrich and Boyd46 (Nakahashi, 2007). Thus, the more 
stable the environment, the less susceptible to conformity bias subjects will tend to be, or so it 
is argued. In a similar vein, McElreath et al. even state that conformity emerges only in scenarios 
with changing environments (McElreath et al., 2005, pp. 501-504). In any case, next to these 
differences in intensity, the dynamics with regard to changing environments have been 
endorsed by several other studies (e.g. Aoki, Wakano, & Feldman, 2005; Wakano & Aoki, 
2006; Wakano, Aoki, & Feldman, 2004). In this context it is most certainly noteworthy that a 
change in the environment can consist of migrations to other places as well, which do favor 
conformist transmission for various migration rates47 (Henrich & Boyd, 1998, pp. 228-229; 
Nakahashi, 2007, p. 62). 
A very important population-level effect of conformist transmission is the fact that if multiple 
groups are present, this results in multiple equilibria. Put differently, once conformist 
transmission occurs in a population in which various subgroups are present, it maintains group 
boundaries between those different groups. In this sense, it is a process which explains within-
group similarity as well as between-group differences on a cultural level, but also phenomena 
at the heart of this study, such as group stereotypes, ethnic conflict and racialization of social 
relations (Henrich & Boyd, 1998, p. 231). As indicated earlier, conformist transmission is likely 
to gain in importance the more instable a given population is in terms of its composition in 
subgroups. In cases of high migration flows and a constant flux, it can therefore be predicted 
that conformist transmission will rise, and, as a consequence thereof, equally so the 
maintenance of group boundaries. It is important to point out that the norms we are talking 
about here are not restricted to  the ones discussed earlier in case of the human ancestral past. 
In principle, the discussion on conformist transmission applies to all kinds of norms, such as 
                                                 
46 The reason probably being that Henrich and Boyd stopped the iterations of the model before a true equilibrium could 
be achieved (see Wakano & Aoki, 2007). In prolonged runs of the same model as applied by Boyd and Henrich, Wakano 
and Aoki achieve results congruent with those of Nakahashi.  
47 In principle, I think the reasoning can be taken further than merely migrating to another environment. For, immigration 
rates may also alter the environment to a large degree, and consequently have a catalyst function in the emergence of 
conformist behavior.  
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what clothes to wear, table manners, norms on interpersonal conduct, and the like – in short, 
anything constituting the cultural habits of a group. Even though such norms may seem 
superficial at first sight, other norms relating to honor and the sanctioning of violence are also 
covered by it. In this sense, conformist transmission is also able to spread the norms relating to 
punishment of norm violators through a given group.  
5.2. Emotions as proximal stimuli 
Now how are all of the aforementioned processes put into practice? What is needed in order for 
these evolutionary adaptive behaviors to take effect in the sense that people also react to them, 
are so called “proximal stimuli”. Evolutionary theorists as early as Darwin (1998) himself 
suggested that the proximal mechanisms of genetically inherited traits relate to emotions. 
Indeed, in the pioneering work of Trivers, an entire section is devoted to “the psychological 
system underlying human reciprocal altruism” (Trivers, 1971, pp. 47-50). There he expounds 
on the emotions of liking and disliking,  moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, and guilt.  
Emotions of shame, guilt, anger, and liking or love play an important role in the maintenance 
of strong reciprocity. It can be argued that even though many of the genetic variations mankind 
has experienced in the course of its evolution may be conscious decisions (for example many 
acts of reciprocity are), but this need not always have been the case, nor is this now always the 
case. That is, the often heard of intuition people act upon may well be proximal extensions of 
the evolutionary mechanisms described above. In the context of altruism and cooperation more 
specifically, one finding in support of this is that people like to punish norm transgressors. De 
Quervain et al. found in this context that the same brain regions were activated in the case of 
punishment as those in the case of rewards (de Quervain et al., 2004). Further, similar research 
indicates that in ultimatum games, low contributions triggered emotions of anger and sadness 
in participants (Bosman, Sonnemans, & Zeelenberg, 2001). In a similar vein, the brain areas 
associated with disgust and anger were activated in this type of scenario (Sanfey, Rilling, 
Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003).  
In the other direction, low contributions may elicit emotions of guilt and shame in the norm 
transgressor. Bowles and Gintis discern guilt and shame in the following sense. Guilt may be 
experienced by an individual alone by not respecting a certain norm, whilst shame needs to be 
induced by others (Bowles & Gintis, 2011, pp. 186-188). Thus, shame is essentially socially 
induced. Bowles and Gintis (Ibid., p. 187) quote Jon Elster (1998, p. 67) to make the point clear: 
“material sanctions themselves are best understood as vehicles of the emotion of contempt, 
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which is the direct trigger of shame”. Thus, next to the strictly material “rational choice” 
component of material punishment, an important emotional component is of great importance 
– if not the most. In this context it is also important to recall that punishment is often symbolic, 
and that this symbolic punishment is often effective. This cannot be explained by material 
incentives alone, but it can be explained on the basis of emotions. Equally so, emotions play an 
important role in spiteful behavior or antisocial punishment. If one contributes a lot and gets 
punished nonetheless, this may induce feelings of spite and anger, with retaliatory actions as a 
result (Bowles & Gintis, 2011, p. 187). This can be regarded as the proximal mechanism 
responsible for the decline of cooperation in cases where antisocial punishment occurs, 
especially taking into account that it is strong reciprocators that are the ones sustaining 
cooperation.48  
6. Conclusion 
In this section, the roots of human sociality have been discussed. As may have already appeared 
from the above, there is a considerable dark side to human sociality as well, especially with 
regard to upholding group norms. Both in-group members and out-group members are often 
the targets of formal or informal sanctions, be it that out-group members are generally punished 
harsher than in-group members. The main hypothesis of the current study is that at the least 
some forms of prejudice can be considered to be instances of pro-social behavior, conditional 
on the initial conditions of intergroup conflict or competition Especially the notion of parochial 
altruism, indicating clearly the fact that pro-social behaviors such as altruism or cooperation 
can be limited to in-group members is compelling in this context. It allegedly resulted in the 
evolution of a psychology of detecting group membership, or, as Kurzban and Leary call it, a 
coalitional psychology (Kurzban & Leary, 2001, p. 196).  
Another important element is altruistic punishment. As was indicated above, norms need to be 
maintained by punishing defectors, otherwise defection would become the dominant strategy. 
We have also seen that this punishment usually is harsher towards out-group members than to 
in-group members, especially if they defect towards in-group members. In combination with 
the notion of coalitional psychology, this might indicate that bias motivated aggression may be 
seen as an instance of parochial altruistic punishment.  
                                                 
48 Even though it has been argued that spite can actually have an evolutionary benefit through “hyper competition” (see 
Jensen, 2010).  
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Further, in the maintenance of pro-social behavior, costly signaling played an important role as 
well. This related to bearing a cost in favor of the in-group, basically to show to fellow in-group 
members that one is a “team player”, or to show one’s dominance. Given the above, this 
dynamic may be intra-group, insofar as signaling may be about indicating one’s willingness to 
uphold group norms, or inter-group, insofar as it may indicate one’s willingness to defend the 
group in conflict or competition. Both may in principle be applicable to bias motivated 
aggression. It must also be remembered that the signaling mechanism is not totally detached 
from the punishment mechanism: the cost of punishment may provide the costly signal one is 
looking for (in case of dominance signaling), or taking part in coalitional punishment may 
provide a signal that one is a team-player (in case of submission signaling). 
On the basis of these theoretical findings, the general goal formulated in the introduction may 
be refined. In this sense, it can be argued that the evolutionary mechanism described above 
fulfills the criteria of theoretical progress formulated by Karl Popper (2002 [1959]), esp. sect. 
34, 35, and 36). First of all, the theory is of a higher degree of universality than most current 
explanations of racism are.  Even though there is no exact way to “measure” the degree of 
universality of any given theory, what can be shown is that most current explanations of 
prejudice, as we will see in the next chapter, are proper subclasses of the evolutionary theory 
set out in this chapter. This relates to the alleged overspecialization in the field of prejudice 
studies: all the different “-isms” can be brought under the auspices of the evolutionary theory 
set out in this chapter, except for those “-isms” that make reference to the ill as this corresponds 
to an entirely different cognitive module. In this sense it can serve as a platform of unification 
of those different theories. In the next chapter, such endeavor will be initiated by incorporating 
current social psychological theory into the evolutionary framework. 
With regard to the latter, it has to be noted that the theory in principle also excludes more, inter 
alia the types of social exclusion directed at the ill. This means that the theory has a larger class 
of potential falsifiers in Popper’s words, which speaks to its merit. This increases the merit of 
the theory, as it allows for more critical tests to potentially reject it: in the case of illness or 
handicap, the theory should not hold, if my conjecture is correct. In this sense, the empirical 
content49 of the evolutionary theory is greater than that of the theories that can be regarded a 
proper subclass of it.   
                                                 
49 Popper defines the empirical content of a theory as the size of its potential falsifiers. Theories that forbid 
more, thus have greater empirical content in the sense that they assert a lot about our world; the boldest claims 
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However, at the same time, the logical content of the theory, defined as the class of non-
tautological statements that can be derived from it (Popper, 2002[1959], p 103) also increases. 
That is, the theory is  not confined to deducing prejudice and bias motivated behaviors alone. 
It is equally allows the deduction of a vast array of different kinds of behaviors, which might at 
first sight seem unrelated to prejudice. In this sense, it also allows for the modeling of, for 
example, purely altruistic acts. This is due to the conditionality of the phenomena deduced from 
the theory: it only results in prejudice if the specific conditions of intergroup conflict or 
competition are present. When other initial conditions are present, other instances will follow 
from it, be it that the universal statement remains the same. In this sense, the theory has a 
powerful potential for unification. This can simplistically be visually represented as follows 
with some random examples of different instances rooted in the same universal statement: 
 
1 Biological altruism / cooperation 
2 Parochial altruism Kin selection 
3 Religious xenophobia racism Investing in children Helping parents 










Table 5: instantiation and various levels of universality. Moving form 1 to 4, the level of universality decreases.  
 
Content-wise, the theory thus predicts the following two propositions to be true: 
P1: prejudice is an instance of human sociality bound by the initial conditions of intergroup 
threat and/or conflict 
P1a: prejudice is an instance of human genuine sociality bound by the initial conditions 
of intergroup threat and/or conflict.  
P1b: prejudice is an instance of human deceptive sociality bound by the initial 
conditions of intergroup threat and/or conflict.  
                                                 
as it were. By the same token, the theories that are the easiest to falsify are also those with the greatest 
empirical content.  
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P2: bias motivated aggression is an instance  of costly signaling one’s commitment to the in-
group, in case of intergroup conflict and/or competition 
P2a: bias motivated aggression is an instance of costly signaling one’s genuine 
commitment to the in-group in the face of conflict and/or competition. 
P2b: bias motivated aggression is an instance of deceptively signaling one’s 
commitment to the in-group in the face of conflict and/or competition. 
Recall that an “instance” in critical rationalism refers to a certain manifestation of a (more) 
universal law, bound by certain conditions. Thus, what P1 states, is that prejudice can be 
regarded as one among many manifestations of human sociality, but only so within the specific 
conditions of perception of threat or conflict emanating from specific out-groups. Similarly, P2 
states that bias motivated behaviors are a manifestation of costly signaling, both in a genuine 
or deceptive way, bound be the very same conditions. In the next chapter, these premises will 




Chapter III. Contemporary social psychological explanations of 
prejudice and bias motivated behaviors 
 
One of Allport’s lasting contributions to our understanding of human nature is the 
recognition that prejudiced attitudes are not necessarily the result of a hateful 
ideology, or that of a limited intellect, or a disordered personality. Prejudice, instead, 
may reflect ordinary principles of social psychology: it is the byproduct of basic 
psychological processes by which the average person understands and relates to the 
social environment. 
Bernd Wittenbrink (2004, p. 306) 
 
In the previous chapter, the theoretical basis of an evolutionary theory on the etiology of 
prejudice and bias motivated behaviors has been outlined. This framework will serve as the 
macro-level framework in which the social psychological theories that will be discussed in this 
chapter, will be placed. In line with the philosophical background of the study, it can be said 
that the universal statement underlying this theory comes down to the following claim: 
Every human is equipped with a coalitional psychological module, the probability 
of it resulting in inter-group hostility is increased by the perception of inter-group 
conflict and / or competition. 
This means that the coalitional psychology humanity is equipped with does NOT50 
automatically lead to prejudice. The only thing this statement says is that the probability of 
prejudice and bias motivated aggression to occur are increased if someone finds him- or herself 
in a context of inter-group conflict and/or competition by a specific out-group. Apart from that, 
it may result in friendly inter-group interactions and exchanges, which is presumably the most 
occurring instance of the coalitional mechanism today. As stated by Pinker, different groups 
usually don’t extinguish each other because people belong to different groups instead of one, a 
great many different modules and norms exist that counteract the manifestation of violence, and 
there are many reasons to keep inter-group relations peaceful. This is especially so more the 
case in contemporary times compared to our evolutionary history (see, inter alia, Pinker, 2002; 
                                                 
50 I put the “not” in capitals to avoid the misreading of such a universal statement in a deterministic way. 
Clearly, evolutionary biology does not result in deterministic explanations of behavior, as explained before, 
for example genes only influence behavior, which is quite something different from determining it (see, inter 
alia, Pinker, 2002).  
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2011). So, it is of the utmost importance to pinpoint the conditions fairly precisely – or as 
precise as is possible in the social sciences – in order to elaborate the evolutionary theory so 
that it is suited to be applied to and researched in contemporary society. In this chapter, current 
scholarship on prejudice and bias motivated aggression will be discussed, and linked back to 
the previous chapter.  
The text is structured as follows. In an introductory part, the general shape prejudice has taken 
over the years will be (briefly) discussed. This will be followed by approaches focused on in 
social psychology. Social psychological approaches will be the sole focus point of this chapter, 
as they appear to have the most longstanding tradition in the explanation of prejudice. More 
precisely, the focus will be on Duckitt’s dual process model of social dominance orientation 
(SDO) and right wing authoritarianism (RWA). This section will be followed by a section 
dealing with another longstanding social psychological research tradition in prejudice studies, 
i.c. integrated threat theory. The focus of these approaches is not on the person as is the case 
with RWA and SDO as they are both individual difference measures, but on the (inter-group) 
context. Throughout the text, reference will be made to the previous chapter on evolutionary 
theory, in order to indicate possible (in)compatibilities between current theorizing and the 
evolutionary framework. In a concluding section, the main research questions of the study will 
be reformulated in terms of the current theories.  
1. A little bit of history 
The roots of the modern study of prejudice and discrimination can be found with Gordon 
Allport, and is in itself a continuation of the tradition of Bogardus (1928). This research 
tradition had a rather strong focus on blatant or explicit forms or prejudice, often measured by 
means of self-report studies (e.g. Pettigrew, 2009, p. 40). “Old-fashioned” racism in this context 
is to be understood as the open expression of racial prejudice and racist attitudes, for example 
in interview settings before, generally speaking, the 1970’s (e.g. Leach, 2005, pp. 434-435). 
However, it is argued by some that, inter alia due to the official judicial recognition of anti-
discriminatory legislation (i.e. the criminalization of racism), overt expressions of racism have 
dropped, which may appear from an increase in the formal support for racial equality, but no 
notable increase in the support of policies designed to achieve that goal (Bobo & Fox, 2003, p. 
323; Rabinowitz, Sears, Sidanius, & Krosnick, 2009, p. 806), or the finding that there is a denial 
of societal discrimination, both socially and formally (e.g. Pedersen & Walker, 1997, p. 563; 
Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).  
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All of these findings seem to indicate two varieties of prejudice, one old and blatant (including 
overt expressions of prejudice such as bias motivated aggression), and one more subtle (overt 
denial and rejection of prejudice, but symbolic expression thereof). In the rather extensive 
literature on this subject, different names and related terms can be found for the “new” racism 
of the post-WWII era: modern racism (e.g. Akrami et al., 2000; Pedersen & Walker, 1997; 
Simmons & Lecouteur, 2008), symbolic racism (e.g. Green, Staerkle, & Sears, 2006; Sears & 
Henry, 2003, 2005), implicit prejudice (e.g. Lun, Sinclair, Whitchurch, & Glenn, 2007; Ryan, 
Turner, & Reynolds, 2002; Sears, 2004), aversive racism (e.g.Dovidio, 2001; Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Penner et al., 2010), subtle prejudice (e.g.Pettigrew 
& Meertens, 1995; Whitley, 2011; Yang, Tian, van Oudenhoven, Hofstra, & Wang, 2010), and 
unconscious racism (Duster, 2008; Quillian, 2008). Even though (minor) differences exist in 
their focus with regard to the explanation of “modern” racism, they do share the belief that 
racism in contemporary society has either shifted to more subtle forms, or that behaviors and 
attitudes generally perceived to be non-biased are in fact motivated by bias (e.g. Pettigrew, 
2009, p. 40). 
As may be expected, however, this concept has been scrutinized by other scholars. Some claim 
that blatant racism has not declined that much (e.g. Vala, 2009), whilst others argue that overt 
or blatant expressions of racism have never been very popular, not even in the first half of the 
twentieth century, and that subtle racism has also been around much longer than has been 
supposed by the scholars researching it (e.g. Leach, 2005, pp. 435-436). This raises the question 
as to the status of these concepts, and how they should, if at all, be discerned. Furthermore, it 
is argued that new racism does not explain racism as such, but rather states that “old racism” is 
replaced by a “new” kind of racism, which indicates the difficulty that modern racism scholars 
face, insofar as might be presented as a “new” kind of racism, but it does not fall back on new 
explanations of racism.  
The brief history of social-psychological research on prejudice also sheds more light on the 
reception of this topic in criminological circles. As appears from literature, criminologists only 
gained interest in the study of prejudice and bias motivated aggression in the last part of the 
20th century. This may be due to the focus criminology often has on crime, in Sutherland’s sense 
as “rule-breaking”. It follows logically that, once egalitarian legislation came into place, 
criminologists’ interest in the topic of prejudice and bias motivated aggression was sparked as 
well, as it presented a new research topic in their domain once it was criminalized (at least in 
part). As will be discussed later, however, criminologists’ interest in the etiology of prejudice 
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and bias motivated aggression is rather limited. Most of the attention in criminologists’ work 
in this respect goes to offending by minorities, and socio-legal studies into the 
(de)criminalization of certain behaviors (in the critical criminology tradition of research).  
What can be said about this discussion from the vantage point of the evolutionary theory 
outlined in the previous chapter? The variety in expressions and “shapes” of prejudice and bias 
motivated aggression seem logical from the point of view of evolutionary theory. For, norms 
and their enforcement play an important role in the evolution of human societies. In this context, 
a variety of norms that go against violence in general and prejudice more precisely, have 
evolved over time as well (see, for example, the excellent book-length exposition on the matter 
by Steven Pinker; and the works of criminologists Knepper and Tonry). As people are 
susceptible to what others think of them (reputation), and are willing to signal conformity to 
the group or their overall quality as a person, the adoption of these norms, consolidated” by the 
stroke of a pen” or not, leads to an overall change in the way prejudice is expressed as well as 
an overall drop of levels of prejudice itself.51 For even if people still are prejudiced, it is at least 
plausible that the expression thereof will change, in order to conform to the new norms that 
have emerged, given that they find themselves in a context where such norms and values are 
salient. Let us now turn to the most prominent explanations of prejudice in contemporary 
scholarship. 
2. Social-psychological theories on prejudice 
The subject matters of prejudice and racism have been studied by a wide variety of disciplines, 
ranging from biology, psychology, social psychology, sociology, criminology, to legal studies. 
As happens often in the sciences, the different fields in which it has been studied (the different 
points of view taken up on the subject), however have not been good conversation partners. An 
awareness of this has emerged in literature, however, for example by Bobo, stating that social 
psychological explanations of racism have become indispensable in any sociological analysis 
thereof (Bobo & Fox, 2003, p. 325). In this section, the main social psychological explanatory 
theories with regard to prejudice will be discussed: the dual process model and integrated threat 
theory.  
                                                 
51 Notwithstanding spatiotemporally bound fluctuations in levels of prejudice, the long term view clearly 
indicates a steep decline in both the attitude itself as well as the biased behaviors that accompany it. Consult 
Pinker (2011) for an overall overview of this and like declines in global levels of violence.  
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2.1. Dual process model  
In contemporary social psychological scholarship on prejudice, two predictors are at the center 
stage: Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Both 
have been deemed to be independent predictors for prejudice with cross-cultural validity. Given 
the fact that they present two distinct paths to prejudice, they have also been combined into a 
single model, i.c. the dual process model.52  
2.1.1. Right Wing Authoritarianism 
Historically, RWA finds its origins in the work of Adorno (1950), where it was considered to 
be a stable personality trait. Due to problems with the dimensionality of the concept (i.e. it was 
not unidimensional), it has been adapted to Right Wing Authoritarianism by Altemeyer (e.g. 
Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 2006)53, who found a unidimensional concept based on three of the 
original nine traits used to measure RWA, i.c. conventionalism (adherence to the norms and 
values of mainstream society and its authorities), authoritarian submission (willingness to 
abide by legitimate authorities unconditionally), and authoritarian aggression (aggression 
against groups perceived to be legitimate targets as described by legitimate authorities).  
More recently, however, the idea that RWA is a stable personality trait has been left behind, 
and it now is regarded as an (ideological) attitudinal dimension. (e.g. Roets et al., 2006, p. 156), 
which is triggered by one’s worldview, personality, and life-course. With regard to worldview, 
it corresponds to the belief that the world is an unsafe place versus a safe one. The two extremes 
can be described following Duckitt et al.: the belief that “the social world is a dangerous and 
threatening place in which good, decent people’s values and way of life are threatened by bad 
people versus belief that the social world is a safe, secure and stable place in which almost all 
people are fundamentally good” (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002, p. 92). This 
perception of the world results in a heightened motivation for security, social order and social 
cohesion. Individuals high in RWA will therefore display a preference for groups that have 
stable norms and in which these norms are effectively upheld (“policed”). It is explicitly threat 
driven, and includes both realistic and symbolic threats (e.g. Asbrock, 2010, p. 326; Stephan & 
                                                 
52 Duckitt even considers them to be the only two dimensions making up one’s ideological space (Duckitt, 
2001). Ideology is seen as a two dimensional concept, with the first dimension ranging from cultural 
conservatism to openness to other cultures, and the second ranging from economic conservative beliefs and 
a belief in hierarchical social stratification to liberalism and openness to others (Duckitt, 2001; as discussed 
by Roets, Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2006, p. 156). 
53 An elaborate, book-length, and up-to-date discussion on “the authoritarians” has been published for free 
on the internet by Bob Altemeyer, one of the founding fathers of the concept. For more information, please 
consult: http://members.shaw.ca/jeanaltemeyer/drbob/TheAuthoritarians.pdf   
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Renfro, 2003). Out-groups, then, are usually seen as threats to traditional values and norms. 
Derogation of out-groups serves the purpose of depicting them as inferior and therefore 
unimportant (e.g. Altemeyer, 2006, p. 56). Derogation of, but also aggression towards these 
out-groups is justified by depicting them as  morally inferior, and is all the more likely to occur 
when such violence would be approved of (or accepted by) what they perceive to be legitimate 
authorities (which can be the state, but also other institutions or persons, such as religious 
leaders etc.). In this sense, their behavior is self-righteous (Altemeyer, 2006, pp. 21-24; 
Whitley, 1999, p. 126). 
Even though RWA is an ideological attitude, it has been brought into relationship with specific 
personality traits. In this sense, from the point of view of the Big Five model of personality.54 
RWA has been shown to be positively related to conscientiousness, or the tendency to be well-
organized, diligent, and achievement oriented. This relationship can be explained by the fact 
that submissive authoritarians usually seek to be part of the bigger picture, i.e. their in-group, 
and consequently dutifully act according to the dictates of that in-group. Second, RWA related 
negatively to openness to experience, or intelligence and imaginativeness, aesthetic sensitivity, 
need for variety and unconventional values, and differentiated emotions55. This relationship can 
be interpreted in terms of RWA given that people high in RWA see the world as a dangerous 
place, and out-groups as threatening security and in-group norms, which is a very poor basis to 
engage in interactions with those out-groups. For the remaining personality traits, i.e. 
extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism, no relationships with RWA have been found (for 
a meta-analysis, consult Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).  
In the slightly divergent HEXACO model of personality, developed by Ashton and Lee (see 
Ashton & Lee, 2001, 2007; Lee & Ashton, 2004), a dimension called “honesty-humility” is 
added56, referring to an inclination towards “fairness and sincerity in social relations versus 
the tendency to manipulate and use people for whatever one can get from them” (Sibley, 
Harding, Perry, Asbrock, & Duckitt, 2010, p. 517), and has been shown to have a positive 
relationship with RWA. This result is interpreted in terms of group cohesion: people high in 
                                                 
54 Representing the five dimensions of personality on which (relative) agreement exists in psychology (see 
McCrae & John, 1992 for an overview) 
55 The facets intelligence and imaginativeness constitute the narrow interpretation derived from natural 
language studies. In the broad interpretation derived from questionnaire studies, the facets aesthetic 
sensitivity, need for variety and unconventional values, and differentiated emotions are added to the two 
facets of the narrow interpretation (McCrae & John, 1992, p. 197).  
56 It also includes extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness to experience which are operationalized 
similarly to the Big Five model. Emotionality and honesty-humility differ from the Big Five model.  
90 
 
RWA tend to prefer groups with clear rules which are readily enforced, and care for collective 
security. 
2.1.2. RWA and the evolutionary framework 
From the above exposition on RWA, two elements that are in complete accord with the 
evolutionary framework emerge. The first is the concept of a dangerous worldview in which 
threat takes up a central place. This resonates strongly with the idea of parochial altruism 
discussed in the previous chapter. For, in a world were competitions and danger are ubiquitous, 
one would expect the probability of acting pro-socially towards the in-group but parochially 
towards out-groups perceived as posing threats,  to rise. Furthermore, it basically refers to 
exactly the same conditions as those who were spelled out in the parochial altruism hypothesis: 
danger and competition. Whilst these notions foremost related to physical violence and 
competition over scarce resources, in our contemporary day and age, they seem to be related to 
other commodities as well, both material and non-material. Thus, notwithstanding the differing 
context, the same coalitional psychology may be triggered by a wider variety of “dangers”, for 
example to the in-group norms, as well.  
On one occasion – the only one to my knowledge – RWA has explicitly been theoretically 
brought into relationship with group living. Kessler and Cohrs (2008) explicitly relate the three 
dimensions of RWA to the evolution of cooperation and groups living. The first dimension, 
authoritarian submission, refers to the tendency to defer to legitimate authorities and their 
dictates. As indicated above, reciprocity and cooperation have evolved to become the norm in 
human group living, which has to be “policed” in order to maintain cooperation. RWA reflects 
this adherence to norms such as reciprocity strongly. Furthermore, Kessler and Cohrs indicate 
that group conventions (group-specific norms and habits) provide for a means to distinguish 
one’s own group from other groups, which yields a clear advantage in the face of conflict or 
competition: when confronted with outside threats from competing groups, it is essential that 
one can discern the in-group from the out-group. In this sense, parochial altruism as described 
above, is dependent on a certain degree of submission to the in-group.  
The second dimension is authoritarian aggression, and refers to the inclination to punish 
transgressions of group norms, another necessary condition to sustain group living (e.g. Boyd 
et al., 2010). As discussed earlier, cheating would soon become the dominant strategy if it is 
not conditional upon punishment of cheaters or, put differently, norm-transgressors. 
Authoritarian aggression can thus be considered to reflect the evolved tendency to punish norm-
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violators in order to keep up group cohesion. This is an essentially in-group dynamic, but in the 
face of threat of competing or conflicting groups, and in combination with authoritarian 
submission, may easily lead to outright hostility towards out-groups. Today, indeed prejudiced 
discourse often includes elements reminiscent of cheating, such as “they exploit us”, “they will 
ruin our culture” or “threaten our values”. This way, the presence of threatening (at least so 
perceived) out-groups triggers the evolved mechanism aimed at dealing with cheaters on a 
group level, through coalitional computation.  
The third dimension is conventionalism, and refers to the tendency to hold on to traditional 
norms and values. Such an attitude has been of great importance in order to facilitate indirect 
reciprocity, a key element in large scale cooperation, as it provides a clear way to deal with 
coordination problems. These can be compared to “rules of the game” when interacting with 
others, for example the convention to stand right and walk left on an escalator. With regard to 
sociality or cooperation, conventionalism deals with the pressing problem of estimating 
whether or not one will reciprocate in the future, and if they will do so in full or only in part. A 
conventional rule of thumb may state that it is rude not to reciprocate, and this may facilitate 
the decision for the person in question. Additionally, knowledge on traditions may make it more 
difficult to cheat, as these are more difficult to fake by potential cheaters (Kessler & Cohrs, 
2008). In practice, these conventions are picked up by social learning mechanisms such as 
horizontal transmission, in which people pick up the habits and conventions of the majority of 
the in-group (e.g. Henrich & Boyd, 1998, 2001). 
Finally, an interesting phenomenon occurs with regard to authoritarian aggression. As 
Altemeyer (2006) explains, authoritarians will usually not act on their own; they will usually 
do so in group. This resonates nicely with the dynamic of informal punishment, where it has 
been suggested that punishment often occurs in coalitions. It has to be noted here that 
punishment in the previous chapter was seen from the point of view of breaking some 
reciprocity norm. However, as our societies evolved from ancestral to modern, the dynamic 
engrafted on other (moral) norms as well, including non-discriminatory norms which does not 
necessarily make RWA an only bad thing, even though it is usually related to moral wrongs 
such as prejudice (Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009).   
2.1.3. Social dominance orientation 
Another such attitude which is related to prejudice is Social Dominance Orientation (Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999), referring to people’s desire to install hierarchical relationships between 
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different groups in society and the idea that the in-group should and can dominate the out-
group(s). In essence, SDO reflects a competitive, “dog-eat-dog” worldview in which 
subordinate groups threaten the dominant group’s (relative) hierarchical position (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999). The two extremes on this attitudinal dimension can be summarized as follows 
according to Duckitt et al.: the “belief that the social world is a competitive jungle characterized 
by a ruthless, amoral struggle for resources and power in which might is right and winning is 
everything versus belief that the social world is a place of cooperative harmony in which people 
car for, help, and share with one another” (Duckitt et al., 2002). People high in SDO resist 
equality in order to safeguard the privileges associated with their hierarchically superior 
position (e.g. Quist & Resendez, 2002). This way, SDO is positively associated with, inter alia, 
social status, support for the Iraq invasion, capitalism, anti-Black racism, and a greater 
allocation of value to the in-group. These and similar conclusions seem to be, furthermore, 
cross-culturally consistent (e.g. Sidanius, Levin, Liu, & Pratto, 2000).  
Hierarchical relations are organized according to three dimensions in Social Dominance theory 
(e.g. Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006, p. 273), each of which differs in flexibility and associated 
levels of violence. The first one is age: adults cross-culturally have disproportionate power over 
children. The second dimension is gender: cross-culturally, men consistently have had 
dominance over women. These two markers of hierarchy are not very flexible in the sense that 
they consistently come forth all over the world, be it to differing degrees.57 With regard to levels 
of violence, great variation exists from culture to culture. The last set of markers are “arbitrary 
set” markers, and are culturally contingent. That is, they do not have the same general, cross-
cultural character as do gender and age, and they can be considered to be the most flexible of 
the three types of markers. Also, the greatest levels of violence are associated with these 
markers, presumably because it is about dominance of males over males, which would 
(theoretically) allow for total annihilation, whereas in relation to children and women total 
annihilation would be disastrous (e.g. Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2006, p. 273-275).  
Hierarchies come into existence and are maintained (i.e. discrimination and violence to defend 
the hierarchy are justified) by legitimizing myths, which are, according to Pratto et al., 
“consensually held values, attitudes, beliefs, stereotypes, and cultural ideologies” that shape the 
“decisions and behaviors of individuals, the formation of new social practices, and the 
                                                 
57 However, differences relate to intensity, not in direction: whilst the power men have over women differs 
between various places (e.g. Middle East vs. Europe), it is usually the men which have the more power over 
women and not vice versa.  
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operations of institutions” (2006, p. 275). Examples of legitimizing myths include nationalism, 
cultural elitism, sexism, political-economic conservatism, noblesse oblige, and meritocracy 
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, pp. 742-743), often resulting in a more positive 
appreciation of the in-group – in-group favoritism58 (Quist & Resendez, 2002). These are called 
hierarchy-enhancing myths. Contrary to this, “myths” may also be hierarchy attenuating, in 
which case they result in lower levels of SDO and higher appreciation of equality. It is 
interesting to see that people in high-status groups usually hold more hierarchy enhancing 
myths, compared to people of low-status groups, who seem to hold more hierarchy attenuating 
myths, and, accordingly, lesser degrees of in-group favoritism (see Levin, Sidanius, 
Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998; Quist & Resendez, 2002; Sidanius, Pratto, & Rabinowitz, 1994). 
SDO has also been related to the Big Five model of personality, where it has been negatively 
associated with agreeableness (or higher levels of “tough mindedness” ) and openness to 
experience. The negative association with openness to experience is shared with RWA. 
However, when taking into account the six-factor HEXACO model of personality, it needs to 
be noted that whereas RWA related positively to honesty-humility, SDO relates to it negatively. 
Thus, the honesty-humility dimension relates differentially to RWA and SDO, providing 
(partial) support for a dual process model of prejudice.  
2.1.4. SDO and the evolutionary framework 
Some elements from SDO theory do resonate with the evolutionary framework, whilst others 
seem to be at odds with it. The idea of arbitrary set markers for prejudice is quite compatible 
with the evolutionary framework put forth in the previous chapter. There, it has been argued 
that the coalitional psychology that may give rise to prejudice under certain conditions does not 
operate on the basis of predefined or “innate” markers, such as race. It only does so, when these 
markers signify coalitional belonging, as was shown nicely in the experiment by Kurzban et al. 
(2001).  
Second, the way certain markers get “cultural meaning” as it has been called, finds a place in 
SDO theory as well: through the notion of legitimizing myths. In these myths, certain markers 
are picked out and given meaning in the sense of hierarchical belonging. This way, SDO theory 
may be conceived of as a contemporary elaboration on this specific point, a point on which the 
                                                 
58 And apparently also out-group hostility: SDO is not only a predictor for political attitudes, but also of social 
attitudes and behaviors. In-group favoritism does not automatically imply out-group hostility (infra). 
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evolutionary framework has remained silent (which is normal, as it is about what happened in 
the ancestral human past).  
However, in the previous chapter, prejudice and bias motivated aggression have been conceived 
of as an instance of human sociality insofar as the conditions of danger and/or competition may 
give rise to an in-group orientation and cooperation, paralleled by out-group exclusion and 
hostility. This is at stakes with the idea inherent in social dominance orientation, as individuals 
high in SDO are not usually conceived of as the most pro-social people around. Quite on the 
contrary, they are often depicted as only interested in their own wellbeing and power (e.g. 
Altemeyer, 2006). However, as indicated in the previous chapter, dominance does play a vital 
role in the evolution of group living, as it usually are dominant individuals that are the most 
efficient at punishing others. That is to say, in order for group living to emerge, dominant 
individuals are needed, too. Further, two types of signaling were discussed in the previous 
chapter, one of which served the purpose of not being exposed as a defector, i.e. subtle cheating. 
Insofar as people higher in SDO tend to focus on their own self-interest, this type of signaling 
resonates well with SDO. Especially with regard to their desire for power and higher status 
within the group, this particular mode of signaling becomes very important. If they were to be 
regarded as defectors, this would have immediate repercussions on their status, which provides 
a strong incentive for them to deceptively signal their commitment to the in-group and its 
norms. This way, dominators can be regarded as selfish, and thus their seemingly social 
behavior can be regarded as an instance of cheating, notwithstanding the function they had in 
the evolution of human socialiy as norm-enforcers and conflict settlers. In this sense, SDO fits 
well within the evolutionary framework discussed in the previous chapter.  
2.1.5. Differential effects according to the out-group 
So far, the discussion on SDO and RWA has been focusing on prejudice without distinction, 
that is generalized prejudice. The idea of generalized prejudice stems from the conception of a 
prejudiced personality in the works of Allport, Adorno and Altemeyer, who considered it to be 
a personality trait affecting all kinds of out-groups (e.g. Ekehammar & Akrami, 2003). Based 
on the idea that RWA and SDO provide different motivational bases of prejudice, a distinction 
has been made, however, with regard to the type of subgroup involved. Three types of 
subgroups are discerned in social psychological literature: “dangerous”, “dissident” and 
“derogated” (Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007).  
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On this basis, it is argued that RWA ought to be a predictor for groups perceived as threatening 
in-group norms, values, and security (but not as subordinate) – “dangerous groups” – and SDO 
ought to be a predictor for groups considered to be subordinate (but not threatening in-group 
norms: in these cases dominance is exercised in order to maintain the power position of the in-
group) – “derogated groups”. Both RWA and SDO can be predictors for directly competing 
out-groups or groups directly challenging social inequality, as both threat driven motivations 
may be elicited in these scenarios – “dissident groups”. 59 The reason why this distinction is 
often overlooked, lies in the fact that “the kind of ethnic minority or stigmatized social groups 
that have been typically studied as targets of prejudice tend to be both low in power and status 
and because they are ethnically or culturally different are also seen as threatening the values 
and norms of the majority” (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007, p. 115). Hence, both SDO and RWA are 
involved in the dual threat conceptualization of prejudice. Next to the evidence gathered from 
correlational studies, more compelling evidence can be found in longitudinal designs (e.g. 
Asbrock et al., 2010; Duriez, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & De Witte, 2007; Sibley, Wilson, & 
Duckitt, 2007) and experimental research designs (e.g. Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Dru, 2007).60 
2.2. Integrated threat theory 
In the previous sections, the person-oriented approaches with regard to prejudice have been 
discussed and summarized. However, people do not live in a vacuum, and the aforementioned 
ideological attitudes do not usually act automatically, which they only do in a specific social 
and structural context. In this section, we will look at integrated threat theory, the second main 
research tradition within social psychology dealing with the explanation of prejudice. Contrary 
to the dual process approach, ITT has an explicit focus on the context in which prejudice occurs. 
Even though both lines of research seem to co-exist rather independently, even though it is 
implicitly and explicitly clear that they are converging, it seems logical that it is “the person in 
the situation” which gives rise to prejudice. For this reason, the context can be considered to be 
equally important. As may already have appeared from the overview above, a lot of the 
literature makes reference to threat either directly or indirectly. In the intergroup approaches, 
                                                 
59 This type of out-group is the most complex one to grasp. Even though there usually is an association with 
RWA in case of these groups, this is not always the case for SDO. SDO had a significant association with 
prejudice against feminists, protestors, “persons who criticize people in authority”. It did not, however, show 
a similar association with atheists, prostitutes, “persons who cause disagreement in our society”, and “persons 
who cause disunity in our society” (Ibid., p. 127). 
60 It has to be noted that the groups are not always as clear-cut across different studies. Some tend to shift 
from one category to another, for example. This may be due to a variety of reasons, ranging from cultural 
differences (recall the cultural contingency of arbitrary sets), and / or methodological issues.  
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initially two theories regarding threats have been considered to be competitive explanations: 
realistic threat theory and symbolic threat theory.  
2.2.1. Realistic threat 
In Sherif’s Realistic Conflict Theory (RGCT, also referred to as realistic group conflict theory) 
(see Sherif, 1966, 1988; Sherif & Sherif, 1953) intergroup relations are considered to  display 
characteristics that go beyond the characteristics of a single group. That is, group norms 
(intragroup) are forged on the basis of intergroup relations. Whilst good intergroup relations 
and shared goals attenuate intergroup bias, realistic conflict over resources (both material and 
tangible, or other resources such as power and status), can worsen intergroup relations and lead 
to both prejudice and bias motivated aggression. The theory has been most broadly studied in 
the last quarter of the past century, with the most famous example being The Robbers Cave 
Experiment (Sherif et al., 1954). A meta-analysis of the tests of this specific theory can be found 
with Jackson (Jackson, 1993)61, and a review discussing various types of threats can be found 
with Sears and Henry (Sears & Henry, 2003). The main argument of the theory is that people 
will display negative out-group behavior if they are involved in a real competition with that 
out-group. Experiments furthermore show that this dynamic is activated even when people are 
completely randomly assigned to different groups. Whilst the original emphasis of the theory 
was on real competition, other recent research has indicated that, next to actual competition or 
threats, the perception of threat suffices in order to achieve intergroup bias (Beaton & Tougas, 
2001; R. Brown, Maras, Masser, Vivian, & Hewstone, 2001; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & 
Armstron, 2001; McLaren, 2003; Zarate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004). 
2.2.2. Symbolic threat 
The competing explanation of RCT was Symbolic Racism Theory (SRT). As opposed to the 
realistic threats proposed by RCT, SRT focuses on conflicting values between different groups, 
or conflicting beliefs (e.g. Sears & Henry, 2003). Furthermore, it has been shown that the more 
conflicting the values or beliefs of the groups are, the more negative attitudes towards those 
groups will be (e.g. Dunbar, Saiz, Stela, & Saez, 2000) However, even though the two 
approaches may have been competitive in the past, nowadays they are viewed as 
complementary rather than mutually exclusive (e.g. McLaren, 2003; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 
2006) 
                                                 
61 In this context it is noteworthy that Sherif was both a psychologist and a sociologist, and a fervent advocate 
of interdisciplinary research in order to get the full picture on intergroup hostility.  
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In a meta-analytic review, Riek, Mania and Gaertner (2006), state that the earlier and 
competitive explanations between realistic and symbolic threat/competition have evolved to 
more integrative theories and research pinpointing new types of threats. The most important 
integrative theory in this respect is Integrated Threat Theory by Stephan and Stephan (e.g. 
Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). In this theory, next to symbolic and 
realistic threats corresponding to SRT and RCT respectively, two other types of threats are 
included: intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes.  
2.2.3. Intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes 
Intergroup anxiety refers to feelings of distress when interacting with members of out-groups, 
and is rooted in the expectation of negative outcomes when interacting with out-group members 
(originally formulated by Stephan & Stephan, 1989). It can be considered to be the emotional 
component of the aforementioned realistic and symbolic threats.62 In principle, it can be 
regarded as the result of negative interactions with out-groups or out-group members (R. Brown 
et al., 2001; Plant & Devine, 2003). Research also supports the consideration of intergroup 
anxiety as a predictor for out-group bias (Ho & Jackson, 2001; Voci & Hewstone, 2003). Thus, 
as opposed to the group-level realistic and symbolic threats, this particular source of threat is 
located on the individual level.  
The fourth source of threat integrated in ITT, negative stereotypes63, has been widely studied 
and its relations to prejudice have been established well. They are ideas about how certain 
groups are thought to behave, which may or may not reflect reality. They can furthermore affect 
the behavior of both the stereotyper as well as the stereotyped. Finally, some antecedents, or 
factors influencing the (perception of) intergroup threat, have been identified in ITT (Riek et 
al., 2006, p. 338). Thus, factors increasing the perception of negative intergroup threat include 
negative intergroup contact64, high in-group identification, perceived intergroup conflict, and 
group status.  
                                                 
62 It would be difficult to say that they are the consequence of those threats. For, the direction of causality 
may be reciprocal, in the sense that indeed threats may evoke intergroup anxiety, but this intergroup anxiety 
in turn may also increase the perception of threats emanating from out-groups.  
63 Positive stereotypes do exist as well; for example the idea that Asians are good at math. Salience of such 
stereotype prior to a performance task (e.g. a math test) has a positive effect on the execution of that task. 
64 Conversely, the presence of positive forms of contact are deemed to reduce prejudice. This is, however, 
not the scope of the current research. For a meta-analytic review, the readers is kindly referred to (Davies, 
Tropp, Aron, Pettigrew, & Wright, 2011) specifically with regard to friendship, and to (Pettigrew & Tropp, 




2.2.4. Threats related to group esteem 
In addition to the aforementioned sources of threats discussed in ITT, two other additional 
sources of threats have been discerned by Riek et al. (Riek et al., 2006), which are derived from 
Social Identity Theory, originally formulated by Tajfel and Turner in the late 70’s – 80’s. The 
theory focuses explicitly on the relationship between self-esteem, as derived from belonging to 
a positively valued in-group, to derogation of out-groups. Three sources of social identity are 
discerned: self-conceptualization, group self-esteem, and commitment to the group.  
A first type of threat in this respect are group esteem threats and relate to the claim that 
individuals identify themselves with positively valued in-groups. When the prestige of the in-
group is threatened, prejudice may be the result (when leaving the group is not possible or 
desirable) (e.g. Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003; Ouwerkerk, de Gilder, & de Vries, 
2000). A second and related threat is distinctiveness threat. There it is found that when 
distinctiveness between groups is low, high in-group identifyers are more likely to react to out-
groups given the importance the in-group identity has for them (e.g. Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 
2001), and that levels of intergroup bias tend to be higher as intergroup distinctiveness is low, 
however only weakly so (based on a meta-analysis by Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004).  
2.2.5. Integrated threat theory and the evolutionary framework 
Integrated threat theory and the other threat theories present a clear link with the evolutionary 
theoretic framework, insofar as they are conceptually quite akin to the context in which the 
“parochial altruism” discussed in the previous chapter could evolve. There, the context of 
intergroup competition / conflict were key elements. Similarly, be it in a more contemporary 
way, integrated threat theory also places a heavy thumb on competition and conflict over 
resources: out-groups perceived to pose threats to certain commodities, be it symbolic or 
realistic, are prone to being treated in a prejudiced way. Whilst the commodities at stake in the 
late Pleistocene supposedly were limited to resources needed in order to survive ,with the 
emergence of ever more complex cultures they may have come to comprise more abstract 
commodities as well, such as in-group norms and customs.  
An interesting point of convergence of both theories is the mention they make of emotional 
responses, such as intergroup anxiety. This fits especially well with the evolutionary 
framework, given that they are regarded as the triggering causes of prejudice. The one thing 
that is missing in the integrated threat approach is coalitional psychology, which is essential in 
the explanation of prejudice as it allows for the identification of out-groups on the basis of  
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culturally contingent  markers of coalitions. The only point in which reference is made to this 
mechanism is through negative stereotypes, be it in a very indirect way. For, without a 
coalitional cognitive mechanism, it would be impossible to ascribe certain traits to an entire 
group of people rather than to individual people belonging to that group. All in all, the integrated 
threat approach seems quite compatible with the evolutionary point of view, as it depicts the 
very same context of conflict and competition, be it in a more contemporary way. This does not 
preclude, however, that the basic cognitive mechanism underlying it would not be the same as 
in the distant human past.  
3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the most prominent explanations with regard to prejudice in (social) psychology 
have been discussed. All of them have proven to be compatible with the evolutionary 
framework, in the sense that they cluster around one or more core elements of the evolutionary 
theoretical framework. Both the dual process model and integrated threat theory perform well 
under the evolutionary framework. Whilst integrated threat theory, which focuses on a context 
of threat emanating from out-groups, is more or less a direct example of what parochial altruism 
and coalitional exploitation may look like today, RWA and SDO provide it’s attitudinal 
counterpart. That is, the focus of RWA and SDO is not so much on a real context of threat, but 
rather on individual differences on how certain out-groups are perceived. Further, the dual 
process model can be regarded as somewhat more fine-grained, as it allows to distinguish 
between RWA, where threat takes up a central place, and SDO, where competition takes up a 
central place. This distinction coincides to a great extent with the behavioral counterparts of 
parochial altruism: where threats are foremost related to genuine signaling of one’s commitment 
to the in-group, competition can be linked to deceptive signaling of one’s commitment to the 
in-group.  
The fact that only psychological theories were discussed in this chapter does not imply that the 
evolutionary framework cannot be used to unify the multitude of criminological theories that 
are present today. In this sense, for example, social disorganization (Shaw & McKay, 1942) 
and social learning (Akers, 1998) theory, where a lot of stress goes to the direct interaction of 
one with his or her environment, can be perfectly integrated in the evolutionary framework, 
where transmission mechanism were discussed as an essential auxiliary mechanism once group 
living emerged. The same basically holds for another popular theory in criminology, i.c. strain 
theory (Agnew, 1992). This theory is very much compatible with the notions of conflict and 
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competition. Both may refer to the notion of removal of positively valued stimuli, whilst 
conflict equally so may refer to presenting people with negatively valued stimuli.  
The evolutionary framework, however, can refine this theory into two distinct types of 
motivation underlying possible prejudice and bias motivated aggression, i.e. genuine signaling 
of one’s commitment to the in-group and deceptively signaling one’s commitment to the in-
group. Whist the evolutionary framework does provide a good point of integration for these 
three popular theories in criminology, the main advantage it has that it is able to provide a 
response to the ultimate question: it is able to show why people are susceptible to social learning 
and strain, something theories often fail to do. In other cases, the evolutionary framework 
contradicts criminological theory. Looking at another popular theory in criminology, social 
control theory (Hirschi 1969), the friction between this theory and the evolutionary theory 
becomes immediately clear: whereas social bond are presumed to have a protective effect on 
crime, this is not necessarily the case in the evolutionary theory. For, in the current study, 
prejudice and bias motivated behaviors have been presented as form so of signaling one’s 
membership to a given in-group. In this sense, they are regarded as the result of social bonds, 
rather than the result of a lack thereof. This does not mean that the entire theory is to be rejected 
in favor of evolutionary theory; rather, it means that the theory can be further refined on the 
basis thereof. Indeed, in many, if not most, cases of social bonds, they will tend to have a 
protective effect, especially in environments where non-discriminatory and non-violence norms 
and customs have flourished. Again, evolutionary theory can, in addition to describing and 
refining the mechanism, add the ultimate explanation of why people are susceptible to bonds in 
the first place.  
I will leave the discussion on the unificatory potential of evolutionary theory for what it is now, 
however interesting it is from a theoretical point of view. In the next chapter, the rather general 
dynamics and premises discussed in this chapter will be translated into a model that can be put 
to the test. I will also derive every hypothesis to be tested in a piecemeal way, which should 
ensure a proper understanding of the rationale behind every hypothesis.  
A full theoretical integration of the existing theories would lead us too far away from the goal 
initially set out at the onset of this study, i.e. uncovering the social roots of prejudice. In the 
next chapter, an empirically testable model of prejudice on the basis of evolutionary theory, 
will be developed. There, the concrete research hypotheses will be formulated and the selection 
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of the variables derived from the existing theories that will be used in the subsequent empirical 
study will be discussed in detail.  
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Chapter IV. Towards a testable model 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw that the evolutionary theoretic framework that forms the spine 
of this study is theoretically compatible with existing scholarship on prejudice and bias 
motivated aggression, and that the evolutionary theoretic framework may very well perform the 
function of integrating those different theories by rooting them in one overarching root cause 
(or “ultimate cause”) of prejudice. This theoretic reasoning is all nice and fine, but eventually 
one will need to put these conjectures to the test, especially given the critical rationalist 
background of this study. In this chapter, a first step in that direction will be taken, as the model 
that will eventually be tested will be discussed here.  
First, I will comment on the selection of the variables that are to be included in the model. As 
was shown in the previous chapter, an vast number of variables may be selected as each theory 
may encompass its own “usual suspects”. For the sake of clarity of the test, however, well-
reasoned selection of variables is warranted. Specific attention should go to the breadth of a 
variable in this context, i.e. that it captures a kind of “conceptual average” of what is meant by 
the different theories. Second, the deducibility relationships between the variables will be 
discussed. There I will zoom in how one can test a “root cause” empirically, which may be not 
so straightforward as it seems, as the higher the level of universality, the less a statement is 
usable in practice (a strictly universal statement alone says nothing, which implicates that it 
cannot be tested, nor measured). In the third part, the model that will be tested, along with the 
hypotheses contained therein will be discussed. In the next chapter, the methodology which 
puts the empirical test of this model to practice is subject of discussion, followed by the results 
of the empirical study.  
1.  Selection of variables of the model 
To choose between the myriad available variables in contemporary scholarship on prejudice 
and bias motivated aggression is not an easy task, and certainly ought not to be a random choice. 
For the reasons set out below, I have opted to take SDO and RWA as predictors of prejudice 
for the purpose of testing the theory.  
1. They represent the most prominent research tradition on prejudice in contemporary 
scholarship. Notwithstanding the variety that exists in research on prejudice, the dual process 
model and its components are by far the most extensively discussed ones in literature. Over and 
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over again, the same basic findings have been corroborated and cross-culturally validated. It 
seems a wise choice, at least to me, to integrate the evolutionary framework with this prominent 
field of research. This allows for a far better estimation of the psychometric properties of the 
coalitional thinking mechanism and its operation in comparison to other predictors which do 
not have the same extensive background in prejudice studies. Thus, this approach merits 
preference given its high degree of corroboration. Given that new concepts are introduced in 
the current study, it is advisable to do so in the presence of concepts with high degrees of 
corroboration as they provide more solid grounds for drawing conclusions later.  
2. They are the most explicitly connected to the evolutionary framework. Even though all of the 
theories discussed share a certain overlap with the evolutionary theoretic approach (or can at 
least be regarded as compatible therewith), RWA and SDO provide the most straightforward 
conceptual linkages with the evolutionary framework. For instance, they are seemingly direct 
contemporary “translations” of the late Pleistocene conditions our ancestors faced, i.c. 
competitive and with scarce resources. Kessler and Cohrs (2008) even related RWA directly to 
the evolution of human sociality, which makes it an excellent candidate to serve as a variable, 
as it allows to empirically test this conjecture of theirs.  
3. They can be regarded as umbrella concepts for the other concepts discussed. In this sense, 
RWA and SDO combine the effects of, say, social learning, into two coherent ideological 
attitudes. They are in principle the result of various processes, such as strain, social learning, 
influence of peers, relative deprivation, and the like. More precisely, the theoretical concepts 
that may exert an influence on RWA primarily are relative deprivation, realistic threats, and 
symbolic threats, whereas the concepts that may exert an influence primarily on SDO are group-
esteem threats, relative gratification and distinctiveness threats. Still other concepts, such as 
negative stereotypes, can be regarded as being associated with both SDO (i.e. legitimizing 
myths) and RWA (i.e. neutralization of anti-discriminatory norms).  
4. Contextual theories are more difficult to test. Even morally impossible often. Theories aiming 
at testing realistic conflict between various groups may be difficult to realize in the specific 
context of prejudice against a certain group present in society. Whilst it is possible to design 
empirical studies to investigate certain inter-group dynamics, as did Sherif in the famous 
Robber’s Cave experiment, such a strategy might be less desirable from an ethical point of view 
when one deals with real groups in society. That is, it would be unethical to trigger conflicts 
between people belonging to different groups in society, and it would be equally unethical and 
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undesirable to ascribe certain characteristics to such real-life groups in society. For this reason, 
it is more appropriate to resort to opinions and attitudes through survey research. Especially 
given that RWA and SDO represent the attitudinal counterpart of the context, this ought not to 
pose a problem. 
5. There is a huge gap between subjective perception and the objective reality. A lot of the 
foregoing relates to the fundamental distinction that exists between objective reality (however 
measured) and individual perception thereof. As indicated in the introductory part on 
philosophy of science, objective reality need not coincide with the subjective perception 
thereof. As it is primarily subjective perceptions of objective problem situations that motivate 
people to act, the most appropriate way seems to focus on these subjective perceptions or beliefs 
in order to test the theory. Thus, this basic psychological phenomenon constitutes one more 
reason not to focus on the objective context, but on the individual representation thereof. SDO 
and RWA qualify to do so, given that they are ideological attitudes based on individual beliefs 
about to world.  
2.  Deducibility relationships  
As was discussed in the philosophical background of the study, explanation is regarded in terms 
of unification, and unification refers to connecting different instances on the basis of a shared 
theoretical statement of a higher degree of universality. As a strictly universal statement is not 
testable, one needs to resort to specific instances in order to test a theory. How does this work 
in practice? 
In this sense,  the notion of a proper subclass of a universal statement  is of interest. Each 
universal statement has an in principle unlimited number of subclasses that can be derived from 
it, on the basis of lesser degrees of universality and/or precision. Stating that two distinct 
phenomena can be unified under a general universal statement thus means that two proper 
subclasses of that universal statement are brought in connection with each other (see, Popper, 
2002 [1959], pp. 100-103). This connection is fully dependent on the initial conditions which 
shapes the instantiation of the universal statement. That is, the universal statement may present 
itself empirically in different forms depending on the specific conditions it instantiates under.  
For the case of prejudice, we have already seen that the conditions that shape pro-sociality are 
a perception of conflict and/or competition. Then, and only then, prejudice towards threatening 
or competing out-groups (because prejudice against the ill and disabled is rooted in another 
cognitive module) will be the outcome of human pro-sociality. In the previous section, I have 
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shown that RWA and SDO can perform this function very well. Therefore, SDO and RWA will 
serve as the initial conditions that shape human pro-sociality in the specific form of prejudice.  
In order to test its connection with the universal statement on pro-sociality, the only option is 
to link prejudice with another instance of pro-sociality with RWA and SDO as mediators, as 
they are presumed to be the initial conditions on which prejudice as a form of pro-sociality 
depends. In this study, it was chosen to create a scale with general instances of signaling pro-
sociality outside of the scope of prejudice (see infra: methodology). This way, two different 
instances of the same universal statement are expected to be associated with one another, 
through mediation by the initial conditions that would give rise to the specific instance65.  
The theoretical model that will eventually be tested is presented in Figure 1. The specific 
hypotheses that are to be tested with this model, as well as their rationale, will be discussed in 
the next section.  
 
Figure 1: theoretical model to be tested in the study. 
 
                                                 
65 In this sense, I would also challenge the often heard terminology of “proximate” and “distal” casues. One 
could say that pro-sociality is the distal cause, whilst the proximal causes are RWA and SDO in the specific 
case of this study. However, neither one of the causes is “distal”: pro-sociality is regarded as a general human 
tendency, which can take up a specific shape according to the context (initial conditions) it is present in. This 
does not, however, make it “distant”, as it is a tendency that is always present in humans (Weber, 2013, 




3. Hypotheses and their rationale 
 
It is but a good practice to clearly state the hypotheses that underlie the model to be tested, and 
to clearly indicate how they relate to the theory and what their falsification potential for the 
theory is. This will be done below.  
 
Hypothesis 1: there is a significant positive indirect effect of genuine signaling of sociality 
on bias motivated behaviors, which runs through RWA and prejudice. 
This hypothesis is, in principle, the core hypothesis of the study. It is the most contra-intuitive 
one as it points toward a link between genuine signaling of pro-sociality and bias motivated 
behaviors, which is not a common way of thinking of prejudice. The hypothesis explicitly states 
that the effect of genuine signaling on bias motivated behaviors is indirect, given that pro-social 
people will usually tend to uphold group norms, which include norms of tolerance and non-
discrimination as well as non-violence in our contemporary society. Therefore, the perception 
of threatening or dangerous out-groups as exemplified in the RWA ideology, is a necessary 
condition for this link to take hold, and a neutralizing mechanism is needed to justify the 
violence. If such a perception is not present, people will presumably not score high on prejudice, 
given the prevalence of non-discriminatory norms.  
This particular hypothesis will be regarded as falsified, when there is no indirect effect of 
genuine signaling of pro-sociality on bias motivated behaviors, or when this indirect effect is 
negative rather than positive. The former can be called “soft” falsification so to speak, as it 
merely indicates the absence of an a priori specified relationship. The latter can be regarded as 
“strong” falsification, as it indicates the existence of a relationship that directly contradicts the 
hypothesis deduced from the theory.  
The hypothesis can be refined into two sub-hypotheses, which form the weaker form of the 
overall hypothesis. The original hypothesis contains indirect effects, and ideally mediated 
paths. Even though these will be tested, two sub-hypotheses that do not meet the requirements 
of mediation or indirect effects can be derived from it: 
- Hypothesis 1a: there is a significant, positive direct effect of genuine signaling of pro-
sociality on RWA. 
- Hypothesis 1b: there is a significant, positive direct effect of RWA on prejudice. 
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These sub-hypotheses simply state a sequence of direct effects. With regard to the theory to be 
tested, hypothesis 1a simply presumes a direct and positive effect of genuine signaling of pro-
sociality RWA, consistent with the conjecture made by Cohrs and Kessler (2008). 
 
Hypothesis 2: there is no significant direct effect of genuine signaling of pro-sociality on 
prejudice. 
Hypothesis 2 explicates the necessary character of the mediation by RWA in the relationship 
between genuine signaling of pro-sociality and prejudice. This hypothesis should be explicitly 
tested, as it is a strong potential falsifier for the theory discussed. For, if a direct relationship 
exists between genuine signaling of pro-sociality and prejudice, the conditionality of this 
particular instance of pro-sociality can be questioned. It is at the core of the study that pro-
sociality can result in a wide variety of behaviors, many of which are morally highly valued, 
depending on the initial conditions in which it instantiates. For example, if the initial conditions 
are working with in-group members on a common goal, cooperation and even altruism can be 
expected to be the result of human pro-sociality. It is only when threat or danger emanating 
from out-groups is perceived, that prejudice may be the instance of pro-sociality.  
This hypothesis can be considered falsified when a direct positive effect of genuine signaling 
of pro-sociality on prejudice is found. This is a form of strong falsification, as this finding would 
contradict the theory directly; it would knock down without any compromise the strong 
mediation hypothesis which is at the very heart of this study.  
 
Hypothesis 3: there is no direct effect of genuine signaling of pro-sociality on bias motivated 
behaviors. 
The 3d hypothesis is a result of the same logic as hypothesis 2.  It refers to the fact that people 
that genuinely care for the in-group and its norms will usually not be very prone to bias 
motivated aggression. On the contrary, given that non-discrimination and non-violence have 
become very salient norms in contemporary Western society (Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981), it 
can be expected that genuine pro-sociality is protective of bias motivated behaviors in the 
absence of mediation by RWA and prejudice. This hypothesis can be considered falsified if a 




Hypothesis 4: there is a positive indirect effect of deceptive signaling of pro-sociality on bias 
motivated behaviors, which runs through SDO and prejudice. 
This hypothesis reflects the same idea as does hypothesis 1, be it in the case of deceptive 
signaling of pro-sociality. As was elaborated in the previous chapter, genuine pro-sociality is 
but one form of pro-sociality. Defecting strategies co-evolved with pro-sociality, as it is 
important for defectors not to be exposed as such, in order to avoid punishment, and – in many 
cases – to reach their own goals of high status in the group. Therefore, a mediation hypothesis 
is presented as well: in the context of conflict or competition between groups, defectors have 
access to a forum on which they can signal their status and willingness to invest in the in-group, 
and by doing so, increase their status and reputation. 
This hypothesis will be considered falsified if no or a negative indirect effect of deceptive 
signaling on bias motivated behaviors emerge. The former can be regarded as soft falsification, 
whereas the latter can be regarded as strong falsification as it contradicts the theory directly.   
The hypothesis can be refined into two sub-hypotheses, which form the weaker form of the 
overall hypothesis. The original hypothesis contains indirect effects, and ideally mediated 
paths. Even though these will be tested, two sub-hypotheses that do not meet the requirements 
of mediation or indirect effects can be derived from it: 
- Hypothesis 1a: there is a significant, positive direct effect of deceptive signaling on 
SDO. 
- Hypothesis 1b: there is a significant, positive direct effect of SDO on prejudice. 
These sub-hypotheses simply state a sequence of direct effects. With regard to the theory to be 
tested, hypothesis 1a simply presumes a direct and positive effect of deceptive signaling of pro-
sociality on SDO, without indirectly influencing prejudice or bias motivated behaviors. 
 
Hypothesis 5: the mediation effect is weaker in cases of deceptive signaling of pro-sociality 
compared to genuine signaling of pro-sociality. 
Hypothesis 5 is inspired by the generally more selfish orientation of people that deceptively 
signal their commitment to the in-group, and intends to highlight the different psychometric 
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properties between both forms of signaling.  A weaker mediation effect is expected for mainly 
two reasons. First, the more selfish orientation of people that deceptively signal their 
commitment to the in-group entails their exploitation of others to their own benefit. Second, in 
a context of intergroup competition, their inclination to act against out-group members is not 
restrained by compliance to other norms as is the case for people who genuinely signal their 
commitment to the in-group. The latter will need to neutralize other, often anti-discriminatory, 
norms before acting against out-group members. As this neutralization is not required for 
deceptive signalers, I expect the effect to be less strongly or entirely not mediated by an 
ideological attitude. Hypothesis 5 can be refined into two distinct sub-hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 5a: there is a positive direct effect of deceptive signaling of pro-sociality on 
prejudice. 
The strong version of hypothesis 5 posits a direct relationship between deceptive signaling of 
pro-sociality on prejudice. This reasoning is basically the same as in case of hypothesis 5: given 
the more selfish orientation of people that deceptively signal their commitment to the in-group, 
it can be hypothesized that they are by default more prone to being prejudiced towards out-
groups than are people who genuinely signal their commitment to the in-group. The reason is 
that they are self-interested, and are thus more likely to safeguard the status and resources of 
their in in-group against outsiders without needing an excuse to do so.  
 
Hypothesis 5b: there is a positive direct effect of deceptive signaling of pro-sociality on bias 
motivated aggression.  
Hypothesis 5b posits a similar direct effect of deceptive pro-social signaling on bias motivated 
aggression. This is a rather bold hypothesis, as it assumes that prejudice is not a necessary 
condition for bias motivated aggression to occur in cases of deceptive signaling of pro-sociality. 
The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that for people with the tendency to defect, a more 
selfish tendency, the status and power of the in-group need to be preserved from outsiders 
notwithstanding the salient pro-social norms in society. Especially in cases where this can be 
combined with a deceptive signal of commitment to the in-group in the sense of punishment of 





Hypothesis 6: there is no direct effect of genuine signaling of pro-sociality on SDO. 
Hypothesis 6 serves the purpose of highlighting and additionally testing the different 
psychometric properties of both forms of signaling. No or a negative effect is expected between 
genuine signaling of pro-sociality and SDO, given the different nature of genuinely pro-social 
people compared to deceptively pro-social people. One would expect a clear and logical 
relationship with RWA in case of the former, and with SDO in case of the latter. As this 
hypothesis is not related to the strict mediation model which is the core of the study, it can be 
regarded as an additional test to push the limits of the study.  
 
Hypothesis 7: there is no direct effect of deceptive signaling of pro-sociality on RWA. 
The reasoning behind hypothesis 7 is basically the same as the reasoning for hypothesis 6. It 
regards an extra hypothesis to check the differences in psychometric properties of both forms 
of signaling, as well as the limits of the model when it comes to cross-national comparisons. It 
is an additional hypothesis, which is not at the heart of the study (i.c. the strict mediation model), 
but may enable further insight into the dynamics at play. 
 
Hypothesis 8: There is no direct positive effect of RWA on bias motivated behaviors. 
This hypothesis focuses on some aspects of RWA that have been left largely unexplored up to 
today, i.c. the potential positive effects of RWA. For, even though RWA has usually been 
brought into connection with morally rejected forms of behavior such as prejudice, evolutionary 
theory suggests this need not be the case. Whether or not it results in morally condemned forms 
of behavior really depends on the norms that are at play. In a situation where one might believe 
that the world is a dangerous and threatening place, but where one does not perceive any 
particular group to attribute such threats or dangers to, it seems logical that people will adhere 
to – already quite salient – norms of non-violence (Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981). Adherence to 
such norms would, in the end, keep the world a safe and unthreatening place to the greatest 
extent possible (at least so perceived).  
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For this reason, I do not expect RWA in itself to have a positive effect on bias motivated 
behaviors. If the above reasoning would true, the only relationship to be expected between 
RWA and bias motivated behaviors, is a negative one rather than a positive one. This hypothesis 
can be considered a bold one, putting the theory to quite a severe test. 
  
Hypothesis 9: there is no direct effect of SDO on bias motivated behaviors. 
A different logic underlies hypothesis 9, relating to the necessity of mediation. Whilst the 
sensitivity to norms makes mediation by RWA a necessary condition, this need not be the case 
for SDO. The theory predicts that people higher in SDO deceptively signal their mimicked 
commitment to the in-group on any occasion they get, for the sole purpose of acquiring better 
reputation and power in the group. This also means that the necessity of mediation by SDO can 
be questioned: if they seize every moment to signal their commitment to the in-group, then what 
would be there to be neutralized by the ideology of SDO? One could say: ok, but at least they 
need to perceive competition, and this is the mediation. They key in understanding the dynamic 
lies in the contribution of evolutionary theory thereto: they don’t necessarily need to perceive 
competition, it suffices if someone else perceives competition and attributes this to a specific 
out-group.  If someone else perceives competition, this provides them with an opportunity to 
deceptively signal their commitment to the in-group as well. For this reason, I have put the 
hypothesis in its current form. It can be considered falsified if there is a direct effect between 
SDO and prejudice.  
 
Hypothesis 10: there is direct, positive effect of prejudice on bias motivated behaviors. 
This hypothesis is a logical consequence of the conjunction of hypotheses 8 and 9, which 
suggest that the effect of SDO and RWA on bias motivated behaviors runs through prejudice. 
In fact, it was theorized that the ideological attitudes in themselves are insufficient to lead to 
bias motivated behaviors, for which a neutralizing and targeting mechanism is needed, which 
is operationalized as prejudice.  
This hypothesis can be read in conjunction with hypotheses 1 and 4, insofar as prejudice is an 
integral part of the indirect path through which deceptive and genuine signaling are presumed 
to exert an effect on bias motivated behaviors.  
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Hypothesis 11: the direction of the results is the same for men and women. 
This is an important hypothesis, and is at the heart of the study. As the mechanism described so 
far is regarded as the result of the evolution of human sociality, which was in its own right able 
to deal with, inter alia, the problems of competition, hunting large game, etc., it is expected to 
be relatively gender-insensitive. I did say relatively, given that it is utterly impossible to strictly 
isolate this particular mechanism in the myriad mechanisms that are at play when people 
actually behave, but still, a valid claim would be that the direction of the results ought to be the 
same for men and women.  
The rationale for this hypothesis is the domain specificity of the mechanism described in the 
previous chapters. Sex differences in behavior (e.g. Pinker, 2002, 2011) usually are the result 
of differing mating strategies and differences in parental investment between men and women, 
a subject matter which is, in principle, unrelated to the domain for which sociality emerged in 
the modular approach. For this reason, differences in intensity of the results may still proliferate, 
as behaviors such as violence and dominance actually are co-determined by gender, but they 
may absolutely not be of the nature that the direction of the results are different for men and 
women.  
 
Hypothesis 12: the model holds in different national settings.  
The final hypothesis is also at the heart of the study. As the mechanism described in the previous 
chapters is assumed to be a result of evolution, it is likewise assumed that all of mankind is 
equipped with this particular mechanism, to a greater or lesser extent. For, the evolution of the 
particular behavioral tendencies discussed in the previous chapters occurred tens of thousands 
of years ago, presumably in the Late Pleistocene, which is a sufficient amount of time to have 
been selected for. Therefore, it can be expected that the mechanism is operational in all of 
mankind of today.  
It should be borne in mind, however, that the mode of testing in this study does not use strictly 
objective criteria, such as particular genes or hormones. Rather, it will concern a survey study, 
in which subjective perceptions will be queried. The logical consequence of this is that there is 
a possibility of slight variation between countries, due to cultural variance as a result of 
horizontal transmission.  
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4.  Conclusion: two stages to bias motivated aggression 
A hypothesis-wise dissection of the model as presented in this chapter, basically brings all the 
pieces of the puzzle together, as it provides detailed insights in how certain relationships are 
predicted by the theory, and, as a consequence, sheds more light on potential tests of the model. 
From the point of view of theory, the hypothesis-wise exposition presented in this chapter fills 
up the gaps in current theorizing on bias motivated aggression. That is, many of the theories 
discussed such as RWA and SDO usually have prejudice as a dependent variable. This is not 
the case in the model presented in this study, however. In the present study, bias motivated 
aggression is the dependent variable, which implies that the concept of prejudice is in need of 
further discussion, in order to clarify its role among the other intervening variables, a discussion 
which has been relatively absent in current scholarship on prejudice.  
The model that was depicted in this chapter, basically is a two staged dual process model (in 
the strict theoretical form). I will not enter the discussion on the dual process character of the 
model again, as this has already been extensively done in the previous chapters. The two stages, 
however, are in need of further explanation. Starting from the two forms of signaling pro-
sociality, deceptively and genuinely, the first stage consists of the mediation of both ideological 
attitudes RWA and SDO. The second stage is common for the two processes in the model, being 
prejudice. The end result of these two mediating variables is bias motivated behaviors (or, at 
least an increase of the propensity thereto) (see Heylen & Pauwels, 2015 for the two staged 
model, reproduced below).   
A first step in moving from the two pro-social tendencies to bias motivated aggression consists 
of the perception of a dangerous and/or competitive world, as suggested by the coalitional 
computation hypothesis. Whereas such a danger and competition was rather straightforward in 
our ancestral past, humans are now equipped with a complex brain able to deal with abstract 
information. This cognitive build-up allows for, inter alia, intricate ideologies to take the place 
of reality. In the social psychological study of prejudice, scholarship has converged on two 
ideological attitudes as the main predictors of prejudice, i.c. RWA and SDO.  
In a second step, the danger needs to be attributed to a specific out-group in a way that 
legitimizes aggression to that out-group. Consistent with coalitional psychology, attribution 
serves the purpose of distinguishing between allied out-groups and hostile or competitive out-
groups. Second, legitimization of aggression is a necessary step, because as people evolved 
over time, cooperation and non-violence have more than ever become the norm (Pinker, 2011; 
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Sober & Wilson, 1998). This phenomenon is elaborately discussed by Peter Singer in his The 
Expanding Circle (Singer, 1981) and has resulted in a steady decline in violence throughout 
history. As people adhere to norms (to differing degrees), they also adhere to norms of 
nonviolence and equality. This is especially the case for people high in RWA, as it reflects a 
need for group cohesion, but equally so for people high in SDO. For the latter, protection of 
reputation is of great importance, and aggression towards out-groups perceived as spiteful by 
the in-group will result in a bad reputation. Therefore, neutralization of these norms – especially 
by others in the in-group, as they will eventually decide upon the status of them – is needed. 
This neutralization occurs by depicting the out-group as either a threat to in-group norms and 
cohesion, or as cheaters reaping the benefits of the in-group, consistent with the theoretical 
framework above. It is, therefore, no surprise that most prejudice scales include items such as 
“immigrants have jobs that US citizens should have” (free-riding), or “the values of immigrants 
are irreconcilable with those of US citizens” (threat to group norms). Additional forms of 
justification, may consist of dehumanization (e.g. Haslam, 2006) of the out-group, or by 
triggering emotions such as disgust or repulsion (e.g. Navarrete & Fessler, 2006). The targeting 
and neutralization process is adequately captured by the concept prejudice, given that it reflects 
socially learned beliefs (e.g. Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012) in which out-group members are 
associated with violations of norms, cheating, and often dehumanization.   
Now how does this particular model relate to the scientific philosophical framework this study 
is embedded in? As was mentioned earlier, it is quite impossible to test a strictly universal 
statement empirically, this can only be done by linking two distinct instances thereof with each 
other, using the proper mediators. These mediators actually represent the initial conditions in 
which the target instance (outcome variable) is expected to manifest itself in. thus, SDO and 
RWA are the initial conditions that make the universal statement “when a perception of threat 
or competition is present, human pro-sociality will turn parochial increases” instantiate in the 
form of bias motivated behaviors. That is, they represent the culturally contingent content of 
what a “perception of threat and/or competition” looks like in Western countries, using the 






U1: If a perception of threat or competition is present, human sociality will turn 
parochial 
IC1: A perception of threat or competition is present in group X (aux. 1: SDO represents 
competition, RWA represents perception of threat)  
IC2: Group X has pro-social tendencies (aux. 2: as do they all, be it in two forms) 
C: Sociality will turn parochial (aux. 3: this “turn” is represented by mediated 
relationships in a SEM model) 
 
Where Ux refers to the first universal statement, ICx to the initial conditions, and C to the 
conclusion. Between brackets, the assumptions derived from the initial conditions are made 
explicit. In this context, auxiliary hypothesis one is derived from both SDO and RWA theory, 
due to their compatibility with the evolutionary framework. Auxiliary hypothesis 2 refers to the 
evolutionary framework developed in the theoretical parts of this study, and rests on the 
assumption that a tendency so important in our ancestral past, has to be present in all individuals 
today, to a greater or lesser extent. I have also included a third auxiliary hypothesis, referring 
to statistical theory. This is not unimportant, as it is precisely on the basis of statistical theory 
that all of the hypotheses will be considered corroborated or falsified. If the approach to this 
study would have been constructivist, an entirely different picture would have emerged, with 
an enormous impact on the results themselves as well as their interpretation.  
A hugely important word in the second initial condition is “group X”. As elaborated on in the 
section on philosophy of science, the above deduction is only applicable to social phenomena, 
and not to individual persons. As such, the study can only deal with a phenomenon on a 
population level, and certainly not with individual cases of hate crime, for which such a great 
variety of additional variables and constraints must be introduced into the equation in order to 
give a realistic picture, that this would, up to today, be an utterly impossible task. Now, one 
might be tempted to see this as a huge difference with the natural sciences (as social scientists 
often seem to compulsively want these differences to exist), but this is not true in my opinion. 
Just like an apple falling from a tree represents only one instance of gravity amongst many 
others (such as a banana falling from a tree, me diving into a swimming pool, someone rope 
skipping, and so on), so too represent prejudice and bias motivated aggression two instances of 
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human sociality, next to a wide variety of others (such as going to church, giving to charity, and 
so on).  
When it comes to predicting individual behavior, one must bear in mind that one individual has 
a great many different tendencies in his or her biological makeup. These do not work in isolation 
from each other, but mutually influence, reinforce or restraint, other tendencies. Let us compare 
this to the apple again. Apart from being less complicated than a human, one could say that, 
from the point of view of gravity, the apple is a static thing, and that gravity there can in fact be 
studied in isolation of other processes, just as is the case with humans by the way (as there is 
no way we can defy gravity). Identical to humans, however, apples are susceptible to a great 
variety of different processes as well, as they are living things. Whilst one might, for example, 
say that an apple decays after you keep it a certain time in your kitchen, the very exact moment 
of decay is impossible to predict, as every individual apple will decay in a different way. Just 
like humans do, by the way.  
To close this discussion on the similarity with the natural sciences, note that this notation does 
not differ much from the notation used in the natural sciences: 
 
U1: If the weight put on a string exceeds its capacity, it will break 
IC1: The weight put on the string exceeds its capacity 
C: The thread will break 
 
I hope to have convinced the reader that the natural sciences do not differ that much from the 
social sciences. Of course, as the headquote of this chapter suggest, the proof of the pudding is 
in the eating. Now we have deduced a theoretical model that is ready for empirical testing, all 
variables and a research strategy are in order. This will be done in the next chapter, which will 




Chapter V. Methodology: truncus communis 
 
It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory—if we look for 
confirmations. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions. 
A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability 
is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice. Every genuine test of a theory 
is an attempt to falsify it, or refute it. 
Karl Raimund Popper  (1963, p. 36)  
 
In this chapter, some general reflections on the methodology of the study will be discussed. The 
empirical study in principle consists of two parts, and the reflections presented in this chapter 
apply to both of the studies conducted in order to test the hypotheses set out in the previous 
chapter. As the quote to this chapter suggests, the methodology and research strategy pursued 
in this study is conceived of as an attempt to falsify or refute the theory. First, a confirmation 
of the hypothesis can be considered to be a corroborating instance if the prediction tested is a 
risky prediction. I will leave it to the appreciation of the reader to estimate whether or not the 
predictions made in this research are “risky”, but will share my own experience and view on 
the matter as well. Initially, the prediction that “prejudice is an instance of pro-sociality” or 
even “bias motivated aggression is an instance of pro-sociality” struck me with a great sense 
of disbelief. It seemed to go against all conceivable background knowledge and intuition that I 
had. It was only after making the deduction that lead to this conclusion over and over again, 
that I came to accept the hypothesis, and decided to test it in this PhD research. This, together 
with the fact that there is no single empirical research on this matter available, make the 
hypotheses presented in the previous chapter “risky” predictions in my opinion. Even though it 
is impossible to know what Popper meant exactly by the word “risky”, it seems at least plausible 
that this is the kind of “risky” he would have in mind.  
But, apart from this, falsification remains the strongest test of any theory. Therefore, I will try 
to show in this common part of the methodology which attempts will be made to refute the 
theory. Even though one can think of a great many ways to do so in a very creative way, it must 
be borne in mind that comparability of a given project to the existing body of literature is of 
great value in any kind of evaluation thereof. Without this comparability, evaluation of the 
theory in terms of precision and levels of universality compared to competing theories would, 
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of course, be impossible. This is, however, of the utmost importance in any scientific enterprise 
as it gives an idea of the “measure of progress” a certain direction in research may or may not 
bring about.66 For this reason, I have tried to balance attempts at falsification with this inherent 
requirement of comparability. In short, falsification will be pursued in three ways: competing 
hypotheses that contradict the theory, an international comparison, and a group comparison 
between men and women. All of these, as well as their place within the general design, are 
outlined below.  
1.  General design: multi-site survey research 
The general design of the two studies is quantitative in nature. First, the studies are designed to 
empirically assess a phenomenon on the population level, not a singular act (or “instance” of a 
certain phenomenon) that will be studied in depth (e.g. the specific case of Anders Breivik). As 
has been argued elsewhere (Heylen & Weber, 2013), both approaches follow a different, yet 
complementary, logic with different notions of causality that accompany them. In the studies at 
hand difference making probability was explicitly chosen, given the aim of explaining a social 
phenomenon. In this sense, the study will provide the reader with a snapshot of the status 
questionis with regard to the hypotheses. The design does not allow for any conclusions with 
regard to stability over time of these results, for which qualitative studies (Heylen & Weber, 
2013) or longitudinal designs are better suited from a philosophy of science point of view.  
More precisely, a cross-sectional survey research was chosen. Notwithstanding certain 
undeniable weaknesses of this design, it was opted for on both practical and substantial grounds. 
Given the limited timeframe and resources within which a PhD-research has to be realized, we 
gave preference to cross-cultural testing over a longitudinal or experimental design (see infra).  
An additional consideration in the choice of the design is the comparability of the current 
research with the existing body of social psychological research with regard to prejudice. The 
goal of the study is to unveil “causes of the causes”. That is, the aim is to unveil more 
fundamental mechanisms that animate prejudice, which are deduced from a coherent theoretical 
framework. This way, the longstanding research tradition in social psychology will be 
integrated with evolutionary thinking on the matter. As the main research strategy adopted in 
that social psychological literature is cross-sectional survey research, it seems but logical that a 
                                                 
66 Of course, no single project like this one will in itself procure “progress of science”. It only gives a direction 
in which this progress may be sought. In reality – in the Kuhnian sense of the growth of science – it will only 
signify progress if it becomes part of “normal science” in that particular domain.  
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similar design, allowing for the usage of the very same research tools such as measurement 
scales, is adopted to realize the current project67. Otherwise, it would be utterly difficult to 
compare the results directly. A consequence of this is that the goal of theoretical integration 
will be jeopardized in this way. This way, the project can contribute to the rich field of study 
occupied with prejudice and bias motivated aggression.  
On a final note, it can be argued that this design indirectly also allows for an evaluation of the 
utility of evolutionary theory and the hypotheses derived thereof in the wider and general 
context of social scientific research.  A common criticism is that evolutionary theory is merely 
“telling tales” and retrospective explanation of certain phenomena (Rose, personal 
communication, 2014). What is usually meant by this is that one creates a theory that fits the 
data in hindsight: an overtly inductive enterprise. This can be considered to be a 
misinterpretation, given the fact that evolutionary premises are situated on a higher level of 
universality and allow for a strict deductive approach.  
2.  Sampling 
A pressing question that poses itself in social scientific research is which sample will be used 
when conducting the empirical investigation. Many times, the question centers around the issue 
of representativeness of the sample used. More specifically, a debate in sampling literature is 
whether the usage of student samples (often on practical considerations) is defensible. The main 
concern is that these samples are not representative, and are thus of a lesser quality and do not 
allow for generalization afterwards. The bias that such samples give rise to is probably best 
summarized by Henrich et al., giving it the acronym WEIRD: students generally are Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). The 
same authors illustrate the differences between student populations and general populations 
with regard to scores on visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, 
categorization and inferential induction.  
As the differences noted by those authors include differences with regard to fairness norms, 
cooperation, and categorization, the question as to which sample to use becomes pressing for 
the project at hand as well. As discussed elaborately in the literature review, these are the 
elementary building blocks in the evolution of prejudice. The differences that Henrich et al. 
refer to, relate to a comparison between Western student samples and, inter alia, small scale 
                                                 
67 The panel studies that do exist furthermore indicate the stability over time with regards to the main 
predictors of prejudice (e.g. Zick et al., 2008).  
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societies. With regard to cooperation, fairness and categorization, differences between both 
reference groups may arise on the basis of culturally contingent norms.  
From the point of view of the theoretic and meta-theoretic underpinnings of the current study, 
this should not be a fundamental obstacle. First, gene-culture co-evolution is explicitly 
acknowledged, and instantiation of the human universal is conceived of as bound by 
spatiotemporally contingent initial conditions of which culturally contingent norms are an 
integral part. These are conceived of as a set of typically Western instances of threat and 
competition, which may not be necessarily present in other societies where threats may relate 
to different commodities. Consistent with the deductive model set out in the literature review, 
this implies that for different societies, different initial conditions will have to be chosen.  
Rather than the specific condition that operates in a given context (which is in fact a specific 
operationalization of a more abstract concept), however, the important point is that it regards 
commodities that may provide to be a source of competition or conflict in a given society (the 
“universal” condition for prejudice to arise). In fact, this kind of cultural variation is implied by 
evolutionary theory itself, inter alia through transmission mechanisms and the various 
equilibria it gives rise to. Even though the operationalization might differ, there are good 
reasons to assume that the same mechanism of coalitional computation – disregarding the 
operationalization of conflict and competition in a specific society –  applies to other 
commodities as well, in light of the available evidence (see chapter on evolutionary theory). 
For the sake of clarity, however, the reader is advised to bear in mind that the results of the 
study can only be interpreted in light of this particular operationalization, thus applying only to 
Western countries and prejudice in the West.  
Still, problems may arise within this specific part of humanity where the concrete 
operationalization of the initial conditions in terms of employment, material commodities and 
the like, applies. For, within a given population, the E(ducated), R(ich), and D(emocratic) of 
the WEIRD people may still cause differences in research results. It should be stressed that the 
differences observed in the social psychological measurement scales used in this research only 
bear on the strength of statistical relationships, not on the direction thereof (e.g. Sibley & 
Duckitt, 2008; Van Hiel, Cornelis, & Roets, 2007). Therefore, a bias due to the circumstances 
of the respondent group, which, on average, is richer, more educated and democratic than the 
population mean, can be expected. This does not preclude the possibility to test the theoretical 
model, as the factors included therein behave in the same way in adult versus student samples. 
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In order to increase variation in the sample, attempts were made to reach  a diverse range of 
students, ranging from bio-engineers to law students. More specific details are provided in the 
chapter on the results of the studies conducted.  
Finally, financial and time constraints force scholars to prioritize certain features in a design. 
Even though an ideal design would be a full experimental, cross-cultural, mixed method design, 
this has proven impossible to realize, however unfortunate this is. In the current study, cross-
national validation of the results was prioritized over a mix between student and adult samples, 
given the value thereof in evolutionary theoretic research).  
3.  Online distribution of questionnaire 
In survey research, another question is the “pencil-versus-internet” question. Previous debates 
have pointed out several biases on the basis of the mode of administration of surveys. Classic 
concerns with online surveys are the fact that they may not reach part of the target population, 
lower response rates, technology skills of the respondent, and concerns about anonymity. On 
the other hand, web-based surveys are associated with a lower cost, more design options and 
instantaneous data collection / entry (e.g. Bethlehem & Biffignandi, 2011; Manfreda & 
Vehovar, 2008).  
For the purpose of this project, an online survey was opted for. First, because the target 
population are students. As universities are increasingly relying on online media and email to 
communicate with students, it can be considered to be an efficient way to reach a large number 
of students. Second, it can be safely assumed that, in this day and age, students possess the 
necessary technological skills to complete an online survey (Livingston & et al., 2013). This 
way, the often heard fear that the online distribution of a questionnaire will fail to reach a part 
of the target population (Potter & Chatwin, 2011) is less applicable to the current study. 
Furthermore, this fear is more present in cases where specific target groups are sought for, 
which is not the case in the present study.  
In order to combat the low response rates, the range of dissemination was considerably 
extended. Instead of sending the survey to one’s own class or faculty, we invited several 
universities to send the survey to different departments, in order to guarantee a sufficiently large 
sample. In the Spanish study, a lot of the preparatory work of the study needed to happen from 
a distance and through telephone and email communication. As different sites in Spain were 
prepared to take part in the study, it was impossible to be at all these sites in person at the time 
of preparation of the study and actual data collection. In order to secure a sufficiently large 
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sample, an open university was included (the Open Univeristy of Cataluña), as this may 
significantly increase the response rates as an open university relies much more on digital 
communication than a regular university does. This has proven to be a good strategy, as this 
particular university was able to generate the vast majority of responses in the Spanish study.  
In order to make sure the anonymity of the respondents is secured, the online survey program 
(Limesurvey) was set to not save the IP addresses in the dataset. The program itself did keep 
track of the IP address, for the purpose of blocking access to the survey once it had been filled 
out on a computer linked to that IP address (Miller et al., 2007).  
Finally, some considerable positive aspects of an online survey are worth mentioning (see also 
Kays, Keith & Brougal, 2013; Tuten, 2010). As paper-and-pen surveys require the researcher 
to manually enter data in the statistical software, there is a considerable risk of making mistakes 
when doing so. An online survey has the great advantage that data entry occurs automatically 
by the survey software, thus leaving no margin for mistakes given that the survey set-up is 
thoroughly tested before administration thereof. Furthermore, a traditional way of 
disseminating paper-and-pencil surveys is to have students fill it out while in the classroom. In 
my opinion, there are some disadvantages to this, too. One such disadvantage is bias in the 
results. Often, students sit next to one another, and filling out a questionnaire with threatening 
questions this way may result in a considerable social desirability bias. A second disadvantage, 
of a practical nature, is that teachers are not very willing to give up a lot of teaching time for a 
research project, as they are usually short in time to cover all the materials in their curriculum. 
This way, online distribution may prove to be both useful to avoid bias as people fill out the 
questionnaire in the privacy of their home, whilst it may increase collaboration from universities 
and professors as it does not cut into their teaching time.  
4. Hypothetico-deductive testing in practice 
As discussed elaborately in the section on the meta-theoretical underpinnings of this study, it is 
explicitly deductive or theory-driven. In the previous chapter where the hypotheses have been 
presented, I already briefly indicated when certain hypotheses can be considered to be falsified, 
and how the model and its hypotheses fit in with the meta-theoretical assumptions of the study. 
In the following paragraphs, I will elaborate on this deductive strategy more elaborately. In 
general, the strategy is to identify, to use Brown’s words, a “human universal” (D. E. Brown, 
1991), which is then conditionally specified towards a specific instance by identifying the 
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relevant and spatiotemporally contingent initial conditions that give rise to this specific instance 
of the universal disposition.  
As indicated earlier, this approach comes down to a search for an ontologically deeper causal 
explanation or, alternatively, an explanation situated at a higher level of universality. This was 
referred to as a search for the evolutionary underpinnings of prejudice and bias motivated 
behaviors. What this concretely means is the following. If we take bias motivated aggression to 
be a more specific instance of the universal phenomenon pro-sociality than is prejudice, it can 
be said that bias motivated aggression is on a lower level of universality. Alternatively put, this 
comes down to the claim that bias motivated behavior is a more restricted instance of prejudice. 
In reality, this means that even though prejudice may give rise to bias motivated aggression, it 
does not necessarily do so; it is a necessary but insufficient condition thereto68 (at least it is so 
theorized in the current study). To put it in the words of Mackie, it is an INUS condition, or an 
Insufficient but Non-random part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for 
their effects (Mackie, 1965). Consistent with the view on mechanisms and regularities in the 
social sciences, this characterization of the conditions studied in the current study are one 
constellation that may lead to the outcome, next to a plethora of other constellations of other 
conditions. Also, this is in line with the view that a mechanism only delivers a partial or 
selective description of the causal process (Hedstrom & Ylikoski, 2010, p. 53); it only presents 
specific core elements derived from evolutionary theory in this particular project – and sticks 
to that for clarity’s sake.  
On a yet higher level of universality, RWA and SDO are located. Again, these are necessary 
but insufficient causes for bias motivated aggression to occur, given that a necessary 
intermediary step is the targeting module of coalitional psychology (or so it is theorized in the 
current study). This way, what the deductive system looks like, is like multifinality: whilst RWA 
can lead to very different outcomes than bias motivated aggression, it can result in it given a 
specific initial condition that makes the more universal ideological attitude instantiate as bias 
motivated aggression. If prejudice is absent, it may instantiate in a wide array of alternative 
                                                 
68 As appears from the literature review, only prejudice is covered as a predictor for bias motivated 
aggression. Obvious additional necessary conditions, however, would be the fact that one at least once has 




behaviors, ranging from genuine altruism to joining Opus Dei so to speak.69 This was also 
visually represented in the conclusion of the theoretical model in the previous chapter. 
How does this model relate to the claims with regard to universality, then? The main problem 
is that it is quite impossible to see how a very universal concept as “sociality as such” can be 
accurately measured.70 One way would be to look for the physiological underpinnings of such 
behavior, but this kind of research still is at an early stage and is impossible to investigate using 
survey methodology.71 Another way of doing so is relating a different set of outcomes of that 
same universal class of behavior to the explanandum. This is what the model represents: on the 
far left side of the model, two forms of pro-social behavior are depicted, which are related to 
the explanandum through the initial conditions that would give rise to it as an instance of the 
same universal class of behaviors.  
Obvious implications for testing and possibly refuting the theory are the addition of direct 
effects between the variables. For example, on the basis of the literature review, one would 
certainly not expect a direct effect between RWA and bias motivated aggression, as this 
particular ideological attitude reflects an adherence to norms, including non-violence norms. 
This way, the analysis can be significantly strengthened by conducting several analyses testing 
for different relationships – both direct and indirect – between the theoretical concepts. The 
addition of direct effects thus tests for the conditionality of the relationship, which is parallel to 
the notion of restricted instantiation: the claim that universal U1 instantiates in phenomenon P1 
if, and only if, it is conditioned by a set of initial conditions [ic1] may be (partly) falsified by 
showing a direct effect between U1 and P1.72 In terms of Dretske’s causal jargon (Dretske, 
1988; Sandis, 2008), this means that pro-sociality is the structuring cause, whilst the ideological 
attitudes RWA and SDO are triggering causes. Translated to the vocabulary of mechanisms (in 
the sense of Little (1991): a series of events governed by law-like regularities that lead from the 
explanans to the explanandum), this would mean that a different instance of pro-sociality (the 
                                                 
69 In this respect it is important to note that the consequence of prejudice may be an unintended consequence 
of seeking in-group support as well. By no means does the theory set out before imply that all prejudice and 
related behaviours are consciously premeditated.  
70 Recall that a universal statement in itself is untestable nor observable. This can only be done in conjunction 
with specific initial conditions.  
71 Even though a research tradition in biosocial criminology is emerging where mixed designs are used, 
combining physiological traits such as genetics, hormones, fMRI’s etc. with more traditional experimental 
and non-experimental research (Walsh & Beaver, 2009a).  
72 Bearing in mind that U1 is represented by a set of other instances thereof than the explanandum. These 
instances are conditioned by other sets of initial conditions. This is, practically speaking, the only reasonable 
way to link the more vague concept “pro-sociality” to a concrete set of behaviors.  
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presumed universal) may be linked to prejudice and/or bias motivated aggression only through 
the mediating variables of Right Wing Authoritarianism or Social Dominance Orientation.  
5.  Implementation: a latent variable approach 
The above strategy can be efficiently implemented using a latent variable approach, more 
precisely structural equation modeling (SEM). In SEM, theoretical constructs such as “social 
dominance orientation” are presumed to be variables that are not directly observable, but may 
exert an influence on specific items in a questionnaire. The latter are referred to as the indicators 
and are nothing more than the items that probe the latent construct one can find in a 
questionnaire. On the basis of a number of observed indicators, the latent variable is estimated. 
By doing so, it is assumed that the responses on the observed indicators (the items of a 
measurement scale) are the result of the respondent’s (partial) degree of membership in the 
latent phenomenon. Furthermore, in contrast to a single variable approach, the SEM approach 
allows for a much better testing of the factorial structure of the variables as well as the internal 
consistency of the individual scales used by rendering a factor loading.  
5.1. Parceling of indicators 
In this study, I have made regular use of parcels to limit the number of indicators for each latent 
variable. In a way, this was done to keep the amount of data manageable and the visual 
representation thereof understandable to the reader, but this particular technique is often 
frowned upon as much as it is applauded. In the current study, however, there are some 
substantive reasons to use the technique. The discussion in this section is fully based on Little, 
Cunningham and Shahar (2002) who have clearly weighed the advantages and disadvantages 
of parceling on the basis of a thorough survey of the discussions on the subject, taking into 
account different research goals. 
First, the study is not about the structure or dimensionality of measurement scales. Would this 
be the goal, then parceling is not warranted as it obscures individual item-level particularities 
in measurement. I am, however, only interested in the relationships that hold between the latent 
constructs themselves. For this reason, established measurement scales were used, too (as they 
are supposed to have been well-tested over time). 
Second, the technique of parceling applied is the “item to total construct” technique. In this 
technique, items with a strong loading on the construct are paired up with items that have a low 
loading on the construct, thus generating parcels that have a more or less similar loading on the 
overall construct. This brings along some basic psychometric advantages, such as higher 
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reliability of measurement and less distributional violations. Beware, this ought only to be done 
when the researcher is interested in the relationships between the constructs, certainly not when 
he or she is trying to investigate the psychometric properties of a scale.  
Third, a good practice is to inspect the structure of item-level data before making parcels. 
Applying the item-to-construct approach of parceling, I have additionally taken into account 
correlated residuals of the individual indicators. Indicators were parceled always a stronger 
with a weaker item, and the weaker items were selected primarily on the basis of correlated 
residuals. Also, this lessens the risk on dual loadings in the data, thus rendering an overall more 
“clean” model from a statistical point of view, eliminating certain nuisances.   
5.2. Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
In order to see if the observed variables (or parcels in this case) are good indicators of the latent 
variable, usually a confirmatory factor analysis is conducted. In contrast to exploratory factor 
analysis, confirmatory factor analysis is of an explicitly deductive nature, in that a theoretically 
expected structure is imposed on the data. This makes it an adequate tool to be used in the 
present study.73  
In practice, a measurement model will be constructed for each sample in the present study. This 
means that all latent variables will be brought into relationship with each indicator (parcels in 
this case), and that all latent constructs will be correlated with all other latent constructs present 
in the model. This provides a relatively strong test for the factor structure of the data, as cross-
correlations of factors and items are taken into account when assessing the fit of the theoretically 
deduced structure that is imposed on the data. Furthermore, the measurement models (i.e. all 
observed variables and their relation to the latent constructs in one model) also take into account 
measurement error, which is not the case in other modes of analysis (e.g. Kline, 2011). In this 
sense, it is worth noting that it has been argued that the traditionally used measure of Cronbach’s 
Alpha is principally unrelated to internal consistency (e.g. Sijtsma, 2009). 
For each individual indicator, a factor loading is computed, which describes its relative 
contribution to the variance in the unobserved variable. The values of these loadings range from 
                                                 
73 In exploratory factor analysis, one tries to make sense of the data using statistical procedures. This is, from 
a philosophical point of view, an inductive procedure, which makes it undesirable for the present study, given 
its deductive nature and the principle of “theory over statistics”. Or, put differently, strict universality (a 
logical concept) over numerical universality (a statistical concept).  
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0 to 1. As a rule, indicators with weak loadings on the latent construct are not used in further 
analyses, the traditional threshold being 0.4. 
Once the indicators (observed variables) for each latent construct are brought into relationship 
with the latent construct and the weak indicators are removed, the fit of this structure on the 
data is estimated using a variety of statistics. These will be discussed below, as the same fit 
statistics are used for confirmatory factor analyses and structural equation models.  
5.3. Structural equation models 
Once an acceptable measurement model is obtained, hypothesis testing can start using structural 
equation modeling. This technique uses the indicators and latent constructs from the 
measurement model, but brings the latent constructs in relationship with each other in a 
structural way, provided by the theoretical model (rather than correlating them as is the case in 
CFA). The great advantage of this technique is that it allows for an estimation of both direct 
and indirect effects, which is important in light of the discussion above on deductive testing of 
the theory. For, this specific method allows to add or delete paths in a sense that contradicts the 
theory, and it allows to model strict mediation and direct effects at the same time, while 
providing summary statistics that allow for a comparison of various alternative and/or 
equivalent models (infra).  
In principle, this technique can be placed in the family of regression analyses, with the big 
difference that multiple regression analyses are being carried out at the same time, and that error 
variance is controlled for. This way, the model includes endogenous and exogenous variables. 
Exogenous variables are similar to independent variables in OLS regression, whereas 
endogenous variables are similar to dependent variables in OLS regression. This way, 
exogenous variables regress on one or more endogenous variables in structural equation 
modeling.74 Visually, this is usually represented by arrows between the constructs, indicating 
the direction in which the influence is expected (i.e. which of both is considered endogenous or 
exogenous). Some variables may fulfill the role of both dependent and independent variable 
(i.e. the variable has both incoming and outgoing arrows). These are referred to as mediating 
variables. Thus, the properties of SEM can be considered to be superior to that of OLS, as it 
allows for the testing of far more complex models than does OLS.  
                                                 
74 Note that this has nothing to do with the measurement of both types of variables. For both, several indicators 
or observed variables are used to estimate the latent construct.  
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The effect size of the statistical relationship is expressed as a bèta coefficient (β), similar to a 
standardized regression coefficient, accompanied by a p-value to assess the level of statistical 
significance. In the current project, the significance level of p < 0.05 is maintained. In reporting, 
the level of significance will be indicated. Path coefficients with p-values below 0.05 will not 
be considered in the analysis.  
5.4. Assessment of model fit 
Apart from the individual effect sizes, the general model is in need of evaluation, too. To this 
extent a wide variety of model fit indices has been developed. In general, they can be classified 
in three categories: absolute fit indices, incremental fit indices and parsimony fit indices. 
Absolute fit indices compute how well the model fits with the data, compared to no model at 
all (McDonald & Ho, 2002). Incremental fit indices are of a comparative nature (Miles & 
Shevlin, 2007), and evaluate model fit by comparing it with a baseline model. As indicated by 
McDonald and Ho (2002), these models assume all variables to be uncorrelated. Finally, 
parsimony fit indices penalize model fit estimates for high degrees of complexity. As high 
degrees of complexity imply an approximation of saturation or saturation as such (meaning that 
all variables are correlated with each other), this implies that such models are theoretically less 
stringent. Therefore, parsimony fit indices take into account the complexity of the model, with 
a preference for theoretically more stringent models (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). 
In practice, a wide variety of such indices exists in each of the three categories, some of which 
are associated with certain problems. For example, the usage of the chi-square statistic is very 
sensitive to sample size, and will almost always yield a significant value (meaning a poorly 
fitting model), whilst this may not be the case for other indices. A review of the literature can 
help in determining which indices are best suited. Based on the suggestions made by several 
notable authors in the field (Boomsma, 2000; Hooper et al., 2008; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 
2011), a selection of five estimates which in principle cover all reported best practices in 
reporting, has been made. In the table below (Table 6), the indices that will be used for the 
purpose of this study are summarized and the way they ought to be interpreted presented.  
This way, at least one of each type of fit indices is reported, along with all the most commonly 
reported indices that have been proven to be useful in assessing model fit. It must be noted that 
the chi-square statistic is only reported for the sake of clarity, as it almost always has a 
significant p-value in large samples (over 400). The samples obtained in this study exceed this 
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number significantly, so it can be expected that the chi-square statistic will be significant. In 
this case, however, the RMSEA is more important to inspect as it is free of this sensitivity.  
 
Name – abbreviation Thresholds 
Chi-square Insignificant p value 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) Value equal to or less than 0.05 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) Value less than 0.07 
Tucker-Lewis Coefficient (TLI) Value equal to or greater than 0.95 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) Value equal to or greater than 0.95 
Parsimonious Comparative Fit Index (PCFI) The closer to 1, the better the fit. No cut off defined.  
Table 6: fit indices and their thresholds 
 
6. Falsification put to practice  
As has been discussed in the chapter on philosophy of science, falsification is considered to be 
of great importance in this deductive, critical-realist research project. Even though there are 
different approaches to this, such as the fuzzy logical approach discussed by Heylen and 
Nachtegael (2013), the current project will not be concerned with such approaches as they  
presumes a different operationalization of the concepts used. Whilst this might be a fruitful 
endeavor in the future, for now it seems 
more appropriate to ensure the 
comparability of the results to existing 
studies. This does not mean, however, that 
no steps to falsify the theory can be 
undertaken. More precisely, three 
strategies aimed at destabilizing and 
really “throwing over” the theoretically 
expected model(s) will be pursued: a 
search for equivalent and alternative 
models, a cross cultural comparison, and 
sex-specific analyses. 
 
A first test of the theory which 
approximates the overall logic of 
falsification is to compare the model that is 
theoretically expected to a (series of) 




equivalent and alternative models. In this sense, an equivalent model is a model that contains 
the same number of parameters to be estimated; it has the same variables and paths, but the 
directions thereof are altered. An illustration of this is presented in Figure 2 (borrowed from 
Tomarken & Waller, 2003). Equivalent models will always result in identical measures of 
model fit.  
 
Evaluation of these equivalent models is not a matter of statistics as fit indices will be identical. 
Rather, it is a matter of theoretical argumentation. Whilst some equivalent models may be 
theoretically acceptable, others will have obvious flaws from a theoretical point of view. In the 
current study, I will stick to the model as it is derived by the theory, however. This is inspired 
by the critical rationalist tradition which underlies this study, in which one tries to avoid 
inductive argumentation on the basis of statistics. If an alternative model is computed, this has 
to be done on the basis of theoretical grounds, not on the basis of statistical fit – which is, quite 
frankly, meaningless without theoretical grounding.   
 
A more statistically oriented approach to falsification is the construction of alternative models. 
These differ from equivalent models insofar as they do not contain the identical variables and/or 
relationships between them as does the theoretically expected model. One way of doing so is 
by making certain changes to the model at hand. This way, paths between variables may be 
deleted or added, variables may be added or removed, or any combination of both. In the current 
project, addition and deletion of paths will prove to be of great use. The theoretical model 
derived in the previous chapter is in principle one of strict mediation. By adding direct effects 
between certain variables and the depend variable, construction of alternative non-equivalent 
models is possible. These models can be compared to the model with strict mediation with 
regards to model fit.  
 
A more specific case of alternative non-equivalent models consists of the addition of variables 
as such. As is the case in regression analyses, model specification in SEM is quite sensitive to 
the problem of omitted variables. This problem refers to the discrepancy that often exists 
between the model that is tested and the variables that intervene in reality. Important variables 
may thus be omitted in the model being tested (which may occur for practical reasons, as it is 
hardly possible to know the entire number of variables implicated in any given social 
phenomenon). However, the omission of relevant variables (as is the inclusion of irrelevant 
variables), may affect the estimates of the model considerably. In a worst case scenario, 
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estimates are not simply biased, but the entire influence attributed to a given variable included 
in the model could be accounted for by an omitted variable. For this reason, it seems 
recommendable to at least try out some alternative models in which other relevant variables are 
included, to see how the estimates react to this. It must, however, be noted that biased estimates 
usually refer to a discrepancy with the “real” population estimates of the influence. It is my 
opinion, however, that for a variety of reasons (not in the least measurement error and 
specification error), no single statistical estimate should ever be considered to be a “true” 
representation of reality. It should only be considered to be a very crude indicator of reality (the 
proverbial tip of the iceberg). 
 
This way, attempts can be made to reject the model. Through equivalent models, the theoretical 
justification of the model can be sharpened, whilst through various alternative non-equivalent 
models, this theoretical assessment can be accompanied by statistical indicators. However, two 
more tests will be used. 
7.  Cross-national validation  
As the project is based on evolutionary theory, an international comparison of the results can 
provide an additional test of the hypothesis contained in the study. The living conditions faced 
by people in our ancestral past were supposedly similar across the world, giving rise to similar 
adaptations of the already existing altruism mechanisms, ultimately resulting in coalitional 
psychology. For this reason, it is expected that the direction of the results will be the same 
across different countries or cultures.  
 
In order to accomplish this, the study was replicated in another country. One comparative 
sample was obtained in Southern Europe, i.c. Spain. This sample will be compared to the 
Belgian sample in order to see whether results are similar with regard to the direction of the 
influences in the model. Variations in the effect size of the various paths can be logically 
expected, given that these are socio-culturally contingent.  
 
With regard to these international comparisons, one needs to take into account that the same 
initial conditions have to apply. If evolved behavioral dispositions are conceived of as “human 
universals”(see D. E. Brown, 1991 for an extensive treatment of the subject), it follows that 
they can only mean something in combination with spatiotemporally contingent initial 
conditions. This way, a comparison is only valid if the same initial conditions apply ( which are 
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socio-culturally contingent). By doing so, the theory may be effectively falsified: if it is valid 
within a given set of conditions, it should be so in all places where these conditions are present.  
 
It is important to note that this does not mean that the conditions need to be identical. If, for 
example, a certain condition cx has a possible range of values ranging from 0 to 1 (the traditional 
operationalization of a degree of membership in fuzzy logic), it may well be that in setting 1, 
condition cx has a value of 0,2 whereas it has a value of 0,8 in another setting. For example, the 
initial condition RWA may be very salient in Belgium, whereas it may be less salient in Spain. 
With regard to falsification of the theory, this means that one may hypothesize expected 
differences in the relationships (more precisely in the strength thereof) on the basis of the 
salience of the initial conditions, in addition to testing for non-equivalent models.  
 
This does not preclude that everyone around the world may display the same behavioral 
tendencies (“human universals”), it merely means that they need to be operationalized in a way 
contingent with the concrete cultural context in which they are studied. Take, for example, the 
universal statement “sociality results in the exclusion of out-group members when these pose a 
threat to the values of the in-group”. This will, from an evolutionary point of view, be valid in 
all contexts. But what is meant by “the values of the in-group” may differ largely across 
contingent cultural settings. One primary example of this is threats to employment, material 
success, etc. which are in principle culturally specific instances (even though they have become 
very widespread) typical of the West (sure these will resonate strongly with our WEIRD target 
group).  
 
For the purpose of this study, two studies have been conducted in Western European countries, 
i.c. Belgium and Spain. I expect the results to be the same across these contexts in terms of the 
direction of the paths, whilst allowing for differences in intensity. These differences may be 
attributed to the country-specific presences of RWA, SDO and prejudice, which are in 
themselves culturally-historically contingent phenomena. Even though it is not within the ambit 
of this study to account for these differences as this would require a completely different 
approach (e.g. a historical and interpretative approach), the main elements that may 
codetermine the salience of these conditions may be, inter alia, immigration history, 
immigration rates, salience of the economic crisis, and the presence of right-wing oriented 
political parties and social action groups. The current study, however, is only concerned with 
the falsificationist, quantitative aspect of this comparison.   
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8.  Sex-specific analyses 
A final element that bears in itself the possibility to challenge the theory, is a sex-specific 
analysis. For, in the evolution of mankind, some kinds of behavior may be primarily displayed 
by males, whereas some other behaviors are primarily displayed by females. The behaviors that 
are susceptible to this, are based in behaviors relevant to procreation in the human evolutionary 
past. The most widely studied example of this are overall gender differences in violence as a 
result of differences in parental investment (e.g. Blokland, 2005; Pinker, 2002).  
 
However, coalitional psychology is a mechanism which is presumed to be of common use to 
both men and women; it is not sex-specific. Therefore, a sex-specific analysis may provide a 
further challenge to the theory. Other than differences in magnitude, which may be due to 
overall lower levels of aggression in women compared to men, the model is expected to be 
substantially the same for both sexes. If not, this would pose serious challenges to the theory. 
Only in one instance would we expect differences with regard to gender. Differences in the 
overall levels of violence between men and women may be explained effectively in terms of 
evolutionary theory. 
9.  Group comparisons in practice: invariance 
In case of cross-national validation as well as gender specific analyses, what will be done in 
practice is a multiple group comparison in the SEM. Two important elements in this approach 
merit attention, i.c. measurement invariance and structural (factorial) invariance (see, inter alia, 
Kline, 2011, for a more substantial discussion on this topic; Meredith, 1993; Vandenberg, 
2002). 
 
Measurement invariance across groups refers to the fact that the same items measure the same 
latent construct in the same way. In other words, prior to conduct any type of group comparison, 
the researcher needs to test whether or not the data structure of the latent constructs is identical 
across contexts. The following three conditions need to be met in order to guarantee strict 
measurement invariance: 
 
- same (highly similar) factor loadings. This is “weak” (“configural”) invariance; 
- same item intercepts. This is “scalar” or “strong” invariance; 




In this study, it was opted for to use country-specific adaptations, given the culturally contingent 
character of RWA and SDO, as well as issues with language, that may not warrant a literal 
translation. Even though this does exclude the option of testing measurement invariance, for 
the full measurement model the usage of slightly different measures does have a certain benefit 
as well: it allows to test the theories dependence on the specific measurements used. In this 
context, it can be considered a virtue of the theory if it works with different operationalizations 
of the same theoretical concepts.  
However, as a form of cross-national comparison provides a very severe test, efforts have been 
taken to conduct one, notwithstanding the different operationalizations in terms of measurement 
scales. Concretely, three items which were equivalent in each country-specific measure were 
selected in order to make an international comparison possible. Thus, the international 
comparison reported on uses heavily reduced scales. Again, however, this is not a problem as 
such. For, the usage of yet another operationalization to test the same theoretical model, in this 
case a “minimal measurement” of the latent constructs, provides quite a severe test of the model 
under scrutiny in this study, and that is what it is about in a critical rationalist approach to social 
science.  
On a personal note, I would like to point out that one should not conduct overly complex 
calculations to confirm the obvious. Even though “scientification” through statistics has 
become commonplace, I do think that in many cases it will be obvious if there are serious 
problems with invariance of the scales used. For example, when one sees two CFA’s of the 
same measurement scale, items of one of which load on different factors, have no sufficient 
loading, or even an inverse loading on certain factors that contradict the other CFA, more 
analysis is not needed.  
The second type of invariance is structural or structural invariance. This refers to the way the 
factors are related to each other in different groups. Whilst measurement invariance is a 
condition before attempting to compare groups, structural variance is not. If two groups are 
structurally invariant, this merely means there is no substantial difference between those groups 
with regard to the model tested; it means that the same structural model holds in the different 
groups. If there is, however, structural variance, this means that substantial (i.e. related to 
theory) differences exist between the different groups included in the study. Such differences 
may partly falsify the theory, and are therefore of the utmost importance. With regard to the 
current study, the threshold to do so is not set to absolute invariance. Paths between latent 
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constructs (satisfying the condition of measurement invariance) will be considered to be 
falsified if: 
- if a path is absent in one of the groups used in the comparison, and/or; 
- if the sign of the path coefficient is different in one or more of the models included in 
the comparison. 
10. Exploratory survey: pretesting the idea behind the study 
Before testing the actual model, an exploratory study was conducted using existing 
measurement scales of pro-social behaviors, social dominance orientation, right wing 
authoritarianism, prejudice and bias motivated aggression. The rationale behind this 
exploratory study is to find out whether or not – and which – connections exist between different 
forms of pro-sociality, the ideological attitudes, prejudice, and bias motivated behaviors before 
initiating the construction of more specific scales intended to probe the two forms of signaling 
discussed in the previous chapters. At the same time, the exploratory survey may serve as a 
pretest for all other measurement scales that will be included in the final questionnaire. A report 
on this pretest can be found in appendix M.1., in which all of the factor analyses can be found, 
as well as supplementary (exploratory) analyses. The survey used for the exploratory study is 
also included there. More measurement scales than will be actually used appear in the current 
study. They have been included to take advantage of the data gathering rounds to test for 
additional relationships and to pretest a new predictor of prejudice, which will be elaborated on 
elsewhere.  
10.1. Construction of signaling scales 
In this section, the construction of a measurement scale that intended to measure dominance 
signaling and submission signaling is discussed. The scale is based on existing scales akin to 
the two concepts, but the items have been adapted from the point of view of the theory. First, 
the structure of the scale will be discussed, followed by the pretest of the scale and, finally, a 
discussion and evaluation thereof.  
10.1.1. Structure of the genuine signaling of pro-sociality tendency scale 
One of the two main reasons that underlie human sociality, is group living. For this reason, 
many tend to behave favorably towards their peers, as this feels good and this way one signals 
his or her compliance to the group. This scale is devised to measure costly signaling in the sense 
of signaling genuine commitment to the in-group. After extensive discussion with various 
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colleagues, the items were constructed using the peer pressure, conformity and popularity 
measure (Santor, Messervey, & Kusumakar, 2000) as a general source of inspiration. However, 
none of the eventual items are direct translations of this measure, as they are adapted towards 
the new target group (i.e. university students instead of adolescents), and are intended to be 
closely related to the notion of genuine signaling of pro-sociality in one’s perceived in group.  
1.I want to be the best 
2. Working in group gives me the opportunity to show my value as a person; 
3. For me, it is very important not to look like loser; 
4. In group activities I tend to take the lead if this helps my group to win; 
5. The best of working in group is that it allows me to show my worth as a group member; 
6. I usually do what others ask me to do; 
7. If my friends exclude me, I feel bad; 
The first and the third item refer to how one wants to be in comparison to others. As discussed, 
in genuine signaling of group commitment, an important element is to be regarded as someone 
with good reputation, and thus good standing. These two items aim at grasping this rather 
general overall quality as a person. Items 2, 4, and 5 refer to how one acts when working in 
group. For people in universities, this is quite a common situation, for which reason the items 
are formulated in terms of group-work. Items 2 and 5 directly grasp the notion of signaling by 
asking respondents if they use group work as a platform to show off their value (compare this 
to the peacock’s tale in signaling theory). Item 4 probes this tendency more indirectly, as taking 
the lead to help the group to win undoubtedly is a good way to gain better standing in that group. 
The latter must not be confused with what was allegorically called “leaders” in subtitle 4.3 
“leaders and followers”. For all clarity, “leader” there refers to incitement or initiation of inter-
group conflict, whereas here, clearly the situation of competition is not incited or initiated by 
the person, but is already present, which makes a very big difference from the point of view of 
evolutionary theory. Furthermore, as indicated earlier, the “leaders”, or people generally higher 
in SDO, do not necessarily take part “in the action”, whereas this item is explicitly framed in 
terms of being in the action. In this sense, the “leader” referred to earlier, is the kind of “leader” 
that verbally incites people to take action against out-groups, but will usually avoid the real 
conflict him- or herself out of the selfish motive of self-protection or self-preservation.  
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10.1.2. Structure of the inclination to deceptively signal pro-sociality 
The evolutionary framework predicts that another facet of pro-social behaviors would consist 
of signaling one’s commitment in the in-group in a deceptive way (subtle cheating/defection). 
Items 1 and 6 refer to the inverse of showing one’s quality as a person when working in group. 
Here, the specific motivation of achieving one’s own goals as the sole purpose for working in 
group is included, in order to grasp the subtle cheating part of deceptive signaling commitment 
to the in-group. In all other items, (items 2, 3, 4, 5, 7), the inclination to do things for the mere 
purpose of showing one is part of the group, whilst the motivation to do such things when one 
is genuinely committed to the in-group, is probed. For example, in item three, it is included that 
one does things one doesn’t really want to do to show one is part of the group. If one would be 
genuinely committed to the in-group, it can be expected that one enjoys doing things with the 
in-group. Similarly, the other items probe more anti-social behaviors, which would be inspired 
by an emotional response against the specific individual in question when one is genuinely 
concerned for the in-group and it’s norms. The items are phrased in such a way that this cannot 
be the case, as it is clearly indicated that the respondent ought not to know the person in 
question. Therefore, the remaining motivation presumably is self-interested signaling of one’s 
commitment to the in-group, or, in evolutionary terms, subtle cheating.  
1. I only work with others if I get something in return, otherwise I don’t usually do it 
2. Sometimes, I take part in bullying even though I do not have anything against the person 
in question; 
3. I only work in group if I get something out of it myself, otherwise I prefer not to do so; 
4. Sometimes I do things I don’t really want to do, to show I’m part of the group; 
5. I sometimes exclude others even though I don’t personally have anything against them; 
6. I sometimes gossip about people, even though I don’t know them ; 
7. I only work in group if it helps me to achieve my own goals, the goals of the group don’t 
interest me; 
8. If my friends are bullying someone, I usually intervene to make them stop (reverse 
coded).  
Items are inspired by the cooperative orientation scale as developed by Chen et al.(Chen, Xie, 
& Chang, 2011) and the Peer Pressure, Conformity and Popularity items, as developed by 
Santor et al. (2000). Adaptations are made in order to capture dominance signaling, and to cover 
concrete signaling instances.  
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10.2. Final questionnaire 
By means of conclusion, for the purpose of this study, the final survey will minimally consist 
of the following measurement scales: 
1. The signaling measures 
2. Right Wing Authoritarianism; 
3. Social Dominance Orientation; 
4. Prejudice composite measure; 
5. Self-reported bias motivated aggression. 
Consistency and CFA of these measures will be reported in the chapter on the  results of the 
studies. The studies are coordinated in a pragmatic way: by doing them sequentially, the first 
study can count as a pretest of the measures for the second study. However, if the factorial 
structure of the scales is acceptable in the first study, it can be regarded as more than a pretest, 
i.e. a full study. Given the fact that the questionnaire was distributed online (except for in the 
Basque country, where paper-and-pencil surveys were administered as well given that the 
Spanish study was coordinated from the University of the Basque Country), this may 
significantly bring up to speed the entire research process. In the next chapter, the results of the 




Chapter VI. Results of the empirical studies 
 
Thus far, a lot of ground has been covered. Starting from a discussion on the underlying logic 
and meta-theoretical assumptions of this study, we moved to a discussion on evolutionary 
theory and its relation to prejudice, connected this to the most salient research domains on 
prejudice in contemporary academia, to end with a discussion on how all of this theory could 
be tested. As the saying goes, the proof of the pudding is in its eating, so no theory should ever 
be uncritically accepted without its being thoroughly tested empirically, in a variety of settings, 
using a variety of strategies.  
In this chapter, this process of theory testing will be initiated, meaning that the testing reported 
here is not conclusive; it can only be regarded as the first step in in the testing of a possibly 
interesting new area of research, and should therefore remain under further development and 
scrutiny in the future – as is the case with any theory for that matter. As indicated in the chapter 
on the methodology, empirical testing of the core model in the study has been done in two 
different settings. Using a survey in a Spanish and Belgian sample, the model was tested using 
different measurement scales insofar as it was chosen to use the specific linguistic adaptations 
of already validated measurement scales in each country (thus linguistic differences in items do 
exist between the Dutch and Spanish surveys). Whilst this is a modest study, it has the 
advantage of cross-national comparison and ruling out the possibility that the connections 
between RWA, SDO and the signaling scales are due to the specific nature (items) of the 
measurement scales, thus strengthening the overall test of the model. The survey used in Spain 
can is included in appendix R.1., and the survey used for the Belgian study is included in 
appendix R.2. 
This chapter will first deal with the results of each country individually. For each study, a 
succinct description of the sample will be given, followed by a summary of the measures used. 
This is followed by a brief discussion on the measurement model, where the confirmatory factor 
analysis of the measurement scales combined will be reported. This is deemed to be a superior 
approach to the use of Cronbach’s alpha (Sijtsma, 2009), given certain shortcomings of the 
latter. Then, the actual model tested will be discussed. The model reported is the best fitting 
model. This means that the theoretically expected model (strict mediation model) will be 
reported on, but in addition thereto additional paths will be reported on that have been tested 
for in line with the hypotheses set out in the previous chapter. The rationale is that the strict 
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mediation model is assumed have a high degree of similarity across countries (i.c. the direction 
of the result is equal), whilst the additional paths may vary across contexts due to cultural 
variation. They can, however, be very informative and shed more light on the psychometric 
properties of the latent concepts used, as well as on the theoretical validity of the model tested. 
After the overall model is discussed, a multigroup comparison based on sex will be done. There, 
the measurement model (“measurement weights” in Amos terminology) and the structural 
model (“structural weights” in Amos terminology) will be focused on using the Amos Graphics 
interface, according to the procedure set out by Byrne (2009), and inspired on the Jöreskog 
tradition, which allows to identify (partial) equivalence. More information on this latter strategy 
will follow later. After presenting the two studies separately, a multigroup comparison across 
countries will follow, using only three indicators per latent construct. The reason for this is that 
a selection of minimally three indicators per latent construct per country had to be made, but 
that the measurement scales differ across countries. This made it difficult to merge the samples. 
However, three indicators per country have been matched. To conduct this multigroup 
comparison, the same procedure is followed as in the country-specific studies. This latter 
approach presents a further challenge to the theory in two respects. First, it allows for the testing 
of cross-national equivalence, which is an important test of any evolutionary approach. Second, 
it allows to test for the strict model using yet other measures (reduced measurement scales), and 
will certainly be interesting to see whether or not the model holds using these different 
operationalizations. Let us now consider the first study, conducted in Spain.  
1. Spanish study 
The Spanish study was conducted on a large sample of 1360 students at different Spanish 
Universities (University of the Basque Country, Open University of Catalunya, University of 
Barcelona and the University of Málaga), enrolled in law, criminology or psychology programs. 
In total, the sample consisted of 957 women (70.4%) and 403 men (29.6%). Most respondents 
were enrolled in a program at the first grade (22.1%), followed by the second (20.5%) third 
(18%) and fourth grades (16.8%)75. A small portion of respondents were enrolled in a master 
program (11.5%) and a tiny portion in a doctoral program (1.9%). About a tenth of respondents 
indicated their level of education to be “other” (9.3%). The mean age of the sample was 34 
years old, with a minimum age of 18 and a maximum age of 71. The vast majority of 
                                                 
75 These levels correspond to the Spanish way in which levels of education are expressed, i.c; “primero 
grado”, “Segundo grado” and so forth. They broadly coincide with first bachelor, second bachelor, third 
bachelor and master.  
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respondents was to be located within the 25-40 age range, with some outliers with an age above 
65 years old. The latter can be explained by the fact that the University of Málaga, which 
provided for the majority of the responses, is an open university which is specialized in distance 
education, thus lowering the threshold (e.g. due to having a job) to enroll for somewhat older 
people. Also, this fact does nuance the earlier made remark regarding the usage of student 
samples; in the Spanish study in particular, the sample can be regarded more or less as in 
between a student sample and a “regular” sample. In any case, this is not to be regarded as a 
problem, as this increases the quality of the test the theory is subjected to (as in the Belgian 
sample only students took part).  
1.1. Measurement and measurement model  
First of all, the survey included the signaling scales discussed in the previous chapter. They 
both scored relatively low yet acceptable on Cronbach’s alpha, with the quality signaling scale 
of five items having an alpha of .64 and the deceptive signaling scale having an alpha of .60. 
However, both scales do not probe pure attitudes but rather behaviors or behavioral inclinations, 
which may, at least in part, explain the relatively low scores on Cronbach’s alpha. That is, they 
can be regarded as variation scales rather than scales measuring a latent construct.  
Further, the well-established RWA and SDO scales were administered. Sample items of the 
RWA scale (6 items, alpha = 0.69)76 are “our country desperately needs a strong leader who 
will do what has to be done to destroy the radical news ways and sinfulness that are ruining us” 
and “once our government leaders give us the go ahead, it will be the duty of every patriotic 
citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within”. Sample items of 
the SDO scale (9 items, alpha = 0.79) are “to get ahead, it is sometimes necessary to use force 
against other groups” and “inferior groups should stay in their position”.  
                                                 
76 Note that only six out of the 12 items originally used in the Spanish study were retained for the analysis. 
The considerations at the basis of this are (i) the internal consistency which is optimized, (ii) items of all three 
subscales were included, and (iii) the overall performance of the measurement model which showed good 
loadings of all parcels on the latent construct. The items that were retained are the following: our country 
needs strong leaders that can eradicate the extremism that is prevalent today, our old values and traditions 
still provide for the best guidelines on how to live, the laws that punish abortion and pornography need to be 
strictly enforced, we should admire our ancestors more, there are many radicals that try to destroy society 
and we should stop them, and, when our government tries to stop dangerous people in our society it is the 
obligation of every good citizen to help. Even though a language-specific adaptation of the RWA scale was 
used for this study, it did not function very well. One reason may be that the bulk of the study was conducted 
in the Northern part of Spain, where “extremism” tends to be more left-oriented rather than right-oriented. 
This is, however, just a personal feeling and needs more in-depth study.  
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The prejudice scale was composed of a combination of Pettigrew and Meertens’ (1995) blatant 
and subtle prejudice scale (9 items, alpha = .86). Sample items are “immigrants have jobs that 
should belong to US citizens” and “the immigrants living here teach their children different 
values than those needed to be successful in this country”.  
For the measurement of bias motivated aggression, a self-report scale was developed probing 
if the respondent has done one of the following things to an immigrant, for the very reason he 
is an immigrant: avoid them, indicate indirectly that they’re not welcome, indicate directly that 
they are not welcome, excluding them from activities or places, intimidate them, damage their 
property, steal from them, being aggressive towards them, hurting them, and intimidating them 
sexually. No alpha is computed for this measure, as it is a self-report behavioral measure, and 
only makes use of binary response categories. The binary responses were summed to get an 
overall score on out-group aggression. The full measurement model with parcels is displayed 
in Figure 3. For factor loadings of individual items please see appendix R1. In general, the 
measurement model performed well in terms of model fit (see Table 7).  
 







RMSEA 0.04 < 0.08 
SRMR 0.04 < 0.05 
TLI 0.96 > 0.95 
CFI 0.97 > 0.95 
PCFI 0.74 Close to 1 










1.2. Test of the theoretical model 
The result of the structural equation model is displayed in figure 4. Only path coefficients with 
a p-value below 0.05 are displayed. The different fit indices are reproduced in Table 8.  
 








RMSEA 0.04 < 0.08 
SRMR 0.04 < 0.05 
TLI 0.96 > 0.95 
CFI 0.96 > 0.95 
PCFI 0.76 Close to 1 
Table 8: fit indices of the model in the Spanish study 
 
As can be inferred from Table 8, the model is well within acceptable range of all reported fit 
indices, apart from the chi-square statistic. This is, however, a normal phenomenon using large 
























































Figure 4: model in the Spanish sample. All paths are significant at the 0.001 level, except the 
path deceptive signaling → prejudice, which is significant at the 0.01 level, and the path RWA 
→ bias motivated behaviors, which significant at the 0.05 level. Non-significant paths are 
omitted from the diagram. 
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In general, the hypotheses were largely confirmed. There is a significant path that runs from 
quality signaling to RWA (β = 0.27, hypothesis 1a), a path that runs from RWA to prejudice (β 
= 0.42; hypothesis 1b), and one that runs from prejudice to bias motivated aggression (β = 0.47, 
hypothesis 10). It is noteworthy that there is a small but negative path between RWA and bias 
motivated aggression as well(β = -0.09), which  provides further support for the fact that Right 
Wing Authoritarianism does not automatically result in bias motivated behaviors (hypothesis 
8)(. In terms of our theoretical exposition, this means that, indeed, people higher in RWA tend 
to be more pro-socially oriented and rule abiding, which would normally lower their propensity 
to bias motivated aggression. The reason for this is that nonviolence has become an important 
norm throughout history as well (e.g. Pinker, 2011). It follows that this now important norm is 
usually respected by people high in RWA as they generally tend to uphold group norms. Put 
differently, neutralization of group norms through prejudice is a necessary step as it may justify 
the violence against a specific out-group. This finding is perfectly in concert with the theoretical 
expectations of this study, and provides corroborating evidence for hypothesis 8 of this study, 
stating that there is no significant positive or a significant negative effect of RWA on bias 
motivated behaviors. Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 4, the model provided corroborating 
evidence for hypotheses 2 and 3 as well, which stated that no direct, significant effects were 
expected between genuine signaling of sociality and prejudice and bias motivated behaviors, 
respectively. 77 
The second set of paths shown in the model, runs from deceptively signaling group membership 
(cheating in the diagram) to SDO (β = 0.24, hypothesis 4a), followed by a path running from 
SDO to prejudice (β = 0.34, hypothesis 4b),  which in turn had a positive relationship with bias 
motivated aggression (β = 0.47, hypothesis 10), as was theoretically expected. Contrary to the 
case of RWA, a direct effect between deceptive signaling and prejudice (β = 0.10), but also a 
considerable direct effect between deceptive signaling and bias motivated aggression (β = 0.21), 
was found, providing corroborating evidence for hypotheses 5, 5a, and 5b. This can be 
explained in terms of an overall more antisocial attitude for those inclined to deceptively signal 
their commitment to the in-group, consistent with evolutionary theory. Their primary concern 
is their own interest, which may incline them to exploit and exclude not only in-group members, 
but also out-group members. To make sure the direct effect of deceptive signaling on bias 
motivated behaviors is not due to item-overlap, a confirmatory factor analysis with deceptive 
                                                 
77 It should be noted, however, that these are nil-hypotheses and it would require more to corroborate them than 
merely showing the absence of a significant path, as the absence thereof might be due to a plethora of other 
reasons than the one discussed in the study.  
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signaling and bias motivated aggression only was run, which showed adequate fit (X 
  = 18.839, 
p = 0.016); AGFI = 0.988; CFI = 0.990; RMSEA = 0.032) and a medium correlation between 
both latent constructs (r = 0.34). Inspection of the indirect effects will shed more light on this 
particular relationship. In Table 9, the effects of genuine signaling and deceptive signaling on 
prejudice and bias motivated behaviors – the most relevant effects in this study – are 
decomposed into total, direct, and indirect effects.  
 
 Causal variables (exogenous) 
 Genuine signaling  Deceptive signaling 
Endogenous variables Ust. SE St.  Ust. SE St. 
Prejudice        
Total effects 0.18 0.04 0.11**  0.43 0.09 0.18** 
Direct effect --- --- ---  0.23 0.08 0.10* 
(Total) indirect effects 0.18 0.04 0.11*  0.20 0.04 0.08** 
Bias motivated behaviors        
Total effects 0.02 0.01 0.03**  0.24 0.04 0.30** 
Direct effect   ---  0.17 0.03 0.21* 
(Total) indirect effects 0.02 0.01 0.03**  0.07 0.02 0.08** 
Table 9: decomposition for effects of exogenous variables on prejudice and bias motivated behaviors in the Spanish 
sample. All reported effects are standardized estimates. Ust., unstandardized; St., standardized; *p<0.05 **; p<0.01; 
***p<0.001. Amos bootstrapping procedure was used to obtain estimates.  
 
From table 9, it can be inferred that forms of signaling indeed exert a total indirect effect (all 
indirect effects present in the model combined) on prejudice and bias motivated behaviors. 
Quality signaling has a modest total indirect effect on prejudice (0.11), and a small but 
significant (total) indirect effect on bias motivated behaviors (0.03). Even though these findings 
provide initial support for hypothesis 1 of the study, there are two potential paths from genuine 
signaling to bias motivated behaviors, one mediated by RWA only, and one mediated by RWA 
as well as prejudice. When the total indirect effects are inspected more closely by computing 
the significance of each mediated path using the bootstrap procedure of (Hayes, 2013; Preacher 
& Hayes, 2008)78, it appears the mediated path genuine signaling → RWA → prejudice → bias 
motivated behaviors is indeed significant (β= 0.03; SE = 0.05; LLCI = 0.02; ULCI = 0.04)79. 
This confirms hypothesis 1. Further, the path genuine signaling → RWA → bias motivated 
behaviors also turns out to be significant (β = -0.01; SE = 0.01; LLCI = -0.03; ULCI = -0.00). 
                                                 
78 In this method, using regression analyses, sequential mediation effects can be computed. Using 
bootstrapping, confidence intervals are computed. Bootstrapping was set at 10000. 
79 SE, bootstrap standard error; LLCI, lower limit of the bootstrap confidence interval; ULCI, upper 
level of the bootstrap confidence interval.  
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The effect is, however extremely small and the upper level of the confidence interval is at the 
border of being acceptable (the unrounded score is -0.0004). Given the large sample size, this 
effect should be considered to be marginal.   
In turn, deceptive signaling has a small total indirect effect on prejudice (0.08), and a total 
indirect effect of a similar magnitude on bias motivated behaviors (0.08), thus providing initial 
for hypothesis 4. When these indirect effects are inspected more closely by using the same 
approach designed by Preacher and Hayes, results indicate that the mediated path deceptive 
signaling → SDO → prejudice → bias motivated aggression is significant (β = 0.02, SE = 0.01, 
LLCI = 0.02, ULCI = 0.03), thus providing corroborating evidence for hypothesis 4. 
Furthermore, the results of the analysis of indirect effects also suggests that the path deceptive 
signaling → prejudice → bias motivated behaviors is significant as well (β = 0.03, SE = 0.01, 
LLCI = 0.01, ULCI = 0.05). These results support hypotheses 5 and 5a, stating that the 
mediation effect is weaker in cases of deceptive signaling of sociality, and that a direct path 
between deceptive signaling and prejudice exists, respectively.  
These findings provide corroborating evidence of the theoretical model developed in this study, 
viz. that bias motivated behaviors are in part determined by two types of pro-sociality, be it that 
in the case of genuine pro-sociality the indirect effects primarily run through RWA and 
prejudice. This way, hypothesis 1, stating that there is a significant indirect effect of genuine 
signaling of pro-sociality on bias motivated behaviors, running through RWA and prejudice, is 
corroborated in this particular study. The same holds for hypothesis 4, stating that there is a 
significant indirect effect of deceptive signaling on bias motivated behaviors, running through 
SDO and prejudice. This way, the two core hypotheses of the study are corroborated.  
Apart from this, hypothesis 2 could not be falsified, as no significant path could be drawn 
between genuine signaling and prejudice. The same holds for hypothesis 3. As  there was no 
significant association between genuine sociality and prejudice, this hypothesis could not be 
rejected. Interestingly hypothesis 5b, which stated that a direct relationship between deceptive 
signaling and prejudice should exist, was corroborated in this study, thus providing support to 
the idea that the necessity for intervening variables is less of a necessity in cases of deceptive 
signaling compared to genuine signaling. Both hypotheses 6 and 7, which stated there would 
be no association between genuine signaling and SDO, and deceptive signaling and RWA 
respectively, could not be rejected as no significant associations could be computed. As a 
negative direct effect existed between RWA and bias motivated behaviors, hypothesis 9 can be 
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regarded as being corroborated. Finally, the strong and significant path coefficient between 
prejudice and bias motivated behaviors, provides for corroborating evidence of hypothesis 10. 
In the next section, hypothesis 11, which stated that no difference regarding the direction of the 
results may exist between men and women (if the evolutionary underpinnings of prejudice and 
bias motivated behaviors as derived in this study are correct), will be investigated using group 
comparisons.  
1.3. Group comparison based on sex 
As discussed earlier, an important additional test for the theory is a comparison between men 
and women. In this respect, it can be expected that the evolutionarily acquired mechanism 
operates in more or less the same way for both men and women, given that the adaptive problem 
it intends to resolve is non sex-specific. That is, both men and women can take advantage of 
the benefits of this particular mechanism in terms of survival. Of course, given that many 
mechanisms operate at the same time, some sex-dependent differences can be expected, due to 
external factors such as aggressiveness, which do vary across sexes, and may have an impact 
on the relationships studied here. The direction of the results, however, ought to be the same 
across sexes, otherwise the evolutionary logic set out in this study can be questioned. Before 
moving to the group comparison, the overall model fit – which is now computed for the model 
across both groups, will be briefly discussed. As appears from Table 10, the model fits well 
with the data, and it can be said that model fit generally is increased in comparison to the single-
group model discussed earlier.  
 






RMSEA .03 < 0.08 
SRMR .05 < 0.05 
TLI .96 > 0.95 
CFI .97 > 0.95 
PCFI .76 Close to 1 
Table 10: model fit for the two-group model based on sex in the Spanish study 
 
To test the group differences, the stepwise procedure as set out by Byrne (2011) and inspired 
on the Jöreskog tradition, was followed. In short, in this procedure one gradually moves from 
testing measurement invariance to testing structural invariance. Whenever a certain model is 
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not equivalent across groups, a stepwise inclusion of the parameters constrained in that model 
is conducted. Every equivalent parameter is kept constrained, whilst those identified as not 
equivalent are left to vary freely across groups. Rather than an all-or-nothing game, this 
particular approach allows to identify the specific points of divergence between both groups. 
The model used for the comparison is the full model (as there are no substantial differences 
between the strict and full model in terms of coefficients and model fit, this may be a more 
informative approach as more relationships are tested with regard to their stability across 
groups). Finally, the focus will be on two models, i.e. the measurement model, which compares 
the factor loadings on the latent constructs across groups, and the structural model, in which the 
path coefficients are compared across groups. I consider these to be the most important aspects, 
as error variances etc. are a very strict demand in terms of model equivalence, a position also 
held by several authors in the field (e.g. Bentler, 2004; Byrne, 2009). In line with the Jöreskog 
strategy, first the measurement model will be scrutinized before inspecting the structural 
parameters.  
In the Spanish sample, the measurement model is equivalent across both sexes, as can be 
inferred from Table 11.  
 
Model Comparative model Df. χ² p 
Factor loadings of all indicators 
constrained equal (Model 1) 
unconstrained 
12 17.36 .14 
All path coefficients constrained equal Model 1 20 37.19 .01 
Table 11: model comparison for sex in the Spanish sample.  
 
As appears from this table, there is no need to a stepwise procedure in which all indicators of 
the latent constructs are constrained successively, as the measurement weights model, in which 
all of these factor loadings are constrained equal, has a non-significant chi-square value, 
indicating a proper equivalence across sexes. In the table, the structural weights model is 
displayed as well. Compared to the baseline model (unconstrained), this model does not show 
equivalence across groups.  
For this reason, multiple structural weights models have been created, where in every model 
one parameter is constrained. If a certain parameter shows equivalence across groups, the 
parameter is kept constrained and the next parameter is constrained. This model is then 
compared to the last model in which parameter were statistically equal. The overall result is 
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that four parameters are not equivalent across groups, i.c. the coefficients of the paths RWA → 
prejudice, RWA → bias motivated behaviors, SDO → prejudice, and prejudice → bias motivated 
behaviors. The summary results of the group comparison are presented in Table 12. 
 
Model  Comparative model Df. χ² p 
Model 1 and coefficient 2 constrained  Model 1 (all factor loadings constrained) 1 0.05 .83 
Model 1 and coefficients 1 and 2 
constrained 
Model 1 and coefficient 2 constrained 
1 0.16 .70 
Model 1 and coefficients 1, 2 and 3 
constrained 
Model 1 and coefficients 1 and 2 
constrained 
1 0.69 .41 
Model 1 and coefficients 1, 2, 3 and 4 
constrained 
Model 1 and coefficients 1, 2 and 3 
constrained 
1 0.02 .90 
Model 1 and coefficients 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
constrained 
Model 1 and coefficients 1, 2, 3 and 4 
constrained 
1 4.23 .04 
Model 1 and coefficients 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 
constrained  
Model 1 and coefficients 1, 2, 3 and 4 
constrained 
1 7.79 .01 
Model 1 and coefficients 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 
constrained 
Model 1 and coefficients 1, 2, 3 and 4 
constrained 
1 2.07 .15 
Model 1 and coefficients 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 
8 constrained 
Model 1 and coefficients 1, 2, 3 and 4 
constrained 
1 11.560 .00 
Coefficient guide: 
1:  genuine signaling → RWA 
2: deceptive signaling → SDO 
3: deceptive signaling → prejudice 
4: deceptive signaling → bias motivated behaviors 
5: RWA → prejudice 
6: RWA → bias motivated behaviors 
7: SDO → prejudice 
8: prejudice → bias motivated behaviors 
Table 12: structural equivalence across sexes in the Spanish sample.  
 
The results in Table 12 are generally consistent with the results one would obtain using the 
pairwise comparison of parameters obtained in Amos through a bootstrap procedure, with the 
exception of the coefficient of RWA → prejudice and SDO → prejudice. As indicated in Table 
13, the coefficient of the path prejudice → bias motivated behaviors clearly differs significantly 
across sexes (z-score -2.58 > |1.96|), as does the coefficient of the path RWA → bias motivated 








 Coefficients for men and women 
 Men Women z-score 
Quality → RWA .23 .28 0.93 
Cheating → SDO .22 .24 0.46 
RWA → prejudice .34 .46 0.83 
SDO → prejudice .44 .30 -1.45 
Cheating → prejudice .16 .08 -0.86 
Prejudice → behaviors .56 .43 -2.58 
cheating → behaviors .16 .23 0.98 
RWA → behaviors -.23 n.s. 2.97 
Table 13: pairwise comparison of coefficients between sexes using the bootstrap procedure and z-scores. 
 
Thus it can be concluded that the model is partially equivalent across sexes. In this context, it 
is of great importance to note that the “evolutionary part” – for lack of a better name – of the 
model, incorporating the newly introduced variables functioning as causes of the causes based 
on evolutionary theory, is fully equivalent across sexes. The differences that do emerge, are 
located in the social psychological scales (which is to be expected, given sex differences in 
aggression etc.).  
The differences that do emerge with regard to sex, however, are not of a nature to falsify the 
theory; some are even utterly compatible with evolutionary theory. For example, regarding the 
path from RWA to bias motivated behaviors, the data suggest that the protective role of RWA 
(i.c. the negative coefficient between RWA and bias motivated aggression) is an exclusively 
male affair: for men, RWA is a protective factor when it is not combined with prejudice, 
whereas this is not the case for women. This resonates well with evolutionary theory. First, 
overt aggression (the type of aggression that the self-report scale probed) is a predominantly 
male affair, which may in itself be a sufficient explanation for this phenomenon. Apart from 
that, however, it can be suggested that the effect of RWA on bias motivated aggression is 
reversed, so to speak, when prejudice is absent. The reason for this is that RWA incites a kind 
of submission to group norms, of which equality is an integral part in our contemporary society. 
Without this norm being neutralized by prejudice – basically expelling the out-group members 
outside of the sphere of application of this particular norm – the typically male overt aggressive 
expressions of bias may take root. Thus this particular finding is in concert with the theory to 
be tested. This explanation may also account for the less obvious (at least in terms of z-scores) 
difference between both sexes regarding the path from prejudice to bias motivated aggression, 
which is larger for men compared to women. This may provide further support for the 
“neutralization” hypothesis, in which male violence may be facilitated by the neutralization of 
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non-violence norms (perhaps exemplified in RWA without prejudice being present) through 
prejudice, which typically incorporates a de-humanization or at least devaluating view of the 
out-group.  
1.4. Summary of the results in the Spanish study 
Taken together, the above findings support the theoretical model developed in this study. Most 
of the predicted relationships have been corroborated. By means of intermediary conclusion, 
all hypotheses underlying this study are reproduced in Table 14, where it is indicated whether 
they are corroborated or falsified.  
Hypothesis 1: there is a significant, positive indirect effect of 
genuine signaling of sociality on bias motivated behaviors, 
which runs through RWA and prejudice. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 1a: there is a significant, positive direct effect of 
genuine signaling of pro-sociality on RWA. 
corroborated 
Hypothesis 1b: there is a significant positive direct effect of 
RWA on prejudice. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 2: there is no significant direct effect of genuine 
signaling of pro-sociality on prejudice. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 3: there is no direct effect of genuine signaling of 
pro-sociality on bias motivated behaviors. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 4: there is a positive indirect effect of deceptive 
signaling of pro-sociality on bias motivated behaviors, which 
runs through SDO and prejudice. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 4a: there is a positive direct effect of deceptive 
signaling on SDO. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 4b: there is a positive direct effect of SDO on 
prejudice. 
Corroborated  
Hypothesis 5: the mediation effect is weaker in cases of 
deceptive signaling of pro-sociality compared to genuine 
signaling of pro-sociality. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 5a: there is a positive direct effect of deceptive 
signaling of pro-sociality on prejudice. 
Corroborated  
Hypothesis 5b: there is a positive direct effect of deceptive 




Hypothesis 6: there is no direct effect of genuine signaling of 
pro-sociality on SDO. 
Corroborated  
Hypothesis 7: there is no direct effect of deceptive signaling of 
pro-sociality on RWA. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 8: There is no direct positive effect of RWA on bias 
motivated behaviors. 
Corroborated  
Hypothesis 9: there is no direct effect of SDO on bias motivated 
behaviors. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 10: there is direct positive effect of prejudice on 
bias motivated behaviors.  
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 11: There is no difference between men and women 
regarding the direction of the results. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 12: the model holds in different national settings. Corroborated  
Table 14: overview of hypotheses corroborated/falsified in the Belgian study 
 
2.  Belgian study 
In the Belgian study, 1300 questionnaires were completed by students from various universities 
in Belgium (Ghent University, University of Brussels, University of Hasselt, University 
College Ghent). The sample consisted of 852 girls and 448 boys. Age ranged from 17 to 71, 
with the mean age being 22 years old. A boxplot indicates that the vast majority of respondents 
is to be found in the category 17 to 25 (all quartiles, except for unusually old respondents in 
comparison to the bulk of respondents), thus constituting a more “typical” student sample than 
the one obtained in the Spanish study. Further, in the Belgian study, the sample consisted of a 
majority of master students (31.3%), followed by first bachelor students (22.1%), second 
bachelor students (16.3%), third bachelor students (15.9%), and doctoral students (6.8%). A 
portion of 7.6% of the respondents indicated other occupancies (e.g. being employed at the 
university in various positions not related to a specific trajectory). It also can be noted that the 
Belgian sample was more diverse in terms of the faculties that took part. Whereas the Spanish 
sample consisted of psychology, criminology, or law students, the Belgian example included 
students from the exact sciences and other alpha sciences as well, and a good balance existed 
among the various “families” of academia included in the sample. In the Belgian study, scales 
that slightly differed from the Spanish measurement scales (except for the signaling scales, as 
they are newly developed), were used. The reason for this is twofold. First, it is advisable to 
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use established translations of measurement scales. For this, the RWA, SDO and prejudice 
scales as they are often used in Belgium were opted for. Second, apart from measurement 
invariance, this approach can provide a certain advantage as it strengthens the test of the model. 
For, if the model would still stand when slightly different scales are used, this indicates that the 
effects observed are not due to a particular measurement instrument.  
As the signaling scales are still in development, they were kept identical in both countries. 
Preliminary analysis of the data indicated measurement variance between both cultural 
contexts, so this will be discussed first. Then, the measurement model used to test the model is 
presented, followed by an exposition on the results.  
2.1. Factorial variance between Spain and Belgium 
When modeling using the same approach as the one used in the Spanish study, i.e. parceling 
the items into three parcels for each individual indicator, a covariance matrix that is not positive 
definite arose. The reasons for this problem to occur may be manifold, but the most likely reason 
it occurred in the Belgian sample is because it too few indicators (parcels) with a sufficient 
loading on the latent construct were included in the analysis. The specific construct that 
displayed this problem was the “quality signaling” construct, where one parcel had a low 
loading on the latent construct (i.e. β = .26), and one a near-zero loading (β = .04). The third 
indicator had an acceptable loading on the latent construct (β = .45). Obviously, then, there is 
no factorial invariance between the Belgian and the Spanish sample, which is exemplified by 
the results of a principal axis factoring procedure forcing all the items to load on one factor, 
reproduced in Table 15.  
 
Item loading 
 I want to be the best [Ik wil de beste zijn] .25 
 Working in group gives me the opportunity to show my value as a person to others[In groep werken 
geeft me de gelegenheid mijn meerwaarde als persoon aan te tonen] 
.67 
 I do a lot not to appear a loser with my friends [Ik doe er veel aan om niet als een loser over te 
komen bij anderen] 
.21 
 In group activities I tend to take the lead if this helps my group to win [In groepsactiviteiten heb ik 
de neiging om de leiding te nemen als mijn groep op deze manier wint] 
.42 
 The best part of working in a team is that it allows me to show my value as a person to others[Het 
beste aan in team werken, is dat ik op deze manier mijn waarde als persoon kan tonen aan de anderen] 
.73 
Table 15: factor loadings of the quality signaling scale in the Belgian sample. The principal axis factoring procedure in 




From this table, it appears there are only three items that have a factor loading with a threshold 
above .40 on the latent construct, and that these preferably be used in order to remedy the 
problem. Using only these three indicators of the scale effectively remedies the problem of the 
not positive definite matrix, whilst still maintaining the minimum number of three indicators 
for this latent construct.  
The reasons for this variance may be manifold. Whilst any retrospective interpretation of 
factorial variance, at least in my view, is tentative (inductive, which is dangerous enterprise), it 
is always interesting to explore possible reasons for it and to explore them in the further 
development of the measurement scales in order to create very consistent, cross-culturally valid 
measurement instruments. The study at hand is not the place, however, for a thorough 
comparative cultural study on Spain and Belgium, but a possible cause for the factorial 
invariance can be pointed out nonetheless80.  
One cultural difference that relates directly to the scales popped up immediately after seeing 
the two items that did not fit the picture well: individualism. When I was in Spain to conduct 
this research, it didn’t take a long time to notice that people there did not at all seem individualist 
in nature; rather, they attach a great deal of importance to spending time with family and people 
in the streets. This seems a bit different in Belgium, where a lot more attention is given to 
individual achievement81. In this sense, it does not come as a surprise to see the three items 
referring to “groups” clustering together, and the two other items referring to individual prestige 
clustering together. It seems as if in Spain, individual achievement is assessed more in light of 
contributions to the group than in Belgium, where individual achievements seem to be 
considered to be a distinct category of achievement.  
Thus, it seems that the two items are interpreted differently against a different cultural 
background. Whereas the item, say, “I want to be the best” is seen as signifying “I want to be 
the best team player” in Spain, it seems to be interpreted as signifying “I want to be the 
best/strongest individual” in Belgium. In this sense, it can be hypothesize that the individual 
achievement items in the Belgian context would fit the cheating scale better than the quality 
signaling scale. By means of a preliminary test, the two items were added to the cheating 
                                                 
80 The possible reasons discussed here are based on my own impressions while I was in Spain in order to 
conduct the Spanish survey. They should therefore only be considered tentative explanations, and not 
scientific ones.  
81 With this I am not saying that Belgians do not care about family, just that there are differences in the 
relative weight this has in both contexts.  
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signaling scale in Belgium – which probes selfishly oriented behavior or prosocial behavior to 
achieve one’s own goals – and the items fitted very well into that scale. Also, overall 
consistency rose to 0.69. Thus, even though this reasoning is not conclusive, it does say 
something about measurement variance across cultural contexts and how different meaning 
may be attributed to one single item.  
To dwell on this topic for a moment, it seems difficult to presuppose strict measurement 
invariance in social sciences – except for blatantly clear cases such as “murder is wrong”. If 
measurement scales are intended to grasp vague concepts, one inherently runs the risk of 
contextual interpretation. Also, the kind of cultural element that will influence this process 
depends on the measurement used and the concept under study. For example, in the case above, 
it was most likely about a cultural difference in individualism. But, for other scales, it might 
well be materialism or any other construct that plays a role in how scales are affected. In my 
personal opinion, this need not be a problem. For even though many social scientists will 
forcefully oppose moving an item to a scale that measures a different concept across cultures, 
it is exactly the understanding of these cultural differences and how items resonate in different 
cultures that could justify this, if construed on the basis of sound theoretical deduction. That 
being said, items that do grasp the same latent construct in different contexts, if possible, are to 
be preferred, of course. Neither should such a procedure be based on mere impressions or mere 
statistical fit (as is the case above – for which reason the two items are discarded from the 
further study), but rather on sound theory and research.  
2.2. Measurement and measurement model in the Belgian sample 
In the Belgian sample, the same signaling scales as in the Spanish sample were used, with the 
exception of the two items in the quality signaling scale that are discarded, as discussed above. 
This way, the scale probing cheating signals consisted of the same 7 as in the Spanish sample 
(α = 0.64), whereas the scale probing signaling of quality as a person consisted of 3 out of the 
original 5 items retained in the Spanish study (α = 0.61). The scales measuring RWA, SDO and 
prejudice were obtained from the research group on social psychology at Ghent University. The 
RWA scale consisted of 11 items (α = 0.76), the SDO scale consisted of 16 items (α = 0.92), 
and the prejudice scale consisted of 14 items (α = 0.90). In addition to the variation scale to 
assess bias motivated behaviors in the Spanish study, a frequency scale probing the incidence 
of these behaviors during the past 12 months was included as well, for exploratory purposes not 
to be discussed in this particular study. Also, the item probing murder was omitted, as this 
appeared to be a too strongly formulated item.  
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Just as in the Spanish study, the items were combined into three parcels for each latent variable 
to keep analysis manageable and to get strong indicators for the latent constructs. The entire 
measurement model is reproduced in Figure 582. The fit indices of this measurement model are 
reproduced in Table 16. 
 






RMSEA 0.06 < 0.08 
SRMR 0.04 < 0.05 
TLI 0.95 > 0.95 
CFI 0.96 > 0.95 
PCFI 0.73 Close to 1 
Table 16: fit indices in the Belgian sample. 
 
As can be inferred from Table 16, the measurement model is acceptable on all fit indices, with 
the usual exception of the chi-square statistic which is not reliable in large samples. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the measurement model fits well with the data.  
From Figure 5, it can be inferred that all indicators of the latent constructs have a sufficiently 
high loading on the latent constructs, with the one exception of the second indicator of quality 
signaling. As the indicators of quality signaling are just one item each, it is not possible to 
remedy this situation in any way. Taking into account the three legged rule, it was chosen to 
leave the indicator as it is, given that the fit indices indicate that the model fits well with the 
data. However, this does indicate that the quality signaling scale is in need of further 
development in future studies.  
                                                 
82 Again, the self-report items are omitted as they do not measure latent constructs and are constructed on the 









1.1. Results of the Belgian study 
The structural equation model of the Belgian sample is reproduced in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6: structural equation model in the Belgian study. For all coefficients, p<0.001. Non-significant paths are omitted 
from the diagram. 
 








RMSEA 0.05 < 0.08 
SRMR 0.04 < 0.05 
TLI 0.95 > 0.95 
CFI 0.96 > 0.95 
PCFI 0.77 Close to 1 
Table 17: fit indices of the structural equation model in the Belgian sample.  
 
The model in the Belgian sample fits well with the data, on all indices of model fit. Again, the 
exception is the chi-square statistic, which is usually significant in larger samples. In general, 


























































in the model. There is a positive direct effect of genuine signaling on RWA (β = .20, hypothesis 
1a), and a positive direct effect of RWA on prejudice (β = .40, hypothesis 1b).In the model, 
there also is a clear direct and positive effect of deceptive signaling on SDO (β = .37, hypothesis 
4a), and a clear direct and positive effect of SDO on prejudice (β = 0.51, hypothesis 4b). 
Significant positive direct effects also exist between RWA and prejudice (β = .40, hypothesis 
1b), and SDO and prejudice (β = .51, hypothesis 4b). Similar to the Spanish sample, a direct 
positive effect of prejudice on bias motivated behaviors (β = 0.45, hypothesis 10) is present. 
This way, the direct effects at the core of this study (i.c. the direct effects the theory would 
predict), have been corroborated in the Belgian sample. 
Similar to the Spanish study, a direct path between cheating signals or deceptively signaling 
one’s commitment to the in-group and bias motivated behaviors emerges (β = .16, hypotheses 
5 and 5b). This can be explained by virtue of the same logic as in the Spanish study: the primary 
concern of people inclined to signal their commitment to the in-group is self-oriented, which 
may incline them to exploit and exclude not only in-group members, but also out-group 
members. 
There are some differences with the Spanish sample as well. First of all, there is no direct 
negative effect of RWA on prejudice in the Belgian sample. In this sense, the “protective effect” 
of RWA is absent in the Belgian sample. However, this does imply that hypothesis 8, which 
stated that there ought not to be a positive direct effect of RWA on prejudice, cannot be rejected. 
Also, as SDO does not have a significant direct effect on bias motivated behaviors, hypothesis 
9 cannot be rejected either. Finally, there was no significant direct effect of deceptive signaling 
on prejudice, as was the case in the Spanish sample. This can be regarded as a falsification of 
hypothesis 5a, which stated that a positive direct effect exists between deceptive signaling of 
sociality and prejudice.  
A final difference with the Spanish sample is the significant and positive direct effect of 
deceptive signaling on RWA in the Belgian sample (β = .24). This may be explained by the 
higher correlation between RWA and SDO in the Belgian sample compared to the Spanish 
sample. Thus, this finding falsifies hypothesis 7, which stated that there is no direct effect of 
deceptive signaling on RWA.  
In order to further investigate the effects both modes of signaling may have on prejudice and 
bias motivated behaviors, the total indirect effects may be inspected. Table 19 presents the 
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decomposition of the effects of genuine signaling and deceptive signaling on both prejudice 
and bias motivated behaviors.  
 
 Causal variables (exogenous) 
 Genuine signaling  Deceptive signaling 
Endogenous variables Ust. SE St.  Ust. SE St. 
Prejudice        
Total effects .28 .07 .08**  .97 .03 .29* 
Direct effect --- --- ---  --- --- --- 
(Total) indirect effects .28 .07 0.08**  --- --- 0.29* 
Bias motivated behaviors        
Total effects .02 .01 0.03**  .49 .10 0.29* 
Direct effect --- --- ---  .28 .05 0.16** 
(Total) indirect effects .02 .01 0.03**  .21 .02 0.12** 
Table 18: decomposition for effects of exogenous variables on prejudice and bias motivated behaviors in the Belgian 
sample. All reported effects are standardized estimates. Ust., unstandardized; St., standardized; *p<0.05 **; p<0.01; 
***p<0.001. Amos bootstrapping procedure was used to obtain estimates.  
 
The picture is basically the same as in the Spanish sample. Again, there is a significant total 
effect of quality signaling and deceptive signaling on bias motivated behaviors, with the total 
effect of deceptive (.29) being more robust than that of genuine signaling (.03). Given that the 
only effect of genuine signaling on bias motivated behaviors is indirect, and given that only one 
path exists, i.c. genuine signaling → RWA → prejudice → bias motivated behaviors, this can 
be regarded as corroborating evidence for hypothesis 1.  
When the influence of deceptive signaling is further decomposed by inspecting its total indirect 
effect on bias motivated behaviors, it appears it does have a significant indirect effect on bias 
motivated behaviors (.12). Consequently, its overall direct effect (.16) outweighs its total 
indirect effects on bias motivated behaviors. Results from the regression based bootstrap 
procedure as developed by Preacher and Hayes (Hayes, 2013; Preacher & Hayes, 2008), which 
allows to estimate which particular mediated paths are significant, indicates that the path 
deceptive signaling → SDO → prejudice → bias motivated behaviors is significant (β = .07; 
SE = 0.01; LLCI = 0.05; ULCI = 0.09; CI = .95)83,84. All other possible mediated paths 
                                                 
83 SE, bootstrap standard error; LLCI, lower limit of the bootstrap confidence interval; ULCI, upper level of 
the bootstrap confidence interval. Bootstrapping was set at 10000. 
84 In principle, applying this procedure to genuine signaling is not necessary, as there only is an indirect 
effect, and only one path leading from genuine signaling to bias motivated behaviors. However, the 
regression based analysis points into the same direction, i.e. a significant but small mediated effect (β = .01; 
SE = 0.004; LLCI = 0.01: ULCI = 0.02; CI = .95). This corroborates hypothesis 1.  
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originating in deceptive signaling of sociality displayed in the model are not significant using 
this procedure. Even though the indirect effect of this path is rather small, this finding supports 
hypothesis 4, which predicted this particular path to exist, thus providing corroborating 
evidence for hypothesis 4. 
1.2. Group comparison based on sex 
In order to compare both sexes, the same Jöreskog inspired stepwise comparison approach was 
followed, as was done in the Spanish sample. When comparing both groups in terms of 
measurement and structural models, it appears the two groups are equivalent both in terms of 
measurement weights and structural weights. The results are displayed in Table 1985.  
 
Model Comparative model Df. χ² p 
All factor loadings constrained (Model 1) Unconstrained 10 9.31 .50 
All path coefficients constrained Model 1 6 3.47 .75 
Table 19: group comparison based on sex in the Belgian sample.  
 
Whilst this test of equivalence – the proper group comparison procedure of Jöreskog – is to be 
preferred over the “fast way” using z-scores, as the latter is only computed on the unconstrained 
model, it may nevertheless be interesting to see whether or not z-scores differ across groups in 
the unconstrained model. Every possible test may yield interesting information with regard to 
the model under scrutiny. In other words, the additional test with z-scores is intended to 
challenge the model equivalence between both sexes (and is an often used procedure). The 
results of the pairwise comparison of parameters is presented in Table 20.  
 
Group comparison men-women 
 Full M Full F z-score 
Quality → RWA .11 .24 2.82 
Cheating → SDO .39 .31 -1.13 
Cheating → RWA .31 .19 -1.47 
RWA → prejudice .39 .40 -0.23 
SDO → prejudice .57 .47 -1.93 
Prejudice → behaviors .43 .48 2.03 
Cheating → behaviors .30 .08 -3.20 
Table 20: group comparison based on gender using z-scores in the Belgian sample. Scores apply to the unconstrained 
model only. 
                                                 
85 It might be interesting to note that both the measurement residuals and structural residuals are equivalent 




This approach indeed challenges the equivalence across genders, be it in a more “superficial” 
way. Two coefficients are non-equivalent across both sexes when all other parameters are left 
unconstrained. The first is the coefficient between quality signaling and RWA (z = 2.82 > 
|1.96|). This means the coefficient for women is significantly larger than that of men. In other 
words, these results suggest that the relationship between quality signaling and RWA is a 
predominantly female affair, at least in the Belgian sample. As both coefficients are positive 
and significant, however, this does not affect the theory.  
The second coefficient with a significantly differing value for men and women according to the 
z-scores is the coefficient of the path from prejudice to bias motivated behaviors (z = 2.03 > 
|1.96|). The coefficient there is stronger for women compared to men. Another difference 
between the sexes is the direct effect of deceptive signaling on bias motivated behaviors, which 
is smaller for women compared to men (z = -3.20 > |1.96|). This indicates that men higher in 
deceptive signaling tend to be more directly prone to bias motivated behaviors, without any 
intervening variable being required. Taken together, the results support hypothesis 11, as there 
are only differences in strength of the effects, not in the direction thereof.  
1.3. Intermediary conclusion on the Belgian study 
Even though measurement invariance was a little bit of an issue regarding the two signaling 
scales, at least this exercise does point out which items can be regarded as the core items of the 
genuine signaling of pro-sociality scale, which may, in turn, provide for a solid basis to further 
develop the scales in future research. As it was possible to retain three items, the study could 
proceed in a similar fashion to the Spanish study, be it that one factor loading was below the 
usual threshold of .04. It was kept in the study, however, in order to guarantee a minimum of 
three indicators per latent construct.  
Apart from these “measurement perils”, it appeared that vastly similar results were produced in 
the Belgian sample compared to the Spanish sample. Most importantly, the same base model 
was present insofar as the theoretically expected paths (i.e. hypotheses 1 and 4) were upheld in 
both contexts, despite differing measurement of genuine signaling of pro-sociality. Again, other 
paths were looked for in order to push the model to its boundaries, and similarly to the Spanish 
sample, a direct path between deceptive signaling of pro-sociality and bias motivated behaviors 
emerged. Different from the Spanish sample was the path between deceptive signaling and 
RWA, which did improve variance explained at both RWA and SDO, most likely due to the 
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larger covariance of both ideological attitudes in the Belgian sample compared to the Spanish 
sample.  
When comparing men and women, it has been shown that both groups are generally invariant 
with regards to both the measurement model and the structural model, and no differences in the 
direction of the results could be found, which provides corroborating evidence of the 
evolutionary logic underpinning the current study. To summarize, the hypotheses of the study 
are presented in Table 21where it is indicated whether they are corroborated or falsified. In the 
Belgian study, two hypotheses that had been intended to push prediction to its limits have been 
falsified. The first is hypothesis 5a, stating that there is a direct effect of deceptive signaling of 
pro-sociality on prejudice. This was not the case in the Belgian sample, where mediation 
through prejudice was a less important feature for people high in SDO. The second hypothesis 
that can be rejected is hypothesis 7, stating that there is no direct effect between deceptive 
signaling of pro-sociality and RWA. This hypothesis intended to make explicit the two strictly 
different paths predicted by the theory. Given the high correlation between SDO and RWA, 
however, the two have become confounded to a certain extent. Most importantly, the two 
hypotheses that are falsified, are additional tests of the model, and are not part of the core 
hypotheses predicted by the theory (being hypotheses 1 and 4).  
Hypothesis 1: there is a significant positive indirect effect of 
genuine signaling of sociality on bias motivated behaviors, 
which runs through RWA and prejudice. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 1a: there is a significant, positive direct effect of 
genuine signaling of pro-sociality on RWA. 
corroborated 
Hypothesis 1b: there is a significant, positive direct effect of 
RWA on prejudice. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 2: there is no significant direct effect of genuine 
signaling of pro-sociality on prejudice. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 3: there is no direct effect of genuine signaling of 
pro-sociality on bias motivated behaviors. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 4: there is a positive indirect effect of deceptive 
signaling of pro-sociality on bias motivated behaviors, which 
runs through SDO and prejudice. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 4a: there is a positive direct effect of deceptive 




Hypothesis 4b: there is a positive direct effect of SDO on 
prejudice. 
Corroborated  
Hypothesis 5: the mediation effect is weaker in cases of 
deceptive signaling of pro-sociality compared to genuine 
signaling of pro-sociality. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 5a: there is a positive direct effect of deceptive 
signaling of pro-sociality on prejudice. 
Falsified 
Hypothesis 5b: there is a positive direct effect of deceptive 
signaling of pro-sociality on bias motivated aggression. 
Corroborated  
Hypothesis 6: there is no direct effect of genuine signaling of 
pro-sociality on SDO. 
Corroborated  
Hypothesis 7: there is no direct effect of deceptive signaling of 
pro-sociality on RWA. 
Falsified 
Hypothesis 8: There is no direct positive effect of RWA on bias 
motivated behaviors. 
Corroborated  
Hypothesis 9: there is no direct effect of SDO on bias motivated 
behaviors. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 10: there is direct, positive effect of prejudice on 
bias motivated behaviors.  
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 11: There is no difference between men and women 
regarding the direction of the results. 
Corroborated 
Hypothesis 12: the model holds in different national settings. Corroborated  
Table 21: overview of hypotheses corroborated/falsified in the Belgian study. 
 
2.  Group comparison across countries 
In this section, testing of the theory will be taken one step further. In the previous sections, 
partial equivalence across sexes has been demonstrated, which provides support for the 
evolutionary framework this study is based on. A further test, however, is to compare the model 
across countries. As a first impression, the same mediated paths are present in both countries in 
which the survey is conducted. It remains to be seen, however, how much the model is identical 
in these two rather different nations. Is measurement of the latent constructs equivalent across 
contexts? If so, is the structural model equivalent? If measurement is not equivalent, does the 
structural model still hold despite these differences in measurement? These are the questions 
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that put the model through one more severe test, which will allow to establish the boundaries 
thereof. In other words, it will be tested in order to challenge it once more.  
2.1. Measurement and measurement model 
Given the fact country specific adaptations of the measurement scales were used, an important 
decision to make relates to the indicators to be used in the model. In line with the three legged 
rule, the three indicators that best coincide from a linguistic point of view (i.e. which are quasi 
literal translations) were selected as indicators for the latent constructs. For quality signaling, 
as indicated earlier, only three indicators were retained in the Belgian study, so there the 
problem is resolved by circumstance.   
This is a good test, as measurement will differ from measurement in both previous studies. If 
the model still holds despite these different operationalizations, this can only indicate the model 
is quite robust and insensitive to specific operationalizations. Finally, only the strict moderation 
model is under consideration here, for two reasons. First, this is a more severe test of what 
would be strictly expected from a theoretical point of view. Second, differences in the country 
specific models exist, and these paths would have to be set to zero in the sample where they are 
not present when data files are merged anyway (then one would be dealing with a partial test 
of equivalence). The full measurement model is presented in Figure 7. 
The measurement model thus obtained fits well with the data across both groups, as appears 
from Table 22 where all fit indices are within acceptable range, with the exception of TLI which 
is rather low.  
 






RMSEA 0.03 < 0.08 
SRMR 0.04 < 0.05 
TLI 0.94 > 0.95 
CFI 0.95 > 0.95 
PCFI 0.73 Close to 1 





Figure 7: measurement model in the comparative sample. 
 
2.2. Results and comparison across countries 
The overall model obtained fits relatively well with the data, as appears from the fit indices 
which are reproduced in Table 23. Whilst RMSEA has a great score, SRMR, TLI, CFI and 
PCFI are a bit on the border of representing a good fit. This can be expected, however, taking 
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into account the selection of the variables, which had to be done in a relatively pragmatic way, 
due to translation issues. 
 
Fit Index value treshold 
    
Df 





RMSEA 0.03 < 0.08 
SRMR 0.05 < 0.05 
TLI 0.93 > 0.95 
CFI 0.94 > 0.95 
PCFI 0.77 Close to 1 
Table 23: fit indices of the comparative study 
 
The model is visually represented in Figure 6. As appears, largely the same results (regarding 
sign and direction of the paths) are obtained compared to the individual samples derived from 
each country. Both mediated and theoretically expected paths emerge in the group comparison 
across countries, which provides further corroborating evidence for the theory under scrutiny 
in this study. Let us now inspect, in a piecemeal fashion, the extent to which the model is 
identical across context, in both a factorial and structural way.  
When applying the same stepwise procedure as with the group comparisons based on sex, the 
following image emerges. It is immediately clear that the measurement model is not equivalent 












Df χ² p 
All factor loadings constrained 
 Unconstrained 
model (Model 1) 
10 137.41 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loadings on genuine signaling constrained  Model 1 2 21.24 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loading of parcel 2 on quality signaling 
constrained 
 
Model 1 1 12.54 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loading of parcel 3 on quality signaling 
constrained 
 
Model 1 1 17.53 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loadings on deceptive   signaling 
constrained 
 
Model 1 2 13.43 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loading of parcel 2 on deceptive signaling 
constrained 
 
Model 1 1 8.81 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loading of parcel 3 on deceptive signaling 
constrained 
 
Model 1 1 10.21 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loadings on RWA constrained  Model 1 2 36.19 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loading of parcel 2 on RWA constrained  Model 1 1 34.07 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loading of parcel 3 on RWA constrained  Model 1 1 24.29 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loadings on SDO constrained  Model 1 2 17.95 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loading of parcel 2 on SDO constrained  Model 1 1 7.97 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loading of parcel 3 on SDO constrained  Model 1 1 4.18 0.04 
Model 1 with factor loadings on prejudice  constrained  Model 1 2 260.01 0.00 
Model 1 with factor loading of parcel 2 on prejudice
constrained 
 
Model 1 1 4.18 0.04 
Model 1 with factor loading of parcel 3 on prejudice
constrained 
 

























































Figure 8: model rendered by the group  comparison between countries. In the diagram, all values on the left are the 
values for the Belgian sample, and values on the right are those of the Spanish sample. For all coefficients p<0.001, 
except for the coefficient cheating deceptive signaling  - social dominance, with p<0.05 in the Spanish subsample.  
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In a second step, the structural weights were compared across national groups, whilst the factor 
loadings were set to vary freely (as there is no measurement equivalence across contexts). This 
yields a mixed picture, in which a part of the model is equivalent whilst another part is not. The 
results of this exercise are displayed in Table 25. The equivalent part contains the coefficients 
accompanying the paths quality signaling – RWA, deceptive signaling – SDO, and RWA – 
Prejudice. The non-equivalent portion of the model contains the coefficients of the paths SDO 
– prejudice and prejudice – bias motivated aggression.  
 
Model  Comparative model Df. χ² p 
All structural weights constrained  Unconstrained model (Model 1) 5 154.67 .021 
Model 1 with coefficient 1 constrained  Model 1 1 0.55 .46 
Model 1 with coefficients 1 and 2 
constrained 
Model 1 with coefficient 1 constrained 
1 0.33 .57 
Model 1 with coefficients 1, 2 and 3 
constrained 
Model 1 with coefficients 1 and 2 
constrained 
1 0.11 .75 
Model 1 with coefficients 1, 2, 3 and 4 
constrained 
Model 1 with coefficients 1, 2 and 3 
constrained 
1 139.40 .00 
Model 1 with coefficients 1, 2, 3, and 5 
constrained 
Model 1 with coefficients 1, 2 and 3 
constrained 
1 25.48 .00 
Coefficient guide: 
1:  genuine signaling → RWA 
2: deceptive signaling → SDO 
3: RWA → prejudice 
4: SDO → prejudice 
5: prejudice → bias motivated behaviors 
Table 25: structural models in the comparison between countries.  
 
Inspection of the z-values of the critical ratio’s for difference with regard to the unconstrained 
model renders the same image. From Table 26 it can be inferred that differences exist between 
both countries in terms of the coefficients accompanying the paths SDO → prejudice (z-score 
= 9,23 > |1,96|) and prejudice → bias motivated behaviors (z-score = -4,77 > |1,96|). Inspection 
of the coefficients shows that all coefficients are significant in both countries, but that the 
coefficient of the path SDO → prejudice is significantly larger in the Spanish sample (.56) 
compared to the Belgian sample (.24), and the coefficient accompanying the path prejudice → 
bias motivated behaviors is significantly larger in the Spanish sample (1.09)86 compared to the 
Belgian sample (.78).  
                                                 
86 Note that the coefficient is larger than 1. This is often assumed to indicate a problem in the data, but, as 
Jöreskog (1999) discusses, this is not always problematic, given that a path coefficient, which in essence is a 
regression weight and not a correlation, can be larger than 1. To make sure there is no problem in the data, 
multicollinearity was checked for by running a correlation table and checking the tolerance and variance 
inflation factor in linear regression. Neither of those procedures revealed a problem with multicollinearity. 
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 Group comparison country 
 Spain Belgium z-score  
Quality → RWA .25 .21 .73 
Cheating → SDO .18 .10 .64 
RWA → prejudice .38 .79 .09 
SDO → prejudice .56 .24 9.23 
Prejudice → aggression 1.09 .78 -4.77 
Table 26: comparison of coefficients across countries based on z-scores in the unconstrained model 
 
To conclude this section, it can be said that notwithstanding differences in measurement – i.e. 
the measurement tools operate differently in both national contexts – the paths theoretically 
expected still hold across both countries, and it fits very well with the data. Whereas some 
differences do exist between both countries with regard to the size of two path coefficients, 
results do go in the same direction in both countries, and the very same paths of the strict 
theoretical model hold in both contexts. Furthermore, the differences that do exist, are not to be 
located in the “evolutionary part” of the model, i.c. the paths between both forms of signaling 
and the ideological attitudes RWA and SDO, but in the “social psychological part” of the model. 
This indicates that the evolutionary logic underpinning the model is sound, as there is no 
difference between coefficients between both countries. That differences exist in the social 
psychological part is to be expected, given cultural variation across both countries that may 
account for these differences. That is, even though the evolutionary origins of the behaviors 
may be the same, cultural evolution and horizontal transmission mechanisms may impact upon 
the concrete size of the coefficients in the social psychological part of the model.  
3. Conclusion  
In this chapter, the results of three studies intended to test the theoretical model with regard to 
the evolutionary roots of contemporary manifestations of prejudice have been reported. In 
general, the theoretical model was upheld in both studies. In both studies, a glimpse of the pro-
social roots of prejudice can be seen: in both there are significant paths between quality 
signaling and RWA, cheating signaling and SDO, which in turn are connected to prejudice, and 
prejudice to bias motivated behaviors. The significant total effects of both signaling measures 
on bias motivated aggression confirm the cross-cultural validity of the model tested.  
Even though differences exist between both contexts where the study was conducted, they are 
not of a nature to reject any of the hypotheses in the study. For, the direction of the results is 
                                                 
An additional check for anomalies in the data did not yield any result. Therefore, it can be assumed there is 
no problem with the data. 
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the same in both samples. As discussed earlier, differences in sizes of effects are absolutely 
permissible when testing evolutionary hypotheses. However, if the nature of the relationships 
would differ (e.g. a positive effect in sample A and a negative effect in sample B), the 
evolutionary origin of the hypothesis tested ought to be rejected. This is clearly not the case, 
however, in the current study.  
In addition to the theoretical model, paths between cheating signals and bias motivated 
aggression, cheating signals and prejudice, can be found. The direct path between cheating 
signals and prejudice can in principle be due to measurement, as both are measures that probe 
certain behaviors rather than attitudes. However, testing for this, CFA points out that both 
constructs are nicely separable statistically speaking, ruling out the possibility that this is a 
statistical artifact. This way, both the direct paths between deceptive signaling and prejudice 
and bias motivated aggression are more than what was theoretically expected, strengthening the 
overall study.  
Basically the same holds for the small negative, but significant relationship between RWA and 
bias motivated aggression found in the Spanish sample. Rather than disconfirming an 
evolutionary hypothesis, it provides support for it. In this sense, RWA reflects a need for 
stability and in-group cohesion, which results in rule-abiding behaviors. In our contemporary 
society, however, non-discrimination and non-violence have become predominant norms, by 
which people high in RWA presumably abide as well. Without the specific 
targeting/neutralizing mechanism of prejudice, then, these norms should not be breached. It 
exactly is the way in which prejudice is conceived of in this study, that allows for a breach of 
these norms: it puts the target group outside of the “expanding circle” of empathy, and thus 
excludes them from the field of application of those norms. As this particular relationship was 
not found in the Belgian sample, it can only be regarded as evidence in the sideline, however.  
As an additional test, a multiple group comparison was conducted to detect any differences 
between sexes in the results. The reasoning is that human in-group sociality, among other 
things, was an essential element in the formation of our species, and that for this reason a 
domain specific cognitive module evolved to solve problems related to dangers or competition 
presented by out-groups or out-group members. Given the fundamental importance of such a 
module for all members of a species, fundamental differences between men and women should 
be nonexistent. At the very least, results need to point into the same direction. In the Spanish 
study no significant differences were found, and in the Belgian sample three significant 
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differences, at least in terms of z-scores in the unconstrained model, were found: the path 
coefficient of quality signaling → RWA is stronger for women, the coefficient of the path 
prejudice → bias motivated behaviors is stronger form women, and the coefficient of the path 
deceptive signaling → prejudice is stronger for men. Given the fact that the direction of the 
results remains unaltered, i.e. the sign of the coefficients is the same, and that both paths have 
a significant coefficient, this cannot be regarded as a refutation of the base model that was 
tested.  
To conclude, it can be safely stated that the base model developed in this study is corroborated 
in both samples. Of course, there are also some limitations to the current study. These will be 




Chapter VII. General discussion 
 
In the previous chapters, the evolutionary backdrop of contemporary manifestations of 
prejudice have been theorized and tested. As appeared from the results of the empirical studies, 
the theoretically expected model holds in two different contexts, which gives it a certain degree 
of robustness. However, what does all this mean, then? To appreciate the results of the previous 
chapter, it is necessary to evaluate the theory from a logical-philosophical point of view, to 
clearly indicate the weaknesses of the study and how these weaknesses may be translated into 
further research initiatives, to draw some links with other research areas where the theory might 
be applicable in a fruitful way, and, finally, to indicate some policy relevant issues that may be 
uncovered by the theory at hand.  
1.  Logical evaluation of the theory 
As indicated in the introductory part to this study, a critical-rationalist evaluation of theory in 
comparison to other theories mainly relies on its empirical content in comparison to other 
theories. That is, the more a theory says about reality, in the sense that it forbids more, the larger 
its class of potential falsifiers is.87 This implies that the higher a theory’s empirical content is, 
the better it is testable or susceptible to falsification, a key element in critical rationalism. Even 
though empirical content is not the same as logical content88, Popper shows that as the empirical 
content of a theory increases, so does its logical content (2002 [1959], p. 103-105). It is the 
latter that will be used in order to evaluate the theory, as it allows to base such an evaluation on 
deducibility relationships, levels of universality and degrees of precision of the theory. Even 
though this is not an exact undertaking in the sense of cardinality, a good way to go about this 
is by means of subclass relationships (Popper, 1959 [2002], p. 98). 
Let us now consider the subclass relationships between the theories discussed in this study. The 
main theory used is the dual process model of Duckitt et al (2001), incorporating theories of 
Right Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and applying those to the 
                                                 
87 Empirical content is not to be confused with the number of positive statements a theory posits. For a theory 
that say everything about reality in this sense is a tautology and cannot be refuted by any means. With 
“positive statements”, I mean non-prohibitory statements in the sense of forbidding certain outcomes. 
Unfortunately, contemporary social science does not approach theories often in this way, and, as a 
consequence, remains largely inductive or at least verificationist/confirmationist in nature, whatever the 
efforts researchers put in the theoretical grounding of their claims may be.  
88 i.e. the class of non-tautological statements derivable from the statement under scrutiny as opposed to  
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ideological concept of prejudice. Apart from this, an evolutionary complement to these theories 
has been elaborated and tested in this study. Of course, a certain degree of abstraction is 
necessary to show this – logic is abstract reasoning. For the purpose of this exercise, let us 
consider two variables, prejudice and bias motivated behaviors (the intermediary outcomes in 
the model), and two predicates, expressions of sociality and expressions of dangerous or 
competitive worldviews. For the sake of clarity of the reasoning, both forms of signaling 
(deceptive and genuine) are collapsed into one, as are the two ideologies of RWA and SDO. 
Logically speaking, however, they can be considered to be subclasses in their own right of the 
sets “expressions of sociality” and “expressions of threatening and competitive worldviews. 
Further, only the strict mediation model is under consideration here. Consider the following 
four statements, following Popper but applied to the current study: 
P: all prejudice is an instance of the evolution of human sociality.  
Q: all bias motivated aggression is an instance of the evolution of human sociality. 
r: all prejudice is an expression of a competitive/dangerous worldview. 
s: all bias motivated behaviors are an expression of a competitive/dangerous worldview 
Now, moving from P to Q, the level of universality decreases, as bias motivated aggression 
forms a subclass of prejudice. Even though this may be contested by pointing out the difference 
between an attitude and a behavior, the strict mediation model depicts prejudice as a necessary 
condition of bias motivated behaviors. Thus, what this subclass relation states is that all forms 
of bias motivated behaviors are an integral part of prejudice, but not vice versa. This 
corresponds to the intuitive difference between attitudes and behaviors motivated by them. For 
the purpose of evaluation of the theory, it follows that when statement P is falsified, statement 
Q is automatically falsified as well. This also means that statement P says more about reality 
than does statement Q. 
Moving from P to r, the precision of the statements (the predicates) decreases. This is so, 
because the dangerous and competitive worldviews are in themselves a result of the evolution 
of human sociality: people are susceptible to these worldviews as they have been constitutive 
in our evolutionary past, and people may share them through transmission mechanisms. 
However, the evolution of human sociality also gave rise to entirely different ideologies, such 
as those of tolerance and non-violence. Therefore, the dangerous/competitive worldviews can 
be considered a subclass of the evolution of human sociality. It follows that, when the evolution 
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of human sociality is falsified, so are the ideologies, but not vice versa. Therefore, statement P 
is more precise than statement r in terms of predicate.  
Now let us compare the theory set out in this study to the fields of study it has drawn upon. 
Thus, it needs to be assessed in light of theorizing on both prejudice and bias motivated 
aggression – two fields of study that are generally quite separated from one another. First, with 
regard to the study of bias motivated aggression, the theory set out in this study has clearly 
linked it with the field of prejudice by depicting bias motivated aggression as a subclass of 
prejudice. This clear theoretical link provides the theory with a higher degree of universality 
with regard to bias motivated aggression. As said before, however, it would be overly 
enthusiastic to claim this is the only study which draws this link, and often such a link is 
implicitly present in theorizing on, for example, hate crime. For this reason I deem it safer to 
say that the theory developed in this study has a higher or at least identical degree of 
universality. With regard to prejudice, it can be claimed that prejudice is a proper subclass of 
parochial altruism, in itself a proper subclass of human sociality. Put differently, if the theory 
on the evolution of human sociality is falsified, so is the consequence thereof, i.c. prejudice (as 
operationalized here). Therefore, it can be said that the theory is of a higher degree of 
universality as its competing theories.   
The most obvious merits of this study, however, are in the degrees of precision. For both 
prejudice and bias motivated aggression, the current study has a higher degree of precision. In 
this sense, a move from P to r as well as from Q to s implies a decrease of the precision of the 
statement, given that the dangerous/competitive worldviews are a proper subclass of the 
evolution of human sociality. If the latter is falsified, so is the former, but not vice versa. By 
the same token, a move from P to s implies a decrease in universality as well as precision of the 
statements. Put differently, statement s is fully derivable from statement P. Even though this 
reasoning is quite abstract and takes away a lot of the précis of the theory, it does allow for an 
evaluation of the theory in comparison to other theories. As indicated in the introduction of this 
study, most current studies on prejudice and derived phenomena such as hate crime, focus on 
quite specific instances thereof. Intuitively, it can be easily seen that the theory developed in 
the current study unifies – or at least allows to do so – these various and more specific accounts 
of prejudice and bias motivated aggression in the overarching theoretical framework of 
evolutionary theory. As prejudice and bias motivated behaviors are just one possible instance 
of the evolution of human sociality, it ought to be clear that the theory explains more than do 
most current studies on prejudice.  
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To summarize, the merits of the theory as it stands now are presented in the brief overview 
below.  
  
 Level of universality Degree of precision 
Theorizing on prejudice Higher Higher 
Theorizing on bias motivated 
behaviors 
Higher Higher 
Table 27: merits of the theory from a logical point of view 
 
This way, in its core, the theory developed in this study can be regarded to perform well in 
terms of both levels of universality and degrees of precision. Even though abstraction has been 
made from the theoretical précis of the study in order to clearly indicate the theory’s 
performance, the logic set out in this section can be easily extended to include more variables 
and predicates by means of simple logical transformations. For example, take the predicate 
“instance of coalitional computation”, a central element in the current study. Let the basic 
statement a be “all forms of prejudice are instances of coalitional computation” and let basic 
statement b be “all forms of bias motivated behaviors are instances of coalitional computation. 
the latter is fully derivable from the former, and the earlier mentioned statements r and s are 
derivable from statements a and b respectively. In turn, statements a and b are derivable from 
statements P and Q above. This way, the logic can be extended to include a great variety of 
elements, through the subclass relationship: bias motivated behaviors are a subclass of 
prejudice, which is in turn a subclass of the ideologies RWA and SDO; which are in turn a 
subclass of coalitional computation, which is, finally, a subclass of human sociality.89 
Another way to compare theories in respect of their degree of testability is the notion of 
simplicity.90 Popper’s notion of logical simplicity (2002 [1959], sect. 41-46) is akin to his 
conception of levels of universality, but allows – at least in my opinion – to hold a more intuitive 
discussion on the merits of a theory. Simplicity in this sense, as opposed to “elegance” or any 
                                                 
89 By the same token, the logic can be extended to include deceptive signaling and genuine signaling of 
sociality (subclasses of human sociality), and RWA and SDO specifically. In such a case new concepts would 
need to be introduced to discern between the types of prejudice represented by the two paths present in the 
diagram.  
90 In itself a derivate from the dimensionality of a theory, or the number of parameters needed in order to 




other pragmatic rule such as Ockham’s razor91, is logical insofar as it can be considered to be 
based on the dimensionality of theories (i.e. the number of parameters necessary in order to 
create a potential falsifier) and the subclass relationship between various statements. This way, 
simplicity refers to the fact that a number of statements may be subsumed under a more general 
statement, with a lower degree of dimensionality and thus one of greater testability.  
Applying this notion to the current theory, it can be said that the ideological attitudes RWA, 
SDO and prejudice  as well as bias motivated behaviors are unified under this theory, thus 
bringing together statements which are often, or at least have been, regarded as independent to 
a certain degree, of each other. Furthermore, it is possible to show that the unification potential 
of the theory is certainly not limited to the theories tested in this study. As this unification 
potential is not tested de facto, what follows in the following paragraphs are just conjectures 
which ought not to be interpreted as corroborated in any sense, rather as highly plausible 
candidates for unification from a strictly theoretical point of view.  
As indicated in the introduction, one aim of this study was to provide a framework in which 
various theories on a variety of “-isms” can be brought together (unified). Many theories exist 
that depict certain instances of the coalitional computation discussed in the evolution of human 
sociality, and which appeared to be of essential importance in the prediction of prejudice. A 
central element in this particular context is the existence of threatening out-groups, either in the 
sense of competition or danger. This way, a mechanism was developed which may eventually 
lead to bias motivated behaviors. From the point of view of simplicity it is important to note 
that this mechanism is of a more universal nature than, say, a theory on “anti-black prejudice in 
the United States”.92 The same holds for other specific theories on instances of prejudice or bias 
motivated aggression which can all be subsumed under the general mechanism of coalitional 
computation.93  
                                                 
91 Which is in principle not compatible with Popper’s account of scientific progress, as it implies that if one 
observes 1000 white swans, the most parsimonious law to be derived from this is that all swans are white. It 
is at the core of Popperian philosophy to be weary of such instances of inductivism as they are psychologically 
appealing yet can easily be misleading in the search for an approximation of truth.  
92 Which can be shown through the subclass relation or dimensionality of the statement. The statement “anti-
black prejudice in the United States” would imply certain parameters to be set to a specific value, indicating 
that the dimensionality of this particular statement is higher than that of coalitional computation where these 
parameters are not to be met. This way, the dimensionality of the latter is lower, its testability greater, and it 
says more about reality. Anti-black prejudice in the United States can thus be subsumed under the more 
universal concept of coalitional computation.  
93 With the exception of those animated by either exclusion of bad reciprocators or parasite aversion, which 
are functionally different mechanisms from coalitional computation.  
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In this sense, the discussion on simplicity provides a link with the discussion on law-like 
regularities in the social sciences. For, the higher the degree of logical simplicity, the less 
variant the mechanisms or regularity is with regard to time and space. Even though this link 
was not explicitly made by Popper when discussing simplicity, it does elucidate what the 
concept may mean for the social sciences, where “the particular” is often theorized on and, I 
am afraid, the search for regularities has oftentimes been given up, especially by those social 
scientists which refer to themselves as “critical”, “postmodern” or “constructivist”. In terms of 
the current study, this approach to the concept of simplicity means to search for regularities 
which are less variant to time and space compared to predecessor regularities. For example, a 
theory on “hate crimes against black Muslim teenagers in new wave party scenes in southern 
Texas” is far less invariant to time and space than a theory on “effects of threat perception on 
bias motivated aggression”, to give just a random example. In this sense, the former theory is 
of greater dimensionality as more parameters need to be explicated to obtain a potential falsifier, 
it is situated on a lower level of universality, and has a lower degree of precision than the latter; 
it is simpler. 
Thus, with regard to simplicity it can be said that the theory developed in this study performs 
equally or better than the theories it was based on, i.c. RWA, SDO, and prejudice. The reason 
for this is that all of these theories can be subsumed under the evolutionary theory on human 
sociality. When the theory on human sociality is falsified, so are those subsumed under it. In 
this sense, it integrates distinct theories – or unifies them – under one broad theoretical 
framework, the evolutionary theory on human sociality. Further support for the theory’s higher 
degree of simplicity can be found in the fact that those instances of human sociality studied in 
this project are certainly not the only ones that can be deduced from it, by means of the same 
initial conditions. To state it simply, for example, if no threat is perceived with regard to a 
certain out-group but rather a positively valued characteristic, such as diligently contributing to 
the common good, prejudice will not be the consequence but rather acceptance or coalition 
formation.  
There are theories in which the case is even clearer. I do not wish to enter into an in-depth 
debate on specific theories, as this would rightfully require a lot of more work to dissect them 
into their composing hypotheses, and as a consequence I will only refer to a type of theory. 
There are approaches which are to be called “hard constructivism”, which state that many 
things, including prejudice and the behaviors resulting from it, are fully socially constructed. 
As a consequence, they ought to be fully deconstructed as well (see, inter alia, Boghossian, 
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2006, for an explanation of and critique on this point of view). Apart from common criticisms 
leveled to such approaches, in the context of the current discussion this would amount to saying 
that only very local phenomena can be theorized on. As the number of parameters to be provided 
in order to provide a potential falsifier for such a theory is, in principle, innumerable (one can 
always protect such a theory with auxiliary hypotheses), the dimensionality of such theories 
would be quasi infinite. As a result, the theories would be of a far lesser level of universality, 
would have a far lower level of specificity, and would be practically untestable: they are highly 
complex.94 The same, but to a somewhat lesser degree, holds for soft constructivist approaches 
such as critical race theory, postmodernist approaches, and the so-called “critical approaches” 
in criminology. Especially for the latter, which is often more a political agenda than explanatory 
theorizing, the involvement of ideology is so great, that the dimensionality of the theory would 
be infinite. Not to mention the measurement problems one would encounter when applying 
such approaches. For all of the reasons above, it can be concluded that the theory presented in 
this study is at least equally, but generally more simple than its competing theories.  
This concludes the logical evaluation of the theory in light of other existing theories. Even 
though the discussion remained at surface level in what regards theories outside of the scope of 
the study, i.e. those that were actually included in the model, the logic in the reasoning is quite 
transparent. Comparing all existing theories that acclaim to have a bearing on prejudice and 
bias motivated aggression would indeed be an interesting exercise, yet a time consuming one 
insofar as they all need to be thoroughly dissected, but falls outside the scope of this study. This 
brings me automatically to the next section, where some suggestions for further research will 
be suggested.  
2.  Challenges and further research 
Even though the theory has received a certain degree of corroboration in the present study, this 
can most certainly not be regarded as an endpoint. It is within the logic of science – at least that 
logic set out at the onset of this study – that all corroboration is relative to the number and 
degree of criticality of the tests it is subjected to. In this respect, some obvious weaknesses can 
be pointed out, and, based on those weaknesses and the logical evaluation of the theory, some 
avenues for further research in order to further critically test the theory at hand will be 
suggested.  
                                                 
94 And by the same token inapplicable in the sense of providing general mechanisms to be applied in given a 
particular context.  
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One such recommendation is in line with the foregoing remarks on precision of the theory. 
Whereas the theory was corroborated in the context of coalitional computation, the test was not 
extended to other groups which would fall within the domain of parasite aversion. This would 
provide a crucial test in the logic of critical rationalism, as it would directly appeal to the class 
of potential falsifiers that the theory posits. Therefore, future research ought to test the same 
model in a context of parasite aversion as well as coalitional computation in a quasi-
experimental design. The theory predicts that the model will hold in case of coalitional 
computation, but that it will not hold in case of parasite aversion.95,96 If it does, this would pose 
serious challenges to the theory of coalitional computation as the specific functionality of the 
mechanism derived from evolutionary theory would be challenged. 
A second obvious weakness of the study is the measurement of quality signaling. Even though 
this measure performed rather well in a Spanish context, it did not perform equally well in the 
Belgian context, where only three items could be retained. Given the interesting psychometric 
properties of this measure (especially its relationship with RWA), it ought to be further 
developed in subsequent research, to reach a higher standard of quality. This is a logical 
consequence of the demand for higher degrees of testability. If testability is the main criterion 
for selecting theories, it follows that the precision in measurement ought to be as high as 
possible, for otherwise differences between theories would be impossible to detect due to 
imprecise measurement (Popper, 1945: 108-109).  
Next to this, measurement can also be more diverse. That is to say, different operationalizations 
of variables in order to see whether or not the effects studied are due to how a variable is 
operationalized or not. Also, it can be interesting to try to conceive of new variables on the basis 
of the same theory, which convey the same sort of information. In this context, for example, it 
might be interesting to make use of the concept empathic concern. As various social and 
evolutionary psychologists have argued, Peter Singer (1981) and Steven Pinker (2011) up front, 
                                                 
95 In fact, it was originally planned to extend the study with such a quasi-experimental design. After the 
studies in Belgium and Spain, it was planned to conduct a study in the U.S. which would provide further 
materials to culturally cross-validate the results, and provide an opportunity to conduct a quasi-experimental 
design, on the condition that measurement of the signaling scales was precise and statistically sound enough. 
The latter is not entirely true, however, as discussed earlier. This, in combination with grave delays due to 
IRB (institutional review board) procedures and other practical obstacles (some universities wouldn’t even 
allow a survey by non-students/staff), it was decided to postpone this study to a later stage. This will enable 
the refinement of the signaling scales, and a more robust planning of the study, as well as the incorporation 
of other suggestions for further research discussed in this chapter.  
96 It can, however, be argued that parasite aversion is also based on a sense of “danger”. The main difference, 
however, lies in the fact that parasite aversion is expected to operate independently from any link with the 
evolution of human sociality, and can thus be considered a self-preservation mechanism.  
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the “circle of empathy” of people has expanded over the years. The sociologist Sawyer (1964) 
argues that empathy or empathic concern is not a stable personality trait, but that it is dependent 
on the object of empathy and the context. Consistent with the theory set out in this study, it 
could thus be argued that in the presence of threat (danger and/or competition), people’s 
empathic concern becomes limited to the in-group only. This way, a new variable could be 
created, which could fittingly be called “parochial empathic concern”. This suggestion, which 
is only one of many potential inventive research approaches, is also based on the evolutionary 
theory set out in this study, and may provide for additional tests, from a slightly different angle, 
on the same subject or problem. In the end, testing until the theory fails is the main idea97.  
Further, in the context of measurement, it is also noteworthy that a survey in itself is just one 
out of many approaches to the social sciences. Even though it allows for a cheap and practical 
measurement of certain concepts, it is doubtful it is the best measurement tool available. The 
main reason for this is that respondents are active thinkers, and they do not necessarily 
objectively convey what the situation is like. This is partly so because of well-known 
phenomena such as social desirability, but an important aspect of this type of research – 
evolutionary theory – is that the reasons why some kind of behavioral propensity evolved need 
not be known by the person exhibiting that particular behavior, as his or her motivation is more 
proximal and often based on emotions. In line with this, Popper also asserted that people’s 
subjective perception of an objective problem situation need not coincide, and when they do, 
people need not be aware of the objective problem to be addressed (1979, 206-56). Given this 
discrepancy, it is advisable to make use of types of measurement in which the import of the 
conscious person is eliminated as much as possible. For the purpose of the investigation of 
evolutionarily acquired behavioral propensities, in my opinion the best way to go about this is 
to uncover the neurobiological basis for this behavior (in this case the module of coalitional 
computation), and extend the theory to include these elements as well. Prediction as to which 
neural paths will or will not be activated when coalitional computation is activated, will shed a 
more objective light on whether or not the theory holds. This setup, in combination with an 
                                                 
97 As a matter of fact I had included such a measure in the Belgian sample for exploratory purposes. 
Respondents were asked to fill out a regular empathic concern scale. At the end of the questionnaire, they 
were asked to fill out an empathic concern scale targeted towards immigrants. The latter score was substracted 
from the former, thus obtaining a numeric index of “parochial empathic concern” (PEC). When this was 
entered in a linear regression, PEC had a beta coefficient of the same magnitude as RWA and SDO, and 
contributed significantly to the variance explained.  
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experimental design, would challenge the theory far more directly than the indirect cross-
sectional approach applied in the current study.  
A third possible weakness is that the study was conducted on students only. This was done for 
practical reasons to get a wider coverage – which has proven to be successful. Even though it 
has been argued that the usage of the “W.E.I.R.D.” people is not a problem as such when it 
comes to RWA, SDO and prejudice (e.g. Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), this remains unknown with 
regard to the signaling measures. For one, they are specifically designed to probe situations 
students face (for example the items relating to group tasks). So, in order to further test the 
theory, it is necessary to develop similar measures for adults, and test the model in adult samples 
as well to assess its robustness.  
In principle, all of the above mentioned weaknesses and suggestions for further research 
concern, the further testing of the theory. In this context, the current research can only be 
regarded as a first and modest exploration of the subject matter, which is in dire need of further 
testing to see where the theory fails. It is the falsification of the theory or parts thereof in a given 
setting that provides for the most valuable information and which allows for theoretical growth. 
Next to this overall purpose, the study at hand values to a great extent unification – which 
essentially is explanation in the Popperian critical rationalist view. For this reason, a further 
general suggestion for further research would be to see how it relates to other fields of study. 
In the sections that follow, a few of these areas with which the theory is compatible and for 
which the evolutionary theory on sociality and prejudice may provide an overarching theoretical 
frame for theoretical unification, will be discussed. The theories selected are current research 
on radicalization and violent extremism, the broad field of restorative justice, the broad field of 
transitional justice, and legal theory on criminal justice.  
3.  Links with other research areas 
The choice for the research areas with which the theory developed in this study will be brought 
into connection is not arbitrary. The choice for radicalization and violent extremism is quite 
straightforward, as the current study also dealt with bias motivated behaviors. As I will intend 
to show, a lot of the concepts used in this field are substantially similar or even identical to 
those used in the current study. Even though the name of something as such usually is matter 
of consensus in a particular field of study, I do hope to show that the evolutionary framework 
developed in this study is equally applicable to radicalization and violent extremism. Therefore, 
I will try to identify privileged variables for cross-fertilization between both theories. The 
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choice for the two other research areas, restorative (and indirectly transitional justice), is in 
principle reminiscent of my own academic interest some years ago, where I was usually 
working on themes within these two broad fields of study. Nonetheless, the fact that these two 
fields of study are located within the more legally oriented approaches in social science, the 
ostensibly great gap between them makes the exercise all the more interesting. Finally, I will 
also apply the theory to enforcement of legal norms.  
3.1. Connections with radicalization and violent extremism 
In criminology, attention is increasingly given to the topic of radicalization. A variety of 
concepts are brought into relationship with radicalization or other aspects thereof such as moral 
support for political violence, and active political violence. Often, the theoretical frameworks 
used in this approach share some elements with the evolutionary approach set out in this study.  
One such concept – which is gaining in popularity in criminological theorizing in general – is 
morality (e.g. De Waele & Pauwels, 2014; Lilly, Cullen & Ball, 2010; Wikström et al. 2012). 
The main hypothesis there is that “individuals with law-relevant morality do not conceive of 
crime as a possible action whereas for individuals with non-law-relevant morality crime is a 
possible action” (De Waele & Pauwels, 2014: 365). Certainly, the theory set out in the current 
study is no stranger to morality and moral rules, as they are the very fundament of human 
sociality. Therefore, it would be an interesting enterprise to include measures of morality in the 
current framework as well, as they may prove to be a significant predictor for prejudice and 
bias motivated aggression.  
With regard to the two signaling measures developed for this study, I would hypothesize that 
morality in general would be related to genuine signaling of commitment to the in-group, but 
not to deceptive signaling. The simple reason for this is that “genuine” sociality implies a certain 
norm-compliance, as this is the backbone of human group living from an evolutionary point of 
view. Apart from that, deceptive signaling represents the cheating side of human sociality. 
Acting pro-socially there only serves self-interested purposes, and, by implication, 
noncompliance to the norms of group living. Thus, for genuinely prosocial people, morality 
could lead to moral support for bias motivated aggression, as this is an imperative of social 
living as well when norms are breached (i.e. punishment of cheaters). As elaborately discussed 
in this study, however, this dynamic is subject to the presence of a perception of conflict or 
competition between groups.   
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A second element often used in radicalization research is perceived injustice, derived from 
Tyler’s theory on law-obedience (Tyler, 2006). This element, again, reminds of the notion of 
fairness which is a central element in the evolutionary theory developed in this study. Fairness 
is at center stage in all forms of reciprocity, and it is exactly this notion which demarcates 
between norm-conform individuals and cheaters. In criminological theory, perceptions of 
injustice also have a place in general strain theory (Agnew, 2011), which may thus be linked to 
the theoretical framework developed in this study. Even though perceived injustice was not 
used in the current study, a very similar idea gave rise to the modeling of SDO and RWA as 
mediators, i.e. a perception of competition or conflict (this link will be clearly explained in the 
next section). Furthermore, the measurement of prejudice itself includes some statements that 
are very akin to perceived injustice. One such example is “immigrants have jobs that actually 
belong to natives”. 
In the original framework of Tyler (2006), however, the role of perceived injustice usually 
relates to the functioning of the police and the courts. This element of perceived injustice is 
entirely absent from the theory set out in this study, and it would indeed be an interesting 
exercise to incorporate it. Given the domain specific nature of a mechanism such as coalitional 
computation, I would hypothesize that the role of perceived injustice operationalized as 
injustice in the operation of courts and police only plays a minor role, especially in the presence 
of more salient predictors such as RWA, SDO and prejudice.  
Further, an important element in current theorizing on radicalization and crime in general, is 
anomie. This concept may be divided into three dimensions, being political powerlessness, 
social powerlessness and social isolation (De Waele & Pauwels, 2014), resulting in a 
“subjective feeling responding to societal dysfunctions” (Van de Velde & Pauwels, 2010). 
Theoretically, this concept is closely related to the concept of RWA, which also centers around 
the notions of social cohesion, obedience to rightful authorities, and exclusion or aggression 
towards individuals threatening the social fabric of a group. The only difference seems to be 
social isolation, which is not explicitly present in RWA, except for the fact that people high in 
RWA usually crave cohesive social groups with clear norms (e.g. Altemeyer, 2006). Thus, it 
seems that the three dimensions of anomia can be brought into the theoretical framework set 
out in the present study through the concept of RWA. Modeling this, however, is tricky. Caution 
is warranted insofar as one needs to be very clear if the dimensions of anomia differ from RWA 
as a concept, and whether they are empirically discernible. At least to me, it seems likely that 
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all of the above revolve around one single latent construct. This remains speculation, however, 
and is need of further theorizing and research.98  
A largely similar reasoning can be put forward with regard to ethnocentrism, a concept that is 
quite predominant in research on vigilantism (e.g. Van Damme & Pauwels, 2012). This concept 
indicates that an in-group identity, so defined on the basis of “ethnic markers”, is often the result 
of an antagonistic process between two competing groups or groups in conflict with each other. 
This way, the in-group is glorified, whereas the out-group is demonized so to speak. This 
basically comes down to the very core of the present study, where parochial altruism – an 
exclusive in-group orientation of sociality – is the result of competition and/or conflict between 
different groups. The concept of ethnocentrism thus is easily reconcilable with the evolutionary 
framework. The only difference is that the evolutionary framework logically incorporates all 
this in a much broader theoretical framework, which has a higher degree of universality and 
precision with regard to the predicates (see above).  
An often used concept in general criminological theory and radicalization in particular, is the 
notion of social learning (e.g. Akers, 1998; Higgins, 2010; Rodriguez-Garcia & Wagner, 2009), 
most often translated into the concept of “peer attitudes” or “peer behaviors”. Again, these relate 
to a single concept in evolutionary theory: transmission mechanisms. Other variables often 
included in research are different measures of “exposure” (e.g. music, movies, etc.), or “parental 
attitudes/behaviors”, different variables measuring school context, and so on. They all form part 
of the pool of transmission mechanisms, and evolutionary theory can structure this variety of 
variables in a theoretically informed way, for example dividing them into “horizontal” and 
“vertical” transmission mechanisms. This not only opens up the opportunity to develop new, 
more integrated measures of it, but it equally allows to integrate a rather large variety of 
theoretical insights into one single theoretical framework. Just to think of some, it can integrate 
elements of subculture theories, differential association theories, moral bonds, and insights 
from environmental theories. 
To conclude, various disciplines have been working on the same subject at the same time, with 
little cross-fertilization. As many concepts used in the various studies concerned with the broad 
themes of prejudice, radicalization and bias motivated aggression, it seems time has come to 
                                                 
98 It is, however, within the ambit of critical rationalism to strive for higher universality and precision, or 
greater simplicity. By creating many concepts which all revolve around the same latent construct, the 
dimensionality of a theory increases and as a consequence also its complexity.  
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look for potential unification in this increasingly popular research area. In this sense, future 
research might want to look for more universal concepts to which the diversity of concepts 
available in the field can be reduced. This would increase the levels of universality and degrees 
of precision, increase the simplicity of theories, and make them better testable. With regards to 
the current study, the evolutionary framework is able to pin a variety of these concepts in a 
specific place in the general theoretical framework. In short, the relative simplicity and clarity 
of evolutionary theory provides a great guide to start such an exercise, and initiate the 
interdisciplinary and theoretically sound integration of various research traditions.  
3.2. Connections with the fields of victimology and alternative sanctioning 
Insofar as criminology is defined as the study of crime (or rule-breaking), consequences of 
crime, and how we can deal with crime, an interesting conceptual link can be made with the 
broad field of victimology. More precisely it seems useful to reflect one moment on the 
usefulness of the legal categories of “victim” and “offender” (Fattah, 2000) in cases of bias 
motivated aggression. This will no doubt be a more controversial exercise, as in both legalistic 
discourse (or representation of reality), and public opinion, these categories are clear cut in the 
sense that it is usually believed that one person is the absolute victim and one is the absolute 
offender. There is, however, a relatively large scholarship that tends to disagree with this 
position. Consider the following quote by one of the founding fathers of what is generally 
referred to as victimology99: 
Those among you who are in daily contact with offenders have surely noticed that a 
large number of them feel and behave like a victim. They suffer from heightened and 
acute feelings of injustice. These feelings of injustice, this firm conviction that they 
are victims, whether the victimization is real (as it is in many cases) or perceived, 
there seems to be little doubt that it plays a significant role in offending. Fattah (2000: 
79). 
This quote immediately casts a huge amount of doubt on the usually sharp legal distinction 
between “victim” and “offender”. However, the position, if not from a legal then at least from 
a behavioral point of view, is certainly compatible with many existing criminological and 
psychological theories. For example, the very well established strain theory (Agnew, 1992) 
always points out toward “stressors”, such as job loss, may easily be experienced as a certain 
                                                 
99 Even though I know for sure – his being my mentor in part and a long time ago – that he would not agree 




degree of “victimization”. Similarly, in psychological research on prejudice, often reference is 
made to conflict, e.g. realistic conflict theory (Jackson, 1993), or varieties of threats, e.g. 
integrated threat theory (Riek et al., 2006). Even though the terminology differs quite a lot, 
given that “victim”, “offender”, and even “crime” are normative concepts par excellence, this 
does not preclude the fact that linkages can be drawn.  
How, then, does this relate to the theory set out in this study? In the case of the path ranging 
from RWA to prejudice the logic is most straightforward. As explained in the theoretical 
exposition, RWA refers to a perception of the world as being an unsafe, dangerous place, 
resulting in a heightened need for security and social cohesion. As a result, people high in RWA 
tend to favor groups with strict norms and an efficient enforcement of these norms. When these 
norms are threatened, people are willing to go far in effectively enforcing them, as history shows 
(ranging from posse’s to compliance with gross violations of human rights such as those that 
occurred in the Nazi regimes and other genocides worldwide).  
Of course, such attitude does not come out of the blue. A theory that finds close connection 
with the concept of RWA is integrated threat theory (e.g. the meta analysis by Riek et al., 2006). 
There, both realistic (e.g. threats to economic wellbeing, to physical integrity) and symbolic 
(e.g. values, customs) threats are considered to be the prime situational trigger for prejudice 
and, eventually, bias motivated behaviors. This theory does not only apply to people high in 
RWA, but extends to all people. Whether or not RWA is a personality trait, and whether or not 
a perception of realistic or symbolic conflicts leads to RWA, in all possible scenarios the central 
notion is a sense or perception of threat.  
This notion can be closely connected to bias motivated behaviors and prejudice more in general: 
threats or a perception thereof do imply a sense of passed or expected victimization, which one 
wishes to avoid. Interestingly, the threat does not necessarily need to be directed towards the 
individual perpetrator; it suffices that it be directed to one of his or her fellow in-group 
members. This phenomenon strikingly resembles the in terrorem aspect of hate crime offending 
on part of the group to which the victim of a hate crime belongs. For, there too, the results of 
the crime, spread to other in-group members, experiencing shock, anger, fear/vulnerability, 
inferiority and a sense of the normativity of the violence (Perry & Alvi, 2012). Perry and Alvi 
discuss some effects which seem, at least at first sight, to be specific of hate crime victims – 
most notably the sense of inferiority – this does not preclude the possibility that this is merely 
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a specific instance of a more general effect, and that a similar in terrorem effect may actually 
be happening with hate crime offenders. 
The main theoretical innovation of this study was to link RWA to the evolution of human 
sociality, following Kessler and Cohrs (2008). It was connected with the phenomenon of 
signaling one’s quality as a group member to fellow group members. The intricate links 
between RWA and this form of signaling are to be explained on the basis of norms and their 
transgression, as discussed in the literature overview. In this sense, bias motivated behaviors 
can, in part, be explained as a form of moralistic violence, i.e. violence directed at norm-
transgressors. Further, the current study showed that RWA in itself will not lead to bias 
motivated behaviors, for which a neutralizing and targeting mechanisms is needed; it will only 
do so if a certain danger or threat is perceived and attributed to a certain out-group. In the 
Spanish study, there even was a negative path between RWA and bias motivated behaviors, 
bolstering this conjecture. All of this indicates that the conjecture that bias motivated behaviors 
are, at least in part, motivated by a sense of injustice or victimization, real or perceived, 
imminent or past, is plausible.  
Let us now turn to the second path, that originating in SDO. As discussed earlier, the worldview 
accompanying SDO is hierarchical and competitive (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis & Birum, 
2002, p. 92). That is, different groups in society are organized along hierarchical lines, and there 
is considerable competition over the relative hierarchical position of one group compared to 
another. In short, the world is perceived as a “dog-eat-dog” competitive jungle. Members of 
higher hierarchical groups will try to defend their position and the privileges associated 
therewith, and consequently withstand (group) equality as this would mean a threat to their 
earned, privileged hierarchic position – at least as they perceive it (e.g. Quist & Resendez, 
2002). A central concept in SDO is that of legitimizing myths. These are shared ideologies, such 
as nationalism, cultural elitism, sexism, political-economic conservatism, noblesse oblige and 
meritocracy (see Pratto et al., 1994, pp. 742-743), that justify the hierarchies in society by 
depicting subordinate groups as deserving of their status. This way, group privileges are 
secured.  
However, can it be said that in case of SDO there is an underlying sense of (real or imagined, 
acute or expected) victimization? Intuitively, it can be said that people high in SDO do 
subjectively perceive that “something is wrong” or not “as it should be”, and that they will 
experience a disadvantage at the hands of certain out-groups. That is, they do seem to be 
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necessarily motivated by (real or imagined) negative personal or others' experiences, quite 
consistent with general strain theory (e.g. Agnew, Brezina, Wright, & Cullen, 2002), where the 
removal of positively valued stimuli plays an important role. As the quote of Fattah (2008) 
suggests, “they suffer from heightened and acute feelings of injustice”100, which could in fact 
be transposed to SDO as well: out-groups can be perceived to threaten the “just” order or 
hierarchy of the world, thus infringing on the benefits associated with that (hierarchical) order. 
Even though it may thus seem counterintuitive and maybe controversial, it would make sense 
to incorporate this specific lesson of victimology in SDO.  
3.3. Reflections on the enforcement of anti-bias legislation 
The fact that a sense of victimization may play an important role in the etiology of hate crime 
has implications for strategies designed to combat prejudice and bias motivated behaviors. It 
certainly is not my intention to have an in-depth debate on legal theory here, but I do want to 
point out some fundamental dynamics with regard to anti-discriminatory and anti-hate crime 
legislation that are implied by the theory developed in this study, be it in a more modest way 
than any legal scholar could.  
In the logic described above, the key is in principle an experience of something that “is bad” or 
“unjust” by a group, in short: a sense of victimization. To draw this line of reasoning through 
to everyday behaviors, the work of the legal scholar Van Schilfgaarde (2008) can be mentioned. 
In a – highly enlightening – attempt to reveal what “justice” is, he discerns between two types 
of justice: law-linked justice and existence-linked justice. Law-linked justice is the kind of 
justice relating to formalized norms or what is generally called “the law”. In principle, it is 
about the correct application of the law (this way, this type of justice is not only related to law, 
but governed by it). The more important notion for the purpose of this discussion is existence 
linked justice. This notion refers to people’s ability to form judgments on their own, apart from 
the law. They inevitably always make judgments in their everyday lives, based on their own 
experiences and interactions with other citizens or institutions. This notion is very consistent 
with the evolutionary framework discussed in this study, as norms and their transgressions 
                                                 
100 Whether or not this injustice can actually be qualified as an injustice from the point of view of, for example, 
equality, does not matter. When talking about behavior, the main motivation is what the perpetrator 
individually and subjectively believes to be the case. So if he is subjectively convinced that there are righteous 
hierarchical positions in society which are threatened by outgroups – or are already taken in by them – then 
this can easily qualify as an injustice in his or her personal perception.  
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basically formed the backbone of the evolution of sociality. Van Schilfgaarde states that it is 
not as much experiences of justice that people react to, but experiences of injustice: 
My thesis is that this justice, which is not a legal norm, is not a social norm either, but a personal 
experience in which irrational and existential element always plays a role. It finds its origin in human 
reason as much as law-linked justice, but in its ultimate form it is often […] beyond human reason. 
If it is a norm as well, it is not a legal or social norm, but a highly personal one and as such it can be 
quite “absolute”. “Absolute” not in the sense that it is valid for everybody, but in the sense that it is 
hard to shake the personal belief in this norm (Van Schilfgaarde, 2008, p. 132). 
The two notions cannot be seen apart from each other: existence linked justice precedes law-
linked justice in the sense that one cannot have institutionalized norms without having social 
norms first.101 As such, this notion can be linked to the above discussion on victimology, more 
precisely the insight that many criminal acts are inspired by a subjective perception of 
victimization. Van Schilfgaarde points in this direction too: 
The moment is there when a citizen finds it hard to accept the judgment [of a formal court]. For him 
there is no or little legal “discours” to level out his unhappiness. Just as the judges and lawmakers 
involved he will be – or ought to be – looking for justice. But – and this is the big difference – his 
search for justice will not follow the path of law but of his own personal rationality. (Ibid., p. 133) 
The implication of this view, which is consistent with both the evolutionary framework and 
Fattah’s assertion regarding of victimization, is that criminal law’s ability to fulfill its functions 
would be severely undermined in cases of bias motivated behaviors, taking into account 
perceived victimization or injustice as a motivating factor. Let us now look into this in more 
detail by deriving some implications. First, the inability of law to provide for deterrence and 
rehabilitation will be discussed as these are the predominant ways in which Western societies 
tend to deal with crime (e.g Taylor, 2009). Second, this argument will be nuanced by making a 
case for the non-abolition of anti-hate legislation, which will rest largely on the symbolic 
function of law. Finally, an alternative means of dealing with hate crime, restorative justice, 
will be advocated on the basis of the discussion to be held.  
As indicated earlier, a widely assumed modality to achieve the social regulation and conflict 
resolution functions of criminal law, is to operationalize them in terms of deterrence and 
retribution respectively. From both the behavioral and legal analyses discussed above, this 
                                                 
101 Interestingly, this notion can be easily linked with the extensive scholarship on collective memory and the 
rule of law available in transitional justice scholarship. In this sense, the current study can also be linked to 
this broad domain (which will be done elsewhere).  
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seems dubious however. With regard to deterrence, an important element of Van Schilfgaarde’s 
(2008) analysis is that existence-linked justice precedes law-linked justice. Thus, from a logical 
point of view, deterrence can only work if the legal rule under consideration is in line with the 
personal judgments of the potential offender. But, as discussed in the victimological approach 
to bias motivated behaviors, there is, in all of the main explanations of the phenomenon, an 
underlying sense of victimization or fear thereof which takes up a central part in the process 
leading up to bias motivated behaviors. Insofar as this can be equated with an existential sense 
of injustice, I reckon it is less likely that this person will regard the law as it pertains to bias 
motivated aggression as legitimate, thus lessening the chances he or she will abide by the legal 
rule. Hence, the effects of deterrence in regard bias motivated behaviors can at most be relative, 
as a function of the degree to which one experiences an injustice. To state it: the greater the 
sense of victimization (and consequently injustice), the lesser the cost of the punishment will 
weigh up against the relative benefits of “justice be done”.102  
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that signaling was an important element of the theory 
outlined in this study. Signaling refers to the phenomenon where someone bears a cost in order 
to improve his or her status in the group. For the purpose of this study, signaling of one’s 
sociality or commitment to the in-group was the focal point. This might complicate things 
further, in the sense that a punitive response might bring along some unintended consequences, 
opposite to the intention of that reaction. As discussed earlier, an in-group is defined as such by 
an individual, and should not be equated with the idea of “mainstream society”. Indeed, often 
people interact with likeminded people (e.g. Page et al., 2005), as discussed earlier in the 
sections on horizontal transmission and sociality. If a shared conception of injustice emanating 
from a specific out-group exists within a certain in-group, acting upon this in the form of 
investing energy and resources to punish norm-transgressors would count as a form of signaling 
which heightens one’s status in the in-group. It is, however, an essential element of signaling 
that the strength and quality of the signal is a function of the cost of that signal. In this sense, a 
punitive response might actually heighten the cost of the signal, thus making it a stronger signal. 
In the logic of costly signaling, this might actually lead to an increase of status rather than a 
decrease, in the eyes of the in-group as defined by the person sending the signal (see Heylen & 
Pauwels, 2015).  
                                                 
102 Which is basically a rational choice (e.g. Clarke & Felson, 2004) approach.  
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But does this logic hold for both types of pro-social people? This certainly is not a clearly 
demarcated issue, given the flexibility and versatility of people. For, all people have deceptive 
and genuine pro-social tendencies, to differing degrees, depending on the specific 
circumstances one finds him- or herself in. Even if abstraction is made from this, and only full 
cheaters and fully genuinely pro-social people are considered, the case is not clear. So, 
inevitably, what follows is mere speculation and  to further, preferably qualitative, research.  
With regard to genuinely prosocial people, I conjecture that it really depends on the type of the 
threat, the intensity of the threat, the group one finds him- or herself in, the subjective value of 
that group and the time spent in that group. On the one extreme, if someone perceives a threat 
to the core values of the group, which is imminent and grave, and if that person spends a lot of 
time in the group whose values are threatened and shares those values personally, then it is very 
likely that prejudice and, if the opportunity presents itself, bias motivated behaviors will occur. 
On the other hand, if there only is a slight threat to a quite arbitrary custom of the in-group, that 
emanates from a distant out-group, and if the person does not spend a lot of time in the group 
whose custom is threatened and if, in addition, this particular custom or value is not very 
important to that person, it is highly unlikely prejudice and bias motivated behaviors will occur.  
Whilst the above reasoning is quite straightforward, it must be borne in mind that in reality 
someone does not belong to just one in-group. People define themselves along a wide variety 
of dimensions103, and the total “amount” – for want of a better term – of threat or competition 
emanating from out-groups one is confronted with across domains and over time, will 
presumably also matter. This way, estimation of the likelihood that prejudice and/or bias 
motivated behaviors will instantiate should take into account the total exposure to threats 
outside of the specific case under investigation, as a weighting factor. This way, if a person is 
exposed to a relatively low threat to a value that is relatively unimportant to him or her, but at 
the same time has a high overall exposure to threats in other domains, will most likely be more 
prone to resort to prejudice and/or bias motivated behaviors. The effect of the weighting factor 
is not at all irrelevant. For people that are genuinely pro-social will tend to uphold norms from 
their environment. So, someone who is generally exposed to tolerance norms and nonviolence 
norms, will have a greater resistance to prejudice and bias motivated aggression, consistent with 
                                                 
103 For example, one can be a father, a soccer player, a university professor, an actor, and so on at the same 
time. Along these lines other values and customs are supposedly upheld to differing degrees.  
194 
 
the findings of the empirical study (especially the Spanish study where a negative path was 
found between RWA and bias motivated aggression)104. 
Let us now take a look at people prone to deceptively signal their commitment to the in-group. 
There is a big conceptual difference between this type of person and the genuinely pro-social 
people, insofar as they are much more self-interested, and are less concerned with the rest of 
the in-group. They will tend to signal their commitment to the in-group only to avoid being 
unmasked as a cheater, and consequently face punishment, or to increase their own power and 
status in the in-group as they define it subjectively. Again, whether or not deterrence and 
retribution will work depends on a few factors. A first dynamic one would expect here, is that 
people inclined to deceptively signal their commitment to the in-group will try to avoid personal 
injury, and that deterrence as a consequence might work for them. However, a lot will depend 
on the particular in-group (as defined by them) again. If there is quite a widespread consensus 
on the inferiority of certain out-groups, it might actually enhance their status to act upon this. 
It is very well possible that, in case of deceptors, a rational choice model (e.g. Clarke & Felson, 
2004) is more suited compared to the more emotional model one finds in case of genuine 
sociality and RWA. If the status benefit outweighs the cost of the sanction, than it is unlikely 
they will be effectively deterred.  
Even though the above is a matter of speculation and ought to be subject to further (qualitative) 
research, a few core elements which play a vital role can be pointed out nonetheless. First, again 
two different logics are present. What they do share, however, are the two core elements in the 
reasoning. The first element is the in-group. As stated, people have differing degrees of 
membership in different groups, and it is about how the person in question defines this group, 
not what outsiders might consider to be this person’s in-group. Second, it is always about 
subjective perceptions of threat or competition, whatever the objective situation may be like. 
As these are not static entities but completely dependent on the context and not stable over time, 
it seems a very personalized way of dealing with prejudice and bias motivated behaviors is to 
be preferred over generic, large scale initiatives. In the section on policy recommendations, one 
of such approaches, i.c. restoratively inspired approaches, will be discussed. Before doing so, 
however, I deem it necessary to explicitly state the necessity of legislation aimed at reducing 
                                                 
104 In this sense, the study is compatible with situational action theory (e.g. Wikström & Treiber, 2009) and 
rational choice theory (e.g. Clarke & Felson, 2004). 
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prejudice and bias motivated aggression, for the above reasoning can in no way be interpreted 
as entailing any such thing.  
For the sake of clarity, a note on the non-abolition of anti-hate crime legislation is in order. One 
could easily see (as has happened in the past) some elements in support of penal abolition in 
the above argumentation. I do not want to go that far however, for several reasons. One of the 
reasons is that in some cases deterrence and retribution will work, as they are a function of the 
degree of perceived victimization in the eyes of the offender. But, more importantly, one ought 
not to forget the symbolic function of law (see, inter alia, Claes, Devroe & Keirsbilck, 2006). 
As has been extensively and convincingly argued by Pinker (2011), hate crimes have not 
increased over time, but we have witnessed a steep decline in hate motivated violence over 
time.105,106 That is, even though the problem persists in both non-Western and Western 
countries, a kind of public awareness – a collective memory (e.g. Czarnota 2001) – seems to 
have emerged, enshrined in various formal, national as well as international, rules and laws that 
counteract the commission of hate crimes. Thus, criminal law has come to symbolize this moral 
stance. Furthermore, even though everyone is presumably prejudiced (as the vast psychological 
literature since Allport tells us), by far not everyone commits, or is even prone to bias motivated 
behaviors. People, under normal circumstances do follow the rules, be it in a deceptive or 
genuine way, and those rules often need to be made explicit by the stroke of a pen so to speak. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this offers no guarantees to the future, it does highlight the 
importance of the symbolic function of law in society.  
4.  Policy implications 
The policy implications that result from the current study and discussion, can be divided in two 
main clusters: alternative sanctions on the one hand, and prevention on the other. I will limit 
the discussion to the elements below, as they form with a framework which can be used to 
                                                 
105 The very fact that the term “hate crimes” has only emerged in the 80’s, presumably in the wake of the 
rights revolutions triggered by events such as the second World War, is an indication of this. In other words: 
the explicit and formal criminalization of hate crime – thus the inclusion of the subjective element of intent 
to specific already existing crimes – indicates a shift in public and political awareness to these issues.  
106 This does not preclude the possibility of variations in the levels of hate motivated violence; the trends 
Pinker talks about are general trends over a larger span of time (e.g. the last century). Of course, locally 
certain spikes are possible in the trend. Neither does this mean that attention should shift away from hate 
crime legislation. It does not preclude the fact that hate crime and prejudice in general might present 
themselves in different, more subtle forms these days, compared to the overt racism in the past – the so called 
“modern” or “symbolic” racism (see, inter alia, Sears & Henry, 2003; Tarman & Sears, 2005), even though 
this may be a consequence of the criminalization of hate crime and the underlying societal shift in attention 
rather than a distinct form of racism.   
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assess a wide variety of existing preventive initiatives. Furthermore, they are, at least in my 
opinion, by far the most important implications that are revealed by the current study.   
4.1. A plea for conferencing 
As appeared from the above, retribution may not be the most appropriate response to violations 
of anti-discriminatory law, mainly because of the aspect of costly signaling involved therein. 
This is especially the case for genuine signaling of sociality, where other measures apart from 
deterrence can be considered. One such approach would be to find inspiration in the broad field 
of restorative justice as a mode of alternative sanctioning. Even though not a lot of scholarship 
exists on the application of these procedures to bias motivated behaviors and prejudice, the 
current research suggests that it may be a fruitful avenue to consider when confronted with such 
crimes (see also Walters & Hoyle, 2012; 2014). 
The main reason is that the dynamic described in this study are largely based on perceptions, 
which in part are conveyed through various transmission mechanisms. The idea, then, would 
be to change the perception of the out-group to a less hostile one, using those very same 
mechanisms. In this context, a variety of mechanisms could be considered, which all share one 
thing: involvement of the broader societal groups involved, and a confrontation aimed at 
understanding both of the parties involved.  
Involvement of all groups is an obviously very important element (see, inter alia, Sullivan & 
Tifft, 2006; Johnstone & Van Ness, 2007). As research continues to show the importance of 
positive contact (see, inter alia, Hodson & Hewstone, 2013; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) in 
reducing prejudice and by consequence bias motivated behaviors, it is but logical that such a 
contact be part of the process dealing with the aftermath of bias motivated aggression. This 
way, involvement of all groups refers not only to the group of the victim (in the juridical sense) 
but also the group of the offender. With regard to the latter, inclusion of his or her peers – that 
may share his or her attitudes or convictions – might seem dangerous at first glance. However, 
if one also includes members of the imagined “in-group”, which usually is quite large and 
ideologically diverse in its own right, this might have a considerable destabilizing effect on the 
offender and his peers. It may show them that there is no real in-group to be defended, no 
wrongs to be righted, or that support of his/her/their actions is far less than they would have 
imagined. This way, the use of bias motivated aggression as a means of signaling may be 
seriously undermined and, in an ideal case, even be eliminated altogether.  
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Inclusion of the victim and the community basically serves the same purpose in this context. 
There, too, the aim is to debunk the signaling mechanism. For, if it can be convincingly shown 
to the perpetrator that there is no real threat going out from this group, there really is not 
anything to base a signal on according to the evolutionary theory set out in this study. For, in 
the case of RWA (which is the mediator for quality signaling), a perception of threat is a central 
element. A courtroom process, which usually strictly deals with guilt and proof of one particular 
act (thus, a snapshot in time), will not be able to show how other social groups are not a threat 
in some symbolic or realistic way. An alternative process, as there exist in the wide array of 
restoratively inspired modes of conflict resolution (e.g. Johnstone & Van Ness, 2007), may be 
of help here. It must, however, be borne in mind that attitudes towards out-groups usually work 
by generalizing certain traits towards all the members that share a common marker such as skin 
color (e.g. Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). A process in which a variety of members of this 
community take part, can show the offender that this community is not a solid block of similar 
individuals, but actually shares the same diversity as does his own perceived in-group. And 
again, it is exactly by diminishing the threatening character of the perceived out-group, that the 
value of signaling is lowered.  
So, both of these processes may work hand in hand in one single superordinate project. If a 
dynamic can be achieved between the two social groups involved, i.e. a non-hostile 
collaborative dynamic, the process may be significantly reinforced. As social psychology 
already has investigated thoroughly, a good way to deal with intergroup conflict, is to provide 
superordinate goals, in which two formerly hostile groups have to collaborate to achieve a 
higher goal that benefits them both (e.g. Jetten et al., 2004; Sherif, 1988). If this is the case, 
being in a situation where one sees two social groups perceived to be at conflict with each other 
collaborating in one and the same process, this might shed another light on the perceived 
threatening character of the out-group.  
In line with the above discussion on victimology, it can be added that a perception of 
victimization (real or perceived, passed or expected), is most likely present on both sides of the 
conflict. As most restoratively inspired processes are aimed, in first instance, at understanding 
(e.g. Sullivan & Tifft, 2006), they seem to be of use in this particular, ideology and morally 
laden type of conflict. Even though things like understanding and the like cannot be predicted 
with any certainty, it could possibly result in a more natural resolution of the conflict, which 
traditional court proceedings are far less likely to obtain. There, victims are usually left behind 
not understanding why they have been victimized, whilst the attitude of the offender goes 
198 
 
unchanged, even maybe bolstered by the strong and costly signal an official punishment equips 
him with. For such punishments will not go unnoticed by the offender’s peers. If anything, the 
theory developed in this study suggests that his or her status will increase in such a scenario  
because of the costly signal.  
To summarize: whilst traditional court proceedings may well result in an adverse effect for both 
parties, restoratively inspired processes may at the very least provide an opportunity to end the 
conflict in a more fundamental way by addressing the very mechanisms that give rise to these 
behaviors in the first place. With regard to the core thesis of this study, one thing they will for 
sure do, is take away the opportunity to create a costly signal on the basis of bias motivated 
behaviors.  
What about people inclined to deceptively signal their commitment to the in-group, then? 
Whilst the dynamics described above may prove successful in the case of genuinely social 
people (in principle by changing the initial conditions that model their social behavior), this is 
less likely to be the case for deceptive signalers, who are more self-oriented: they are expected 
to attach far less importance to what others think of them if it does not serve their own purposes. 
However, one very important element remains true, disregarding the type of signaling: the fact 
that a restoratively inspired process as described above takes away the opportunity to signal 
one’s commitment to the in-group through bias motivated behaviors. In this sense, it is unlikely 
that someone self-interested would carry the burden of bias motivated aggression, if it does not 
result in any apparent advantage for him or her. This would mean he or she only bears costs, 
which is in contradiction to the principle of self-interest. Of course, such a process takes places 
post factum, so it will not result in an effective prevention of this type of behavior. On the other 
hand, it may result in desistance. This is important insofar as bias motivated aggression usually 
is not a single incident, but a process which may eventually escalate into serious aggression. 
Early detection and early intervention may therefore halt this process.  
Also, in the case of deceptive signalers, it may be worthwhile to consider the following option. 
Signals do not only come in a positive variant, but equally so in a negative variant. A possible 
strategy may then be to turn the signal that is once hoped for to be positive (towards the 
perceived in-group of the offender), into a negative one. This way, no reputation can be built, 
and the experience that this type of behavior may result in a negative rather than a positive 
reputation, may result in desistance on behalf of the offender. One possible way to do so is a 
process proposed by Braithwaithe (1989): reintegrative shaming. This is a type of shaming in 
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which a community or social group explicates its disapproval of certain modes of behavior (and 
not the offender as a person), without being disintegrative (stigmatizing). In order to achieve 
this, as Tyler (2006) suggests, the procedure through which this is achieved must be guarded at 
all times. Only a sense of procedural justice in combination with reintegrative shaming can 
achieve the desired effect of lowering recidivism rates.  
In addition, a restoratively inspired process may address a key element in the mechanism 
leading to bias motivated behavior as discussed in this study: prejudice. Prejudice was 
conceived of as the targeting mechanism and the prime predictor of bias motivated behaviors. 
It is the result of an out-group being cast out of Singer’s expanding circle (1981), thus justifying 
aggression towards that out-group. This “casting out of the expanding circle” really refers to an 
aspect of de-humanizing (e.g. Haslam, 2006). Whilst people generally tend to be kind towards 
fellow humans, in the conditions of conflict and/or competition, this may easily become limited 
to what is perceived to be the in-group. A restoratively inspired process such as a conference 
may allow for the perpetrator to understand that the “dehumanized other”, in reality is an 
equally valuable part of society, with the same social embeddedness, needs, reactions, fears, 
and ambitions as any of us. Especially the acceptance and (empathic) concern of members of 
the offender’s perceived in-group towards this person, may bolster this phenomenon. This way, 
one of the necessary conditions to speak of bias motivated aggression may be efficiently 
tackled.  
The question that imposes itself then, is where to draw the line between shaming and the 
constructive processes. In reality, it will always have to come down to a mixture of both, I think. 
Even though the two paths to prejudice and bias motivated aggression have been considered 
separately above, research indicates that they may well be intertwined to a large extent. This is 
certainly the case for the two attitudinal dimensions SDO and RWA, but presumably equally 
so for the two signaling measures. In this context, the process needs to find a balance between 
shaming and the constructive processes, on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, it also seems a 
necessary step to make sure the process is monitored and coordinated by a team of professionals 
on the matter, in close and constant dialogue with the different parties involved.  
4.2.  Critical remark to the plea for conferencing 
A critical remark may be in order here, in order not to paint to nice a picture of the way prejudice 
and bias motivated aggression are to be dealt with. The process described in the previous section 
only focuses on the individual level processes that may play an important role in the etiology 
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of prejudice and bias motivated behaviors. However, evolution is about the person in the 
environment. Consequently, any successful strategy needs to address the environment as well. 
In this sense, critical criminology has unveiled certain structures that may also contribute to the 
etiology of prejudice and bias motivated aggression, which have not been discussed in this 
study. One such theory is critical race theory (see Crenshaw, 2011 for an overview). This theory 
focuses on the structurally embedded character of race relations and oppression in society, and 
often reacts against the psychometric – or empirical in general – approaches outlined above. In 
this sense, it has an explicit normative focus, as questions pertaining to race are rooted in 
ideology, with a view to change social reality (e.g. Lipsitz, 2011). It has its historical roots in 
legal scholarship, but is finding its way into a wide array of other disciplines, including 
psychology (see Adams & Salter, 2011 for an overview). CRT tends to be self-reflexive and 
challenges mainstream conceptions of race, more precisely the methodologies, individualistic 
approaches, and atomistic conceptions of race applied in a variety of social scientific research. 
That is, racism (and presumably generalized prejudice) is not considered to be an individual 
bias, but a sociocultural problem reproduced in the everyday experiences of people and both 
professional and academic praxis.  
Another such theory, which attaches great importance to the notion of reproduction of a culture 
of hate, is Perry’s theory of “doing difference”. Perry (2001, 2002) theorizes that modern state 
hierarchies are based on dominance over difference. A range of hierarchies based on differences 
with respect to race, gender, sexual orientation and others characterizes modern society. 
Another key concept in the theory is “belonging”: individuals will consider them to be part of 
a groups that share similar characteristics with respect to the various dimensions social 
stratification is based on. These groups are referred to as in-groups. In the formation of in-
groups, it ought to be noted that a process of antagonism plays an important role as well: 
belonging in this sense entails a clear depiction of what one is not: the out-group. Further, 
according to Perry the creation of the in-group is hegemonic: those who are not like the in-
group are feared and thus resisted. In principle, thus a binary classification system along certain 
dimensions such as sexuality and race is created in which the antagonistic out-groups are 
excluded given the threat they pose to the in-groups’ identity. This is in essence what Perry 
means by “doing difference”: difference is actively sustained in a process of antagonistic and 
hegemonic identity construction, through labor, power, sexuality and cultural relations. Thus, 
hate is reproduced throughout society, structurally, culturally, as well as institutionally. 
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Whilst these theories and approaches fall outside of the scope of this study, which is essentially 
focuses on individual-level mechanisms, it must be pointed out that the general context that 
these and like theories describe will in large part determine the success of the processes and 
practices discussed in the previous section (i.e. conferencing and shaming). The more a culture 
of hate exists, the less efficient these strategies may be. The message to take away from this 
section is, not surprisingly, that an efficient strategy to deal with prejudice cannot be based on 
the individual alone. In the next section, I will briefly consider a rather holistic preventive 
approach to crime in general, and apply it to the subject matter of this study.  
4.3. The fundamental importance of social crime prevention 
The second general recommendation regarding policy is to stress the importance of crime 
prevention programs. This type of program is all the more important taking into account the 
difficulties that have been discussed regarding classical approaches to bias motivated 
aggression. Furthermore, so-called “micro-aggressions” (Constantine, 2007) can be mentioned 
here as well; these are the type of bias motivated behaviors that are not necessarily covered by 
any form of criminal law, but can nevertheless have a devastating impact on people’s lives, 
given the fact that any form of bias motivated behavior is targeted at the very essence of what 
one is. In this same vein, a chain of tiny events that may seem not so important to the outside 
world, can easily result in the same devastating effects as does one more serious incident. In a 
criminal justice system that usually deals with a snapshot, these types of matters are 
increasingly difficult to deal with, especially if the “perpetrator”107 is not clear, or if more than 
one perpetrators are involved (e.g. Walters & Hoyle, 2012). Finally, it ought to be remembered 
that the binary classification of “offender” and “victim” may not hold in many real-life cases 
of bias motivated behaviors, but that both parties violate one another in a spiral of events. For 
all of these reasons, it is obviously better to prevent than to cure, as the cure might be more 
complicated than what our justice systems are equipped with.  
When preventing crime, a plethora of different strategies may be followed. Even though social 
crime prevention may seem the best way to go about the prevention of prejudice and bias 
motivated behaviors, given the largely social nature of the process and the heavy thumb it places 
on subjective perceptions and transmission mechanisms, this alone hardly ever suffices as these 
strategies tend to be overly broad (Tilley, 2009). Instead, a holistic approach to the prevention 
                                                 
107 I intentionally put the word perpetrator between brackets as micro aggressions are not usually criminalized 




of bias motivated behaviors is in order. An expert in this particular domain is Tore Bjørgo, who 
identifies nine preventative mechanisms, which all interact with each other. Below, all of these 
preventative mechanisms will be discussed (Bjørgo, 2013). For the main mechanisms (from the 
point of view of the theory developed in this study), the following elements will be discussed: 
the group(s) targeted by the mechanism, the actors involved, the part of the model described in 
this study it acts upon, the strengths and benefits of the mechanism, and the limitations. For 
certain other mechanisms, such as the disruption of bias motivated acts, the discussion will be 
limited, as this type of mechanism does not relate to the theory developed in the current study. 
Given the rather complex nature of prejudice and bias motivated behaviors, some of these 
mechanisms will seem to be in contradiction with each other when applied to the theory 
developed in this study, a fact that is mostly due to the group or individual targeted by the 
mechanism. In any case, devising a concrete and holistic prevention strategy aimed at 
successfully reducing bias motivated behaviors and prejudice will prove to be all but a simple 
task.  
4.3.1. Creating normative barriers against and preventing the emergence of bias 
motivated behaviors 
The first mechanism concerns the creation of normative barriers which will help people refrain 
from performing certain acts. In this section I will also deal with Bjørgo’s second mechanism, 
i.c. the prevention of the emergence of prejudice and bias motivated behaviors, as the two are 
intrinsically linked theoretically. It has become a widely accepted notion in contemporary 
criminology that crime in principle is a form of “moral rule breaking”  (Wikström & Sampson, 
2006; Wikstrom & Svensson, 2010; Wikstrom & Treiber, 2009). In the current study, it also 
appeared that norms and their maintenance were fundamental elements in the evolution of 
human group living, which, in turn, entails prejudice if this sociality becomes limited to the in-
group in the face of threat or competition ascribed to certain out-groups.  
Mechanism and measures. In light of the current study, aggression directed towards out-group 
members can be considered to be sanctioned when the in-group is at risk, either in the form of 
threat (especially for genuinely pro-social people) or competition (especially for deceptively 
pro-social people). Through this process, the general norm of non-violence may become limited 
to the in-group, whilst the out-group in question may face either exploitative or defensive 
violence. So regarding prevention, the key is to avoid the out-group being excluded from this 
non-violence norm, which can only be done if there is no perception of threat or conflict that 
can be ascribed to this out-group. Thus, the question is not so much creating a new norm, but 
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rather extending the field of application of an existing norm (when prejudice and bias motivated 
behaviors are already present), or preventing its limitation to a certain group of people (when it 
is not)108. Measures to achieve this are targeted at eliminating the separation of a specific group 
from the notion “in-group”, and should have a broad scope. In principle, this comes down to a 
visible inclusion of out-group members in everyday life activities, such as political life, tv-
shows, presenters, community initiatives, and so on, so the out-group is not perceived as a threat 
to values or resources, or as a competitive group in the hierarchy of society.  
Target group. The target group of this preventative mechanism should be both broad and 
specific. Society at large may obviously benefit from this type of measure, as it may provide 
for more resilience towards pressures that might otherwise lead them towards prejudice or bias 
motivated behaviors. However, it can also be targeted at risk groups (which are more prone to 
prejudice and bias motivated behaviors, e.g. because of a more intensive exposure thereto) or 
problematic groups (which are already prejudiced and/or involved in bias motivated behaviors). 
Building normative barriers for problematic groups will prove to be more difficult, but 
restoratively inspired processes such as the conferencing approach described above may prove 
to be helpful in this context. For at risk groups, a more targeted approach may be desirable, for 
example in the form of bringing them in close contact and cooperation with potential (at risk) 
out-group members in order to achieve a superordinate goal. The latter has been proven to be 
successful in social psychological studies (e.g. Sherif, 1988), and may be as simple as putting 
different people together in a football team, as suggested by the research of Kurzban and 
colleagues (Kurzban, Tooby & Cosmides, 2001).  
A final group which should not be forgotten are the victims, for two reasons. The first reason 
is quite obvious: because of the harm suffered. The second reason is less obvious, and relates 
to the above discussion on the (relative) interchangeability of the labels “victim” and 
“offender”. For, if victims are left without, there is a risk they will become equally biased 
towards the perpetrator’s group (e.g. Walters & Hoyle, 2012) This might at first seem a strange 
reasoning, but remember that one of the main sources of prejudice is threat, accompanied by a 
sense of (existence linked) injustice. Therefore, victims – so perceived by the person in question 
                                                 
108 In this context it is also possible that well-intended campaigns combating prejudice and/or bias motivated 
aggression may have the unintended consequence of actually separating an out-group from an in-group, or at 
least draw attention to what differentiates the out-group from the in-group.  
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–  should be attended to on both sides of the conflict at hand, again consistent with restorative 
justice theory as discussed above.  
Actors involved. The actors involved are a broad group of people, in part depending on the 
target groups. In case of the general population, the actors involved are, inter alia, politicians, 
NGO’s, media, community initiatives, religious leaders, producers of music/television/film, all 
the way down to the man in the street (e.g. family members, peers, “random” people). When 
talking about more specialized groups (risk and problematic groups), the level of specialization 
of actors involved should increase as well. There, one would need assistance of social workers, 
psychologists, prison staff, etc. It must be borne in mind, however, that inclusion of community 
members is always a good idea – as the core animating principle in the model generated in this 
study finds its origins in human sociality – be it that the process itself be guided by 
professionals.  
Strengths and weaknesses. An obvious strength of this approach is that it is targeted at the core 
animating principle (or “social regularity” or “social law” if you want) in the model developed 
in this study. As indicated earlier, the aim is not to install new norms or eliminate certain norms 
in people’s minds – which is difficult – but rather to change the field of application of a norm. 
That is, alter the perception of the person involved, that is, changing the initial conditions by 
which this norm of pro-sociality instantiates, which will automatically bring about a change in 
the social phenomenon at hand. Furthermore, the field of application of this strategy is broad, 
ranging from entire populations (primary), to risk groups (secondary), problem groups 
(tertiary), and even victims. With regard to the latter two groups, installing moral barriers ties 
in nicely with the restoratively inspired processes described earlier, which were also aimed at 
changing the offender’s perception of conflict/competition, not so much at installing an entirely 
new kind of morality.  
The weaknesses in this approach are rather straightforward. When altering the perception of 
someone, it all depends on the strength of the social bonds this individual has with certain 
groups, and how he or she defines his or her own identity in terms of membership in certain 
groups. If, for example, someone is highly socialized in an extremist group, this strategy is not 
likely to yield a positive outcome, if no additional measures are taken (i.c. removal from that 
group and resocialization for an extended period of time). To put it short, this strategy is most 
likely to yield the best results for groups of people that have no to weak social bonds with biased 
groups, which are at lower risk of committing bias motivated aggression in the first place. On 
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the bright side, it is preventative pur sang, as it might prevent people from developing such 
bonds over time. So, this strategy alone will be too general to really make difference, and more 
is needed.  
With regard to the two different types of pro-sociality described in this study, the mechanisms 
of creating normative barriers and preventing the emergence of prejudice and bias motivated 
aggression, should theoretically be relatively invariant. Whilst it is certainly true that genuinely 
pro-social people will be more efficiently dealt with in this way, deceptively pro-social people 
also have a stake in mimicking pro-sociality. For both, however, the key is to redefine their in-
group and to change their perception of threat or competition emanating from a certain out-
group.  
4.3.2. (Perceived) deterrence 
Mechanism. Even though at first sight it might seem strange to talk about deterrence when this 
has just been questioned severely given the unintended consequences it can result in, it may be 
an important element in picture holistic preventive strategy. The mechanism involved relates to 
the quintessential role punishment has played in the evolution of human sociality, and more 
precisely the bystander effect (and, by extension, transmission mechanisms). As discussed in 
the literature review, looking at people getting punished has a positive effect on bystanders in 
terms of norm obedience. That is, when people see rule-breakers getting punished, this incites 
them to follow the rules as well. For this reason, strong legislation and strong responses (not 
necessarily punitive ones!) to bias motivated behaviors are desirable in order to maintain 
compliance to non-discriminatory norms by the wider public. This has to be balanced, however, 
with the earlier discussion on possible adversary effects of a punitive response (where a 
restorative response might have the same impact while taking away the benefit of committing 
the act in terms of signaling).  
Actors involved. The actors involved in this process are primarily the police, and the criminal 
justice system. However, as the process leading to prejudice cannot be regarded as an all-or-
nothing game, some kind of social control would be desirable as well, in the sense that a 
“deterrent” or at least a disapproving response to early signs of prejudice has the best results. 
Criminal justice can only intervene when the person already is severely biased, and/or when 
certain morally reprehensible acts have been committed. Social control is something, however, 
that can only grow in a bottom-up fashion given that it is executed by the public at large, and is 
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therefore dependent on the first preventative mechanism, i.e. building normative barriers 
against prejudice and bias motivated aggression.¨ 
Strengths and weaknesses. The main strength of this mechanism is that it may reinforce the 
moral barriers to prejudice and bias motivated aggression of third parties, i.e. parties not 
involved or with low degrees of membership in prejudice/bias motivated aggression. In this 
sense, the mechanism is also firmly rooted in the theory tested in this study, as it relates directly 
to the bystander effect. The flipside is that it will be relatively inefficient towards people highly 
socialized in prejudiced groups which are prone to bias motivated behaviors. The bystander 
effect only works when the punishment is carried out by one or more members of one’s 
perceived in-group. Specifically for the case of prejudice and bias motivated behaviors, if 
someone finds him- or herself in such a group, punishment by an “outside group” is likely to 
have no to little deterrent effect, and may even have an adversary effect insofar as it may incite 
more bias motivated behaviors through the mechanism of costly signaling. So, as a form of 
primary prevention it may well work, but, as a stand-alone measure, not for secondary or tertiary 
prevention.  
4.3.3. Disruption of bias motivated acts 
This mechanism aims at preventing planned actions to take place, thus preventing victimization 
and third-party negative consequences of bias motivated behaviors through an in-terrorem 
effect. Even though this mechanism may prove to be especially useful in case of large-scale 
organized bias motivated groups, it may not be of primary importance in individual cases of 
bias motivated aggression – the focus of this study. For the process leading up to bias motivated 
behaviors is a gradual one, and it may be impossible for law-enforcement officials and 
investigators to uncover all the “hot spots” in society in this respect, especially if it concerns 
individuals which do not have explicit ties to more organized biased groups. 
4.3.4. Protecting vulnerable targets and reducing harmful consequences of bias 
motivated behaviors 
Protecting vulnerable targets can be considered to be of primary importance in cases of 
imminent bias motivated behaviors. Whilst this strategy, again, is more likely to yield results 
in cases of well-organized prejudiced groups, it may prove difficult to implement in isolated 
cases of bias motivated behaviors and prejudice. The reason is the same, i.c. that it is not always 
possible to foresee individual bias motivated behaviors. On the basis of this study, a good way 
to (indirectly) protect vulnerable targets is to change the perception of potential offenders 
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regarding the competitive or threatening character of specific out-groups, as this is a root cause 
of both prejudice and bias motivated behaviors. Such initiatives should have a broad as well as 
a specific scope, and should be initiated as soon as possible. One possible strategy to obtain this 
is to work through superordinate goals, as these have proven to eradicate prejudice against out-
groups, or to target the mechanism of coalitional computation by changing the marker one is 
associated with as was the case in the experiment by Kurzban and colleagues (2001).  
If bias motivated behaviors have taken place, it is of the utmost importance that the victims are 
attended to. In this sense, it is important that they feel accepted by the broader community, and 
that they also learn to see that not all members of the perpetrator’s in-group are likely to behave 
in a biased way. The benefits of this are twofold. First, it can provide for a barrier against the 
in-terrorem effect bias motivated behaviors often result in by depicting the act as an isolated 
event rather than a structural phenomenon. Second, it can stop a spiral of prejudice to occur. 
For, once bias motivated behaviors have occurred, the perpetrator’s group is likely to be 
perceived as threatening as well, which, in turn, may result in prejudice. In this sense, a 
restoratively inspired process may be of interest, as this type of intervention is explicitly aimed 
at the victim and its inclusion in the community (e.g. Walters, 2014; Walters & Hoyle, 2012). 
4.3.5. Reducing rewards  
Even though the potential rewards of bias motivated behaviors have been theorized on at some 
length above, it is worth mentioning them briefly again here. As discussed, insofar as bias 
motivated behaviors can be considered to be an instance of signaling one’s commitment to the 
in-group (or pro-sociality), the main reward is status or reputation from fellow in-group 
members, the in-group being defined subjectively by the perpetrator. This means a punitive 
response from society at large may not render the result hoped for as this is not necessarily the 
in-group as perceived by the offender. The same holds for deterrence. It may even well be so 
that a punitive response increases the cost of the signal the offender wishes to send to his fellow 
group-members, thus rendering it more powerful. This, in turn, leads to a higher status or 
reputation rather than a lower one. Caution is thus warranted when implementing this strategy.  
One alternative way is described restoratively inspired process as described above. An 
important element to take into account when trying to implement a strategy aimed at reducing 
the rewards for bias motivated behaviors is the in-group as perceived by the offender. People 
usually are not part of just one social group, but many. Further, people also often tend to 
simplify notions such as their “in-group” (pars pro toto), and may not be aware of the fact that 
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other members of that same group may well think entirely differently. This way, when 
organizing a restoratively inspired intervention, it is of the utmost importance to guarantee a 
fruitful composition of the audience present. These ought to include as many people as possible 
that are close to the offender, but condemn his acts. Then, and only then, will it result in a 
potential successful change of behavior through effective removal of rewards (in this case a 
positive reputation or higher status). Obviously, this cannot come in a prefabricated formula, 
but needs to be determined on a case-to-case basis.  
4.3.6. Incapacitation 
The idea of incapacitation is appealing in the case of crime prevention as it renders offenders 
incapable of doing further harm. Again, I think this is foremost applicable to well-organized 
and relatively small groups, but may be less efficient in non-organized cases of prejudice and 
bias motivated aggression. First, the idea stands in contradiction to the above mentioned 
rewards for bias motivated behaviors, for which alternatives can be sought such as a restorative 
approach. Apart from that, it seems again that an indirect form of incapacitation seems to be 
preferable over what might be called “hard” incapacitation. With this, I am pointing towards a 
more efficient “policing” of hate speech and potential sources of incitement, such as internet 
fora, social events, and especially political speech, as the latter  is often a source of 
legitimization of biased speech and acts.  
4.3.7. Disengagement 
Of course, disengagement is a primary aim of any prevention strategy. With regard to the 
current study, disengagement centers around the same two basic elements of the theory: a 
perception of danger and/or competition, and what is perceived to be the in-group. From the 
point of view of the theory discussed in this study, both can be considered to be necessary 
conditions for bias motivated aggression to occur. Alterations to these perceptions may, as a 
consequence, lead to an alteration in behaviors (different instantiation of pro-sociality). Again, 
a restoratively inspired process may provide for a good template to achieve the goal of 
disengagement. This type of process may be used as a stage on which the alleged “competitive” 
or “dangerous” out-group is presented as an allied group to the offender’s perceived in-group, 
preferably in the sense of contributing to a superordinate goal, as the latter strategy has already 




5.  A final thought: no “myth of pure evil” 
The above discussion has shed more light on important theoretical issues and possible avenues 
to combat prejudice and bias motivated aggression. Even though these can be considered to be 
valuable findings, perhaps the most important finding of this study has not yet been discussed 
in depth. What the evolutionary backdrop of prejudice and bias motivated behaviors clearly 
suggests, is the fact that everybody is susceptible to it, to differing degrees depending on their 
perception of the in-group and their perception of threat and/or competition. This absolutely 
does not imply that “racism is inborn” or anything of the like, leave alone that bias motivated 
behaviors can be excused on the basis that it is “only natural”. The only thing that is natural 
about it, is the fact that the mechanism that may lead up to prejudice is inborn. This mechanism, 
however, does not automatically lead to prejudice, for this is entirely dependent on the initial 
conditions which instantiate it.  
This is an important message. All too often, prejudice and bias motivated behaviors are seen as 
a distinct category of behaviors, as a “myth of pure evil” to use the expression of Baumeister’s 
(1997). Rather opposed to that idea stands the idea developed in this study, an idea that has 
become mainstream among criminologists and victimologists alike, i.c. that many “evils” are 
mainly reactions to specific situations, or perceptions thereof, rather than inspired by a purely 
malevolent intention on behalf of the perpetrator. Of course, this might sometimes seem rather 
strange when looking upon specific instances of bias motivated behaviors, which are often of a 
heinous and incomprehensible nature. Insofar as the theory developed in this study holds, these 
behaviors might be considered to be morally justified109 in the eyes of the perpetrator, rather 
than being considered to be a breach of a moral rule. This idea was derived from the evolution 
of human sociality, as well as current thinking in victimology as well as legal theory.  
However, that moral rule – essentially being based on reciprocity – has been essential in the 
evolution of human sociality. Therefore, it is a fundamental dynamic in contemporary society 
to which all of us, notwithstanding our moral beliefs, are susceptible. This implies that everyone 
of us is equally susceptible to prejudice and bias motivated behaviors, given that they are 
specific instances of an inborn sense of right and wrong, bound by certain initial conditions. 
                                                 
109 This will especially be the case for genuinely pro-social people (and, as a consequence, people high in 
RWA). As discussed at length in this study, deceptively pro-social people have a different motivation to 
present themselves as pro-social. Nonetheless, it may still be that they react upon what they perceive to be a 
moral imperative of the in-group they are part of, otherwise their (deceptive) behavior would not count as an 
instance of signaling pro-sociality to that in-group. 
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The message basically is a simple one: “the prejudiced” is not a different kind of person from 
any of us, all of us bear in ourselves the inherent capacity for prejudice and bias motivated 
behaviors. This was already suggested by Gordon Allport (1979), and has once again been 
corroborated in this study from a different theoretical point of view.  
While people often tend to think of themselves as “not prejudiced” and “good group members”, 
the risk on prejudice is still equally great. In the modular mind approach (Kurzban, 2010), 
different specialized modules co-exist at the same time. Within these modules, contradictory 
information can exist at the same time. From this, it can be derived that it is perfectly possible 
that people may seem very altruistic and caring in many situations, but may be prejudiced 
nonetheless in other situations. It really depends on the context and how certain out-groups are 
perceived. Further, it is not because people genuinely reject prejudice and bias motivated 
behaviors, that they de facto are not prejudiced in one way or the other. How many times does 
one not hear the phrase “I am not prejudiced, but….”, a typical instance where such 
contradiction comes to the surface. Oftentimes, however, it remains hidden, and may provide 
for a seed of further and more intensified prejudice in the future, if, and only if, the initial 
conditions are right.  
Taking stock of the entire discussion above, I think the most efficient way to deal with prejudice 
and bias motivated behaviors starts with each individual person.  An awareness of the innate 
dynamics that may give rise to prejudice and bias motivated behaviors, may enable (empower) 
people to take them into closer account. Evolved mechanisms often operate in an unconscious 
way, but this does not preclude the fact that people can be made aware of them, which may in 
turn affect their behavior. Dealing with prejudice and bias motivated behaviors should not be 
left to officials alone, it is a shared responsibility of all of us. The first place where prejudice 
should be eradicated or contained, is us ourselves. This may ripple through society (inter alia 
through horizontal transmission mechanisms), and provide for a much more solid barrier 




Chapter VIII. General Conclusion 
The idea that lies at the basis of this study is the observation that prejudice and bias motivated 
aggression remain widespread in our contemporary society, notwithstanding the great efforts 
that have been taken to combat or reduce it. Those efforts consist of policy measures as well as 
research investigating the phenomenon, primarily in social psychology. This indicates that the 
phenomenon prejudice might not be understood well enough yet; that certain lacunae exist in 
theorizing on the topic. As a consequence, the general and primary goal set out in this study 
was to further the study of prejudice and bias motivated aggression, by expanding the 
theoretical underpinnings of the phenomenon. This general goal was specified in terms of 
philosophy of science in the first chapter, where it was considered to be a conceptual problem, 
in the sense that current theorizing on prejudice and bias motivated aggression “fails to utilize 
concepts from other, more general theories to which it should be logically subordinate” 
(Laudan, 1977: 146). 
The latter claim, that current theorizing fails to utilize concepts of more general theories to 
which they should be logically subordinate, has its roots in the observation that (i) prejudice 
and bias motivated aggression occur in every society worldwide, to differing degrees, (ii) that 
prejudice and bias motivated aggression are of all times, and (iii) that current theorizing is 
spatiotemporally localized, which may explain the lack of rooting in a more general theory. The 
first two observations give a clear indication of the “more general” theory to which current 
theorizing should be logically subordinate: evolutionary theory. The rationale for this is that the 
phenomenon is so widely spread and so omnipresent throughout history, which makes it 
extremely unlikely to be a random mutation. Prejudice and bias motivated aggression can thus 
be considered to have been functionally adaptive in the evolution of mankind.  
In chapter two, the evolutionary backdrop of contemporary prejudice and bias motivated 
aggression was discussed. There, the main argument was that human sociality is, to a large 
extent, forged in conflict and competition. Two theoretical strands are of importance here. The 
first is parochial altruism (e.g. Choi & Bowles, 2007), according to which human sociality is 
in large part the result of intergroup conflict. In the human ancestral past, hunter-gatherers were 
obliged to move from place to place in order to secure the scarce resources available to them. 
This inevitably leads to encounters with other hunter gatherers, in search of the same scarce 
resources. In such a competitive environment, in-group cooperation is favored by selection, as 
it increases the chances on securing the scarce resources available. Thus, cooperation is 
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parochial in a context of conflict or competition, as people will cooperate with the in-group, but 
exclude out-group members. In a similar vein, Kurzban et al. (2001) argue that, in that very 
same hostile and competitive environment, a specific cognitive module evolved, which they 
call coaltional exploitation. This specific module is designed to identify the in-group, 
competing out-groups, and allied out-groups on the basis of arbitrary markers (markers that 
only have coalitional meaning). Both use the same background, the Late Pleistocene living 
conditions of humanity, as a starting point, and are complementary even though they evolved 
in quite different theoretical terms (whilst the former adopts a group-selection model, the latter 
does not).  
In the evolution of sociality, signaling is of great importance. As group living cannot be 
sustained unconditionally, penalizing mechanisms are necessary for it to thrive (e.g. Bowles & 
Gintis, 2011). These come down to punishment and/or exclusion of bad reciprocators. As 
people will only tend to interact with people that will reciprocate, directly or indirectly, the 
status of being a good reciprocator gains in importance. For this reason, people will signal their 
commitment to the in-group in various ways, for example by “taking one for the group”. The 
quality of such a signal, which contributes to reputation, is dependent on the cost that one bears 
for the group, without eventually benefitting from this “investment” him- or herself: the greater 
the cost, the stronger the signal. Quite similar to the peacock’s tail.  
However, not all signals are genuine signals of commitment to the in-group. As people evolved, 
detection of defectors or cheaters became more refined. Cheaters or defectors themselves, 
however, also evolved more refined cheating strategies, making it more difficult to detect them. 
Cheating without being detected has a great evolutionary advantage, as one can enjoy the 
benefits of group-living, without investing heavily in it. In principle, this is an instance of what 
Trivers (1971) called subtle cheating. As a consequence, two distinct types of signaling related 
to group-living emerged: genuine signaling of commitment to the in-group, and deceptive 
signaling of commitment to the in-group.  
Whilst both forms of signaling in principle are an intra-group affair, they can be easily 
transposed to the inter-group level through the mechanism of coalitional computation. For, if 
the in-group is threatened by or in competition with a certain out-group, this provides for 
signaling opportunities. In this sense, one can signal commitment to the in-group by standing 
up for the in-group in the face of danger or competition. Both forms of signaling apply. Those 
who have an inclination to genuinely signal their commitment to the in-group, will do so 
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because they feel it is the right thing to do; they like it. Throughout evolution, in-group 
cooperation has become a salient and enforceable norm, and people that genuinely care about 
this norm will be happy to apply it. On the other hand, those inclined to deceptively signal their 
commitment to the in-group, will also be provided with opportunities to enhance their status in 
the face of out-group threat or competition. Even though their motive is more selfish, they will 
tend to avoid being exposed as a cheater. By doing so, they enhance their reputation, which 
enables them to reap more benefits of in-group cooperation. This way, both forms of signaling 
can be linked back to the two forms of signaling that emerged from the evolution of human 
sociality.  
Even though this mechanism makes sense from an evolutionary point of view, it needs to be 
translated to contemporary society before it can be actually tested. In the third chapter, the main 
theories that are invoked to explain prejudice and bias motivated aggression in social 
psychology were reviewed. From the field of social psychology, the main player in explaining 
prejudice, Duckitt’s (e.g. 2001) dual process model which consists of right wing 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, and integrated threat theory (e.g. Stephan & 
Stephan, 2000). All of these approaches are highly compatible with the evolutionary 
explanation of prejudice and bias motivated aggression. For right wing authoritarianism and 
social dominance orientation, literature already indicated that they may have their roots in 
evolved psychological mechanisms. The theoretical framework in this study has clearly 
elaborated and exposed these evolutionary roots in detail.   
As was argued in the fourth chapter, the dual process model was selected for the empirical test 
of the study, for a variety of reasons. The main reasons were that this theory is the most widely 
used in the study of prejudice, and that it makes explicit reference to evolutionary theory. With 
regard to the latter, the main point of attachment is a theoretical piece by Cohrs and Kessler 
(2007), in which right wing authoritarianism is conceptualized as being a result of the evolution 
of human sociality. The current study can be regarded as the first empirical test of this 
conjecture. Further, the theoretical model to be tested was also deduced in this chapter. The 
main variables included in the model are deceptive signaling of sociality, genuine signaling of 
sociality, social dominance orientation, right wing authoritarianism, prejudice and bias 
motivated aggression. In this model, two main paths are present. One path leads from genuine 
signaling of sociality to right wing authoritarianism (as predicted by Cohrs and Kessler, 2007), 
then from right wing authoritarianism to prejudice, and from prejudice to bias motivated 
aggression. The second path runs from deceptive signaling of sociality to social dominance 
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orientation, from social dominance orientation to prejudice, and from prejudice to bias 
motivated behaviors. Both paths were predicted by the theory, and the empirical study supports 
them.  
To further challenge the model, group comparisons were conducted. For each study, a group 
comparison based on sex was conducted. This is an important test of the model, given that the 
cognitive mechanism that underlies prejudice and bias motivated behaviors have evolved 
because of a functionally adaptive reason – dealing with group conflict and competition – that 
is sex-invariant. In other words, it is not related to sex-specific roles such as parental investment 
and the like. Notwithstanding slight variations in effect sizes, presumably due to interference 
from other biologically determined factors such as violence, and cultural variation, the direction 
of the results should be the same for both contexts. The empirical studies supported this claim, 
providing corroborating evidence for the theory and the hypotheses derived from it.  
A second group comparison was conducted on the basis of the country where the study was 
conducted. Given the evolutionary nature of the mechanism studied, the theoretical model 
should be upheld in different national settings. The rationale behind this is that the module that 
gives rise to, inter alia, prejudice and bias motivated aggression is so fundamental in the 
evolution of human sociality, that it should be found everywhere. The group comparison 
corroborated this prediction, lending support to the theory developed in this study. 
Notwithstanding slight differences in effect sizes, all predicted paths were present in both 
countries.  
In the discussion of this study, some links were drawn with other research areas, and policy 
implications were presented. A first interesting field the study can be connected to is the field 
of victimology. Following Fattah (2008), the study suggests that prejudice and bias motivated 
behaviors are, to a large extent, inspired by a sense of perceived injustice or victimization at the 
hands of certain out-groups. This is especially the case for genuinely pro-social people, where 
a dangerous worldview plays an important role in the etiology of prejudice and bias motivated 
aggression. Following this, it was suggested that restorative approaches may be better suited 
to deal with prejudice and bias motivated aggression, as it may temper the root cause of 
prejudice, i.e. the perception of (i) danger associated with an out-group, and (ii) may present 
the out-group as allied rather than hostile.  
It has been argued, however, that restorative approaches such as conferencing can also be 
beneficial for those inclined to deceptively signal their commitment to the in-group. For these 
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people, their own status and power are the primary reasons to act pro-socially. A restorative 
process can actively remove this reward, and expose them as defectors to the community. 
Again, this strikes at the very heart of the study, where signaling played an important role.  
The central element of signaling further revealed that a strictly punitive response can possible 
result in an unintended consequence. Even though punitive enforcement of anti-discriminatory 
legislation in principle aims at reducing rates of bias motivated aggression or deterring potential 
offenders, the current study suggest an adversary effect can be the result thereof. For, the 
success of signaling correlates strongly with the cost of the signal. As punitive responses 
significantly increase the cost of a signal, such as an act of bias motivated aggression, it is 
dubious if this will really deter any “convinced” bigot. Notwithstanding the deterrent effect it 
may have on moderately prejudiced people, those already socialized in a prejudiced 
environment are deemed to be less susceptible to deterrence.  
In this regard, prevention is a far more advisable strategy in dealing with prejudice. Prevention 
was discussed along the lines set out by Tore Bjørgo (2013), who discusses nine preventive 
mechanism which interact and complement each other in order to achieve a successful, integral 
preventive strategy. Even though all of the nine preventive mechanisms can be applied to 
prejudice and bias motivated aggression, the one mechanism that strikes at the core of the 
current study is the mechanism of creating moral barriers against prejudice and bias motivated 
aggression. In the current study, norms have been theorized as being central to the evolution of 
human sociality. In our contemporary world, norms of equality and non-violence have become 
predominant, which appears from the lowering levels of violence throughout history, which is 
extensively illustrated by Pinker (2011). But, the mechanisms of parochial altruism and 
coalitional psychology may result in a limited application of these norms. That is, whenever 
danger or competition are perceived from an out-group, those norms may get neutralized 
through prejudice. For this reason, it is of the utmost importance to ensure that out-groups are 
not perceived as being either dangerous or competitive. This type of prevention relates to one 
of the core principles outlined in the study, and provides a platform on which many other 
preventive strategies can be built.  
Apart from these substantive aspects of the study, a secondary goal was to apply the work of 
Karl Popper as it was originally formulated in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002 [1959]) 
to the social sciences. Overall, I think it is clear that it can be applied, in the sense that it can 
serve as a guiding light through research. Throughout the entire study, from problem 
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formulation over theory, methodology, results and their interpretation, and the evaluation of the 
theory once tested, the work of Popper has proven to be useful. Personally, I was at first struck 
by the logical simplicity and rigor of Popper’s Logic of Scientific Discovery some years ago. I 
am also happy I have had the chance to apply it to the social sciences, and I hope this proves to 
the reader that philosophy of science can indeed be a great ally in the social sciences. It is 
especially in the social sciences, where concepts and measurement are often vague, personal 
interpretations and expectations trouble the researcher’s vision, and ideological considerations 
often provide for nuisance in the research trajectory, that a clearly delineated scientific-
philosophical framework can be of great use (Popper’s or any other for that matter).  
Further, given that the logic of Popper’s epistemology could in fact be applied to the social 
sciences also shows that the gap between the natural sciences and the social sciences is not as 
big as it is usually presumed to be. Even though it is true that the subject matter of the social 
sciences differs to some extent from the natural sciences, this need not imply that the same logic 
of scientific enquiry cannot be applied. This is more about an attitude and a way of working 
than the subject matter at hand. Surely, our measurements are often less precise than those in 
the natural sciences, and surely we cannot use certain research designs as do natural scientists 
in laboratory settings, but does this really imply that we cannot follow the same logic in the 
research process? I am absolutely convinced the same logic can be applied, and I hope the 
reader concurs on the basis of the exploratory application of Popper’s work to the social 
sciences in this study. In this context, it is my hope that the social sciences (and criminology in 
particular) will embrace similar principles to those in the natural sciences, in order to strengthen 
their overall research capacity.  
On a final note, and now I turn back to the substance of the study, I would like to end with some 
commonsensical advice. Looking back at the results of the study, prejudice and bias motivated 
aggression should not be regarded in the sense of a “myth of pure evil”. Rather than thinking 
of it as what “others” are, or as a stable personality trait, or as a characteristic of “bad” people, 
it ought to be conceived of as the result of a very fundamental cognitive module that is present 
in all people all over the world. This does imply that everyone, without any exception, is 
susceptible to prejudice and bias motivated aggression if the conditions are right, and, as an 
extension, that everybody does display prejudice to a certain degree, how small it may be. On 
the bright side, it has also been clearly stated that there are no “innate” grounds for prejudice; 
the markers are arbitrary and completely depend on the context, more precisely a subjective 
perception thereof. This also means that prejudice need not remain present in our world; indeed, 
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as Kurzban et al. state, “race can be erased” (2011), and the best place to start erasing prejudice, 
is us ourselves. First by becoming aware of possible prejudices we hold ourselves, and second, 
by addressing prejudiced speech and acts in our own environments, how little they may be. The 
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The pretest of the first version of the survey was conducted in Belgium. A paper and pencil 
version of the survey was administered to a class of criminology students during the class of 
quantitative research methods. The total number of students was 124, which is sufficient to test 
the reliabilities of the measurement scales and to conduct some preliminary analyses. The 
pretest will be described in detail in this section. In this pretest report, some measures are 
reported that are not included in the final study making up this PhD. The reason for this is that 
they either performed poorly in terms of internal consistency, or that they were included for 
experimental/exploratory purposes, for later usage.  
 
1. Pro-social tendencies measure 
 
The measure used is a translated version of the “pro-social tendencies measure” as developed 
by Carlo et al. (Gustavo Carlo, Hausmann, Christiansen, & Randall, 2003; G. Carlo & Randall, 
2002). This measure is the main predictor of the study, in which the relationship between pro-
sociality and prejudice is examined. This measure was chosen because it reflects six different 
kinds of pro-social tendencies, and thus provides a greater analytic potential than, say, a 
standard measure on altruism.  
 
The table below lists the factor solution of the pro-social tendencies measure.  
 
Factor scores pro-social tendencies 
 Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Ik help andere mensen vooral als er anderen op staan 
te kijken 
0.05 0.09 -0.06 -0.14 -0.13 0.48 
2. Als anderen in de buurt zijn, is het makkelijker voor 
mij om mensen in nood te helpen 
-0.06 -0.11 -0.22 -0.15 -0.17 0.55 
3. Anderen helpen voelt goed wanneer er anderen in de 
buurt zijn 
0.14 0.07 -0.31 -0.74 -0.06 0.62 
4. Als anderen me vragen hen te helpen, doe ik dit 
direct 
0.30 0.10 0.35 0.20 0.82 -0.30 
5. ik reageer direct als anderen me om hulp vragen 0.39 0.13 0.55 0.17 0.74 -0.23 
6. Een van de beste dingen aan anderen helpen is dat 
het me er goed doet uitzien 
-0.08 -0.18 0.11 0.69 0.29 -0.50 
7. Ik denk dat geld of goederen doneren beter werkt als 
men hier zelf ook een voordeel kan uithalen 
-0.17 -0.15 0.03 0.49 0.20 -0.18 
8. Als ik iemand help, moeten ze mij in de toekomst ook 
helpen 
-0.38 0.17 0.23 0.49 -0.12 0.00 
9. Ik heb de neiging mensen te helpen die in een 
crisissituatie zitten 
0.34 0.04 0.43 0.08 0.34 -0.22 
10. Doorgaans help ik mensen die zich ernstig verwond 
hebben 
0.19 0.19 0.37 -0.01 0.16 -0.07 
11. Het doet me plezier als anderen me complimentjes 
geven als ik iemand geholpen heb 
0.09 -0.11 0.13 -0.40 0.03 -0.15 
12. Ik help anderen snel als ze in nood verkeren 0.24 0.11 0.97 0.10 0.33 -0.24 
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13. Ik doneer geld het liefst anoniem -0.02 0.44 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.01 
14. Ik help het liefst mensen in nood als ze niet te weten 
komen dat ik hen geholpen heb 
-0.10 0.83 0.23 -0.01 -0.12 0.08 
15. Als ik iemand help, heb ik liever dat de persoon in 
kwestie dit niet weet 
-0.01 0.77 0.18 -0.03 0.11 0.01 
16. Het is niet belangrijk dat mensen weten wie hen 
geholpen heeft 
-0.07 0.38 0.13 0.31 0.28 -0.03 
17. Het geeft me een goed gevoel iemand die verdrietig 
is te troosten 
0.46 -0.16 0.17 -0.05 0.31 -0.14 
18. Ik help anderen vooral als ze triest of depressief zijn 0.64 0.09 0.26 -0.19 0.21 -0.02 
19. Ik reageer het best op vragen om hulp als de situatie 
erg emotioneel geladen is 
0.64 -0.00 0.05 -0.26 0.15 0.17 
20. In emotionele situaties krijg ik een drang om 
mensen in nood te helpen 
0.69 -0.20 0.14 -0.13 0.31 -0.08 
 
 
The factor structure yielded does reflect the six categories of behavior, but the factor scores are 
relatively low for the majority of variables. Furthermore, three items (16, 20 and 22) had to be 
excluded from the analysis as they yielded communality > 1, resulting in the failure to yield a 
solution. 
 
Inspecting the Cronbach’s alpha’s yields the following solution: 
 
 Translated scale (Dutch) Original scale (U.S.) 















2. empathic concern and perspective taking 
 
The empathic concern and perspective taking scales were those available from the Davies 
Personal Reactivity Index. A Dutch version of the scales is available on the website. The items 
were forced into two factors, based on theoretical grounds (Davies Personality Reactivity 
Index). A free solution yields two more factors, both considerably smaller than the principal 
ones, and both corresponding to either PT only or EC only. Internal consistency is acceptable, 
                                                 
110 It should be mentioned that only two items measured this subtype, and that it is likely that the alpha is an 
overestimation of the real consistency.  
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with an alpha value of 0.715 for empathic concern and an alpha of 0.706 for perspective taking. 
The two factor structure is presented in the table below. 
 
Factor scores empathic concern and perspective taking 
 Factor 
1 2 
1. Ik geloof dat er twee zijden zijn aan elke vraag en probeer te kijken 
naar beide 
0.72 -0.01 
2. Ik probeer naar ieders kant van een meningsverschil te kijken 
alvorens ik een beslissing neem 
0.60 -0.24 
3. Ik probeer mijn vrienden soms beter te begrijpen door me in te 
beelden hoe de dingen eruit zien vanuit hun perspectief 
0.59 -0.03 
4. Alvorens iemand te bekritiseren, probeer ik mij voor te stellen hoe 
ik mij zou voelen mocht ik in hun plaats zijn 
0.58 0.13 
5. Wanneer ik overstuur ben door iemand probeer ik mezelf meestal 
voor een tijdje in zijn schoenen te plaatsen 
0.52 0.02 
6. Als ik zeker ben dat ik over iets gelijk heb, verspil ik niet veel tijd 
aan het luisteren naar andermans argumenten 
0.32 0.12 
7. Ik vind het soms moeilijk de dingen te zien vanuit andermans 
standpunt 
0.31 0.06 
8. Ik voel me vaak bezorgd over mensen die minder gelukkig zijn dan 
ik 
0.19 0.58 
9. Wanneer ik iemand zie waarvan wordt geprofiteerd, voel ik me 
nogal beschermend tegenover hen 
0.10 0.37 
10. Ik ben vaak nogal geraakt door de dingen die ik zie gebeuren 0.06 0.61 
11. Andermans ongelukken verstoren me meestal niet veel 0.03 0.50 
12. Ik zou mezelf beschrijven als een vrij teerhartig persoon 0.02 0.51 
13. Soms heb ik niet veel medelijden met andere mensen wanneer ze 
problemen hebben 
-0.12 0.56 
14. Wanneer ik zie dat iemand unfair wordt behandeld, voel ik soms 




The two factors correlated weakly with another (i.e. r=0.20). 
 
3. Right wing authoritarianism scale 
 
The RWA scale does not load on one specific factor nicely. A solution of three (even four in 
the unrestricted solution in which item 7 is a single item) factors was adopted given that the 
scale theoretically consists of three dimensions. In the original version, items 3, 5, 9 reflect the 
authoritarian aggression dimension, items 1, 2, 4, 6, 11 reflect the authoritarian submission 
dimension, and items 7, 8, 10 reflect the conventionalism subscale. Unfortunately, these 
dimensions are not reflected in the factor structure yielded by the factor analysis. The reason 
for this may be the lack of diversity in the sample (I did note frequent responding patterns while 
coding the questionnaires), or the small sample size. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 






Factor scores right wing authoritarianism 
 Factor 
1 2 3 
1. Onze samenleving heeft nood aan vrije denkers die het aandurven 
de gevestigde waarden in twijfel te trekken, ook al bevalt dit vele 
mensen niet 
0.78 -0.19 -0.06 
2. Onze traditionele waarden volgen is nog steeds de beste manier 
van leven 
0.56 0.02 -0.09 
3. Eerder dan zomaar aan te nemen wat gevestigde autoriteiten 
zeggen, zou onze samenleving meer openheid moeten hebben 
tegenover mensen die voor zichzelf durven denken. 
0.51 0.04 0.35 
4. Om de vrijheid van meningsuiting te verdedigen, moeten we zelfs 
de publicatie van literatuur die tegen onze ideeën indruist, toelaten 
0.38 -0.17 0.03 
5. Veel mensen bekritiseren de gevestigde autoriteiten en negeren 
de normale manier van leven, hoewel deze net goed zijn 
0.37 0.19 0.15 
6. De normen van onze samenleving moeten strikt nageleefd 
worden. Overtredingen van deze normen moeten streng bestraft 
worden 
0.45 0.41 -0.16 
7. Men zou meer respect en bewondering voor onze voorouders 
moeten hebben voor wat ze voor onze maatschappij hebben gedaan, 
zeker in deze tijden waar er krachten aan het werk zijn om onze 
maatschappij kapot te maken 
0.09 0.27 0.06 
8. Er zijn vele radicale of immorele personen die de zaken willen 
verpesten voor ons. De samenleving moet hen tegenhouden 
-0.04 0.56 0.06 
9. Elke goede burger zou mee moeten helpen om het kwaad dat onze 
samenleving bedreigt uit te roeien als dit nodig blijkt te zijn 
-0.12 0.62 -0.07 
10. Onze samenleving heeft nood aan sterke leiders om 
onruststokers, criminelen en perverse types tot de orde te roepen 
-0.18 0.55 0.09 
11. Onze samenleving zou er beter uitzien als we wat meer tolerantie 
en begrip aan de dag zouden leggen voor niet-conventionele 
opvattingen 
0.02 0.04 0.30 
12. Onze samenleving zou er op vooruit gaan moesten we 
oproerkraaiers menselijk behandelen en zo tot inzicht trachten te 
brengen 





Even though some factor have small loadings on the factors, internal consistency cannot be 







1. Onze samenleving heeft nood aan sterke leiders om onruststokers, 
criminelen en perverse types tot de orde te roepen 
0.65 
2. Onze samenleving heeft nood aan vrije denkers die het aandurven de 
gevestigde waarden in twijfel te trekken, ook al bevalt dit vele mensen niet 
0.64 
3. Onze traditionele waarden volgen is nog steeds de beste manier van leven 0.64 
4. Onze samenleving zou er beter uitzien als we wat meer tolerantie en 
begrip aan de dag zouden leggen voor niet-conventionele opvattingen 
0.65 
5. De normen van onze samenleving moeten strikt nageleefd worden. 
Overtredingen van deze normen moeten streng bestraft worden 
0.61 
6. Eerder dan zomaar aan te nemen wat gevestigde autoriteiten zeggen, zou 
onze samenleving meer openheid moeten hebben tegenover mensen die voor 
zichzelf durven denken. 
0.61 
7. Veel mensen bekritiseren de gevestigde autoriteiten en negeren de 
normale manier van leven, hoewel deze net goed zijn 
0.62 
8. Men zou meer respect en bewondering voor onze voorouders moeten 
hebben voor wat ze voor onze maatschappij hebben gedaan, zeker in deze 
tijden waar er krachten aan het werk zijn om onze maatschappij kapot te 
maken 
0.64 
9. Er zijn vele radicale of immorele personen die de zaken willen verpesten 
voor ons. De samenleving moet hen tegenhouden 
0.63 
10. Om de vrijheid van meningsuiting te verdedigen, moeten we zelfs de 
publicatie van literatuur die tegen onze ideeën indruist, toelaten 
0.66 
11. Onze samenleving zou er op vooruit gaan moesten we oproerkraaiers 
menselijk behandelen en zo tot inzicht trachten te brengen 
0.65 
12. Elke goede burger zou mee moeten helpen om het kwaad dat onze 
samenleving bedreigt uit te roeien als dit nodig blijkt te zijn 
0.65 
 
The three factors extracted correlate moderately: there is a correlation of .30 between factors 1 
and 2, and a correlation of 0.31 between factor 3 and 1, and a correlation of .22 between factors 
2 and 3. 
 
4. Social dominance orientation 
 
The SDO scale performs well in a one factor structure. However, a free exploratory factor 
analysis yields a three factor structure. In the three factor structure, the third factor only contains 
one item with a factor score >0.4. The two factors seem to revolve around a distinction between 
“group equality” and “dominance”. It is notable that the factors consist of either the inversely 
scored items (marked grey), or the regularly scored items (no marking). Both elements are valid 




Factor scores SDO 
 Factor 
1 2 3 
1. Alle groepen van personen zouden gelijke kansen moeten 
krijgen in het leven 
0.82 -0.06 -0.11 
2. Het zou goed zijn als alle groepen van personen 
gelijkwaardig zouden zijn 
0.73 0.01 0.05 
3. Gelijkheid tussen de verschillende groepen van personen in 
de samenleving zou ons ideaal moeten zijn 
0.68 0.05 0.18 
4. We zouden minder problemen kennen als we alle groepen 
van mensen meer gelijk zouden behandelen 
0.66 -0.25 0.26 
5. We zouden er naar moeten streven de inkomens tussen 
leden van verschillende groepen met gelijkwaardige 
kwalificaties zo gelijk mogelijk te maken 
0.65 -0.04 -0.27 
6. Ik ben voorstander van een toegenomen sociale gelijkheid 0.58 0.21 0.02 
7. We zouden al het mogelijke moeten doen om de lat gelijk te 
leggen voor de verschillende groepen 
0.47 0.06 0.23 
8. Soms moeten bepaalde groepen van personen op hun plaats 
gehouden worden 
0.28 0.40 -0.01 
9. Het is waarschijnlijk een goede zaak dat sommige groepen 
aan de top van de ladder staan en andere groepen onderaan 
0.18 0.56 0.13 
10. Inferieure groepen zouden op hun plaats moeten blijven 0.16 0.70 -0.180 
11. Om vooruit te komen in het leven, is het soms nodig om 
andere groepen van mensen de pas af te snijden 
0.05 0.36 0.20 
12. Superieure groepen zouden inferieure groepen moeten 
domineren 
0.02 0.64 0.11 
13. De waarde van sommige sociale groepen is groter dan die 
van andere 
-0.08 0.67 -0.10 
14. Als sommige groepen op hun plaats zouden blijven, zouden 
we minder problemen kennen 
-0.19 0.61 0.13 
15. Soms is het nodig geweld te gebruiken tegen leden van 
andere groepen om de doelstellingen van de eigen groep te 
bereiken 
-0.24 0.39 0.35 
16 Geen enkele groep van mensen zou mogen domineren in de 
samenleving 
0.21 0.02 0.67 
 
 
5. Threat perception 
 
The threat scale performs excellent in terms of internal consistency, which appears from the 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.92. With regard to the factor structure, the scale is unable to discern 
between symbolic and realistic threat. Items one through 4 are deemed to be symbolic threat, 
whilst items 5 through 13 are deemed to be realistic threat, according to integrated threat theory. 
The free exploratory factor analysis shows a different picture, however. There are two clearly 
distinct factors, i.e. items 1 through 9 on the one hand, and 10 through 13 on the other. From a 
theoretical point of view, this is interesting, given that items 10 to 13 usually are not included 
in threat scales, and the fact that both types of threat cannot usually be discerned. On the basis 
of this structure, one could argue that the “real” realistic threats consist of threats to physical 
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evidence, rather than those usually deemed to be realistic threats. One possible explanation is 
that most people do not have issues with, for example, access to health care, but can think 
immigrants pose a risk thereto. This basically renders the threat symbolic in the true sense of 
the word.  
 
 
Factor scores threat perception 
 Factor 
1 2 
1. Educatieve waarden (bv. waarden die in scholen worden aangeleerd, de 
invloeden waaraan kinderen in scholen worden blootgesteld) 
0.74 0.03 
2. Familiale waarden (bv. waarden t.a.v. bejaarden, gelijkheid tussen 
mannen en vrouwen, opvoeding) 
0.40 0.30 
3. Religieus geloof (bv. religie, geloofsbeleving) 0.47 0.30 
4. De tradities van onze cultuur (bv. vieren van nationale/Vlaamse feesten, 
Belgische/Vlaamse gewoonten) 
0.51 0.09 
5. Toegang tot werk 0.64 0.10 
6. Toegang tot de gezondheidszorg (bv. beschikbaarheid van artsen, 
mogelijkheid om de nodige zorgen te krijgen in het hospitaal) 
0.73 -0.09 
7. Toegang tot het onderwijssysteem (bv. beschikbare plaatsen in scholen, 
bijstand bij onderwijs, kwaliteit van onderwijs, beschikbaarheid van 
leerkrachten) 
0.77 -0.01 
8. Toegang tot sociale bijstand (bv. huishoudhulp, 
werkloosheidsvergoedingen) 
0.79 -0.08 
9. De economische stabiliteit van ons land (bv. de werkmarkt, 
werkloosheidscijfers, pensioensysteem) 
0.60 0.21 
10. Gezondheid (voorbeeld gevaar: blootstelling aan ziekten) 0.14 0.45 
11. Uw persoonlijke veiligheid (voorbeeld gevaar: waarschijnlijkheid om 
slachtoffer te worden van een misdrijf) 
0.06 0.87 
12. De openbare orde (voorbeeld gevaar: misdaadcijfers, mafia) -0.12 0.99 
13. De veiligheid van het land (voorbeeld gevaar: de waarschijnlijkheid dat 
een grootschalige aanval voordoet) 
-0.02 0.93 
 
6. Blatant prejudice 
 
The blatant prejudice scale performed well in terms of internal consistency, and in terms of the 
factor structure. Item 13 has a significantly lower factor score compared to the other items. The 
scale performs well in terms of Cronbach’s alpha, with a value of 0.79 that cannot be increased 





Factor scores blatant prejudcie 
 Factor 
1 2 
1. Ik zou er geen probleem mee hebben als een allochtoon van een 
gelijkaardige socio-economische status door huwelijk deel zou gaan 
uitmaken van mijn naaste familie 
0.99 -0.18 
2. Ik zou er geen probleem mee hebben een seksuele relatie aan te gaan met 
een allochtoon 
0.82 -0.06 
3. Als ik later kleinkinderen krijg, zou het me niet storen dat deze er fysiek 
(bv. huidskleur) anders uitzien dan de mensen van mijn kant van de familie 
0.59 0.13 
4. Ik zou er geen probleem mee hebben als een goed gekwalificeerde 
allochtoon mijn overste (baas) zou worden 
0.52 0.18 
5. Allochtonen zijn even eerlijk als autochtonen 0.37 0.37 
6. Allochtonen en autochtonen zullen nooit echt met mekaar kunnen 
opschieten, ook al zijn ze soms vrienden 
0.32 0.27 
7. Allochtonen hebben jobs die eigenlijk aan autochtonen toebehoren 0.27 0.47 
8. De meeste allochtonen zouden perfect kunnen leven zonder 
overheidssteun als ze een beetje hun best deden 
0.20 0.57 
9. De meeste politici in België geven meer om allochtonen dan om 
autochtonen 
0.02 0.38 
10. Het feit dat allochtonen van minder goede rassen afstammen verklaart 
waarom ze doorgaans minder goed af zijn 
-0.18 0.75 
 
The two factors that emerge in this exploratory factor analysis are rather strongly correlated (r 
= 0.68). The distinction between both is compatible with the distinction Pettigrew and Meertens 
make with regard to the “threat and rejection” subscale (items 1 through 6) and the “intimacy” 
subscale (items 7 through 10). Only item three loads on the other subscale, and item 6 has cross 
loadings on both. The scale can thus be used as one composite scale.  
 
7. Subtle prejudice 
 
The subtle prejudice scale (variant of McConahay) scores good in terms of internal consistency, 
with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86, which cannot be increased by removing one or more items 
from the scale. 
 
In the two factor solution, two items stand out on the second factor: 1 and 6. While coding it 
was clear that almost everyone responded to these items in a similar fashion. This might be an 
effect due to the specific group to which the pretest was distributed, and might disappear once 
the group is made more heterogeneous and larger. The two factors correlate rather strongly, 





Factor scores subtle prejudice 
 Factor 
1 2 
1. Allochtonen krijgen te weinig aandacht in de media 0.63 -0.20 
2. De multiculturele maatschappij is een vooruitgang 0.60 0.01 
3. Allochtonen worden te veeleisend in hun streven naar gelijke rechten 0.58 0.20 
4. Het is gemakkelijk om de woede van allochtonen hier in België te 
begrijpen 
0.57 0.10 
5. Er zijn speciale programma’s nodig om jobs te creëren voor allochtonen 0.52 -0.05 
6. De vraag voor gelijke rechten vanwege allochtonen is gemakkelijk te 
begrijpen 
0.52 0.16 
7.  Er werden reeds genoeg programma’s uitgedokterd om allochtonen aan 
het werk te krijgen 
0.34 0.14 
8.  Discriminatie tegen allochtonen is geen probleem meer in België 0.11 0.50 
9.  Racistische groepen zijn geen bedreiging meer voor de allochtonen -0.15 0.91 
 
8. Empathic concern and perspective taking towards immigrants 
 
Here, the items of the empathic concern and perspective taking scales are reproduced, but 
geared towards immigrants specifically. This was done by replacing “someone” by “an 
immigrant” for example. Some items were omitted as they did not allow such a reformulation. 
Whilst the internal consistency of empathic concern was good, that of perspective taking was 
simply horrible.   
 
Factor scores parochial empathic concern and perspective taking 
 Factor 
1 2 
1. Wanneer ik zie dat allochtonen unfair worden behandeld, voel ik soms 
weinig medelijden met hen 
0.89 -0.15 
2. Het ongeluk van allochtonen doet me doorgaans niet veel 0.87 -0.15 
3. Doorgaans heb ik niet veel medelijden met allochtonen wanneer ze 
problemen hebben 
0.62 0.17 
4. De argumenten van allochtonen met betrekking tot hun situatie doen me 
niet veel, ik weet beter hoe de vork in de steel zit 
0.60 0.14 
5. Ik heb vaak tedere, bezorgde gevoelens voor allochtonen die minder 
gelukkig zijn dan ik 
0.45 0.21 
6. Wanneer ik zie dat van allochtonen wordt geprofiteerd, voel ik me nogal 
beschermend tegenover hen 
0.33 0.43 
7. Ik probeer allochtonen soms beter te begrijpen door me in te beelden 
hoe de dingen eruit zien vanuit hun perspectief 
0.02 0.73 
8. Ik vind het soms moeilijk de dingen te zien vanuit het standpunt van 
allochtonen 
0.01 0.13 
9. Alvorens allochtonen te bekritiseren, probeer ik mij voor te stellen hoe 
ik mij zou voelen mocht ik in hun plaats zijn 
-0.03 0.73 
10. Wanneer ik overstuur ben door een allochtoon probeer ik mezelf 





Cronbach’s alpha for the empathic concern items is 0.83, which is good, and of the perspective 
taking scale 0.03, which is non-existent. No factor analysis of this scale will be presented.  
 
9. Bias motivated behaviors 
 
The results for bias motivated behaviors can be found in the table below. First, the results of 
“peer racism” as measured by concrete behaviors is presented. 
 
Frequencies bias motivated behaviours of peers 
 
Responses Percent 
of Cases N Percent 
1. Een allochtoon uitgescholden 80 47.6 95.2 
2. Gespuwd naar een allochtoon 6 3.6 7.1 
3. Gedreigd om een allochtoon te slaan 33 19.6 39.3 
4. Iets naar een allochtoon geworpen 7 4.2 8.3 
5. Een allochtoon gevolgd of achternagezeten 10 6.0 11.9 
6. Goederen van een allochtoon beschadigd (bv. auto) 5 3.0 6.0 
7. Een allochtoon geslagen of gestampt 18 10.7 21.4 
8. Een allochtoon met een voorwerp geslagen of 
gestampt 
5 3.0 6.0 
9. Een allochtoon beroofd 3 1.8 3.6 
10. Een allochtoon met een scherp voorwerp gestoken 1 0.6 1.2 
Total 168 100.0 200.0 
 
From this table, it appears that the majority of respondents report having friends that have called 
immigrants names. This is followed by threatening to beat an immigrant and de facto beating 
an immigrant. If we consider the results of respondents’ own bias motivated behaviors, then, 
we get the following results. 
 
Frequencies Self-reported bias motivated behaviors 
 
Responses Percent 
of Cases N Percent 
1. Een allochtoon uitgescholden 31 54.4 88.6 
2. Gespuwd naar een allochtoon 1 1.8 2.9 
3. Gedreigd om een allochtoon te slaan 9 15.8 25.7 
4. Iets naar een allochtoon geworpen 2 3.5 5.7 
5. Een allochtoon gevolgd of achternagezeten 5 8.8 14.3 
6. Goederen van een allochtoon beschadigd (bv. auto) 1 1.8 2.9 
7. Een allochtoon geslagen of gestampt 7 12.3 20.0 
8. Een allochtoon met een voorwerp geslagen of 
gestampt 
1 1.8 2.9 
Total 57 100.0 162.9 
 
Again. scoffing at immigrants is the most frequent behavior. followed by threatening to beat an 
immigrant and de facto beating an immigrant. If we consider the motives for this behavior. we 





Frequencies motives for bias motivated behaviors 




1. Ik wou mijn mensen beschermen tegen 
allochtonen 
8 29.6 66.7 
2. Ik werd hiertoe aangezet door mijn vrienden 1 3.7 8.3 
3. Ik werd hiertoe aangezet door mijn familie 2 7.4 16.7 
4. Ik werd hiertoe aangezet door een persoon die ik 
respecteer. buiten mijn familie of vrienden 
1 3.7 8.3 
5. Ik wou mijn omgeving tonen dat ik voor hen 
opkom 
6 22.2 50.0 
6. Ik wou indruk maken op mijn omgeving 2 7.4 16.7 
7. Ik wou gewoon wat plezier maken. en het was 
een geschikt doelwit 
1 3.7 8.3 
8. Ik wou wraak nemen voor al wat allochtonen ons 
aandoen 
2 7.4 16.7 
9. Ik wou wraak nemen voor al wat allochtonen 
mijn familie hebben aangedaan 
1 3.7 8.3 
10. Ik wou wraak nemen voor wat allochtonen mijn 
vrienden ooit hebben aangedaan 
1 3.7 8.3 
11. Ik wou wraak nemen voor wat allochtonen mij 
ooit hebben aangedaan 
2 7.4 16.7 
Total 27 100.0 225.0 
 
The most frequent motive for doing things to an immigrant is self-protection. This is followed 
by an interesting motive which is very much in line with signaling theory: showing to one’s 
environment that one stands up for them. Frequencies are very low. however; it seems not all 
respondents who reported bias motivated behaviors indicated a reason thereof. Given the very 

























Welkom bij de studie naar sociale reactiviteit en diversiteit. De studie bestaat uit drie delen. In 
een eerste deel worden enkele vragen gesteld naar uw omgang met de mensen uit uw 
omgeving. De bedoeling van dit deel van de survey is om enkele nieuwe vormen van 
interpersoonlijk gedrag in kaart te brengen. In een tweede deel worden enkele vragen gesteld 
omtrent uw wereldbeeld. Er is immers een enorme diversiteit aan opvattingen, en hier zouden 
we graag beter zicht op krijgen.  
 
In een derde deel, worden enkele vragen gesteld naar uw mening over diversiteit in België. 
Vaak ziet men in de media en politiek bepaalde visies naar voor geschoven worden, en u zelf 
zal ongetwijfeld ook discussies over diversiteit hebben gevoerd met vrienden en familie. De 
bedoeling is om u een platform te geven om, op volstrekt anonieme wijze, uw mening over 
diversiteit recht voor de raap te geven. In dit tweede deel van de survey willen we ons een 
beeld vormen van wat er onder de mensen zelf leeft: durf spreken! Uw mening is immers de 
mening die telt! 
 
Het invullen van de vragenlijst neemt ongeveer 20 minuten in beslag. Het is niet de bedoeling 
om over elke stelling lang na te denken, tracht te antwoorden wat bij het lezen van de stelling 
intuïtief bij u opkomt. De gegevens worden op een volledig anonieme wijze verzameld, het is 
dus op geen enkele manier mogelijk om u als persoon te identificeren op basis van uw 
antwoorden.  
 





Voor meer informatie en/of vragen met betrekking tot de resultaten: ben.heylen@ugent.be 
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A: jijzelf in de omgang met anderen 
In dit deel van de vragenlijst worden enkele vragen gesteld met betrekking tot uzelf als persoon. Zoals 
je weet, kunnen mensen zeer verschillend reageren in dezelfde situaties. We zouden door deze vragen 
een beter beeld willen krijgen van deze diversiteit. We zouden je willen vragen iedere stelling te lezen 
en het antwoord dat het eerst in je opkomt te omcirkelen. We willen er ook op wijzen dat er hier geen 
“juiste” of “foute” antwoorden mogelijk zijn, alle mogelijkheden zijn even goed mogelijk. Het belangrijkste 
is dat je neerschrijft wat jou als persoon het beste omschrijft in de omgang met de mensen waarmee u 




  Helemaal 
Eens 
Eens Neutraal Oneens Helemaal 
oneens 
1 Ik help andere mensen vooral als er anderen 
op staan te kijken 
     
2 Het geeft me een goed gevoel iemand die 
verdrietig is te troosten 
     
3  Als anderen in de buurt zijn, is het makkelijker 
voor mij om mensen in nood te helpen 
     
4 Een van de beste dingen aan anderen helpen 
is dat het me er goed doet uitzien 
     
5 Anderen helpen voelt goed wanneer er 
anderen in de buurt zijn 
     
6 Ik heb de neiging mensen te helpen die in een 
crisissituatie zitten 
     
7 Als anderen me vragen hen te helpen, doe ik 
dit direct 
     
8 Ik doneer geld het liefst anoniem      
9 Doorgaans help ik mensen die zich ernstig 
verwond hebben 
     
10 Ik denk dat geld of goederen doneren beter 
werkt als men hier zelf ook een voordeel kan 
uithalen 
     
11 Ik help het liefst mensen in nood als ze niet te 
weten komen dat ik hen geholpen heb 
     
12 Ik help anderen vooral als ze triest of 
depressief zijn 
     
13 Het doet me plezier als anderen me 
complimentjes geven als ik iemand geholpen 
heb 
     
14 Ik help anderen snel als ze in nood verkeren      
15 Als ik iemand help, heb ik liever dat de 
persoon in kwestie dit niet weet 
     
16 Als men tijd en geld aan liefdadigheid 
spendeert, zou men hier meer erkenning voor 
moeten krijgen 
     
17 Ik reageer het best op vragen om hulp als de 
situatie erg emotioneel geladen is 
     
18 ik reageer direct als anderen me om hulp 
vragen 
     
19 Het is niet belangrijk dat mensen weten wie 
hen geholpen heeft 
     
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  Helemaal 
Eens 
Eens Neutraal Oneens Helemaal 
oneens 
20 Ik vind liefdadigheid nuttig omdat het goed op 
mijn CV staat 
     
21 In emotionele situaties krijg ik een drang om 
mensen in nood te helpen 
     
22 Ik doneer vaak anoniem geld omdat ik me er 
goed bij voel 
     
23 Als ik iemand help, moeten ze mij in de 
toekomst ook helpen 




Als je dan denkt aan de mensen waarmee je dagdagelijks in contact komt (bv. uw vrienden, familie, …), 
in hoeverre zijn de volgende stellingen dan van u op toepassing? De antwoordcategorieën zijn ongeveer 
dezelfde als voorheen. Geef simpelweg het antwoord dat als eerste spontaan bij je opkomt; goede of 
slechte antwoorden bestaan niet met betrekking tot de stellingen.  
 
 
  Helemaal 
Eens 
Eens Neutraal Oneens Helemaal 
oneens 
1 Ik voel me vaak bezorgd over mensen die 
minder gelukkig zijn dan ik 
     
2 Ik vind het soms moeilijk de dingen te zien 
vanuit andermans standpunt 
     
3 Soms heb ik niet veel medelijden met andere 
mensen wanneer ze problemen hebben 
     
4 Ik probeer naar ieders kant van een 
meningsverschil te kijken alvorens ik een 
beslissing neem 
     
5 Wanneer ik iemand zie waarvan wordt 
geprofiteerd, voel ik me nogal beschermend 
tegenover hen 
     
6 Ik probeer mijn vrienden soms beter te 
begrijpen door me in te beelden hoe de 
dingen eruit zien vanuit hun perspectief 
     
7 Andermans ongelukken verstoren me 
meestal niet veel 
     
8 Als ik zeker ben dat ik over iets gelijk heb, 
verspil ik niet veel tijd aan het luisteren naar 
andermans argumenten 
     
9 Wanneer ik zie dat iemand unfair wordt 
behandeld, voel ik soms weinig medelijden 
met hen 
     
10 Ik ben vaak nogal geraakt door de dingen die 
ik zie gebeuren 
     
11 Ik geloof dat er twee zijden zijn aan elke 
vraag en probeer te kijken naar beide 
     
12 Ik zou mezelf beschrijven als een vrij 
teerhartig persoon 
     
13 Wanneer ik overstuur ben door iemand 
probeer ik mezelf meestal voor een tijdje in 
zijn schoenen te plaatsen 
     
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  Helemaal 
Eens 
Eens Neutraal Oneens Helemaal 
oneens 
14 Alvorens iemand te bekritiseren, probeer ik 
mij voor te stellen hoe ik mij zou voelen 
mocht ik in hun plaats zijn  
     
 
 
Hieronder volgen een aantal vragen in verband met je wereldbeeld. Iedereen heeft wel een andere kijk 
op de wereld, en die diversiteit zouden we graag vatten. Geef voor elk van onderstaande stellingen aan 
in hoeverre u het daarmee eens bent, door een kruisje in het juiste vakje te zetten. Onthoud dat de 
vragenlijst volledig anoniem is, en er zeker geen “juiste” of “foute” antwoorden zijn. Antwoord simpelweg 
wat intuïtief direct bij je opkomt.  
 
 
  Helemaal 
Eens 
Eens Neutraal Oneens Helemaal 
oneens 
1 Onze samenleving heeft nood aan sterke 
leiders om onruststokers, criminelen en 
perverse types tot de orde te roepen  
     
2 Onze samenleving heeft nood aan vrije 
denkers die het aandurven de gevestigde 
waarden in twijfel te trekken, ook al bevalt dit 
vele mensen niet 
     
3  Onze traditionele waarden volgen is nog 
steeds de beste manier van leven  
     
4 Onze samenleving zou er beter uitzien als we 
wat meer tolerantie en begrip aan de dag 
zouden leggen voor niet-conventionele 
opvattingen 
     
5 De normen van onze samenleving moeten 
strikt nageleefd worden. Overtredingen van 
deze normen moeten streng bestraft worden  
     
6 Eerder dan zomaar aan te nemen wat 
gevestigde autoriteiten zeggen, zou onze 
samenleving meer openheid moeten hebben 
tegenover mensen die voor zichzelf durven 
denken.  
     
7 Veel mensen bekritiseren de gevestigde 
autoriteiten en negeren de normale manier 
van leven, hoewel deze net goed zijn 
     
8 Men zou meer respect en bewondering voor 
onze voorouders moeten hebben voor wat ze 
voor onze maatschappij hebben gedaan, zeker 
in deze tijden waar er krachten aan het werk 
zijn om onze maatschappij kapot te maken  
     
9 Er zijn vele radicale of immorele personen die 
de zaken willen verpesten voor ons. De 
samenleving moet hen tegenhouden 
     
10 Om de vrijheid van meningsuiting te 
verdedigen, moeten we zelfs de publicatie van 
literatuur die tegen onze ideeën indruist, 
toelaten 
     
11 Onze samenleving zou er op vooruit gaan 
moesten we oproerkraaiers menselijk 
behandelen en zo tot inzicht trachten te 
brengen 
     
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  Helemaal 
Eens 
Eens Neutraal Oneens Helemaal 
oneens 
12 Elke goede burger zou mee moeten helpen om 
het kwaad dat onze samenleving bedreigt uit 
te roeien als dit nodig blijkt te zijn 
     
13 De waarde van sommige sociale groepen is 
groter dan die van andere 
     
14 We zouden al het mogelijke moeten doen om 
de lat gelijk te leggen voor de verschillende 
groepen  
     
15 Soms is het nodig geweld te gebruiken tegen 
leden van andere groepen om de 
doelstellingen van de eigen groep te bereiken  
     
16 Als sommige groepen op hun plaats zouden 
blijven, zouden we minder problemen kennen 
     
17 We zouden minder problemen kennen als we 
alle groepen van mensen meer gelijk zouden 
behandelen  
     
18 Om vooruit te komen in het leven, is het soms 
nodig om andere groepen van mensen de pas 
af te snijden  
     
19 Geen enkele groep van mensen zou mogen 
domineren in de samenleving  
     
20 Gelijkheid tussen de verschillende groepen 
van personen in de samenleving zou ons 
ideaal moeten zijn 
     
21 Alle groepen van personen zouden gelijke 
kansen moeten krijgen in het leven 
     
22 Ik ben voorstander van een toegenomen 
sociale gelijkheid 
     
23 Superieure groepen zouden inferieure 
groepen moeten domineren 
     
24 Het is waarschijnlijk een goede zaak dat 
sommige groepen aan de top van de ladder 
staan en andere groepen onderaan 
     
25 We zouden er naar moeten streven de 
inkomens tussen leden van verschillende 
groepen met gelijkwaardige kwalificaties zo 
gelijk mogelijk te maken  
     
26 Soms moeten bepaalde groepen van 
personen op hun plaats gehouden worden 
     
27 Het zou goed zijn als alle groepen van 
personen gelijkwaardig zouden zijn 
     
28 Inferieure groepen zouden op hun plaats 
moeten blijven  
     
29 Welk is in uw ogen de meest legitieme 









C: Uw mening over diversiteit in België 
 
 
Zoals je weet wonen er in België verschillende bevolkingsgroepen, met elk hun eigen gewoonten en 
normen, bv. allochtonen en autochtonen. Zowel in de straat als in de politiek wordt er vaak gespeculeerd 
over hoe men met de verschillen tussen autochtonen en allochtonen dient om te gaan. Hier wordt vaak 
echter geen rekening gehouden met wat de mensen zelf denken over deze kwestie. We willen je hier 
de kans geven om uw eigen mening te geven, door aan te geven in welke mate je het al dan niet eens 
bent met een aantal stellingen. Net zoals de vorige keer bestaat er geen juist of fout antwoord, en vragen 




In hoeverre denk je dat allochtonen de volgende zaken in gevaar brengen? Gebruik de volgende 
schaal om te antwoorden: helemaal niet, slechts weinig, een beetje, redelijk wat, veel.  









1 Educatieve waarden (bv. waarden die in 
scholen worden aangeleerd, de invloeden 
waaraan kinderen in scholen worden 
blootgesteld)  
     
2 Familiale waarden (bv. waarden t.a.v. 
bejaarden, gelijkheid tussen mannen en 
vrouwen, opvoeding) 
     
3  Religieus geloof (bv. religie, geloofsbeleving)        
4 De tradities van onze cultuur (bv. vieren van 
nationale/Vlaamse feesten, Belgische/Vlaamse 
gewoonten)  
     
5 Toegang tot werk        
6 Toegang tot de gezondheidszorg (bv. 
beschikbaarheid van artsen, mogelijkheid om 
de nodige zorgen te krijgen in het hospitaal) 
     
7 Toegang tot het onderwijssysteem (bv. 
beschikbare plaatsen in scholen, bijstand bij 
onderwijs, kwaliteit van onderwijs, 
beschikbaarheid van leerkrachten)  
     
8 Toegang tot sociale bijstand (bv. 
huishoudhulp, werkloosheidsvergoedingen) 
     
9 De economische stabiliteit van ons land (bv. 
de werkmarkt, werkloosheidscijfers, 
pensioensysteem) 
     
10 Gezondheid (voorbeeld gevaar: blootstelling 
aan ziekten) 
     
11 Uw persoonlijke veiligheid (voorbeeld gevaar: 
waarschijnlijkheid om slachtoffer te worden 
van een misdrijf) 
     
12 De openbare orde (voorbeeld gevaar: 
misdaadcijfers, mafia) 
     
13 De veiligheid van het land (voorbeeld gevaar: 
de waarschijnlijkheid dat een grootschalige 
aanval voordoet) 
     
Met de volgende stellingen zouden we willen weten hoe je denkt dat de situatie van de allochtonen in 
België er uitziet. Geef telkens aan in welke mate je het al dan niet eens bent met de stelling, en tracht 
252 
 
zo spontaan mogelijk te antwoorden. De vragenlijst is anoniem, en er zijn geen goede of slechte 
antwoorden. De antwoordcategorieën blijven dezelfde. 
 
 
  Helemaal 
Eens 
Eens Neutraal Oneens Helemaal 
oneens 
1 Discriminatie tegen allochtonen is geen 
probleem meer in België 
     
2 De vraag voor gelijke rechten vanwege 
allochtonen is gemakkelijk te begrijpen 
     
3  Er werden reeds genoeg programma’s 
uitgedokterd om allochtonen aan het werk te 
krijgen 
     
4 Allochtonen krijgen te weinig aandacht in de 
media 
     
5 Er zijn speciale programma’s nodig om jobs 
te creëren voor allochtonen 
     
6 Racistische groepen zijn geen bedreiging 
meer voor de allochtonen 
     
7 Allochtonen worden te veeleisend in hun 
streven naar gelijke rechten 
     
8 De multiculturele maatschappij is een 
vooruitgang 
     
9 Het is gemakkelijk om de woede van 
allochtonen hier in België te begrijpen 
     
10 Allochtonen hebben jobs die eigenlijk aan 
autochtonen toebehoren 
     
11 De meeste allochtonen zouden perfect 
kunnen leven zonder overheidssteun als ze 
een beetje hun best deden 
     
12 Allochtonen en autochtonen zullen nooit echt 
met mekaar kunnen opschieten, ook al zijn ze 
soms vrienden 
     
13 
 
De meeste politici in België geven meer om 
allochtonen dan om autochtonen      
14 Het feit dat allochtonen van minder goede 
rassen afstammen verklaart waarom ze 
doorgaans minder goed af zijn 
     
15 Allochtonen zijn even eerlijk als autochtonen       
16 Als ik later kleinkinderen krijg, zou het me 
niet storen dat deze er fysiek (bv. huidskleur) 
anders uitzien dan de mensen van mijn kant 
van de familie 
     
17 Ik zou er geen probleem mee hebben een 
seksuele relatie aan te gaan met een 
allochtoon 
     
18 Ik zou er geen probleem mee hebben als een 
goed gekwalificeerde allochtoon mijn overste 
(baas) zou worden 




  Helemaal 
Eens 
Eens Neutraal Oneens Helemaal 
oneens 
19 Ik zou er geen probleem mee hebben als een 
allochtoon van een gelijkaardige socio-
economische status door huwelijk deel zou 
gaan uitmaken van mijn naaste familie 
     
20 Autochtonen zijn beter af dan allochtonen in 
België 
     
 
 
Men komt in de straat wel vaak allochtonen tegen, en er wordt ook vaak over gesproken met vrienden, 
familie en dergelijke. In hoeverre zijn de volgende stellingen met betrekking tot uzelf van toepassing? 
De antwoordcategorieën zijn: 
 
 
  Helemaal 
Eens 
Eens Neutraal Oneens Helemaal 
oneens 
1 Ik heb vaak tedere, bezorgde gevoelens 
voor allochtonen die minder gelukkig zijn 
dan ik 
     
2 Ik vind het soms moeilijk de dingen te zien 
vanuit het standpunt van allochtonen 
     
3 Doorgaans heb ik niet veel medelijden met 
allochtonen wanneer ze problemen hebben 
     
4 Wanneer ik zie dat van allochtonen wordt 
geprofiteerd, voel ik me nogal beschermend 
tegenover hen 
     
5 Ik probeer allochtonen soms beter te 
begrijpen door me in te beelden hoe de 
dingen eruit zien vanuit hun perspectief 
     
6 Het ongeluk van allochtonen doet me 
doorgaans niet veel 
     
7 De argumenten van allochtonen met 
betrekking tot hun situatie doen me niet 
veel, ik weet beter hoe de vork in de steel zit 
     
8 Wanneer ik zie dat allochtonen unfair 
worden behandeld, voel ik soms weinig 
medelijden met hen 
     
9 Wanneer ik overstuur ben door een 
allochtoon probeer ik mezelf meestal voor 
een tijdje in zijn schoenen te plaatsen 
     
10 Alvorens allochtonen te bekritiseren, 
probeer ik mij voor te stellen hoe ik mij zou 
voelen mocht ik in hun plaats zijn  
     
 
 
Zoals je weet worden allochtonen vaak uitgelachen of uitgescholden, en gedragen mensen zich vaak 
agressief tegenover hen. Ken je vrienden die ooit dergelijk gedrag tegenover een allochtoon hebben 
gesteld? Gelieve voor elk gedrag aan te geven of het al dan niet ooit is voorgevallen (door een vriend 
van u), en hoe vaak dit ongeveer is voorgevallen in de laatste twaalf maanden. Graag benadrukken we 






Ken je VRIENDEN die ooit het volgende hebben gedaan 
Hoe vaak is dit in de laatste twaalf 
maanden voorgevallen? 



























Goederen van een allochtoon beschadigd (bv. auto) 
 nee 
 Ja  
 
Ongeveer …………keer 


































En als we dan naar uzelf kijken, hoeveel maal in uw leven hebt u de volgende dingen tegen een 
allochtoon gedaan? Graag benadrukken we hier nogmaals dat alle antwoorden op een strikt anonieme 
wijze zullen worden verwerkt, en dus nooit iemand kan te weten komen wat je hebt geantwoord. Het is 
echter zeer belangrijk voor ons dat je een eerlijk antwoord geeft.  
 
 
Heb je ooit ZELF ooit de volgende dingen gedaan:  
Hoe vaak is dit in de laatste twaalf 
maanden voorgevallen? 





























Goederen van een allochtoon beschadigd (bv. auto) 
 nee 
 Ja  
 
Ongeveer …………keer 


































Om verschillende redenen kunnen de bovenstaande gebeurtenissen plaatsvinden? Als u terugdenkt 
aan de redenen waarom u de bovenstaande zaken hebt gedaan, welke zijn dan van toepassing? 
(meerdere antwoorden zijn mogelijk) 
 
 
Waren één of meer van de volgende redenen op toepassing op één 
of meer van de gedragingen die je hierboven aangaf?  
Voor welk incident was dit een 
reden? 





















Ik werd hiertoe aangezet door mijn familie 
 nee 
 Ja  
………………………………………….. 
Ik werd hiertoe aangezet door een persoon die ik 

























Ik wou wraak nemen voor al wat allochtonen mijn 




Ik wou wraak nemen voor wat allochtonen mijn 

















Concluderende vragen en dankwoord 
 
 
Vooreerst willen wij u vriendelijk bedanken voor het invullen van deze vragenlijst. Alvorens af te sluiten 
zouden we nog enkele korte vragen van algemene aard willen stellen. 
 
 
1 Wat is uw leeftijd? …………jaar 
2 Wat is uw geslacht? man           vrouw  
3  Wat is uw opleidingsjaar? 
Indien je een aangepast traject volgt, gelieve dan het jaar te geven van 
het jaar waar je de meeste vakken van volgt.  
      1 BA  
      2 BA 
      3 BA 
      1 MA 
      2 MA 
 
4 Wat is uw studierichting? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………. 
5 In welk land ben jij en je ouders geboren? 




















  Ander land buiten Europa nl. 
..............................(in 
hoofdletters) 
  Weet ik niet 
..............................(in 
hoofdletters) 
  Ander land buiten Europa nl. 
..............................(in 
hoofdletters) 
  Weet ik niet 
..............................(in 
hoofdletters) 
  Ander land buiten Europa nl. 
..............................(in 
hoofdletters) 




Heeft u nog opmerkingen bij deze vragenlijst, bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot de lengte, lay-out, 













































Bienvenido al estudio sobre la reactividad social y la diversidad. El estudio está compuesto de 
tres partes. La primera parte consiste en algunas preguntas sobre tu interacción con la gente 
de tu entorno cotidiano. En esta parte, quisiéramos comprender nuevos tipos de 
comportamiento interpersonal. En la segunda parte, hacemos algunas preguntas sobre tu 
concepción del mundo. En la tercera parte, te preguntamos sobre tu opinión de la diversidad 
en España. Así esperamos descubrir la diversidad de concepciones del mundo que existe 
entre la gente.  
 
Llenar el cuestionario te llevará mas o menos 15-20 minutos. La idea es que no pienses 
demasiado sobre las preguntas, que simplemente pongas la contestación que se te ocurra 
espontáneamente. No hay contestaciones “correctas” o “incorrectas”, sólo hay opiniones. 
Toda la encuesta es estrictamente anónima, de modo que nadie pueda descubrir lo que has 
respondido. En ningún lugar te hacemos preguntas sobre tus detalles personales que podrían 
identifcarte 
 
¡Muchas gracias por tu cooperación! 
 
El equipo de investigadores 
 
Quisieras saber más? Ponte en contacto con ben.heylen@ugent.be!  
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A: jijzelf in de omgang met anderen 
En este parte del cuestionario te hacemos algunas preguntas sobre ti como persona. Como sabes, cada 
persona puede reaccionar de forma  muy differente en situaciones parecidas. Quisiéramos comprender 
más sobre esta diversidad. Por favor, lee las afirmaciones siguentes, e indica si estás de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo con la declaración utilizando una escala del 1 (claramente en desacuerdo) al 6 (claramente de 
acuerdo), pensando en tus interacciones sociales cotidianas con la gente de tu entorno (por ejemplo, 
familia, amigos,colegas...).  
 
 




2 3 4 5 6 
Claramente 
de acuerdo 
1 Normalmente hago lo que se me pide        
2 Sólo colaboro con otros si yo obtengo algo 
a cambio; si no prefiero no hacerlo 
      
3  A veces, he hecho bullying a otra persona 
con mis amigos, aunque no estaba en 
contra de él/ella  
      
4 Quiero ser el/la mejor       
5 A menudo hago cosas que no me gustan, 
para demostrar que soy parte del grupo  
      
6 Trabajar en grupo me da la oportunidad de 
demostrar mi valía sobre los demás 
      
7 A veces he ignorado o excluído a otros por 
el simple hecho de no ser populares con mis 
amigos, aunque no les conozca  
      
8 Para mí es muy importante no parecer un 
fracasado/a 
      
9 En actividades en grupo me inclino a tomar 
el mando si esto ayuda a mi grupo a ganar 
      
10 Si mis amigos me excluyen, me siento mal       
11 Lo mejor de trabajar en equipo es que así 
puedo mostrar mi valor como persona 
      
12 A menudo, chismorreo de gente con mis 
amigos/as, aunque no los/las conozca bien 
      
13 Me gustan los trabajos en grupo sólo si me 
sirve a mi mismo; los objetivos del grupo 
me importan poco 
      
14 Si mis amigos están haciendo bullying a 
alguien, normalmente intervengo para que 
dejen de hacerlo 
      
 





Como sabes, hay muchos grupos diferentes en la sociedad. Quisiéramos saber cómo crees que la 
sociedad trata al grupo al cual perteneces tu mismo, comparado a los otros grupos. Por favor, indique si 
estas en desacuerdo o de acuerdo con las afirmaciones siguentes.  
 




2 3 4 5 6 
Claramente 
de acuerdo 
1 Creo que el grupo al que pertenezco está en 
una situación más favorable comparado a 
los inmigrantes 
      
2 Me enfado cuando me doy cuenta de cómo 
se trata a los inmigrantes comparado con mi 
grupo  
      
3  Creo que los inmigrantes a menudo está 
discriminado comparado con el grupo al 
que pertenezco 
      
4 Si comparo el grupo al que pertenezco con 
los inmigrantes, creo que están siendo 
tratados de forma injusta 
      
 
 
Parte 2: tu concepción del mundo 
 
Abajo hay algunas preguntas sobre tu concepción del mundo. Todos tenemos una concepción diferente, 
y quisiéramos saber más de esta diversidad entre la gente, a diferencia de la concepción presentada por 
los políticos y los medios. Por favor, lee las afirmaciones siguentes, e indica si estás  en desacuerdo o de 
acuerdo con la afirmación, utilizando la misma escala del 1 (claramente en desacuerdo) al 6 (claramente 
de acuerdo). 
 




2 3 4 5 6 
Claramente 
de acuerdo 
1 Nuestra sociedad necesita líderes fuertes 
que puedan erradicar el extremismo y la 
inmoralidad que prevalecen actualmente 
      
2 Nuestro sociedad necesita libres 
pensadores, que tengan la valentía para 
confrontar los convencionalismos, incluso 
si esto molestase a muchas personas. 
      
3  Las tradiciones y valores antiguos aún nos 
indican la mejor forma de vivir 
      
4 Nuestra sociedad sería mejor si 
mostráramos tolerancia y comprensión por 
las ideas y valores diferentes (no 
convencionales) 
      
5 Las leyes que castigan el aborto y la 
pornografia, y que contribuyen a proteger el 
matrimonio deben ser estrictamente 
acatadas. Las transgresiones deben 
castigarse severamente 
      
 
De vuelta por favor 
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2 3 4 5 6 
Claramente 
de acuerdo 
6 La sociedad necesita mostrar una mayor 
apertura hacia las personas que piensan por 
sí mismas y diferente de las autoridades, 
más que apoyar el que dichas autoridades 
decidan por nosotros 
      
7 Muchas personas desafían al estado, 
critican a la iglesia e ignoran las formas 
normales de vida, sin que por ello dejen de 
ser buenas. 
      
8 Nuestros antepasados deben ser más 
admirados y respetados por su contribución 
a la construcción de nuestra sociedad, 
sobre todo en esta época en que existen 
fuerzas que tratan de destruirla 
      
9 Hay muchas personas radicales o inmorales 
que tratan de echar a perder las cosas; la 
sociedad debe frenarlos 
      
10 En defensa de la libertad de expresión 
deberíamos permitir la publicación de 
literatura que incluso podemos considerar 
mala o contraria a nuestras ideas 
      
11 La situación de la sociedad actual mejoraría 
si los agitadores fueran tratados con 
humanidad e intentando hacerlos entrar en 
razón 
      
12 Cuando nuestro gobierno y autoridades 
condenan los elementos peligrosos de 
nuestra sociedad, es el deber de un buen 
ciudadano ayudar a combatirlos 
      
13 Deberíamos hacer todo lo posible para 
igualar las condiciones de los diferentes 
grupos 
      
14 A veces es necesario utilizar la fuerza contra 
otros grupos para conseguir los objetivos 
grupales 
      
15 Ningún grupo debería dominar en la 
sociedad 
      
16 La igualdad entre grupos de personas 
debería ser nuestro ideal 
      
17 Todos los grupos de personas deberían 
tener igualdad de oportunidades en la vida. 
      
18 Se debe aumentar la igualdad social       
19 Probablemente es bueno que ciertos grupos 
estén en una posición superior y otros en 
una posición inferior 
      
20 Debemos luchar por conseguir ingresos 
más igualitarios para miembros de grupos 
diferentes con competencias parecidas   
      
21 Los grupos inferiores deberían mantenerse 
en su posición 
      
 




Su opinion sobre la diversidad en España 
 
Como ya sabes, en España viven muchos grupos sociales extranjeros, con sus propios valores y 
tradiciones.. Igual en la calle que en la política, se discuten las relaciones entre los inmigrantes y los 
españoles.Por favor, indica en qué medida sientes que, a causa de los inmigrantes, están en peligro 
algunas cuestiones. Como antes, no hay contestaciones correctas o incorrectas, solo hay opiniones. 
Recuerda también que el cuestionario es totalmente anónimo.  
 
¿En qué medida siente usted que, a causa de los inmigrantes, están en peligro las siguientes 
cuestiones? Utilice la siguiente escala para responder: nada, poco, algo, bastante, mucho.  
 
  Nada Poco  Algo Bastante Mucho  
1 Los valores educativos (por ejemplo, los valores 
que se enseñan en los colegios, las  
influencias a las que son expuestos los niños/as 
en la escuela) 
     
2 Los valores familiares (por ejemplo, valores hacia 
personas mayores, la igualdad de género, cómo 
educar a los hijos/as) 
     
3  Las creencias religiosas (por ejemplo, creencias, 
práticas y cumplimiento o prohibiciones 
religiosas) 
     
4 Las tradiciones de nuestra cultura (por ejemplo 
celebración de fiestas, tradiciones españolas) 
     
5 El acceso a un puesto de trabajo      
6 El acceso al sistema sanitario (por ejemplo, 
disponibilidad de médicos, facilidad de recibir el 
cuidado necesario en el hospital) 
     
7 El acceso al sistema educativo (por ejemplo, 
reservas de plaza en los colegios, número de 
plazas ofertadas, subvenciones y ayudas al 
estudio, calidad de la enseñanza, disponibilidad 
del profesorado)  
     
8 El acceso al sistemo público de ayudas (por 
ejemplo, ayudas para la vivienda, ayuda de paro) 
     
9 La estabiliad económica de nuestro país (por 
ejemplo, el mercado laboral, los índices 
nacionales de paro, el sistema de pensiones) 
     
10 La salud (por ejemplo exposición a 
enfermedades) 
     
11 La seguridad personal (por ejemplo, probabilidad 
de ser víctima de algún delito) 
     
12 El orden público (por ejemplo, índices de 
delincuencia, mafias) 
     
13 La seguridad del país (por ejemplo, probabilidad 
de sufrir un ataque a gran escala) 
     
 





En las afirmaciones siguentes, quisieramos saber más de tu opinión sobre la situación de los inmigrantes 
en España. Por favor, lee las cuestiones siguentes, e indica si estás en desacuerdo o de acuerdo con la 
affirmación, utilizando una escala del 1 (claramente en desacuerdo) al 6 (claramente de acuerdo) 
 




2 3 4 5 6 
Claramente 
de acuerdo 
1 El inconveniente de que los inmigrantes se 
introduzcan en determinados lugares (pisos, 
locales públicos, etc.) es que no saben 
respetar las normas de convivencia 
establecidas 
      
2 A menudo siento simpatía por los 
inmigrantes 
      
3  Los inmigrantes deberían salir adelante por 
sus propios esfuerzos sin que se les tenga 
que dar un trato especial 
      
4 A menudo, siento admiración por los 
inmigrantes que viven aquí en circunstancias 
duras 
      
5 Si los inmigrantes se esforzaran un poco 
más, podrían estar tan acomodados como los 
ciudadanos españoles 
      
6 Los inmigrantes que viven aquí enseñan a 
sus hijos valores y habilidades diferentes a 
los que se requieren para triunfar en este país 
      
7 Los inmigrantes ocupan puestos de trabajo 
que deberían ser ocupados por ciudadanos 
españoles 
      
8 La mayoría de los inmigrantes que viven 
aquí y que reciben algún tipo de ayuda 
social o económica podrían defenderse sin 
ella si lo intentaran 
      
9 Los inmigrantes y los españoles no pueden 
confiar plenamente los unos en los otros 
aunque sean amigos 
      
10 La mayoría de los políticos españoles se 
preocupan demasiado por los inmigrantes y 
no lo suficiente por los ciudadanos 
españoles 
      
11 Los españoles son tan“de fiar” (igual de 
honestos) como los inmigrantes 
      
 
Ahora, algunas preguntas sobre tus amigos. ¿En qué medida piensas que a tus amigos les importa si 
haces uno o más de los comportamientos que aparecen abajo? Utiliza una escala del 1 (no les importa 
nada) al 6 (les importa mucho). Recuerda que el cuestionario es totalmente anónimo de modo que nadie 
puede descubrir lo que has contestado.  
 
  1 
Les importa 
nada 
2 3 4 5 6 Les 
importa 
mucho 
1 ...si dices que no quieres tener nada que ver 
con los inmigrantes 
      




  Les importa 
nada 
2 3 4 5 Les 
importa 
mucho 
3  ...si te pelearas con un inmigrante sin 
ningún motivo aparente 
      
4 ...si pintaras en un muro “stop racismo”        
5 ...si te pelearas con un racista sin ningún 
motivo aparente 
      
6 ....si dices que no quieres tener nada que ver 
con los racistas 
      
 
Acudimos a ti ahora. Por favor, indica si alguna vez has pasado por la situación descrita (tú mismo).. 
Recuerda que el cuestionario es totalmente anónimo de modo que nadie puede descubrir lo que has 
contestado. Para nosotros es muy importante que seas honesto.  
 
Has hecho TÚ MISMO las siguientes situaciones contra/por un inmigrante sin motivo apparente? (Solo por 
el hecho de que es inmigrante) 
me he sentido incómodo cerca de inmigrantes 
 sí 
 no 
he tenido sentimientos negativos hacía los inmigrantes (por ejemplo, miedo, rencor, rabia...) 
 sí 
 no 
he evitado un encuentro con inmigrantes 
 sí 
 no 
he indicado que no quiero tener nada que ver con los inmigrantes, de modo indirecto (por 
ejemplo poniendo símbolos, pintando un sentencia en un muro, usando ropa específica..) 
 sí 
 no 
he indicado de modo explícito a inmigrantes que no quiero tener nada que ver con ellos (por 
ejemplo, insultando a un inmigrante, gesticulando...) 
 sí 
 no 
he excluido a inmigrantes de actividades (por ejemplo, ir de fiesta, trabajo en grupo, ...) o de 
lugares (por ejemplo de mi casa, de mi barrio...) 
 sí 
 no 




He dañado las cosas de un/a inmigrante (por ejemplo, dañar su coche, echar por tierra un cubo 
de basura, graffiti, ...) 
 sí 
 no 
He robado a un/a inmigrante  
 sí 
 no 
me he puesto agresivo con los inmigrantes, solo o con amigos (por ejemplo, dar empujones a 
un inmigrante, pegar o patear a un inmigrante,  
 sí 
 no 
he herido a un inmigrante con violencia 
 sí 
 no 
he intimidado a un/a inmigrante sexualmente (por ejemplo, bromas sexuales, tocando a un/a 






Véase a la vuelta S.V.P 
Conclusión 
 
Muchas gracias por tu cooperación! Antes de terminar, algunas preguntas generales.  
 
1 ¿Qué edad tienes? tengo……..……años 
2 ¿Eres chico o chica? chico           chica  
3  ¿Cual es tu nivel de formación?       1 de grado  
      2 de grado 
      3 de grado 
      4 de grado 
      Master 
      Doctorado 
 
4 ¿Cual es tu especialidad de estudios? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………. 
5 ¿Dónde naciste tú y dónde nacieron tus padres? 











































Welkom bij de studie naar sociale reactiviteit en diversiteit. De studie bestaat uit drie delen. In 
een eerste deel worden enkele vragen gesteld naar je omgang met de mensen uit je 
dagdagelijkse omgeving. De bedoeling van dit deel van de survey is om enkele nieuwe vormen 
van sociaal gedrag in kaart te brengen. In een tweede deel worden enkele vragen gesteld 
omtrent je wereldbeeld. Er is immers een enorme diversiteit aan opvattingen, en hier zouden 
we graag beter zicht op krijgen. In een derde deel worden enkele vragen gesteld naar je 
mening over diversiteit in België. Ook hier zijn we vooral geïnteresseerd in wat je persoonlijk 
denkt over dit onderwerp.  
 
Het invullen van de vragenlijst neemt ongeveer 15 minuten in beslag. Het is niet de bedoeling 
om over elke stelling lang na te denken; tracht te antwoorden wat bij het lezen van de stelling 
intuïtief bij je opkomt. De gegevens worden op een volledig anonieme wijze verzameld, het 
is dus op geen enkele manier mogelijk om je als persoon te identificeren op basis van uw 
antwoorden. Dit geldt voor iedereen: noch je medestudenten, de onderzoekers of wie dan ook 
kunnen achterhalen wat je hebt geantwoord.  
 





Voor meer informatie en/of vragen met betrekking tot de resultaten: ben.heylen@ugent.be 
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A: jijzelf in de omgang met anderen 
In dit deel van de vragenlijst worden enkele vragen gesteld met betrekking tot jezelf als persoon. Zoals je 
weet, kunnen mensen zeer verschillend reageren in dezelfde situaties. We zouden door deze vragen een 
beter beeld willen krijgen van deze diversiteit. We zouden je willen vragen iedere stelling te lezen en het 
antwoord dat het eerst in je opkomt te omcirkelen. We willen er ook op wijzen dat er hier geen “juiste” of 
“foute” antwoorden mogelijk zijn, alle mogelijkheden zijn even goed mogelijk. Het belangrijkste is dat je 
neerschrijft wat jou als persoon het beste omschrijft in de omgang met de mensen waarmee je dagdagelijks 
in contact komt. Gebruik hiervoor een schaal van 1 (helemaal oneens) tot 5 (helemaal eens). 
 
SCALE: COMPLIANCE AND DOMINANCE SIGNALING BEHAVIORS (SELF-CREATED) 
  Helemaal 
oneens 
2 3 4 Helemaal 
eens 
1 Ik werk enkel met anderen samen als dit me 
helpt mijn eigen doelstellingen te halen; 
anders doe ik dit liever niet  
     
2 Ik heb wel eens met mijn vrienden meegedaan 
als ze iemand aan het pesten waren, hoewel ik 
zelf niet echt iets tegen hem/haar heb 
     
3 Ik wil de beste zijn       
4 Soms doe ik zaken die ik eigenlijk niet wil 
doen, om aan te tonen dat ik bij de groep hoor  
     
5 In groep werken geeft me de gelegenheid mijn 
meerwaarde als persoon aan te tonen  
     
6 Ik heb wel eens anderen genegeerd of 
uitgesloten omdat ze niet populair waren bij 
mijn vrienden, hoewel ik zelf niet echt iets 
tegen hem/haar heb 
     
7 Ik doe er veel aan om niet als een “loser” over 
te komen bij anderen  
     
8 In groepsactiviteiten heb ik de neiging om de 
leiding te nemen als mijn groep op deze 
manier wint 
     
9 Het beste aan in team werken, is dat ik op 
deze manier mijn waarde als persoon kan 
tonen aan de anderen 
     
10 
 
Ik roddel wel eens over andere mensen met 
mijn vrienden, hoewel ik de persoon in 
kwestie niet goed ken 
     
11 Ik werk vooral in groep als dit me helpt mijn 
eigen doelen te bereiken, de doelen van de 
groep zijn minder belangrijk voor mij  
     
12 Als mijn vrienden iemand aan het pesten zijn, 
komt ik normaal tussenbeide om dit te doen 
ophouden 
     
 
 
Als je dan denkt aan de doorsnee Vlaming (bv. uw vrienden, medestudenten, “de man in de straat”, enz.), 
in hoeverre zijn de volgende stellingen dan op jou van toepassing? De antwoordcategorieën zijn ongeveer 
dezelfde als voorheen. Geef simpelweg het antwoord dat als eerste spontaan bij je opkomt; goede of 
slechte antwoorden bestaan niet met betrekking tot de stellingen.  
 
SCALE: EMPATHIC CONCERN (DAVIES)(SPECIFIEK NAAR IN-GROUP TOE GEFORMULEERD, OM 
LATER TE KUNNEN HERHALEN NAAR ALLOCHTONEN TOE) 
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  Helemaal 
oneens 
2 3 4 Helemaal 
eens 
1 Ik voel me vaak bezorgd over Vlamingen 
die minder gelukkig zijn dan ik  
     
2 Soms heb ik niet veel medelijden met 
andere Vlamingen wanneer ze problemen 
hebben 
     
3 Wanneer ik een Vlaming zie waarvan 
wordt geprofiteerd, voel ik me nogal 
beschermend tegenover hen 
     
4 De ongelukken van andere Vlamingen 
verstoren me meestal niet veel 
     
5 Wanneer ik zie dat een Vlaming unfair 
wordt behandeld, voel ik soms weinig 
medelijden met hen 
     
6 Ik ben vaak nogal geraakt door de dingen 
die ik zie gebeuren met andere Vlamingen 
     
7 Ik zou mezelf beschrijven als een vrij 
teerhartig persoon als het gaat over 
Vlamingen 
     
 
 
Zoals je weet, zijn er vele verschillende groepen in de samenleving. We zouden je mening willen weten 
over hoe de samenleving omgaat met de groep waar jij toe behoort in vergelijking met andere groepen. 
Geef a.u.b. aan in hoeverre je het al dan niet eens bent met volgende stellingen, gebruik makend van een 
schaal van 1 (helemaal oneens) tot 5 (helemaal eens).  
 
SCALE: INDIVIDUAL (1-4) AND GROUP RELATIVE DEPRIVATION (4-8) (SOURCE: RADIMED).  
  Helemaal 
oneens 
2 3 4 Helemaal 
eens 
1 Het maakt me boos als ik denk aan hoe ik 
behandeld word in vergelijking met 
anderen in België 
     
2 Ik denk dat ik het minder goed heb dan 
anderen in België 
     
3 Ik heb het gevoel dat ik gediscrimineerd 
word. 
     
4 Als ik mezelf met anderen in België 
vergelijk, heb ik het gevoel dat ik 
oneerlijk behandeld word 
     
5 Ik denk dat de groep waar ik bij hoor het 
minder goed heeft dan andere groepen in 
België 
     
6 Het maakt me boos als ik denk aan hoe 
de groep waar ik bij hoor behandeld 
wordt in vergelijking met andere groepen  
in België 
     
7 Volgens mij wordt de groep waartoe ik 
behoor gediscrimineerd 




  Helemaal 
oneens 
2 3 4 Helemaal 
eens 
8 Als ik de groep waartoe ik behoor 
vergelijk met andere groepen in België, 
dan heb ik het idee dat wij oneerlijk 
behandeld worden. 
     
 
Dan zouden we nu enkele vragen willen stellen met betrekking tot uw contact met allochtonen. Gelieve 
aan te geven hoe vaak u contact hebt met allochtonen, gebruik makende van een schaal van 1 (nooit) tot 
5 (heel vaak). 
 
INTERGROUP CONTACT _ QUANTITY 
  Nooit 2 3 4 Zeer vaak 
1 Hoe vaak heeft u contact met 
allochtonen? 
     
2 Hoe vaak heeft u een gesprek met 
allochtonen? 
     
3 Hoe vaak heeft u contact met allochtonen 
in de buurt waar u woont? 
     
 
Hoe zou u het contact dat u hebt met allochtonen omschrijven? Gelieve voor elke vraag te antwoorden in 
hoe u het contact met allochtonen hebt ervaren, gebruik makende van een schaal van 1 (helemaal niet) 
tot 5 (helemaal wel). 
 
INTERGROUP CONTACT _ QUALITY 
  Helemaal 
niet 
2 3 4 helemaal 
wel 
1 In hoeverre ervaar je het contact met 
allochtonen als aangenaam? 
     
2 In hoeverre ervaar je het contact met 
allochtonen als vervelend? 
     
3 In hoeverre ervaar je het contact met 
allochtonen als vriendschappelijk? 
     
4 In hoeverre ervaar je het contact met 
allochtonen als vijandig? 
     
 







Hieronder volgen een aantal vragen in verband met je wereldbeeld. Iedereen heeft wel een andere kijk op 
de wereld, en die diversiteit zouden we graag vatten. Geef voor elk van onderstaande stellingen aan in 
hoeverre je het daarmee eens bent, door een kruisje in het juiste vakje te zetten. Onthoud dat de vragenlijst 
volledig anoniem is, en er zeker geen “juiste” of “foute” antwoorden zijn. Antwoord simpelweg wat intuïtief 
direct bij je opkomt.  
 
Scales: Right Wing Authoritarianism (1-11) and Social Dominance Orientation (12-25) (bron: Van 
Hiel / D’hondt, pers. communicatie) 
  Helemaal 
oneens 
2 3 4 Helemaal 
eens 
1 Gehoorzaamheid en respect voor het gezag 
zijn de meest belangrijke deugden die 
kinderen moeten leren 
     
2 Jonge mensen krijgen soms opstandige 
ideeën, maar als zij ouder worden horen zij 
daar overheen te groeien 
     
3  Vriendelijkheid zet leeglopers en criminelen 
aan om van onze zwakheid te profiteren. Het 
is dan ook beter om met harde en besliste 
hand met dergelijke lui om te gaan 
     
4 Tijdens verkiezingen is het toegelaten om zich 
vragen te stellen en te twijfelen, maar wanneer 
iemand verkozen is en de leider van ons land 
wordt, zijn we hem steun en loyaliteit 
verschuldigd 
     
5 In deze onrustige tijden moeten wetten zonder 
medelijden worden uitgevoerd, speciaal als 
we met oproerkraaiers en revolutionairen te 
maken hebben die actievoeren 
     
6 Wanneer iemand de regels verbreekt, is een 
goede, strenge straf de beste manier om 
hem/haar het juiste van het foute te leren 
onderscheiden.  
     
7 Veel van onze omgangsregels over 
bescheidenheid en seksueel gedrag zijn enkel 
gewoonten die niet beter of heiliger zijn dan 
regels die andere mensen volgen 
     
8 Seksuele vergrijpen zoals verkrachting en 
aanranding verdienen meer dan alleen maar 
gevangenisstraf; aan misdadigers die zich 
hieraan schuldig maken behoren bovendien in 
het openbaar lijfstraffen te worden toegediend 




  Helemaal 
oneens 
2 3 4 Helemaal 
eens 
9 Ons nationaal erfgoed en onze gewoonten 
hebben ons groot gemaakt en sommige 
mensen zouden meer aangezet moeten 
worden om er respect voor te betonen 
     
10 In deze gecompliceerde wereld kan je alleen 
maar leven als je vertrouwt op experten en 
specialisten 
     
11 Goede leiders die het volk respecteren en 
steunen, moeten strikt, streng en veeleisend 
zijn 
     
12 Sommige groepen van mensen zijn 
gewoonweg inferieur aan andere groepen 
     
13 Om te verkrijgen wat je wilt, is het soms nodig 
om geweld tegen leden van andere groepen te 
gebruiken 
     
14 Het is niet meer dan normaal dat leden van 
sommige groepen meer kansen in het leven 
hebben dan andere 
     
15 Om vooruit te komen in het leven is het soms 
nodig om ander groepen de pas af te snijden 
     
16 Als sommige groepen op hun plaats zouden 
blijven, zouden we minder problemen kennen 
     
17 Het is waarschijnlijk een goede zaak dat 
sommige groepen aan de top van de ladder 
staan en andere groepen onderaan 
     
18 Inferieure groepen zouden op hun plaats 
moeten blijven 
     
19 Soms moeten bepaalde groepen op hun 
plaats worden gehouden 
     
20 Het zou goed zijn als alle groepen 
gelijkwaardig zouden zijn 
     
21 Gelijkwaardigheid van alle sociale groepen 
zou ons ideaal moeten zijn 
     
22 Leden van alle groepen zouden een gelijke 
kans in het leven moeten krijgen 
     
23 We zouden al het mogelijke moeten doen om 
de lat gelijk te leggen voor de verschillende 
groepen 
     
24 Ik ben voorstander van een toegenomen 
sociale gelijkheid 
     
25 We zouden minder problemen kennen als we 
alle mensen meer gelijkwaardig zouden 
behandelen 
     
26 We zouden ernaar moeten streven om de 
inkomens zo gelijk mogelijk te maken 
     
27 Geen enkele groep zou onze maatschappij 
mogen domineren 






C: Uw mening over diversiteit in België 
 
 
Met de volgende stellingen zouden we willen weten hoe je denkt dat de situatie van de allochtonen in België 
er uitziet. Geef telkens aan in welke mate je het al dan niet eens bent met de stelling, en tracht zo spontaan 
mogelijk te antwoorden. De vragenlijst is anoniem, en er zijn geen goede of slechte antwoorden. De 
antwoordcategorieën blijven dezelfde. 
 
Scales: subtle prejudice (1-8) and blatant prejudice (only Pettigrew’s threat and rejection items) (9-
14)  
  Helemaal 
oneens 
2 3 4 Helemaal 
eens 
1 Allochtonen zouden het verstand moeten 
hebben zichzelf niet op te dringen op 
plaatsen waar ze niet welkom zijn 
     
2 Over het algemeen heb ik een goed gevoel 
over allochtonen 
     
3  In het verleden bleek dat Italiaanse 
allochtonen zich vlot aanpasten aan onze 
cultuur. Turken en Marokkanen zouden dit 
ook moeten doen, zonder dat ze hiervoor 
speciaal beloond worden 
     
4 Ik bewonder de allochtone gemeenschap die 
hier in harde omstandigheden leeft 
     
5 Sommige allochtonen doen gewoonweg niet 
hun best om zich aan te passen. Indien zij dit 
werkelijk zouden willen, zouden zij even goed 
af zijn als de Belgen 
     
6 Ik voel sympathie voor allochtonen      
7 Allochtonen leren hun kinderen waarden en 
vaardigheden die hun kansen op succes in 
onze maatschappij beknotten 
     
8 Ik voel mee met de allochtone gemeenschap      
9 Allochtonen hebben jobs die eigenlijk aan 
autochtonen toebehoren 
     
10 De meeste allochtonen zouden perfect 
kunnen leven zonder overheidssteun als ze 
een beetje hun best deden 
     
11 Allochtonen en autochtonen zullen nooit echt 
met mekaar kunnen opschieten, ook al zijn ze 
soms vrienden 
     
12 De meeste politici in België geven meer om 
allochtonen dan om autochtonen 
     
13 
 
Het feit dat allochtonen van minder goede 
rassen afstammen verklaart waarom ze 
doorgaans minder goed af zijn 
     






Men komt in de straat wel vaak allochtonen tegen, en er wordt ook vaak over gesproken met vrienden, 
familie en dergelijke. In hoeverre zijn de volgende stellingen met betrekking tot uzelf van toepassing?  
 
SCALE: EMPATHIC CONCERN BIS (BASED ON DAVIES,FORMULATED TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS) 
  Helemaal 
oneens 
2 3 4 Helemaal 
eens 
1 Ik heb vaak tedere, bezorgde gevoelens 
voor allochtonen die minder gelukkig 
zijn dan ik 
     
2 Doorgaans heb ik niet veel medelijden 
met allochtonen wanneer ze problemen 
hebben 
     
3 Wanneer ik zie dat van allochtonen 
wordt geprofiteerd, voel ik me nogal 
beschermend tegenover hen 
     
4 Het ongeluk van allochtonen doet me 
doorgaans niet veel 
     
5 Wanneer ik zie dat allochtonen unfair 
worden behandeld, voel ik soms weinig 
medelijden met hen 
     
6 Ik ben vaak nogal geraakt door de 
dingen die ik zie gebeuren met 
allochtonen 
     
7 Ik zou mezelf beschrijven als een vrij 
teerhartig persoon als het gaat over 
allochtonen 
     
 
 
Zoals je weet worden allochtonen wel eens uitgelachen of uitgescholden, en gedragen mensen zich wel 
eens agressief tegenover hen. Ken je vrienden die ooit dergelijk gedrag tegenover een allochtoon hebben 
gesteld? Gelieve telkens aan te geven hoeveel vrienden je hebt die dergelijk gedrag wel eens stellen, 
gebruik makende van een schaal van 1 (geen enkele) tot 5 (de meeste). Graag benadrukken we nogmaals 
dat de vragenlijst volledig anoniem is, en dus niemand te weten kan komen wat je geantwoord hebt.  
 
SCALE: PEER MORALISTIC AGGRESSION (= RESPONDENT’S EXPOSURE TO MORALISTIC 
AGGRESSION) (SOURCE: SELF-CREATED, BASED ON THEORY – ALLPORT, EVOLUTIONARY 
FRAMEWORK – AND LAW). 
  Geen 2 3 4 De 
meeste 
1 Zich ongemakkelijk voelen als er allochtonen in de 
buurt zijn 
     
2 Negatieve gevoelens gehad tegen allochtonen (bv. 
schrik, afkeer, woede) 
     
3 Allochtonen vermeden (bv. in de bus op een andere 
plaats zitten, aan de andere kant van de straat lopen, 
plaatsen waar vaak allochtonen komen vermijden…) 




  Geen 2 3 4 De 
meeste 
4 Duidelijk gemaakt dat ze allochtonen niet moeten, 
zonder dit expliciet tegen henzelf zeggen (bv. door 
een symbool te dragen, door een spreuk op een muur 
te tekenen, door een bepaalde kledingstijl aan te 
nemen…) 
     
5 Duidelijk gemaakt dat ze allochtonen niet moeten, 
door dit expliciet tegen hen te zeggen (bv. door hen 
uit te schelden, door bepaalde gebaren zoals een 
middenvinger op te steken…) 
     
6 Allochtonen niet uitgenodigd om deel te nemen aan 
bepaalde activiteiten (bv. op café gaan, groepswerk, 
….) 
     
7 Alleen of met vrienden een of meerdere allochtonen 
geïntimideerd (bv. hen in groep bedreigen, 
achtervolgen, …) 
     
8 Bezit van allochtonen besmeurd, beschadigd, of 
vernietigd (bv. graffiti op een muur, een vuilzak omver 
werpen, een brievenbus in brand steken…) 
     
9 Iets van een allochtoon gestolen      
10 Agressief met allochtonen omgaan (bv. vechten, er 
iets naar gooien,…) 
     
11 Een allochtoon of allochtone seksueel geïntimideerd 
(bv. seksueel getinte opmerkingen maken, seksuele 
aanrakingen zonder dat zij/hij dit wenste, proberen 
seks af te dwingen….) 
     
 
 
En als we dan naar jezelf kijken, welke van de onderstaande zaken heb je ooit tegen een allochtoon 
gedaan? Geef ook aan hoeveel keer dit ongeveer in de laatste twaalf maanden is voorgevallen. Graag 
benadrukken we hier nogmaals dat alle antwoorden op een strikt anonieme wijze zullen worden verwerkt, 
en dus nooit iemand kan te weten komen wat je hebt geantwoord. Het is echter zeer belangrijk voor ons 
dat je een eerlijk antwoord geeft.  
 
SCALE: MORALISTIC AGGRESSION (SELF MADE) 
Heb je ooit zelf een van de volgende zaken tegen een 
allochtoon gedaan of ervaren, omwille van het feit 
dat hij of zij allochtoon is?  
Hoe vaak is dit de laatste 12 maanden 
voorgevallen?  








1 Ongemakkelijk gevoeld als er 
allochtonen in de buurt zijn 
 neen 
 Ja 
      
2 Negatieve gevoelens gehad tegen 
allochtonen (bv. schrik, afkeer, woede, 
…) 
 neen 












3 Allochtonen vermeden (bv. in de bus 
op een andere plaats zitten, aan de 
andere kant van de straat lopen, 




      
4 Duidelijk gemaakt dat ik allochtonen 
niet moet, zonder dit expliciet tegen 
henzelf zeggen (bv. door een symbool 
te dragen, door een spreuk op een 
muur te tekenen, door een bepaalde 
kledingstijl aan te nemen…) 
 neen 
 Ja 
      
5 Duidelijk gemaakt dat ik allochtonen 
niet moet, door dit expliciet tegen hen 
te zeggen (bv. door hen uit te schelden, 
door bepaalde gebaren zoals een 
middenvinger op te steken…) 
 neen 
 Ja 
      
6 Allochtonen niet uitgenodigd om deel 
te nemen aan bepaalde activiteiten (bv. 
op café gaan, groepswerk, ….) 
 neen 
 Ja       
7 Alleen of met vrienden een of meerdere 
allochtonen geïntimideerd (bv. hen in 
groep bedreigen, achtervolgen, …) 
 neen 
 Ja       
8 Bezit van allochtonen besmeurd, 
beschadigd, of vernietigd (bv. graffiti 
op een muur, een vuilzak omver 




      
9 Iets van een allochtoon gestolen  neen 
 Ja 
      
10 Agressief met allochtonen omgaan (bv. 
vechten, er iets naar gooien,…) 
 neen 
 Ja 
      
11 Een allochtoon of allochtone seksueel 
geïntimideerd (bv. seksueel getinte 
opmerkingen maken, seksuele 
aanrakingen zonder dat zij/hij dit 




      
 
 
Concluderende vragen en dankwoord 
 
Vooreerst willen wij u vriendelijk bedanken voor het invullen van deze vragenlijst. Alvorens af te sluiten 
zouden we nog enkele korte vragen van algemene aard willen stellen. 
 
1 Wat is je leeftijd? …………jaar 
2 Wat is je geslacht? man           vrouw  
3  In welk jaar van je opleiding zit je? 
Indien je een aangepast traject volgt, gelieve dan het jaar te geven van 
het jaar waar je de meeste vakken van volgt.  
      1e bachelor 
      2e bachelor  
      3e bachelor  
      master 
      doctoraat 
      andere (specifieer) 
4 Wat is uw studierichting? 
(hier wordt nog een lijst van de opleidingen per faculteit ingevoerd) 
……………………………………………………………………………. 
5 In welk land ben jij en je ouders geboren? 
278 
 





  Ander land binnen Europa nl. 
..............................(in 
hoofdletters) 
  Ander land buiten Europa nl. 
..............................(in 
hoofdletters) 





  Ander land binnen Europa nl. 
..............................(in 
hoofdletters) 
  Ander land buiten Europa nl. 
..............................(in 
hoofdletters) 





  Ander land binnen Europa nl. 
..............................(in 
hoofdletters) 
  Ander land buiten Europa nl. 
..............................(in 
hoofdletters) 
  Weet ik niet 
 
 





























r 1 ,299** ,209** ,064* ,147** ,177** 
Sig.   ,000 ,000 ,018 ,000 ,000 
N 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 
Deceptive 
signaling 
r ,299** 1 -,015 ,164** ,136** ,278** 
Sig.  ,000  ,572 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 
RWA r ,209** -,015 1 ,190** ,398** ,142** 
Sig. ( ,000 ,572  ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 
SDO r ,064* ,164** ,190** 1 ,406** ,281** 
Sig.  ,018 ,000 ,000  ,000 ,000 
N 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 
prejudice r ,147** ,136** ,398** ,406** 1 ,472** 
Sig.  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000  ,000 




r ,177** ,278** ,142** ,281** ,472** 1 
Sig. ( ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000  
N 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 
Table 28: Correlations between constructs in the Spanish sample. 
 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Genuine signaling 1360 16,7243 4,81578 23,192 
 Deceptive signaling 1360 13,7875 4,63324 21,467 
RWA 1360 19,6051 5,90263 34,841 
SDO 1360 18,9735 4,45227 19,823 
prejudice 1360 24,2154 9,23130 85,217 
bias motivated behaviors 1360 ,9309 1,15007 1,323 


















r 1 ,027 ,105** -,007 ,021 ,032 
Sig.   ,338 ,000 ,797 ,449 ,244 
N 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1291 
Deceptive 
signaling 
r ,027 1 ,173** ,286** ,237** ,233** 
Sig.  ,338  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1291 
RWA r ,105** ,173** 1 ,515** ,599** ,265** 
Sig. ( ,000 ,000  ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1291 
SDO r -,007 ,286** ,515** 1 ,688** ,375** 
Sig.  ,797 ,000 ,000  ,000 ,000 
N 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1291 
prejudice r ,021 ,237** ,599** ,688** 1 ,445** 
Sig.  ,449 ,000 ,000 ,000  ,000 




r ,032 ,233** ,265** ,375** ,445** 1 
Sig. ( ,244 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000  
N 1291 1291 1291 1291 1291 1291 
Table 30: Correlations between constructs in the Belgian sample. 
 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Genuine signaling 1300 15,0738 3,62662 13,152 
 Deceptive signaling 1300 9,5885 2,29449 5,265 
RWA 1300 29,2692 6,40726 41,053 
SDO 1300 34,6469 11,90962 141,839 
prejudice 1300 38,3992 9,47838 89,840 
bias motivated behaviors 1291 2,0782 1,21141 1,468 

















r 1 ,282** ,141** ,041* ,090** ,047* 
Sig.   ,000 ,000 ,033 ,000 ,015 
N 2660 2660 2660 2660 2660 2660 
Deceptive 
signaling 
r ,282** 1 ,097** ,145** ,128** ,151** 
Sig.  ,000  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 2660 2660 2660 2660 2660 2660 
RWA r ,141** ,097** 1 ,324** ,383** ,049* 
Sig. ( ,000 ,000  ,000 ,000 ,012 
N 2660 2660 2660 2660 2660 2660 
SDO r ,041* ,145** ,324** 1 ,385** ,059** 
Sig.  ,033 ,000 ,000  ,000 ,002 
N 2660 2660 2660 2660 2660 2660 
prejudice r ,090** ,128** ,383** ,385** 1 ,367** 
Sig.  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000  ,000 




r ,047* ,151** ,049* ,059** ,367** 1 
Sig. ( ,015 ,000 ,012 ,002 ,000  
N 2660 2660 2660 2660 2660 2660 
Table 32: Correlations between constructs in the comparative sample. 
 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Genuine signaling 2660 9,7759 2,74697 7,546 
 Deceptive signaling 2660 6,6079 2,41750 5,844 
RWA 2660 8,7150 3,14379 9,883 
SDO 2660 6,3808 2,16447 4,685 
prejudice 2660 7,6752 3,19631 10,216 
bias motivated behaviors 2660 1,4902 1,31167 1,720 
Table 33: desccriptives of the comparative sample. 
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